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until the goods had been shipped, whereupon plaintiffs asked that the consignee hold the goods subject to their order. The consignee took possession of the goods, and sold them to defendant: Held, that defendant acquired no better title than his vendor had, which was that of bailee for plaintiffs.-LEFFLER V. WATSON, Ind., 40 N. E. Rep. 1107.

102. STATUTES- Enactment - Constitutional Law. Courts will not go behind a statute authenticated as required by Const. art. 4, § 25, by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature, to see whether it was passed within two days of the adjournment, in violation of article 5, § 14.-WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. V. TAGGART, Ind., 40 N. E. Rep. 1031.

103. TRUST-Husband and Wife. In an action by a divorced wife against her former husband to establish a trust in land held by him, it appeared that when the parties were married defendant had no property; that defendant rented a farm of his father, and that this farm was afterwards conveyed to defendant; that plaintiff had joined with defendant in the execution of trust deeds to secure loans, describing the land as defendant's; that in former litigation between them plaintiff had spoken of the land as defendant's, and asked to be allowed a part thereof; and while the parties lived together plaintiff allowed defendant to receive a large amount of money that she had inherited, but there was no direct evidence that this money went into the land in question: Held, insufficient to entitle plaintiff to a decree.-THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON, Va., 22 S. E. Rep. 162.

104. TRUST DEED-Power of Sale. - A trust deed of land provided for a sale on default, "as in cases of foreclosing mortgages, by bill in chancery, by some suitable person, to be appointed in writing by any person interested in such trust fund:" Held, that a con veyance to a purchaser at a sale conducted as a sale under judicial process, by a person appointed in writing by one interested in the debt, conveyed to him the legal title.-LANG V. STANSEL, Ala., 17 South. Rep. 516.

105. TRUST AND TRUSTEE-Misappropriation of Fund -Equity.-Where money was contributed to establish an industrial school for colored youths, the contribu. tors cannot require trustees to account, as for a misappropriation of the trust fund, merely because the trustee subsequently appropriated a part of the fund for a church.-CLARK V. OLIVER, Va., 22 S. E. Rep. 175.

106. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Purchaser of Land. The title of a purchaser in good faith from the vendee in a sale with a power of redemption after the sale has become absolute, by reason of the non-exercise of the right of redemption, is secure against an attack from the original vendor or his creditors, on the ground that the "sale with redemption" was really a contract for security which did not shift the ownership. The purchaser is not affected by secret equities, unknown to him, or not disclosed by the record.-BROUSSARD V. WEST, La., 17 South. Rep. 476.

107. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Estoppel.-An agreement to sell certain lands, in case they are acquired by the promisor, and divide the proceeds with another, is not such a conveyance as operates as an estoppel, when title is subsequently obtained by him.-OLIPHANT V. BURNS, N. Y., 40 N. E. Rep. 980.

108. VENUE-Practice.-Const. art. 12, § 16, providing that a corporation may be sued in the county where the contract is made, or where the breach occurs, etc., is merely permissive; and by joining another defend ant, whose residence is in a different county, plaintiff waives the benefit of such provision. - GRIFFIN & SKELLEY CO. V. MAGNOLIA & HEALDSBURG FRUIT-CANNERY, Cal., 40 Pac. Rep. 495.

109. WATER COURSE-Easement. - In an action for damages for damming a ditch running through defendant's land, and used to drain the land of plaintiff, when the proof shows only a parol contract for the easement claimed, and there was no independent assertion of right to the ditch by plaintiff open and ad

verse to the rights of defendant, on which a presumption could be raised, a peremptory instruction to find for defendant should be given.-DUNHAM V. JOYCE, Mo., 31 S. W. Rep. 337.

110. WATER-Pollution.-A complaint for nuisance, charging defendant with polluting the waters of a river with offensive matter from "a sawmill, outhouses, stables, and other fixtures which usually accompany a sawmill," will embrace a finding that the cause of pollution was a hog pen and the manure pile of a stable maintained in connection with the sawmill.PEOPLE V. ELK RIVER MILL & LUMBER CO., Cal., 40 Pac. Rep. 486.

111. WILLS-Charges on Land Devised. - Testator gave all his real estate to two sons for $2,500, and pro vided that upon the death of his widow, and after all personal property was sold, what was left should be equally divided between his 10 children: Held, that the $2,500 was a charge on the land.-IN RE WEILER'S ESTATE, Penn., 32 Atl. Rep. 101.

