Genesis. I at first hesitated, but the pope insisted, and at length I complied with his desire. The holy father told me he had felt much interested in its perusal, and upon my alluding to certain delicate points, he said, "No matter, no matter, my son, all that is exceedingly curious, and certainly quite new to me." I then,' continued M. Denon, explained to his holiness why I had hesitated to lend him the work, which, I observed, he had excommunicated, together with its author. "Excommunicated you, my son!" exclaimed the pope, in a tone of the most affectionate concern, "I am very sorry for it, and I assure you I was not at all aware of it."' M. Denon, on relating to me this anecdote, observed, that he had constant reason to admire the virtues and resignation of the holy father, but be added, that it would nevertheless have been easier to make him a martyr, than to have induced him to yield on a single point, until he should be restored to the temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself the depositary, and of which he would not endure the reproach of having willingly sacrificed.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Departure of Napoleon and Maria-Louisa for Dresden -Napoleon and Alexander desire War-Attempt to detach Sweden from her Alliance with Russia.

HAVING provided for the pope's residence, Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria-Louisa, who had expressed a wish to see her father.

The expected war with Russia, the most gigantic enterprise, perhaps, that the mind of man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander the Great, now absorbed universal attention, and set at nought the calculations of reason. The Manzanares was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen, already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a common centre, were moving men and horses, carriages and provisions, and baggage of every description. The ambitious hopes of the generals, and the fears of the wise, were all now directed towards Russia. The war in Spain, which was becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but feeble interest, and our most distinguished officers considered it almost a

disgrace to be employed in the Peninsula. In short, it required no great foresight to tell that the period was at hand, when the French would be obliged to re-cross the Pyrenees. No general plan of operation was laid down for the troops who were scattered into many separate divisions, and although Joseph had returned to Madrid, he had scarcely a single general under his orders. Though the truth was concealed from the emperor on many subjects, he certainly was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the spring of 1812. In February, the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him, that without considerable reinforcements of men and money, no important advantages could be hoped for, since Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English. The French were shortly after defeated at the battle of Salamanca, and Wellington entered Madrid.

The negotiations which Napoleon carried on with Alexander, when he yet wished to appear averse to hostilities, resembled those oratorical circumlocutions which do not, however, prevent us from coming to the conclusion we desire. The two emperors equally wished for war; the one with the view of consolidating his power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which had become a species of vassalage; for it was little short of it to require a power like Russia to close her ports against England, merely to favour the interests of France. At this period there were but two European powers not tied to Napoleon's fateSweden and Turkey. With these powers, such near neighbours of Russia, Napoleon was anxious to form an alliance. With respect to Sweden, his efforts were vain; and though, in fact, Turkey was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand Seignior was not now, as at the time of Sebastiani's embassy, under the influence of France.

The peace which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia and Turkey, increased Napoleon's embarrassment, who was far from expecting such a result. The left of the Russian army, secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps from Moldavia. This corps subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and thus destroyed the last hope of saving the wrecks of the French army, reduced as it

then was one half. It is difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of past injuries on the part of France to induce her to terminate the war with Russia, when France was attacking that power with immense forces. The Turks never had a more favourable opportunity for taking revenge Russia, and unfortunately for Napoleon they suffered it to escape.

on

With the northern power Napoleon was not more successful. In vain were his overtures addressed to the prince whose fortune he had made-who was allied to his family-but with whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor Alexander had a considerable body of troops in Finland, destined to protect that country against the Swedes-Napoleon having consented to that occupation, in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon, when, being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte, that he had a sure opportunity of retaking Finland; a conquest which would be glorious to himself, gratifying to his subjects, and the certain means of winning their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon wished to force Alexander to maintain his troops in the northern part of his empire, and even to augment their numbers, in order to cover Finland and St. Petersburgh. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured to draw the prince royal into his coalition. Napoleon cared little whether Bernadotte should succeed or not. The Emperor Alexander would have been obliged to increase his force in Finland, and that was all Napoleon desired. In the gigantic struggle in which France and Russia were about to engage, the most trivial alliance was not to be neglected. But in the month of January, 1812, Davoust had invaded Swedish Pomerania, without any declaration of war, and without any apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proffered alliance, even had that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was impossible, and Bernadotte took the part that was expected of him. He rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming

events.

Alexander, on his side, was desirous of withdrawing his forces from Finland, in order to make a more effec tual resistance to the immense army which threatened his states. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August, 1812, at Abo, with the prince royal, for the purpose of effecting an arrangement and a union of interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia promised Bernadotte that, happen what might, he should not be involved in the fate of the new dynasties; that he would guarantee the possession of his throne, and that he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far as to hint, that he might eventually supersede Napoleon. Such promises had the desired effect. Bernadotte adopted all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made common cause against Napoleon.

CHAP. XL.

Reflections on Poland-Disasters in Russia-Mallet's Conspiracy-Motives of Napoleon's Return to Paris -his Exertions to repair his Losses-War still resolved on.

Ir has been a question frequently and warmly discussed, whether Bonaparte, previous to undertaking his last campaign, had resolved on restoring her independence to Poland. Facts will but prove that Bonaparte, as emperor, never formed the decided intention of re-establishing the old kingdom of Poland, although at a previous period he was fully convinced of its necessity. He may have said that he would do so, but I must beg leave to say that this affords no reason for believing that such was his real intention.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland, the Diet of Warsaw, convinced, as it had reason to be, of the emperor's sentiments, declared the kingdom free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were pronounced to be null, and unquestionably the Diet, relying upon Napoleon's support, had a right so to act. But the address it sent up to the emperor, in which these principles were declared, was but ill-received. His answer was ambiguous and indecisive, nor could his motive

be blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia, he had just guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon therefore declared, that he could take no part in any movement or resolution, tending to disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish provinces, forming part of her empire. To act otherwise, he said, would be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian provinces, Napoleon declared that he would see what could be done, should Providence prosper their good

cause.

The character of Bonaparte presents many most unaccountable inconsistencies. Although the most positive man that, perhaps, ever existed, yet there never was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same thing. But never did he indulge in greater illusions than at the beginning of the campaign of Moscow. The burning of their towns and villages seemed a sufficient proof that the Russians wished to allure us into the heart of their empire. It was the opinion of all sensible people, even before the commencement of those disasters which accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, that the emperor ought to have passed the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in the spring. But his natural impatience urged him forward as it were unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible demon, stronger even than his own will:-this demon was ambition. He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its power, and how much is oftentimes gained by delay. And yet he might have learned from Cæsar's Commentaries, which were his favourite study, that Cæsar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another delusion by which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and which past experience might render in some degree excusable, was the belief that the emperor Alexander would propose peace, when he saw him at the head of his army on the Russian territory. But the burning of Moscow soon convinced him that it was a war of extermination, and the conqueror, so long accustomed to receive overtures from his vanquished