been domiciled therein at the time the cause of action arose, or unless the defendant shall have been personally served with process within said State, or should have voluntarily appeared in such action or proceeding, and that where a marriage is dissolved both parties to the action shall be at liberty to marry again. Among all the subjects considered that of marriage and divorce, it appears, aroused the greatest difference of opinion. Mr. Stimson very properly points out that the law of corporations is one of the subjects most needing uniformity; but with the exception of marriage and divorce there is no subject wherein uniformity is more hopeless. The laws of adjoining States vary from laxity to extreme severity, giving corporations indefinite powers or limiting them to hardly any. He suggests two or three cardinal propositions which might be adopted in all States to the benefit of the country generally: First, that the capital stock of all corporations should be paid for in cash at par, and proper State regulations made to see that this was carried out; second, that this capital should be maintained unimpaired, and third, that the indebtedness of no corporation should exceed the amount of its capital stock. This is already the law in many States, and would inure to the great benefit both of investors and creditors throughout the Union if it could be made general; fourth, upon the important question of the transfer of stock, all will agree with Mr. Stimson in thinking that in view of the number of loans which are in modern times based on a pledge of stock by delivery of the certificate, that this delivery should be made, as it now is in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and many States, sufficient to hold the stock in the hands of the person advancing the money on it as against any attaching creditor on the books of the corporation. There are in the address many other valuable suggestions in the direction of uniformity which it would be well for the commissioners to adopt.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

CRIMINAL LAW - INCEST INTERCOURSE WITH RELATIVE OF HALF BLOOD. - One of the points decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Shelley v. State, 31 S. W.

Rep. 492, is that brothers and sisters of half blood are included in a statute providing that no man "shall have carnal knowledge *** of the daughter of his brother or sister." This precise question was before the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of State v. Wyman, 59 Vt. 527, where the court said: "It was objected that the indictment was not sustained by proof that the respondent committed the offense with a daughter of his halfbrother, it being claimed that the word brother in the statute was not broad enough to cover a brother of the half blood. In support of this claim it is urged that, at common law, a brother of the half blood is not a brother, and cannot inherit as such. It is true that by the common law a brother of the half blood could not inherit, but this was a rule for the regulation of the descent of property, and had no broader scope. It did not undertake to affect the relations of brethren of the half blood any further than to prescribe, for certain reasons having their origin in the ancient system of feudal tenures, that on the descent of the inheritance a brother of the half blood should be left out. The common law rule, therefore, would have no force in a case of this kind, but the generally understood significance, and the word 'brother' as used in the common affairs of life, and as defined by lexicographers of recognized authority, should be adopted in the construction of the statute." See, also, Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50.

The court in the Tennessee case first referred to also hold that one who knowingly and voluntarily commits the crime of incest is an accomplice, and the other party cannot be convicted upon her uncorroborated testimony. In the case of Mercer v. State, 17 Tex. App. 452, it was held that, if a woman consents to the crime of incest, she is an accomplice, and a conviction cannot be had upon her unsupported testimony, and that she must be deemed to have consented, where she testifies that the crime was committed between her father and herself weekly for a period of eight years. Again, in the case of Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237, the court said, viz.: "It was entirely upon the testimony of the defendant's daughter, with whom the incestuous intercourse is alleged to have occurred, that this conviction was obtained. It is contended by defendant's counsel that she was an accomplice in the of

