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dicated by our statute will prevent a recovery by the creditor of the excess stipulated for, but it does not require that the debtor shall be disabled to pay such excess, or to give away his money, if he chooses to make that use of it." Woolfolk v. Bird, 22 Minn. 341. That language, we think, expresses the policy foreshadowed by our own statute.

The further points are made by appellant that there is no usury law in this State, and that the defense of usury, in order to be available on the trial, must be pleaded. Properly speaking, we had no usury law at the time of this transaction, and that when usury is relied upon as a defense it must be pleaded is well settled as a legal proposition everywhere. We think the defendants entirely failed in their defense, and that plaintiff's motion for judgment should have been sustained. The judgment must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for appellant in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

NOTE-Any calculation or mode by which the lender receives more than the legal rate of interest on each hundred dollars loaned is usury, even though there be no intent to violate the law. Drury v. Wolfe, 34 Ill. App. 23. Of course when there is no law on the subject no rate of interest can be usurious, no matter how high it may be. Reynolds v. Neal, 91 Ga. 60o. In examining the question of usury, the courts will ascertain the real nature of the transaction, no matter what device the party has resorted to in order to hide the usury, and no matter how free from taint the contract may be on its face. Dayton v. Dearholt, 85 Wis. 151; Jackson v. Travis, 42 Minn. 438. Though as a part of the contract real estate or other property is sold, yet if such provision is a mere cloak for usury, the courts will so treat it. Tillar v. Cleveland, 47 Ark. 287; Parker v. Maxwell, 51 Minn. 523. Such question is ordinarily to be determined as a question of fact in the trial court (Chase v. New York, etc. Co., 49 Minn. 111), and parol evidence is admissible in contradiction of written contracts. Tillar v. Cleveland, supra. Where, however, a note given bona fide for the purchase of land, and not as a cover for a loan or forbearance of money, calls for interest on the principal mentioned therein in excess of the rate allowed by law for a loan or forbearance of money, such note is not usurious. What is thus called interest is as much a part of the purchase price of the land as the principal sum, and the rate of interest called for will be enforced. Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159. If, however, in order to compensate the grantor for giving time on the purchase price, a sum is added to the agreed price, greater than the legal ratio, the contract is usurious, though such sum is incorporated in the interest notes. Fisher v. Hoover, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 81.

Compounding Interest. The courts disagree as to the right to compound interest. Where a note provided for semi-annual payments of interest, and for interest on unpaid interest, the note was held to be objectionable. Taylor v. Hiestand, 46 Ohio 345; Merck v. American, etc. Co., 79 Ga. 213. It has been held that such agreement will not be enforced, unless it is made after the interest has become due (Hochmark v. Richler, 16 Colo. 263), or unless it is expressed in an instrument having the qualities of negotiable paper, separate from the instrument evidencing the principal debt. Bowman v. Neely, 46 Ill.

App. 139; Drury v. Wolfe, 184 Ill. 294. This view is advanced not by reason of any statute, but on grounds of public policy in order to avoid harsh and oppres. sive accumulations of interest. Bowman v. Neely, supra.

Discounting Paper. The taking in advance of the highest rate of interest allowed is not considered to be usury. Maxwell v. Willett, 49 Ill. App. 564; Telford v. Garrels, 132 Ill. 550; Rose v. Munford, 36 Neb. 148. The law is generally silent as to when interest is to be paid, consequently the courts have held that it is not usury to require its payment when the money is loaned. If more than a year's interest were exacted in advance, the contract would probably be consid ered to be usurious. Fowler v. Equitable T. Co., 141 U. S. 384. The disposition seems to be to allow such discount only on short time paper, such as banks usually discount. Vahlberg v. Keaton, 51 Ark. 534; Mackenzie v. Flannery, 90 Ga. 590. Where A buys B's note and he knows it has not been negotiated, then he will be guilty of usury should he charge a discount in excess of the highest legal rate; should he, however, buy it under the belief that it had been negotiated, and the paper so indicated, then he may buy it at any discount without being chargeable with usury. Claflin v. Boorum, 122 N. Y. 385; Jackson v. Travis, 42 Minn. 438. In relation to bonds of public corporations a different rule prevails, and a party may purchase them from the corporation without being guilty of usury though the discount may be great. Memphis v. Bethel, 17 S. W. Rep. 191.