112. WILLS-Estate Devised.-Under a devise "to my adopted daughter, H, to have and to hold for and during the term of her natural life. And after the death of H I give and devise the reversion or remainder to her lawful issue, to have and to hold the same in com mon to them, their heirs and assigns, forever. And, in case the said H should die without leaving lawful is. sue, then the aforesaid real estate shall revert to my estate, and I give and devise the same to my heirs under the interstate laws,"-H takes a fee; the words "lawful issue" meaning lineal descendants, and hav Ing, prima facie, the force of words of limitation, and the words "in common" not being such superadded words of limitation or distributive modification as will make the words "lawful issue" words of purchase. -GRIMES V. SHIRK, Penn., 32 Atl. Rep. 113.

113. WILL-Caveat - Fraud. -The only ground of the caveat insisted upon at the trial being that the pro pounder and another had falsely and fraudulently represented to the testator that the caveatrix was not in fact his neice, and had by means of this fraud and deception induced him to disinherit her, and there be ing no evidence whatever that any such representa tions had ever been made except the declarations of the testator himself, the caveat was not sustained, and the verdict setting aside the will was without evidence to support it. The declarations of the testator were admissible to show the state of his mind at the time of executing the will, but were not admissible for the purpose of showing that the facts stated by him were true. -MALLERY V. YOUNG, Ga., 22 S. E. Rep. 142.

114. WILL - Residuary Clause.-After bequeathing legacies to certain heirs, testatrix's will recited: "It is my will that B, my step-sister, shall have a full share of my estate, share and share alike with my brothers and sisters." B was in fact testatrix's half sister, and the estate consisted of personalty: Held, that such item disposed of the residue of the estate equally among testatrix's brothers and sisters and half-sister.-IN RE STRIEWIG'S ESTATE, Penn., 32 Atl. Rep. 83.

115. WILL Vested Remainders.-Testator devised his estate to trustees, a portion of the income being payable to his wife, who was authorized, during the trust, to dispose of one-third of the personal property by will, and the remainder of the income to be paid in equal proportions to a daughter and three sons; and provided that if the daughter or either of two s0118 should die, leaving issue, the issue should take the parent's share; but power of disposition was not given to any child. The trust was to end on a fixed date, and the property was then to be paid to testator's legal representatives: Held, that the remainders did not vest on testator's death, so that, on the death of the daughter before the termination of the trust, her surviving husband became entitled to the income previously payable to her, or to any part of the princi pal of the estate. -EAGER V. WHITNEY, Mass., 40 Ν. Ε. Rep. 1046.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 16, 1895.

business with him pass through the halls. The owner continues to possess the right to control the halls subject only to the rights of parties therein which they have acquired by reason of their lease. It cannot be that those passages are to be treated as a part of the sidewalk or as in any degree dedicated to the public. The only persons who have acquired any right to the use of the halls are those who hold such right under the title of the landlord. It may be that persons who have received an express invitation to go to the room of a tenant have sufficient right to permit them to complain of an interference with their passage through the halls, although it may be doubted whether it is not entirely a question between the tenant and the landlord as to the obstruction of the easement. But the rule certainly cannot be stretched to allow every person who has merely the implied license of a tenant to visit him to complain of interference with his entry by the landlord forbidding him to enter. The above is, in brief, the view of the court. On the other

A valued California correspondent sends us an opinion by Judge McKinley, a nisi prius judge of Los Angeles, which, we think, is something out of the ordinary and therefore worthy of mention. The question was as to the right of a landlord over the passages leading to the rooms of his tenant. The controversy was the outcome of these state of facts. A book agent desires to canvass among the numerous occupants of a certain building for subscribers for that book. The owner of the building refuses to allow him so to do and threatens to eject him if he persists in so doing, though expressing his willingness to allow the agent to go to any office in the building upon the express request of the occupant. The question, as will be observed, is novel and important, in view of the large number of office buildings now existing in our cities. The court held that the agent had | hand, it may be said that when the room is

no right to enter and canvass in the building against the wishes and directions of its owner. The court conceded that every man has the absolute control of his own property, and the right to say who shall enter upon it, subject, of course, to the exception of officers executing process, etc. But his willingness that others should enter may be implied as well as expressed. Such an implied invitation to enter may naturally be inferred on the part of the owner or lessee of property to enter to transact business beneficial to the licensor. Thus, an implied invitation is held to be extended by the merchant to his customers, the physician to his patients, and the lawyer to those desiring to transact business with him. There is, also, in addition to the class who enter by implied invitation, those who may enter as mere licensees, who are there merely by sufferance, whose purpose is to secure their own advantage or pleasure. The owner of a building, says the court, who rents the rooms, parts with his title to the premises rented for the period of the lease, but as far as the halls, corridors and passages are concerned, all that the tenant ordinarily takes by the lease is an easement therein to pass over the same and the right to have parties having Vol. 41-No. 7.