ceptance by the seller of an installment of the purchase money, after default, is a recognition of the contract as still subsisting, and a waiver of the forfeiture. Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 158; Hurst v. Thompson, 73 Ala. 158. And other acts than acceptance may have the same effect. A party cannot take two inconsistent positions. If he has a right either to rescind a contract on account of a breach by the other party or to continue it in force, and he elects to continue it in force, he thereby abandons the right to rescind, and is bound by the election so made. Boldman v. Burt, 61 Md. 422; Manufacturing Co. v. Larentz, 44 Md. 233; Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns. Ch. 23. And so a vendor of chattels, where a fraud has been practiced, has a right either to affirm the contract and sue for the price or to rescind it and retake the goods, but he is bound by his first election. Troup v. Appleman, 52 Md. 456. In like manner a cause of forfeiture in a lease may be waived. In 1 Add. Cont. marg. p. 260, it is laid down that "the right of entry for forfeiture of a lease is governed by the general law that where a man has got a right to elect to do a thing to the injury of another his election, when once made, is final and conclusive, and he cannot afterwards alter his determination. If therefore, a lease has been forfeited, and there is an election on the part of the landlord to enter and defeat the lease, or not, as he pleases, and he by word or act manifests his intention that the lease shall continue, he waives the forfeiture, and cannot afterwards annul the lease." Leake, Cont. (3d Ed.) p. 583, to the same effect. In such cases of a waiver of a forfeiture or of a right to rescind a contract, there is no necessity for a consideration, but the question turns rather upon the principle of election between two inconsistent rights. Bish. Cont. § 805; Johnston v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 466; Manufacturing Co. v. Teetzlaff, 53 Wis. 220, 10 N. W. Rep. 155; Deyoe v. Jamison, 33 Mich. 94. A case similar in some respects to the case at bar is that of Albert v. Investment Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 127, where Lord Cockburn said: "This is the case of a mortgage whereby the mortgagor transfers the property in certain goods to the mortgagees, but subject to the mortgagor's right of redemption; and there are certain clauses in the deed, the result of which is that the mortgagees cannot seize and sell the goods unless the mortgagor makes default in paying the installments of £2, which he is bound to do on each successive Monday till the loan is repaid. Now the facts are that the plaintiff's wife went to Bayne (who must be taken to have had full authority *), and told him that her husband had difficulty in meeting the installment due on the 28th of August, and Bayne extended the time for payment of that and the next installment to the 11th of September. Now the bill of sale provides that if the mortgagor shall make 'default' in payment of the sum of £62. 10s., or any part thereof, the whole amount shall be then immediately due and payable, and it shall be lawful for the mortgagees to take possession of the goods, and to sell and dispose of them. Now 'default' must be taken to mean a nonpayment by a party bound to pay, without the consent of the parties having a right to waive the payment; and I see nothing which goes to show that if, by the consent of the person who is to receive payment, the time for payment is extended, the omission to pay within the time specified must be a 'default' within the meaning of the word in the bill of sale; and it would be monstrous to hold that it was a default, for the mortgagee might always lead the mortgagor into a snare by consenting that the time for payment should be extended, and then coming down upon him

by insisting that there had been a default." It is true that this case, so far as the meaning of the word "default" is concerned, was questioned by Lord Justice Bramwell in Williams v. Stern, 5 Q. B. Div. 412; but the bill of sale before the court in Williams v. Stern gave to the vendee a right to remove the property and sell it in the event of a failure to pay the installments when due, and such failure made the whole debt due. Unlike the case at bar, it did not provide for an election between a right to declare a forfeiture and a right to continue the contract in force. In Carpenter v. Blandford, 8 Barn. & C. 575, there was a waiver of a default in payment which was held to be binding. It appeared in this case that the defendant had agreed to sell to the plaintiff certain property at an appraisement to be made by appraisers to be appointed by the respective parties. The price was to be paid on or before March 25th, and the buyer deposited a sum to be forfeited if he did not complete the agreement. The appraisers met on March 25th, when plaintiff's appraiser said that he could not finish the work till the next day. No objection was then made, but on the next day the defendant refused to proceed. In deciding the question of his right to do so, Bayley, J., said: "The defendant in this case insists on a forfeiture which is strictissimi juris. He ought therefore to show that he has done everything which he was bound to do to entitle him to insist on the forfeiture, and that he has not done anything to waive that right. It was the duty of defendant's agent to inform his principal that such a communication was made, and it must be presumed that he did so. If that communication was made, and the defendant meant to insist on the forfeiture, it was his duty to inform the plaintiff that he should insist on the forfeiture unless the contract was completed on that day." These principles are conclusive of the present case. The failure of the appellant to pay the installments when due was a default which did not render the contract void, or cause the entire purchase money to become due, but the contract was thereby made voidable at the option of the appellee. It was then necessary for the appellee to elect whether he would avoid the contract, retake the goods, and declare a forfeiture of the installments already paid, or whether he would continue it in force and become entitled to the future payments. He made his election to continue the contract in force by his notification to the appellant, who had a right to rely upon it, and, having thus waived the forfeiture on account of this particular default, it follows that he could not subsequently insist upon it.