Borrowing through Agent.-Very often in loaning and borrowing money agents are employed, and the allowances for their services become important in questions of usury. It is generally held, that when A employs the services of B to borrow money for him, that the lender is not chargeable with usury by reason of B's charges against A, since he has nothing to do with it and is not benefited thereby. May v. Flint, 54 Ark. 573; Telford v. Garrelles, 31 Ill. App. 441; Merck v. American, etc. Co., 79 Ga. 218; Vahlberg v. Keaton, 51 Ark. 534; Ginn v. New England, etc. Co., 92 Ala. 135; Pass v. New England, etc. Co., 66 Miss. 365. It has been held, that mere knowledge by the lender, that the intermediary charges large commissions will render the loan usurious, when the borrower thereby pays more than the highest legal rate. Brown v. Brown, 38 S. C. 173. But as mentioned before, the court will thoroughly investigate the contract regardless of its statements, and though the contract says, that the intermediary is the agent of the borrower, yet the court will consider him to be the agent of the lender, if the facts of the case so show, and will adjudge the contract accordingly. Dayton v. Dearholt, 85 Wis. 151. If the agent of the lender charges a commission for his services, which with the addition of the interest reserved for the lender makes the borrower pay more than the legal rate, yet the loan is not inJurious, if the lender was not aware of such charge by his agent and has not ratifiedit and has received no benefit from it. Telford v. Garrells, 31 III. App. 441; Vahlberg v. Keaton, 51 Ark. 534; Ginn v. New England, etc. Co., 92 Ala. 135; Stein v. Swensen, 44 Minn. 218. If, however, the lender obtains some benefit from the commission, or knows of such charge by his agent, or ratifies it subsequently, the loan becomes usurious. Greenfield v. Monaghan, 85 Iowa, 211; Vahlberg v. Keaton, supra; Banks v. Flint, 54 Ark. 40; Stein v. Swensen, supra. It is not necessary to prove direct knowledge on the part of the lender, but he is presumed to know the general manner in which his general agent transacts his business, and with such knowledge he may be chargeable with usury, though he obtains no benefit from the commissions collected. Stein v. Swensen, 44 Minn. 218; Banks v. Flint, 54 Ark. 40; Matzenbaugh v. Froup, 36 III. App. 261; Dayton v. Dearholt, 85 Wis. 151. It was held, that where money was placed with an agent to be loaned at the highest legal rate with the understanding that the agent was to be paid by the borrower, a loan so effected was usurious. Thompson v. Ingram, 51 Ark. 546. There are cases when the charges may be in excess of the highest legal rate with knowledge of the lender and still the loan may be unobjectionable. Such charges must be for services rendered or expenses incurred, and not a mere cloak for concealing usury. If they are bona fide and are reasonable in amount they will be allowed. Stein v. Swensen, supra; Landis v. Saxton, 89 Mo. 375: Acheson v. Chase, 28 Minn. 211; De Forest v. Strong, 8 Conn. 513. Among such items are charges for examining the title, preparing the writings, investigating the condition and value of the property, the expenses of collection and cost of exchange. Daley v. Minnesota, etc. Co., 43 Minn. 517; Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380; Smith v. Wolff, 55 Iowa, 555. A charge for expense and trouble on the part of the lender, in obtaining the money wherewith to make the loan, cannot be so allowed. Jackson v. May, 28 Ill. App. 305. Where the lender exacted the legal rate and required the borrower to pay his agent $50 for examining the title, and $50 dollars as a commission, the loan was held to be usurious as to the last $50. Ammondson v. Ryan, 111 Ill. 506. Where a charge of usury is sought to be evaded by a claim for services rendered, such claim will not be allowed, if the services were of a neighborly character, generally performed without remuneration, and there was no special agreement for compensation and it is not shown what charge was made for any particular service. Humphrey v. McCauley, 55 Ark. 143. A provision for a reasonable charge for an attorney's fee in case of foreclosure is never considered as usurious, since it is only a provision to protect the lender from loss in case of failure of the borrower to redeem his promise. Matzenbaugh v. Troup, 36 Ill. App. 26; Fowler v. Equitable T. Co., 141 U. S. 384, 411; Shelton v. Aultman, etc. Co., 86 Ala. 315.