leased, there goes with it by implication the right of way for the tenant and all persons who have any lawful business with him, whether for their own benefit or that of the tenant, to pass and repass to and from the rooms through the halls and passages to the street and that with this right the landlord had no right to interfere at all, so long as the visitor conducted himself properly. The question is certainly a nice one, without much light from the authorities and one not free from difficulty, though we are inclined toward the belief that the ruling of the California judge, if he is correctly reported, goes too far.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

MECHANIC'S LIEN-FIXTURES - ELECTRIC WIRES. In Hughes v. Lamberville Electric Light Co., 32 Atl. Rep. 69, it is decided by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey that wires and insulators which are used in forming and completing the connection between an electric light and power plant and dwellings, stores and other public places, for the purpose of conveying or transmitting light and heat thereto, are fixtures, within the

provisions of the mechanic's lien law. The court said in part:

This claim to a lien arises from the fact that the Southern Electric Company supplied the wires and insulators and did the work or labor of connecting the said wires with the poles and wires erected upon and along the streets with the dwelling houses, stores and other places of business, and that because of such connection they became part of the plant. This claim to the benefit of the lien law should be supported. The fifth section of the Mechanic's Lien Law (Revision, p. 669), provides that "any fixed machinery or gearing or other fixtures for manufacturing purposes, shall be considered a building for the purpose of this act." The phrase, "or other fixtures for manufacturing purposes," is as comprehensive as the language will admit of. Certainly, whatever appliances may be used for the accomplishment of a given purpose, through the use of fixtures, in a manufacturing es tablishment, may fairly be considered a "building," within this act. Whatever is so attached to the freehold as to be denominated a "fixture," and is essential to the successful operation of the plant, will pass with the freehold. Without the connection to the dwellings, stores and other public places by means of the wires, as above stated, the plant could not be operated according to the design. Such connection is absolutely essential. These wires connect with the main wires, which were strung upon the poles along the streets, which last named wires were all connected with the building or plant in which the electricity is generated. It is very well settled that where a thing is annexed to the freehold by the owner with the intention of making it a part thereof, and it is essential to the enjoyment of the freehold, it will be regarded as a fixture. Blancke v. Rogers, 26 N. J. Eq. 566; Potts v. Ordinance Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 396; Crane v. Brigham, 11 N. J. Eq. 29; McMillan v. Paper Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 610; Watson v. Manufacturing Co., 30 N. J. Eq. 484. In Van Keuren v. Railroad Co., 38 N. J. Law, 165, it was held that a railroad track, consisting of ties to which were fixed the iron rails, constructed for the purposes above indicated, was a fixture, and passed with the title to the land. In Philbrick v. Ewing, 97 Mass. 133, it was held that a water pipe attached to a main pipe in the street, and running across the land of a third person into a dwelling house upon the side of the street, for the purpose of carrying water into such dwelling, was a fixture, and passed with a conveyance of the lot. In Badger Lumber Co. v. Marion Water Supply, Electric Light and Power Co., 48 Kan. 182, 29 Pac. Rep. 476, it was held that poles placed in the street, upon which wires were strung, which wires were connected with an electric light andpower plant, were within the Kansas statute, which secured a lien upon buildings and the appurtenances to laborers and material men. In Beatty v. Parker, 141 Mass. 523, 6 N. E. Rep. 754, it was held that "a pipe connecting a house with a sewer built in the street, necessary to the use of the house, and included in the contract for building it, is a part of the house, and it is immaterial whether it is inside or outside of the walls of the house, under or above ground, whether extended one foot or thirty feet, or whether the fee of the land in the street was or was not in the owner of the lot on which the house was built." A petition to enforce a mechanic's lien for the land in placing said pipe was sustained. In Steger v. Refrigerating Co. (Tenn.), 14 S. W. Rep. 1087, it was decided that "a mechanic's lien for material furnished in laying pipes for a refrigerating company, which supplies vapor