CRIMINAL LAW-OBSCENE PUBLICATIONINDICTMENT.-In Commonwealth v. McCance, 41 N. E. Rep. 133, it is held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that on a prosecution for selling a book, only parts of which contain obscene language, if the language complained of is too obscene to place in the records, the indictment must identify by description or reference the parts containing the language upon which it is founded. Field, C. J., says:

The first precedent, so far as we know, for an indictment in this form is the second count in the indictment in Com. v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335. In that case the court say: "The second and fifth counts in this indictment are certainly good; for it can never be required that an obscene book and picture should be displayed upon the records of the court, which must be done if the description in these counts is insufficient. This would be to require that the public itself should give permanency and notoriety to indecency in order to punish it." This decision has been followed by many of the courts in this country. See People v. Girardin, 1 Mich. 90; State v. Pennington, 5 Lea, 506; McNair v. People, 89 Ill. 441; Fuller v. People, 92 III. 182; State v. Brown, 27 Vt. 619; State v. Griffin, 43 Tex. 538; State v. Smith, 17 R. I. 371, 22 Atl. Rep. 282; U. S. v. Bennett, 16 Blatchf. 338, Fed. Cas. No. 14,571. No authorities are cited in Com.v. Holmes, and the opinion in Com. v. Wright, 1 Cush. 46, shows that the decision in Com. v. Holmes must be regarded as an exception to the general rule of pleading relating to libelous publications. Com. v. Tarbox, 1 Cush. 66, decides that in an indictment for publishing an obscene paper, if the indictment purports to set out the alleged publication, it must do it in the very words of the paper, and the court say that "the excepted cases occur whenever a publication of this character is so obscene as to render it improper that it should appear on the record; and then the statement of the contents may be omitted altogether, and a description thereof substituted; but, in this case, a reason for the omission must appear in the indictment by proper averments." See Com. v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46. Com. v. Wright, 139 Mass. 382, 1 N. E. Rep. 411, where the indictment was quashed, decides that the indictment "must at least by some general description identify the paper" which is alleged to contain obscene matter, and which the defendant is charged with publishing. This question of the mode of pleading in cases of this kind was considered in England by the court of appeals, in Bradlaugh v. The Queen, 3 Q. B. Div. 607, and it was unan. imously decided that the words alleged to be obscene must be set out according to their tenor. The two principal Massachusetts cases were considered, and the decision in Com. v. Holmes was not approved. Id. 620, 638, 641. But the weight of authority in this country is in favor of the decision in Com. v. Holmes, and the principle of that decision has been several times recognized by this court as correct, and we think that it must be regarded as an established rule of law in this commonwealth. It remains to be considered whether the present indictment contains a reasonably specific description of the obscene, inde. cent, and impure language which it is alleged that the book, among other things, contains. The Decameran of Boccaccio was probably not written for the purpose of corrupting the morals of youth. It was written long before the invention of printing, when the number of persons who could read were few, and it is supposed to represent the taste of many cultivated people of the world in Italy at the time. It was read for the entertainment of men and woman. Parts of it are coarse, and according to the standards of modern times, are obscene, indecent, and impure, and other parts of it are decent and pure enough to be read by the present generation. Because it is not a book which is wholly obscene, indecent, and impure, the book is described in the indictment as containing, "among other things, certain obscene, indecent, and impure language." If books of this character are to be regarded as within the provisions of St. 1890, ch. 70, upon which we express no opinion, we think it reasonable that the parts of the book which the grand jury find to be obscene, indecent, and impure should be described or referred to in the indictment so