Who can Take Advantage of Usury. The only parties allowed to make a claim of usury are the borrower, his legal representative or his heir at law. Moses v. Home, etc. Ass'n, 100 Ala. 465; Holladay v. Holladay, 18 Oreg. 523. To this list has been added sureties and privies (Cheney v. Dunlap, 27 Neb. 401), and also parties to the contract or those having an interest in or are prejudiced by the contract. Lehman v. Marshall, 47 Ala. 362. Such privilege has been denied to a judgment creditor of the mortgagor (Mason v. Pierce, 142 Ill. 331), to a garnishee (Wabash, etc. R. R. v. Dougan, 41 Ill. 543), to a purchaser of the equity of redemption, who had assumed the mortgage as a part of the consideration (McKnight v. Phelps, 37 Neb. 858), and to one who for a valuable consideration had assumed the payment of the note (Speakman v. Oaks, 97 Ala. 503); but it has been allowed to the assignee of an insolvent debtor and to an officer, who had acquired a lien on the property by execution or who held it under attachment. Stein v. Swenson, 44 Minn. 218. Whether, if the usurious interest has been paid, it can be recovered, and if so, by what proceeding, is a matter depending upon the law of each State. Tucker v. Coffin [Tex.], 26 S. W. Rep. 323; Wilcox v. Van Voorhis, 58 Hun, 575; Bexar B. & L. Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163; Fowler v. Equitable

T. Co., 141 U. S. 384. Usury cannot be set-off in a suit by a national bank, since the statute provides another remedy. Barnett v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555. S. S. MERRILL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In the JOURNAL for Aug. 9th (Weekly Digest No. 29, State v. Clements [La.], 17 South. Rep. 502), it is stated that an accused has the burden on him of establishing a plea of insanity, to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. I have read many cases in which a preponderance of evidence was held sufficient, and do not remember one in which it was required that a defense must be established by evidence that excludes all reasonable doubt. See People v. McCann, 16 N. Y.58; William Silvers v. State, 22 Ohio, 90; State v. -, 8 Nev. 291; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230; Alexander v. People, 96 III. 96. These cases are cited in Territory v. Edmonson, 4 Mont. 141, where it was held that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient to establish a defense; many other cases might be cited. D. S. W.

DISTINCTIONS OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN EVIDENCE.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The introduction of clever trickery into photography will doubtless go far toward destroying the confidence in photographs as secondary evidence. It will be recalled that in the early days of the art the courts were seriously averse to admitting photographs, and this because of the original difficulty of securing really good likenesses of the scene or person exposed to the apparatus. But as the art progressed and perfection was more closely approached, the courts relaxed their rules so that it is no longer a legal question as to admitting photographs in evidence upon complimentary proof of the correctness of the view, etc. But recent discoveries as to the manipulation of negatives and print paper so that pictures apparently natural though absolutely false may be made, will nearly destroy confidence entirely in the value of photographs as evidence. Given a corrupt motive, a venal photographer and an unconscionable party, and there is no end to the amount of false testimony that may be manufactured. It is a well known trick to photograph the head of one person onto the body of another by a clever manipulation of negatives, single and composite. We recall a case in New York wherein a photographer had succeeded in producing composite photographs of noted society ladies in Black Crook costume, the faces being true miniatures, and the whole appearing genuine "spirit" photographs-where a ghost-like image is introduced as the spirit of a departed friend, or relative, into a picture are a common fraud. The clever trick of taking back front and side views of a person with but one exposure to the camera is practiced. In fact there is no end to the tricks that may now be performed by the aid of photography, and it would be useless to point out more of them. Suffice it to say that to any person who has seen the various kinds of skillful deceptions practiced in photography and who learns that there is practically no limit to the combinations that are possible, it seems that the

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The American and English Encyclopædia of Law Compiled under the Editorial Supervision of Charles F. Williams. Vol. XXVII. Northport, Long Island, N. Y.: Edward Thompson Company, Law Publishers. 1894.