for "cold storage" to customers at a distance, through pipes in the ground, extends to the whole plant as an entirety, and may be enforced against the ground upon which the manufactory is located, although the pipes are laid on the land of strangers." The fact that these poles which support the wires along the streets stand upon the land the title to which may be in others, and that the wires which connect the main wires with the several dwellings, stores and other public places pass into and are fixed to the dwellings and stores and public buildings of persons who were strangers to the company, except as they gave their consent to such erection and the making of such connections, does not alter the rights of lien claimants. The effort is not made to enforce the lien against the land upon which the poles are erected, nor against the dwellings, stores or other places into which the connected wires are extended, but only against the plant itself and land whereon it stands. It is this which the lien law makes liable for materials and labor, and not the thing which becomes a fixture. For I apprehend that whether things furnished for a structure, whether a dwelling or manufactory, whether such thing be brick, lumber or machinery, a a lien will lie, whether the thing be actually placed in the building or not. The two cases last above cited show that it makes no difference in whom the owner of the fee may be, upon whose land or in whose dwelling the poles may be set, or the wires extended.

DEED-VENDOR'S LIEN ON CROPS-PRIORITIES.-The Supreme Court of Arkansas decides in Martin v. Schichtl, 31 S. W. Rep. 458, that a reservation in a deed of a lien on crops to be thereafter planted on the land, to secure the purchase money, is valid and entitled to precedence over the lien of a subsequent mortgagee who had actual notice thereof. Bunn, J., dissented. The court said: In Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56, which was a suit in equity on the mortgage of a future crop, it was held the lien of a mortgage on an unplanted crop attaches, in equity, as soon as the subject of the mortgage comes into existence; and can be enforced, in a proceeding to foreclose, against the mortgagor, and those holding under him with record notice. This power was recognized and confirmed by an act of the general assembly, approved February 11, 1875, which made mortgages on crops to be planted valid.

It has been frequently held that a reservation in a lease of a farm of a lien on crops not in esse, which are to be grown on the land, as security for the payment of a stipulated rent, is sufficient to hold the crops so soon as they come into existence. Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465.

The reservation of the lien on crops in this case was an equitable mortgage. If a mortgage on a crop before it is planted, to secure an ordinary debt, and the lien of the lessor reserves in the lease, attach to the crop so soon as it is planted, the lien reserved by Mrs. Rice certainly attached and held the crops as a security for the payment of the purchase money.

The fact that the reservation is inconsistent with and repugnant to the grant in the deed does not defeat the lien. Reservations of easements, like a right of way in conveyances of land, and in leases of "grass, herbage, feeding, and pasturage," have been upheld, and yet they are inconsistent with the grant. Rose v. Bunn, 21 N. Y. 275.

The case of Darling v. Robbins, 60 Vt. 347, 15 Atl. Rep. 177, sustains our view. In that case it was held that a "reservation in a warranty deed of land of the crops that might be produced thereon, to secure the interest on the purchase money, is a valid lien, and may be foreclosed." The difference between this and that case is, the lien reserved on the crops in the former is to secure the payment of the notes given for the purchase money, instead of the interest alone, as in the latter case. But the rule is the same, and sustains the lien in both cases.

In Walters v. Meyer, 39 Ark. 560, Watson v. Pugh, 51 Ark. 218, 10 S. W. Rep. 493, and Quertermous v. Hatfield, 54 Ark. 16, 14 S. W. Rep. 1096, cited by appellants, no lien on crops was reserved or created by contract, and the law gave none. They were cases in which land was sold, and the vendee executed his note for the purchase money, and promised to pay it as rent. The court held that "calling the purchase money rent would not make it such, nor create a lien on the crops for its payment." In Walters v. Meyer, while so holding, Chief Justice English, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "No doubt a vendor may, by contract, reserve a lien upon lands and crops, its fruits to secure the payment of purchase money."

The calling the lien reserved on the crops a "landlord's lien" does not defeat the manifest intent of the parties to create it. The misnomer cannot defeat the intention of the parties. Equity requires no particular words to be used in creating a lien. It looks through the form to the substance of an agreement; and if from the instrument evidencing the agreement "the intent appear to give or to charge or to pledge property, real or personal, as a security for an obligation, and the property is so described that the principal things intended to be given or charged can be sufficiently identified, the lien follows." In the case of Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486, Fed. Cas. No. 4,847, Judge Story said: "If the transaction resolved itself into a security, whatever may be its form, and whatever name the parties may choose to give it, it is in equity a mortgage." Bell v. Pelt, 51 Ark. 433, 11 S. W. Rep. 684; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1237; 2 Devl. Deeds, $1237.

