impossible to assist them. In France, the universal cry was for peace-peace-at whatever price it was to be purchased. The levy of October was followed within a month by another of 300,000 men, and it was then only that France fully understood how deep and deadly were the wounds she had received. In this state of things, it may even be affirmed that the year 1813 was more fatal to Napoleon than the year 1812. His own activity and the sacrifices of France succeeded in repairing the disasters of Moscow-those of Leipsic were irreparable.

After the battle of Leipsic, in which France lost for the second time a formidable army, all the powers allied against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that they would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it was not merely a continental peace, but a general peace, that would be insisted on, and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its object would be rejected. The Allied Powers declared, that France ought to be satisfied with her natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

According to these proposals, Germany, Italy, and Spain, were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France. England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there appeared no reason to doubt her sincerity when she professed her willingness to make very considerable sacrifices for the promotion of the object proposed by the Allies. But to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the congress should meet in a town to be declared neutral, on the right bank of the Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent powers were to assemble-but the course of the war was not to be impeded by these negotiations.'

The Duke de Bassano, who was still minister for foreign affairs, replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures made by the Allies for a general congress, and stated that the emperor acceded to them, and wished Manheim to be chosen as the neutral town. We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations were attended with no result. In the month of October the Allies overthrew the colossal edifice, denominated the French empire. When led by victory to the banks of the Rhine, they declared their wish to abstain from

conquests, explained their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution not to depart from them. This determination of the Allies induced the French government to evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent desire for peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of his subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices, which, according to his proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the partition of Poland, and the immense aggrandizement of the English possessions in Asia. But his grand object was to gain time, and if possible to keep the allied armies on the right bank of the Rhine.

The nation was weary of its sacrifices; the immense levies raised one after the other had converted the conscription into a sort of press. The labourers of the country and the artisans of the town, were alike dragged from their employment, and the dissatisfaction of the people at the measures of government was loudly and boldly expressed. Still, however, they were will ing to make one last effort could they have believed that the emperor would henceforth confine his views to France alone. Napoleon sent Caulincourt to the headquarters of the allies, but that was merely to gain time, and to induce a belief that he was favourably disposed to peace.

The Allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon was raising, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in France, published their famous manifesto, addressed to the French people, which was profusely circulated, and which may be referred to as an important lesson to subjects who trust to the promises of governments.

The good faith with which those promises were kept, may be judged of from the treaty of Paris. In the mean time, the manifesto did not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were yet faithful to his cause, for, believing in the declarations of the Allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so ardently desired. It was in vain, too, to levy troops-every thing essential to an army was wanting.

To meet the most pressing demands, the emperor drew out thirty millions from the immense treasure which he had accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the Pavillon Marsan at the Tuileries. These thirty millions, a generous sacrifice on the part of Napoleon, were soon swallowed up.

I am now arrived at the most critical period in Napoleon's career. What reflections must he have made, if he had had leisure to reflect; if he had compared the recollections of his rising glory with the melancholy picture of his falling fortune! How forcible the contrast, when we compare the famous flag of the army of Italy, carried to the Directory by Bonaparte when flushed with youth and victory, with those drooping eagles, who were now compelled to defend the aerie, whence they had so often taken flight to spread their triumphant wings over Europe! How strikingly does this display the difference between liberty and absolute power! Napoleon, the child of Liberty, to whom he owed every thing, had disowned his mother, and was now about to fall. For ever past were those glorious triumphs, when the people of Italy consoled themselves for defeat, and submitted to the magical power of that liberty, which heralded the armies of the republic. Now, on the contrary, it was to free themselves from a despot's yoke, that the nations of Europe had taken up arms, and were preparing to invade the sacred soil of France.

I have already made frequent mention of the sufferings of the unhappy city of Hamburg, but these were merely the prelude to what it had still to undergo. During the campaign of 1813, the Allies, after driving the French out of Saxony, and obliging them to retreat towards the Rhine, besieged Hamburg, where Davoust was shut up with a garrison of 30,000 men, resolutely determined to make it a second Saragossa. From the month of September, every day augmented the number of the allied troops, who were already making rapid progress on the left bank of the Elbe. Davoust endeavoured to fortify Hamburg on so extended a scale, that, in the opinion of the most experienced military men, it would have required a garrison of 60,000 men to defend it in a regular and protracted siege. At the commencement of the siege, Davoust lost Vandamme, who was

killed in a sortie at the head of a numerous corps, which was rashly sacrificed, the greater part being made prisoners. It is but fair, however, to state, that Davoust displayed great activity in his erroneous and useless plan of defence; he began by laying in large supplies, and employed upwards of 15,000 men in the works of the fortification. General Bertrand was ordered to construct a bridge which might form a communication between Hamburg and Haarburg, by joining the islands of the Elbe to the continent, along a total distance of about two leagues. This bridge was to be built of wood, and Davoust seized upon all the timber-yards to supply materials for its construction. In the space of eightythree days the bridge was finished. It was a very magnificent structure; its length being 2,529 fathoms, exclusive of the lines of junction formed on the two islands.

The inhabitants underwent every species of oppression but all the cruel and tyrannical measures of the French to preserve the place were ineffectual. The Allies advanced in great force and occupied Westphalia, which obliged Davoust to recall to the town the different de tachments dispersed around the neighbourhood of Ham burg. In the month of December, provisions began to diminish, and there was no possibility of renewing the supply. The poor were, first of all, compelled to leave the town, and afterwards all persons who were not usefully employed. It is no exaggeration to estimate at 50,000 the number of persons who were thus exiled. At the end of December, people, without distinction of sex or age, were dragged from their beds, and conveyed out of the town on a cold night, when the thermometer stood between sixteen and eighteen degrees, and, by a refinement of cruelty, their fellow-townsmen were obliged to form their escort. It was affirmed that several aged men perished in this removal. Those who survived were left on the outside of the gates of Altona; at which town, however, they all found refuge and assistance. Such is a brief statement of the vexations and cruelties which long oppressed this unfortunate city.

CHAP. XLIII.

Prince Eugene and the Affairs of Italy-Murat's Perfidy; declares War against France-the National Guard of Paris enrolled-the Emperor's Address. THE affairs of Italy, and the principal events of the vice-royalty of Eugene, now demand some share of attention; I shall therefore somewhat anticipate the order of time in laying before the reader those particulars relative to Eugene, which I obtained from authentic

sources.

After the campaign of 1812, when Eugene revisited Italy, he was promptly informed of the more than doubtful dispositions of Austria towards France. He, therefore, lost no time in organizing a force, capable of defending the country which the emperor had committed to his safeguard. Napoleon was well aware of the advantage he would derive from the presence, on the northern frontiers of Italy, of an army sufficiently strong to harass Austria, in case she should draw aside the transparent veil which still covered her policy. Eugene did all that depended on him to further the emperor's intentions; but, in spite of all his efforts, the army of Italy was, after all, only an imaginary army to those who could compare the number of men actually present with the number stated in the lists. When, in July, 1813, the viceroy was informed of the turn taken by the negotiations at the shadow of a congress assembled at Prague, he had no longer any doubt of the renewal of hostilities, and foreseeing an attack on Italy, he resolved, as speedily as possible, to approach the frontiers of Austria. By his utmost endeavours he could only assemble an army of about 45,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, consisting both of French and Italians. On the renewal of hostilities, the viceroy's head-quarters were at Udina. Down to the month of April, 1814, he succeeded in maintaining a formidable attitude, and in defending the entrance of his kingdom with that military talent which was to be expected in a man educated in the great school of Napoleon, and whom the army looked up to as one of its most skilful generals.

During the great and unfortunate events of 1813, pub