The American State Reports, Containing the Cases of General Value and Authority Subsequent to those contained in the "American Decisions" and the "American Reports," Decided in the Courts of Last Resort of the Several States. Selected, Reported and Annotated, by A. C. Freeman, and the Associate Editors of the "American Decisions." Vol. XLIII. San Francisco: Bancroft Whitney Company, Law Publishers and Booksellers. 1895.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A circular having been sent to the address of a man whose administrators had failed to make the fact of his death sufficiently public, the postmaster returned it with the comment: "- has been in heaven for a couple of years, we hope. Perhaps a copy of the laws of Moses would suit him just as well."

"My wife will bear witness," said the prisoner at the bar, "that at the very time I am accused of burglarizing Mr. Smith's premises, I was engaged in walking the floor with my infant child in my arms, endeavoring to soothe it by singing, 'Rock-a-bybaby." "The prisoner is discharged," remarked his honor; "he can prove a lullaby."

The counsel for the prisoner (charged with larceny), was making his final appeal to the jury. He grew so earnest and eloquent that the audience was visibly affected, and even the prisoner compelled to wipe his eyes. At that moment the attorney happening to glance at him, involuntarily interrupted his argument to exclaim: "Why, the infernal scoundrel has got my handkerchief."

...9, 10, 12, 23, 31, 41, 53, 63, 69, 89

UNITED STATES C. C. OF APP

UTAH

VIRGINIA

WEST VIRGINIA.... WISCONSIN.

..45, 73, 92, 93

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1. ACCIDENT INSURANCE - Presumptions. In an ac tion on a policy insuring against death by such accidental injuries as shall be visible off the body, where it is shown that deceased was found mangled on a railroad track, without any evidence as to how the accident occurred, the burden is on defendant to show that death resulted from a violation of some condition of the policy.-MEADOWS V. PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO. OF CALIFORNIA, Mo., 31 S. W. Rep. 578.

2. APPEAL - Motion for New Trial.-Rev. St. 1889, § 2243, provides that a motion for a new trial shall be made four days after the trial: Held that, though a motion for a new trial was made within four days after exceptions to a commissioners' report condemning certain land were overruled, no matters of exception could be reviewed on appeal, no motion having been made after entry of final judgment. -CITY OF ST. LOUIS V. BOYCE, Mo., 31 S. W. Rep. 594.

3. APPEAL-Bill of Exceptions. -A bill of exceptions, which was not filed in the clerk's office after being signed by the court, will not be considered on appeal. -JEMISON V. STATE, Ind., 41 N. E. Rep. 74.

4. APPELLATE JURISDICTION - Attachment.-Upon interplea in an attachment suit the value of the chattels attached, and not the amount of the attachment debt, constitutes the amount in controversy.-MARTIN V. DUNCAN, Ill., 41 N. E. Rep. 43.

5. ATTACHMENT-Fraudulent Conveyance. The statute allowing attachments where a debtor has fraudulently conveyed or assigned his effects so as to hinder and delay his creditors, does not authorize attach ments where the debtor has, without fraudulent intent, made a conveyance which is only constructively fraudulent.-WEARE COMMISSION CO. V. DRULEY, III., 41 N. E Rep. 48.

6. ATTACHMENT - Motion to Vacate. - On a motion to vacate an attachment, the court will not decide whether property levied on is personalty, or so affixed to realty as to be appurtenant to it.-NORTHWESTERN WHEEL & FOUNDRY CO. V. SALT LAKE CITY COPPER MANUF'G Co., Utah, 40 Pac. Rep. 702.

7. BONDS-School Districts. - Where a school district contracted for a loan on bonds which were afterwards declared to be void, it is liable for money advanced 8. CARRIERS OF GOODS - Bailment. The rightful owner of personal property in the possession of a common carrier, or other bailee, may enforce his right thereto, although a stranger to the contract of bailment.-SHELLENBERG V. FREMONT, E. & M. V. R. Co., Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 859.

in good faith under the contract which was used for school purposes.-STATE V. DICKERMAN, Mont., 40 Pac. Rep. 698.

garnishee plaintiff no rights which the legislature could not abrogate.-FREIBERG V. SINGER, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 754.

