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of the course pursued by the officer. He is not liable, unless he consents to the officer's course, or subsequently adopts it." There is an entire absence of competent testimony in this case to show that the plaintiff in error authorized, or had knowledge of, any improper conduct of the officer, if there was any, and therefore nothing upon which to base a verdict against him for damages for any trespass then committed. Before he can be so held, it must appear (1) that there was such an abuse of the process by the constable as to make him a trespasser, and to forfeit all protection which his writ otherwise would give; and (2) that plaintiff in error either directed or counseled such wrongful conduct, or thereafter consented thereto by accepting the benefits resulting therefrom, with full knowledge of the facts. The instructions which were given by the court at the special instance of the defendant in error ignored these principles, which lie at the foundation of the liability of the plaintiff in error, and are erroneous.

TAXATION LICENSE OF CARRIER-INTERSTATE COMMERCE. -In City of San Bernardino v. Southern Pac. Co., 40 Pac. Rep. 796, it was held by the Supreme Court of California that a city, situated on a branch and not the main line of a foreign railway corporation engaged in business involving interstate commerce, cannot impose on the company a license tax on the privilege of engaging in the business of a common carrier within its limits. The court upon this question says:

In the agreed statement of facts we find the following: "That the defendant is now, and at all the times stated in plaintiff's complaint herein was, a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and engaged in operating, as lessee of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, a continuous line of steam railroad, for the carriage of freight, passengers, and United States mails, for hire as common carriers, from the city of New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, through the States of Louisiana and Texas, the territories of New Mexico and Arizona, and the States of California and Oregon, to the city of Portland in the State of Oregon, and that as a part of its said transcontinental line of railroad, and connecting with its main line thereof, near Colton in the county of San Bernardino, State of California, it operates a line of steam railroad to and into the city of San Bernardino, in said county and State, for the carriage of freight, passengers and United States mails to and from points on its said main line of railroad outside the State of California; also between points in the State of California; and that it does now, and at all times mentioned in said complaint did, under contracts with the gov. ernment of the United States, regularly carry over its said line of railroad the mails of the United States to and from said city of San Bernardino, and to and from points outside of the State of California, and has at all times mentioned in the complaint herein maintained an office at said city of San Bernardino for the carrying on of its said business."

A license tax which is a tax on the privilege of doing business involving interstate commerce, is void, and cannot be enforced. This doctrine cannot be questioned. In Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725, the court said: "We have repeatedly held that no

State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which solely belongs to congress." See, also, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 Sup. Ct. 851.

It would appear from appellant's brief that this proposition of law is not controverted, but its application to the facts of this case is denied upon the ground, as it is claimed, that the line of railroad operated by the defendant in the city of San Bernardino is not its main trunk line, but is only a branch thereof. In other words, it is conceded that a similar license tax to the one here involved would not be a valid tax, and could not be collected, in any city located upon the main trunk line of road between New Orleans and Portland, Or., not even in the city of Colton, which is situated at the point of junction of the main and branch lines, and in the same county as the plaintiff itself. Under the agreed statement of facts, there is no sound foundation upon which to rest the application of a different principle of law in these two classes of cities. It is stipulated that this branch line is “a part of its said transcontinental line of railroad," and in the face of the existence of such fact we do not

perceive any force in plaintiff's contention that this particular part of the railroad is no part of its main trunk line. But the stipulation of facts even goes beyond this broad statement, and declares that the line of road operating in the city of San Bernardino carries passengers, freight and United States mails to and from points, on its said main line of railroad, outside of the State of California; also between points in the State of California, and likewise conveys the United States mails to and from such points. Carrying passengers and freight from San Bernardino to a thousand places on the line of the road in other States, and likewise from those points to San Bernardino, is conducting an interstate commerce business pure and simple, and by the stipulation this is the business the defendant is carrying on in the city of San Bernardino. The question of power in the city to create such an ordinance is not to be tested by the fact as to whether or not the city is located upon any particular line of railroad, be it trunk or branch line, but rather by the character of the business in which the defendant is engaged in the city passing the ordinance. In dealing with this question, we do not concern ourselves as to the character of the franchise under which either the trunk line or the branch line of defendant is doing business. The character of defendant's business, and not the character of its franchise, points the judg. ment. Again, as far as plaintiff is concerned, it is the terminus of the transcontinental line; but we think the question of direct line and termini wholly immaterial.