It is said that the mortgage in favor of Martin & Harton, having been filed before the deed of Mrs. Rice, is entitled to precedence over the reserved lien, as to the crop of 1892. But this contention is not sustained by the decisions of this court.

In Taliaferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511, Eliza Comer sold and conveyed certain lands to Panley, took notes for the purchase money, and reserved lien on the land in the deed for the payment of the notes. Panley sold the land to Barnett, who had actual notice, before he purchased, of the lien reserved by Comer. This court held that, inasmuch as Barnett derived title from Panley, he had, when he purchased, constructive notice of the lien; and, inasmuch as he also had actual notice of the same, the lien was valid and subsisting, and could be enforced against him.

In Stephens v. Shannon, 43 Ark. 464, Shannon sold and conveyed certain lands to Winfrey, and reserved a lien on the land. Winfrey afterwards sold and conveyed the land to Ivey, and Ivey sold and conveyed a portion of it to Stephens. The deed of Shannon, which contained the reservation of the lien, was not placed on record, but this court held that "Stephens was affected with notice of all the recitals in the title deeds of his vendor, whether they were of record or not."

According to the opinions of this court in the two

cases last cited the lien reserved in a deed to a purchaser is not affected by the statutes providing for the registration of mortgages, but by the statutes providing for the acknowledgement and record of deeds, bonds, or instruments of writing, affecting the title in law or equity to any property which are contained in chapter 29, Sand. & H. Dig. Under them (the opin❘ions) purchasers are affected by liens reserved in the deeds to their grantors, because they are required to take notice of what appears in their chain of title, notwithstanding the deeds are not on record. So they are affected by such liens if they had actnal notice of them before purchasing. These results would not follow if the statutes providing for the registration of mortgages governed, for under them a mortgage constitutes no lien against strangers until it is filed with the recorder, even though they may have actual notice of its existence.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADULTERATION OF VINEGAR ARTIFICIAL COLORING POLICE POWER. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Weller v. State, 40 N. E. Rep. 1002, was called upon to decide a constitutional question of considerable interest, the decision being that where in the manufacture of vinegar, low wine, formed from fermented grain, is, previously to its acetification, passed through roasted malt, not for the purpose of adding any substantial ingredient to the vinegar, but for the purpose of giving it color, as well as aroma and flavor, and without this treatment it would be colorless, the vinegar so produced contains artificial coloring matter, within the meaning of section 2 of an act to prevent the adulteration of vinegar, as amended April 14, 1888; and its possession for the purpose of sale is an offense under the provisions of section 5 of the same act. Section 2 of the above entitled act, as amended April 14, 1888, does not exceed the police power of the State conferred on the General Assembly by the constitution in the general grant of legislative power, and is a valid law. The court says in part:

It is claimed that the primary object of using roasted malt is to give aroma and flavor to the vinegar, and that color is simply an incident to the process adopted in attaining the primary end, and hence that the giving of color in this way cannot be said to come within the meaning of the statute. But the evidence tends to show that the primary object was to give color. His purpose in using the roasted malt was a question of fact, to be determined by the court trying the case. His statement as to his purpose cannot control the court, if, in view of all the evidence, the court is satisfied that his real and principal purpose was to give color to the vinegar. Again, if the primary object was to give aroma and flavor, still the process adopted for this purpose was an artificial one. Distilled vinegar, as is that of the defendant, has no such aroma. It is given, if at all, by the artificial method of running the distillation through roasted malt, be

fore its acetification, and artificial coloring is one of the principal results; and in such case it is not material whether color or aroma was the primary object, both being attained by artificial means. The process adds no substantial ingredients to the vinegar, for neither aroma, flavor nor color can be said to be substantial ingredients of any product. They are not susceptible of analysis, and are merely perceived by the aid of the senses.