18. CONTRACT-Agreement to Purchase Notes. - Where one promises that he will, at a certain price, purchase certain notes, if the person to whom such promise is made shall procure the title to said notes by an exchange therefor of other property, and by such promise causes the proposed exchange to be made, he is bound by his promise, and is liable for payment of such damages as, by the violation of said promise, he has caused to the promisee. STRATTON V. MEREDITH, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 927.

19. CONTRACT-Subscription.-Where one of several subscribers to the purchase of a boat, to be owned by all in proportion to their subscriptions, at the request of the agents of the subscribers, superintends its construction and expends money therein, and afterwards it is agreed between him and the other subscribers that his interest in the boat shall cease, he can recover from the other subscribers at law for the value of his services and disbursements.-NICKERSON V. SPINDELI, Mass., 41 N. E. Rep. 105.

20. CONTRACT - Damages. Where plaintiff, on the promise of defendant, to make papers giving her property to plaintiff's wife, after defendant's death, if plaintiff would move "from his residence" to defendant's home, and take care of her, moved his buildings onto defendant's property, he cannot recover therefor, on defendant's repudiation of the agreement and refusal to allow plaintiff to remove them; moving the buildings having been either a gratuitous act, or at most a means by which plaintiff enabled himself to do his stipulated part.-KENERSON V. COLGAN, Mass., 41 N. E. Rep. 122.

21. CONTRACT-Reformation-Mistake. - A resolution of the city council "that the mayor be instructed to purchase" plaintiff's property cannot, at plaintiff's suit for specific performance, be amended by parol, on the ground of mistake, so as to express a completed purchase, especially where the mistake was not mutual.CARSKADDON V. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, Ind., 41 N. E. Rep. 1.

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22. CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT - Construction. certain contract between the parties hereto, whereby the plaintiff was employed as the general agent of the defendant, and was to receive certain renewal com. missions as a part of his compensation for his services as such agent, construed, and held, that he is not entitled to such commission on renewal premiums paid after the termination of his agency, by his discharge for cause. - JACOBSON V. CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. Co., Minn., 63 N. W. Rep. 740.

9. CARRIERS-Stock Shipment-Damages. The measure of damages for killing and injuring; cattle while in transit is, for those killed, their market value at the place of destination in the condition in which they should have arrived, and, for those injured, the difference between their market value at such place in the condition in which they did arrive and that in which they should have arrived.-HOUSTON & T. C. RY. CO. V. WILLIAMS, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 556.

10. CARRIER OF GOODS Interstate Commerce.-A common carrier transporting freight under a contract for its shipment from one point to another in the same State by line of transit wholly within the State, and for its delivery on arrival at the latter point to another carrier for transportation out of the State, is not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.-HOUSTON DIRECT NAV. CO. V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 560.

11. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS Negligence.-An Instruction that it is the duty of a railroad company in operating its trains "to exercise the highest degree of care, diligence, and skill" is not improper where the court, in other parts of its charge, explains that such expression means the highest degree of care reasonably consistent with the practical operation of the road.-ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. V. SWEET, Ark., 31 S. W. Rep. 571.

12. CERTIORARI AFTER DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.-Where an appeal has been dismissed by the court of civil appeals because the statement of facts in the record was not approved by the trial judge, a motion for rehearing and for certiorari, showing that the statement had in fact been approved, and that such approval ap. peared on the original statement filed with the district clerk, should be granted.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. CANNON, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 498.

13. CHATTEL MORTGAGE - Preferring Creditors.-In the absence of fraud, an insolvent debtor may execute a chattel mortgage to secure a just debt, although the collection of other valid claims is thereby defeated.JONES V. MEYER, S. Dak., 63 N. W. Rep. 773.

14. CHATTEL MORTGAGE Unrecorded Mortgage.Where one takes a chattel mortgage expressly subject to a prior unrecorded one, he is charged with notice of the contents of the prior one, and of the rights of the mortgagee therein. - CITIZENS' COAL & COAK CO. V. STANLEY, Colo., 40 Pac. Rep. 693.

15. COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX-Issue as to Liability. St. 1891, ch. 425, imposing a tax on collateral legacies and successions, and conferring on the pro. bate court jurisdiction to determine any question relating to any legacy under that act, does not take away the right of a legatee, under Pub. St. ch. 136, § 19, to recover his legacy in an action at common law, and have the question determined there whether the legacy is subject to a tax under St. 1891, ch. 425.-INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF ESSEX V. BROOKS, Mass., 41 N. E. Rep. 119.