If this question is to be determined by the character of the business done, and we are clear that by such rule the rights of defendant are to be measured, then plaintiff stands upon common ground with every other city situated in the State of California upon the main line proper, for in those cities the defendant conducts and carries on the same kind and character of business as is conducted and carried on in the city of San Bernardino. While defendant does business in the city of San Barnardino in carrying freight and passengers to and from other points in the State of California upon the trunk line, the same conditions are present as to every other city located upon the trunk line, and such circumstances, if controlling, would give them all power to levy the tax here assailed.

There is no attempt by the ordinance here under discussion to levy this tax upon the local business of the defendant, even if the power to take such course existed, but by its terms it includes both local and interstate business. The ordinance covers its entire business as common carriers, regardless of its nature, and therefore, of necessity operates as a burden upon interstate commerce, if its business is of that character. As a condition attached to the conduct of its business in the city of San Bernardino, it is required by this ordinance to pay a tax to the city. In that city its business is not confined with the State lines of California. It is therefore engaged in interstate commerce, and, being so engaged, no statute or municipal law can burden or handicap its business, for the regulation thereof rests solely in the hands of congress.

SALE-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. In Rogers v. Schnieder, 41 N. E. Rep. 71, it was held by the Appellate Court of Indiana that as affecting the right of stoppage in transitu on account of the insolvency of the vendee, it was a question for the jury whether the transit had ended where the vendee, being unable to pay the freight, was, to save demurrage, allowed by the railroad to unload the cars and pile the goods in its yard until he could pay the freight. The following is from the opinion:

The right of a vendor of personal property to retake it before it comes into the actual possession of the vendee, upon the vendee's insolvency, or inability to pay therefor, is highly favored on account of its intrinsic justice. One man's goods ought not to be taken to satisfy the debts of another. The vendor, if it be possible to do so, without violating any principle of law, should have the prior right to make himself secure out of the property which gave rise to the debt due him, and, to this end, he may retake the goods at any time before the transitus ends. A clear an unequivocal case of the termination of the transit should be made out by the evidence before the vendor should be deprived of this right. The transit does not necessarily end upon the arrival of the goods at the point of their destination, but continues so long as they remain in the possession and control of the carrier as such. It is true that the carrier may convert himself into an agent for the vendee, or receive and store goods as a warehouseman, and thus terminate the transit before the goods come into the actual possession of the vendor. This constitutes a constructive delivery to the vendee, and the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is lost. Benj. Sales, sec.. 1117; Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 Mees. & W. 518; Williams v. Hodgas (N. C.), 18 S. E. Rep. 83. There are some cases which hold that when the carrier, by arrangement or agreement with the vendee, becomes his agent or warehouseman, the agreement in order to terminate the transitus must be supported by a consideration. Farrell v. Railroad Co. (N. C.), 9 S. E. Rep. 302; Whitehead v. Anderson, supra. On the other hand, there are cases which hold that any arrangement made between the consignee and the carrier by which the carrier becomes a bailee for the goods will end the transitus. We do not find it neces

sary to go to either of these extremes in this case. Whether or not the transitus had ended, or in what capacity the railroad company held the iron-whether as carrier or bailee-at the time the mortgage was executed, was a question of fact, to be determined from all the evidence in the case, and should have been submitted to the jury. If the evidence was conflicting upon these questions, or if it was undisputed, and two reasonable inferences arise therefrom, it was within the province of the jury to determine the conflict and to draw the inference, and these questions should not be arbitrarily taken from it. The evidence makes a strong impression upon our minds that the railroad company has not ceased to be a carrier, in relation to the iron, at the time the appellant exercised its right of stoppage in transitu. At all events, under the circumstances of this case, the appellant was entitled to go to the jury on that question.

THE SUICIDE CLAUSE IN LIFE POLICIES.