specifically that they can be identified by the evidence, unless they are set out according to their tenor. In the present indictment it cannot be known that the defendant has not been indicted upon evidence relating to certain parts of the book, and convicted upon evidence relating to certain other parts. A picture or print has no tenor, and must of necessity be set out by description, but printed words always can be set out according to their tenor. If this is not done because it is alleged that the language is too indecent to be placed on the records of the court, we think that, in the absence of any statute regulating the procedure, the law requires that the language complained of should be identified by such a description or reference that it may be known that the indictment was founded upon the language which is put in evidence and relied upon at the trial. If the obscene language complained of is found only in some passages in a book, the rest of which is free from obscenity, the book as a whole should not be presented, but only the book as containing these obscene passages. The records of the court of common pleas or of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Worcester contained no copy of the book entitled "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," referred to in the indictment in Com. v. Holmes, but apparently the whole book was presented, and the indictment was at common law. The statutes on the subject were first enacted here in Rev. St. ch. 130, § 10. It may be suggested that on a motion to quash the indictment the court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the book referred to in the indictment. But it appears by the indictment that the book referred to contains other things than the obscene language complained of, and no attempt has been made in the indictment to distinguish between these other things and the obscene language, and no excuse has been given in the indictment for not designating the part of the book complained of, and the evidence shows that the indictment might easily have described or referred to the novels put in evidence so that the defendant could have known to what he was called upon to answer at the trial. We are of opinion that the indictment is not reasonably specific, and that it should have been quashed.

PUBLIC RECORDS RIGHT TO INSPECTABSTRACT OF TITLE-MANDAMUS. -In Barber v. West Jersey Title & Guaranty Co., 32 Atl. Rep. 222, it is held by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in accordance with the weight of authority, that every person has the right of access to the public records of the county clerk's office, without the payment of fees to the clerk, to examine any title in which he is interested, subject to reasonable rules and regulations; that the respondent in the case has the same right of access to the records when employed to examine and guaranty the title to a particular piece of the property, but has not the right to occupy the office of the clerk for the purpose of making an abstract of the records, in order to set up and establish a rival business to the clerk, and that mandamus is the proper fense, and that, her testimony being uncorroborated in the manner required by law, the conviction is not sustained by sufficient evidence. If the witness knowingly, voluntarily, and with the same intent which actuated the defendant, united with him in the commission of the crime charged against him, she was an accomplice, and her uncorroborated testimony cannot support the conviction. But if, in the commission of the incestuous act, she was the victim of force, threats, fraud, or undue influence, so that she did not act voluntarily, and did not join in the commission of the act with the same intent that actuated the defendant, then she would not be an accomplice, and a conviction would stand even upon her uncorroborated testimony." Whart. Cr. Ev. § 440; Freeman v. State, 11 Tex. App. 92.

STATUTORY PENALTIES ACTION TO RECOVER.-The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Hale, 63 N. W. Rep. 849, after a review of the authorities, which are somewhat in conflict, held that an informer cannot maintain an action in his own name to recover a penalty unless authorized so to do by statute. Rogan, C., says:

James B. Hale, suing for himself and the State of Nebraska, brought this suit to the District Court of Lancaster county, against the Omaha & Republican Valley Railroad Company, to recover the penalty denounced by section 104, ch. 16, Comp. St. 1893, against corporations owning railroads that had neglected to sound a whistle or ring a bell at railroad and street crossings. The petition contained 76 causes of action, substantially alike, and prayed judgment as follows: "Wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant for the sum of $3,800 and costs of suits." Hale had a verdict and judgment, and the railroad company has prosecuted to this court a petition in

error.

The section of the statute on which this action is based (said section 104) is as follows: "A bell of at least thirty pounds weight or a steam whistle shall be placed on each locomotive engine, and shall be rung or whistled at the distance of at least thirty rods from the place where the said railroad shall cross any other road or street, and be kept ringing or whistling until it shall have crossed said road or street, under a penalty of fifty dollars for every neglect, to be paid by the corporation owning the railroad, one-half thereof to go to the informer, and the other half to the State, and also be liable for all damages which shall be sustained by any person by reason of such neglect." Can the informer mentioned in said statute maintain an action in his own name to recover the penalty provided for therein? There seems to be some conflict among the authorities on this question. In U. S. v. Laescki, 29 Fed. Rep. 699, it was held that such an action must be brought in the name of

the informer, and that the penalty could not be recovered by indictment at the instance of the government; but the statute on which that action was predicated provided that: "Every person who violates this section shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars, recoverable one-half to the use of the informer." Rev. St. U. S. $5188. The word "recoverable," in this statute, would seem to authorize a suit for the penalty by the informer.