16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Officers Manner of Appointment. Const. art. 5, § 1, vesting the executive powers of the State in the governor, does not preclude the legislature from passing an act making the governor, auditor, treasurer, secretary of State, and attorney general a board for the selection of prison directors.FRENCH V. STATE, Ind., 41 N. E. Rep. 2.

17. CONSTITUTIONAL Law - Curative Acts Vested Rights. The fact that between the filing of the bond and the passage of the act curing defects therein garnishee process was served on the assignee gave the

23. CONTRACT OF INDORSEMENT-Consideration.-The compromise of an impending lawsuit is sufficient consideration to sustain a verbal guaranty and written indorsement of a note.-HILLIARD V. WHITE, Tex., 31 8. W. Rep. 553.

24. CONTRACT BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. -A contract by an attorney who has charge of the interest of heirs in an estate, with such heirs, for the pur. chase of a portion of the estate which they have received in a compromise negotiated by him with their consent, is valid, if the consideration is adequate, and the transaction is without concealment or fraud on his part.-MITCHELL V. COLBY, Iowa, 63 N. W. Rep. 769.

25. CONTRACT Rescission-Burden of Proof. In an action against a vendee to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud and undue influence, where no fiduciary relations existed between the parties, the burden of proof is on plaintiff. -COOPER V. REILLY, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 885.

26. CORPORATIONS Construction of Charter - Directors. The declaration in the articles of incorporation of a chamber of commerce, that it "is formed not for profit," is not inconsistent with a provision for capital stock, nor with a declaration that it is intended to promote the prosperty of the city in which it is lo43. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE Discharge of Em plovee. An action of tort does not lie against an em. ployer for discharging a servant.-COMERFORD V. WEST END ST. RY. CO., Mass., 41 N. E. Rep. 59.

eated; and the trustees or directors of such corporation are personally liable for all its debts by them contracted.-SNYDER V. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Ohio, 41 N. E. Rep. 33,

27. CORPORATIONS - Consolidation - New Stock.Where several corporations transferred their entire property and business to a new corporation, which accepted the same subject to an agreement between the members of the original corporations that payment for the transfer should be made by an issuance of stock of the new company to the several original incorporators, respectfully, in exchange for the old stock held by each, an original stockholder could sue the new company to compel it to issue to him the number of its shares conceded to be his proportion.ANTHONY V. AMERICAN GLUCOSE Co., N. Y., 41 Ν. Ε. Rep. 23.

28. CORPORATIONS Insolvency - Preference.-Directors of an insolvent corporation cannot take advantage of their position to obtain a preference of debts owing by the corporation to themselves. Neither can they prefer debts to third persons, for which they are obligated as sureties.-TILLSON V. DOWNING, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 836.

29. CORPORATIONS-Franchises-Right to Transfer.Franchises granted to an electric light company, and the property used to exercise the same, being inalienable, a transfer thereof to an electric street railway company does not relieve the electric light company from liability for taxes thereon, or cast it on the railway company.-MILWAUKEE ST. RY. CO. V. ANDERSON, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 746.

30. CORPORATION Creditors' Bill.-One is not entitled to rellef under a creditors' bill against a foreign corporation, when he has not issued execution under his judgment in the only county in the State in which the corporation has a place of business and where its property is, as he knows, though he has issued an execution in the county in which his judgment was rendered, and it has been returned unsatisfied.NORTHWESTERN IRON CO. V. WEST SUPERIOR IRON & STEEL CO., Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 752.

21. CORPORATION - Discharge of Employee. - Where the by laws of a railroad company vest in an executive committee the control of the salaries and functions of all "executive and administrative officers," and provide that the officers of the passenger and certain other departments shall be appointed by the first vice presi dent, subject to the approval of the president, and may be removed by him at pleasure, the first vicepresident has authority, with the consent of the president, to employ a person for a fixed term as general passenger and ticket agent of the road.-MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. V. FAULKNER, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 543.