This subject in the law of life insurance is one whose scope is essentially narrow, both by reason of the limited ground for subtle minds to construct legal theories and distinctions upon, and because of the comparatively small number of cases involving the question. The clause itself does not generally contain as many as two dozen words, and the reported causes construing the same would probably not number much more than one hundred in all, yet it would be difficult to find any legal nut that has been cracked in so many different ways. The Supreme Court of the United States has well termed the conflict of decisions irreconcilable, and it cannot be said that the prospect of agreement between the various eminent tribunals that have differed on the subject, grows more hopeful as decisions multiply, and forceful arguments of able text-writers appear from time to time. Insurance companies have, indeed, attempted to simplify the matter in extending the scope of their suicide clauses by adding to them words of (seemingly) the most comprehensive import, but the effect has only been, as we shall see later on, to shift the ground of contention to another point, equally as difficult, equally as contestable as the former. The only remedy would seem to be the voluntary abandonment by the insurance companies of the suicide clause in their policies, or statutory regulations dealing with the subject. Missouri has adopted a statute providing in substance that suicide shall be no defense to an action on the policy, in spite of

1 Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580.

a clause to that effect, unless it shall be shown that the assured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy.2

I shall discuss the subject under the fol. lowing heads:

1. Where the policy contains no suicide clause.

2. Where the clause used contains the word "suicide," or its equivalent, without qualifying words.

3. Where the words "sane or insane," or their equivalent, are used.

4. Evidence.

1. Where the Policy Contains no Suicide Clause.-While no cases have been found expressly deciding that the suicide of the assured will avoid a policy, there are numerous authoritative dicta to that effect, and it is doubtless good law, proceeding, as it does, upon the principle that any other rule would virtually uphold a fraud against the company, and besides would be in contravention of sound policy and public morals. And it has

been held that where one insures with intent to commit suicide and so provide for his family and creditors, and, while sane, carries out that intent, the policy will be void, the court saying: "This was a legal fraud in its inception, and the policy thus obtained never had any binding force in his hands."'4 But on the other hand, it has been frequently decided that where the policy has been taken out for the benefit of others, suicide of the

2 Rev. Stat. § 5855.

3 Horn v. Anglo-Australian, etc., L. I. Co., 7 Jur. N. S. 673, 30 L. J. Ch. 511, 9 W. R. 359, 4 L. T. N. S. 142; Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 445; Bank of Oil City v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Big. L. I. Cas. 478; Moore v. Woolsey, 4 Ell. & Bl. 243; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. St. 466; Wainewright v. Bland, 1 M. & Rob. N. P. Cas. 486; Cf. Amicable Society v. Bland, 2 Dow & Clark, 1. But see contra, dictum of Hunt, J., in Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 586; and Cook on life Ins. § 41. So it has been held, on the ground of public policy, that no recovery can be had when death results from the insured having voluntarily submitted herself to an illegal operation, known by her to be dangerous to life, with intent to cause an abortion, without any justifiable medical reason. Hatch v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550.

4 Smith v. Nat. Ben. Soc. of N. Y., 51 Hun, 57, 54 N. Y. Supp. 521. Of course, the word "suicide" in the rule stated above means felonious suicide, for if the death of the assured was accidental, or he took his own life while insane, the policy will not be forfeited. Horn v. Anglo-Australian, etc., L. Ins. Co., supra.

assured will be no defense to an action in the absence of a clause to that effect.5

2. Where the Clause used Contains the word "Suicide," or its Equivalent, without Qualifying Words. Insurance companies have, however, for many years, been in the habit of inserting clauses in their policies, providing, in substance, that if the assured shall "commit suicide," or shall "die by suicide," or shall "die by his own hand," or shall "die by self-destruction," or other equivalent expression (for it is indubitably settled that these phrases mean one and the same thing), the policy shall be null and void.

a. Deaths Resulting from Accidents.-It may be stated at once, that all the authorities are agreed that deaths resulting from causes purely accidental are not within the meaning or scope of such a clause, as, for example, the taking of poison by mistake, the unintentional discharge of a pistol, or the fall from a building.7

b. Deaths Resulting from Insane Impulse. -All the authorities likewise agree that

5 Patrick v. Excelsior Life Ins. Co., 67 Barb. 202; Fitch v. Amer. Pop. L. Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 557; Kerr v. Minnesota Mut. Ben. Asso. 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. Rep. 312; Mills v. Rebstock, 29 Minn. 383, 13 N. W. Rep. 162; Darrow v. Family Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537, affirming 42 Hun, 245; Northwestern, etc., Asso. v. Wanner, 24 Ill. App. 357.