Railroad Co. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 415, was an action brought by Howard, suing for himself and the State of Illinois, against the railroad company. The statute on which the action was based provided that, if the railroad company should fail to sound a whistle or ring a bell, etc., "it shall forfeit a penalty of fifty dollars, one-half to the informer and the other half to the State." Laws 1849, p. 31, § 38. It is to be observed that this statute is almost identical with ours; and the court held that the suit was properly brought in the name of Howard.

In Lynch v. The Economy, 27 Wis. 69, it was held that the informer might maintain an action in his own name for the penalty. The court said: "The action is evidently a qui tam action, and we are inclined to hold may be brought in the name of the complainant (informer) alone. It is a general rule that a common informer cannot sue for a penalty unless authorized so to do by statute; but many cases hold, where the statute gives the forfeiture, or a part of it, 'to any person who shall prosecute therefor,' that this, or equivalent language, confers express authority upon him to sue in his own But if there were any doubt upon this point it is removed by the language making the penalty a demand or lien against the boat, 'to be sued for and collected in the manner provided' for the collection of demands against boats and vessels. This language, we think, shows that the statute contemplated that the complainant (informer) should be the plaintiff in the action, and that the proceeding should be analogous to an ordinary suit for the collection of a demand against a vessel."

name.

The statute of Arkansas provided that railroad companies should cause a whistle to be sounded or bell rung, etc., "under a penalty of two hundred dollars for every neglect, to be paid by the corporation owning the railroad, one-half thereof to go to the informer and the other half to the county," etc. Mansf. Dig. § 5478. One Bell sued in his name, for the use of the State of Arkansas and Miller county, a railroad company, to recover the penalty provided for by said statute. The court said: "The demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained as it showed that the plaintiff, Bell, was not, and that the State was, the party entitled to prosecute the action." St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. State (Ark.), 19 S. W. Rep. 572.

In Nye v. Lamphere, 2 Gray, 295, the court sustained a suit brought by an informer in his own name to recover a statutory penalty, but the statute on which the action was based provided that the penalty was "to be recovered in any court proper to try the same, one-half to the use of the said town and the other half to any person who shall prosecute therefor." St. 1851, ch. 98, § 1. This statute expressly conferred authority on the informer to prosecute the action. The court said: "The defendant's objection to the maintenance of this action is that the plaintiff is an informer, and therefore cannot sue in his own name, because authority so to sue is not given him by statute. And undoubtedly it is a general rule that a common informer cannct sue for a penalty, without express statuory authority. But by what terms

in a statute is such authority conferrred? Certainly by terms like those used in the statute on which this action is brought, namely, by giving the forfeiture, or a part of it, to any person who shall prosecute therefor."

In Higby v. People, 4 Seam. 166, a suit was brought to recover a penalty in the name of the people. The statute provided that the penalty sued for should go to the informer and the county, and the court held that the State had no interest in the recovery, that, "the statute not authorizing the suit to be instituted in the name of the people, it was improperly brought, and the court erred in not dismissing it." Laws 1835, p. 63, § 2.

In Colburn v. Swett, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 232, it was held that: "As a general rule, a common informer cannot maintain an action for a penalty, unless power is given to him for that purpose by statute."

In Fleming v. Bailey, 5 East, 313, it was held that at common law an informer could not sue in his own name to recover a penalty; that he had no right to maintain an action for a penalty except such right was conferred by statute. To the same effect, see Barnard v. Gostling, 2 East, 569.