32. COURTS Disqualification of Judge. The court record need not show that the judge, in calling in a judge from another circuit, as provided by Rev. St. 1889, § 4178, was justified in so doing by the acceptance of the conditions prescribed by the statute, this being presumed.-STATE V. NEWSUM, MO., 31 S. W. Rep. 605.

33. CREDITORS' BILL-Statutory Remedy. To entitle one to maintain a bill under the statutes giving a remedy in equity against property of a debtor which cannot be attached or taken on execution at law, the claim need not be reduced to judgment.-SANFORD V. SOULE PIANO & ORGAN INV. CO., Mass., 41 N. E. Rep. 120.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape-Intent.-A person is guilty of rape, w'thout reference to his ulterior intention in the event of resistance, if the woman yields through fear of, or to, superior force.-HOOPER V. STATE, Ala., 17 South. Rep. 679.

35. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. On the separate trial of one of two who had been indicted together for larceny, it is fatal error to admit against the one on trial the acts and statements of the other, made after the crime had been completely committed.-PEOPLE V. FARRELL, Utah, 40 Pac. Rep. 703.

36. CRIMINAL LAW Jury - Indictment. On the ex amination of a juror on his voir dire, each party has the right, within reasonable limits, to put pertinent questions for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for a challenge for cause, and also to enable the party to properly exercise his statutory right of peremptory challenge.BASYE V. STATE, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 811.

37. CRIMINAL LAW - Homicide. A person who is un. lawfully attacked by another in such a manner as to excite in him a reasonable belief that he is in danger of losing his life or receiving some great bodily in. jury may use such force to repel the attack as at the time appears to him to be reasonably necessary, al though he may be mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger, when other reasonable and judicious men would have been alike mistaken. He is justified in acting, in such case, upon the facts as they appear to him, and is not to be judged by the facts as they actually are.-BABR V. STATE, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 857.

38. DEED-Mineral Lands - Constructions. A deed reserving the right to prospect for "coal and other minerals," and to mine and remove the same, if found on the land conveyed, does not convey a fee simple; and a quit claim deed releasing the right reserved as to coal, only, does not cure the defect.-ADAMS V. REED, 40 Pac. Rep. 720.

39. EASEMENT - Highway - One who, after agreeing with an adjoining owner upon the opening of a road between their tracts, each to give part of the land therefor, obstructed the proposed road by fences for a period of 30 years, cannot ask the courts to aid him in opening up the road, as against one who purchased the land of the adjoining owner in ignorance of the agreement as to the road, and built his fences along side the other's fences without objection.-MONAGHAN V. MEMPHIS FAIR & EXPOSITION Co., Tenn., 31 S. W. Rep. 497.

40. ЕЈЕСTMENT Improvements - Color of TitleSubrogation-Tenants in Common.- Possession under a deed which is afterwards set aside on the ground that there was no delivery thereof may constitute a possession while "holding adversely by color of title asserted in good faith, founded on a written instru ment," within Rev. St. §§ 3096, 3098, allowing recovery for improvement to a person so in possession, where a recovery of the land is had of him. STEWART V. STEWART, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 886.

41. ELECTIONS-Marking Ballots. - Ballots should not be rejected because the names thereon of candidates not voted for were stricken out with a pencil, or be cause certain letters or figures were written on them, or because the same number was written on them twice.-HANSCOM V. STATE, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 547.

42. EMINENT DOMAIN Extension of Street Across Railroad.-Where extension of a street is made across a railroad right of way 200 feet wide, of which only 60 feet is occupied by tracks, it is error to exclude evidence of the value to the railroad company of the re sidue of the land for the purpose of erecting thereon permanent structures for railroad purposes other than tracks, since the use of the land for the street will neeessarily exclude its use for such structures.-ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. V. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 41 N. E. Rep. 45.

44. EQUITY-Bill to Cancel Tax Deeds. -A bill by a landowner to cancel numerous tax deeds, held by different persons under a sale made by the commis sioner of school lands, in West Virginia, in one proceeding to forfeit the lands for taxes, may be maintained as a bill to remove cloud from title, and on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, where all the parties claim under a common source of title.ULMAN V. JAEGER, U. S. C.C. (W. Va.), 67 Fed. Rep.

980.

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