The plaintiff in error, in support of his contention, relies largely upon Ammon v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 543, 14 Atl. Rep. 610. The case arose upon a conviction of Ammon under a statute of that State making it an offense for any one to have in his possession, for the purpose of sale, "oleomargarine that is colored, stained or mixed with annotto, or any other coloring matter or substance." It appeared by the plea of the defendant, and was admitted by the State, that cotton seed oil, a nutritious vegetable substance-formed about one-fifth of the product called "oleomargarine," and was used in its manufacture, not simply for the purpose of coloring the product, but as one of its substantial ingredients. The court, applying the rule noscitur a sociis, held that the language, "or other coloring matter," extends only to coloring substances that resemble annotto-substances used merely or chiefly for the same purpose, annotto being used only as a coloring matter-and that "the language cannot, with propriety, be interpreted so as to include materials employed chiefly to make up the substance of the compound, and which imparts some color only as a necessary incident of their use." The case is clearly distinguishable from the one before us. Our statute inhibits the possession, for the purpose of sale, of any vinegar, containing artificial coloring matter, and is therefore broader than the New Jersey statute as to oleomargarine. And again, as shown, the roasted malt in this case was used, not as a substantial ingredient, but only to give color, flavor or aroma, neither of which are substantial ingredients of the vinegar. The construction asked to be given this statute would permit a manufacturer to run distilled vinegar through roasted apples, and, by thereby im. parting to it the color and aroma of cider vinegar, sell it in the market as such. And this, we understand, was claimed in the court below. But the purpose of this statute was, we think, to protect the public against such deceptions. Much is claimed from the fact that it was admitted on the trial that the vinegar of the defendant was wholesome, and that he did not intend to deceive any one by using the roasted malt, and labeling and selling his product as "malt vinegar." But this is wholly immaterial. It matters not what his intentions may have been. The tendency of such de. vices is to deceive the public, and the statute was enacted to afford it protection therefrom. Such a statute is clearly within the proper exercise of the police power of the State. Every one has the right to distinguish for himself what an article of food is, and have the means of judging for himself its quality and value. Palmer v. State, 39 Ohio St. 236; Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. St. 265, 7 Atl. Rep. 913; Powell v. Penn. sylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257. In Powell v. Com., the act of the legislature of Pennsylvania prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleo. margarine, or keeping the product with intent to sell, was held to fall within the police power of the Statea power held to include the making of all "wholesome and reasonable" laws, not repugnant to the constitution, that the legislature may judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and its people. It was offered on the trial of the case to show by

experts that oleomargarine is a wholesome article of food. This was rejected. Error having been assigned as to this, the court said: "The mere fact that experts may pronounce a manufactured article intended for food to be wholesome or harmless does not render it incompetent for the legislature to prohibit the manufacture and sale of the article. The test of the reasonableness of a police regulation prohibiting the making and vending of a particular article of food is not alone whether it is in part unwholesome and injurious. If an article of food is of such a character that few persons will eat it, knowing its real character; if, at the same time, it is of such a nature that it can be imposed upon the public as an article of food which is in common use, and against which there is no prejudice; and if, in addition to this, there is probable ground for believing that the only way to protect the public from being defrauded into the purchasing of the counterfeit article for the genuine is to prohibit altogether the manufacture and sale of the formerthen we think such a prohibition may stand as a reasonable police regulation, although the article prohibited is in fact innocuous, and although its produc tion might be found beneficial to the public, if in buying it they could distinguish it from the production of which it is the limitation," citing State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110. The case may be regarded as a somewhat extreme one, but it was affirmed on error by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Powell v. Pennsylvania, supra, and is valuable as illustrating the extent of the power possessed by the legislature of a State over such subjects, when exercised to prevent deception and fraud in the manufacture and sale of an article of food. There can, as we think, be no question as to the validity of our own statute to prevent the adulteration of vinegar. A statute of the State of New York not only in substance, but in language, like our own, has recently been sustained by the Court of Appeals of that State. People v. Girard, 39 N. E. Rep. 823. In replying to the argument that the law is an interference with a vested right, Finch, J., in delivering the opinion said: "Sometimes it [the argument] is pertinent and weighty, but in this case it is neither. It becomes the assertion of a vested right to color a food product so as to conceal or disguise its true or natural appearance; in plain words, a vested right to deceive the public."

"OPEN COURT."

As the statutes of the various States provide in cases of default in divorce proceedings, that the testimony and proof shall be taken in open court, we thought an article on "Open Court," and the effect of non-compliance with these statutes, would be of interest to the profession. For example, the statutes of Illinois provide that the testimony in such cases shall be taken in "open court," and the question arises, would a decree rendered upon testimony, other than that taken in open court, be an irregularity or a nullity. It is some times difficult to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule is to determine what is an ir

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