These authorities, we think, without serious conflict, recognize this rule: An informer cannot maintain an action in his own name to recover a penalty unless authorized so to do by statute. The statute on which this action is based does not expressly authorize the penalty denounced by said statute to be sued for and recovered by an informer, nor does the statute contain any language from which such an authority may be inferred. The act provides that the penalty shall be paid by the corporation owning the railroad. Paid to whom? We think, paid to the State. The corporation by violating the law forfeited to its sovereign, the State, not to the informer, the penalty denounced by the act. It is true that the law holds out an inducement to the citizen to inform the officers charged with the execution of the law of its violation, and in effect offers the informer a reward for his information; but it does not authorize the informer to bring the action, nor, when brought, to control it.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-VOID JUDGMENTTRESPASS.-In McVea v. Walker, 31 S. W. Rep. 839, it is decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas that a justice of the peace is liable in damages for injuries inflicted under color of a judgment rendered by him with knowledge that he was so related to one of the parties as to render the judgment void, and that one who commits a trespass under color of a void judgment rendered by a justice may be sued therefor jointly with the justice. The court says:

It is provided by law that "no justice of the peace shall sit in any cause where he may be interested, or where he may be related to either party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity." Sayles' Civ. St. art. 1538. Vanfleet, in his work on "Collateral Attacks on Judicial Proceedings" (section 49), and the Supreme Courts of a few of the States, take the position that judgments rendered by a judicial officer in violation of the statute as to relationship are merely voidable, but the great weight of American authority s to the effect that they are absolutely null and void.

Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219; Horton v. Howard, 44 N. W. Rep. 1112, 79 Mich. 642; Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 254; People v. Connor, 142 N. Y. 130, 36 N. E. Rep. 807, affirming same case in 20 N. Y. Supp. 209. To the same effect are the decisions in Texas. Chambers v. Hodges, 23 Tex. 104; Newcome v. Light, 58 Tex. 141: Templeton v. Giddings (Tex. Sup.), 12 S. W. Rep. 851; Winston v. Masterson (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. Rep. 691; Frieburg v. Isbell (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. Kep. 988. The justice of the peace having been, as alleged, related within the third degree to one of the parties to the suit, his judgment was absolutely void, and want of jurisdiction could be shown in a collateral proceeding; and, while appellant might have gained relief by appeal or certiorari, he was not compelled to do so. He had the right to proceed in an independent action for damages received under color of the authority given by the void judgment. Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 254. The justice of the peace being disqualified from sitting in the case by the plain, positive terms of the statute, there was no scope for the exercise of any judicial discretion on his part. It is alleged that the fact of his disqualification was brought before him, and that he had full knowledge of the same, and there is excellent authority for holding that he would be responsible for dam. ages arising from his acts in rendering the judgment and issuing the writ by which the property was seized and converted. 2 Add. Torts, 966, p. 178; Inos v. Winspear, 18 Cal. 399; Clarke v. May, 2 Gray, 410; Piper v. Pearson, Id. 120. It is said in the Piper-Pearson Case: "If a magistrate acts beyond the limits of his jurisdiction, his proceedings are deemed to be coram non judice, and void; and if he attempts to enforce any process founded on any judgment, sentence, or conviction in such case, he thereby becomes a trespasser." This is, as said in Clarke v. May, undoubtedly the law, when it is made to appear that the justice of the peace was cognizant of all the facts which constituted the defect of jurisdiction in the proceedings. Judicial officers will be protected in the fearless and impartial administration of justice so long as they act within the scope of their jurisdiction, but when they knowingly act outside of and beyond their jurisdiction their acts become a wanton and oppressive abuse of authority, and they will be held responsible as any other trespasser for the injuries arising out of their acts.

SALE-DEFAULT IN PAYMENT-WAIVER.The Court of Appeals of Maryland decide in Cole v. Hines, 32 Atl. Rep. 196, that where goods are sold to be paid for in installments at specified times, title to remain in the seller till all payments are made, and the seller to have the right in case of default in any payment to treat the agreement as annulled, and retake the goods, or give more time, the granting of more time by the seller after a default is a waiver thereof, by which he is bound. The court says in part:

In all contracts where time is of the essence, a breach of the contract in that respect by one of the parties may be waived by the other party's subse quently treating the contract as still in force. Pinckney v. Dambmann, 72 Md. 178, 19 Atl. Rep. 450; Webb v. Hughes, L. R. 10 Eq. 281; Black v. Woodrow, 39 Me. 194. In these cases of conditional sales, the ac