6 Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468; Bigelow v. Berkshire, Life Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121; Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227; Eastabrook v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; New Home L. Asso. v. Hagler, 29 Ill. App. 437; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dufaur v. Professional L. Ins. Co., 25 Beav. 599, 4 Jur. N. S. 841, 27 L. J. Ch. 817.

7 Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73, 8 N. Y. 299; Mallory v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; Penfold v. Universal L. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414; Blackstone v. Standard L. & A. Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 593, 42 N. W. Rep. 156; Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 29 N. E. Rep. 393; Edwards v. Travelers' L. Ins. Co., 20 Fed. R. 661; Eastabrook v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; Bank of Oil City v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 Big. Ins. Rep. 478; Scheffer v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 25 Minn. 534. So in Equitable L. Asso. Soc. v. Patterson, 41 Ga. 338, it was ruled that if assured drank to intoxication and while in this condition took an overdose of laudanum by mistake and died therefrom, this was not a dying by his own hand in the sense of the policy, even though the mistake was occasioned in some sense by his drunkenness; but if he took the laudanum to destroy his life, though it was only the intent of a drunken man, this was a dying by his own hand. But see Pollock v. U. S. Nat. Acc. Asso., 102 Pa. St. 230; Hill v. Hartford Acc. Ins. Co., 22 Hun (N. Y.), 187.

where the act is committed under an insane impulse which it is impossible to control, or when the assured is unable to understand the physical nature and effect of the act at the time he commits it, and that death will result therefrom, the policy will not be forfeited. In other words, the act must be voluntary and the assured must be capable of forming an intention to commit it. The limitation of the rule is well expressed in Weed v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. The court there says: "The policy was avoided, unless his mind was so impaired that he did not understand the consequences of his action, and that death would ensue. If he exercised volition, was capable of forming an intention, and with full knowledge that death would follow his action, his mind concurring in the act, he voluntarily destroyed his own life, the policy, by its terms, became null and void and of no effect." The following examples of deaths of this kind are given in the books: 10 Where the assured, in a paroxysm of fever, threw himself from a window, or, having been bled, under the influence of delirium removed the bandages, or compassed his destruction by any method while in a state of blind frenzy, etc. It will be perceived that cases of this description are little more than mere accident, and are, in fact, so treated.

c. Construction of Clause. - Having thus determined that in order to prevent a recovery under the clause in question, it is necessary that the death of the assured should have been intentional, not accidental, and voluntary, not involuntary, the question at once presents itself, what is meant by the term "suicide?" Does it imply the idea of felony? Is it essential, in order to bring the act of self-destruction within the meaning of the clause, that the mind of the assured

* Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121; Scheffer v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 25 Minn. 534; Lawrence v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Ill. App. 280; Van Zandt v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169; Newton v. Mut. Ben. L. I. Co., 76 N. Y. 426; Borrodaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & G.639; Mecham v. N. Y. State Mut. Ben. Asso., 120 N. Y. 237, affirming 46 Hun, 363; Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. St. 92; American L. Ins. Co. v. Isett, 74 Pa. St. 176; New Home L. Asso. v. Hagler, 29 III. App. 437; Coverston v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 Big. Ins. Rep. 169; Bank of Oil City v. Guar. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 5 Big. Ins. Rep. 478; Dean v. American Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), 96; St. Louis L. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush (Ky.), 268.

9 70 N. Y. 561, affirming 41 N. Y. Super. 476 and 35 N. Y. Super. 386.

10 Cases, supra.

should be capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the commission of the act? In brief, is suicide selfmurder? This is the question which has evoked so much discussion in the construction of this clause, and given rise to two exactly opposite opinions, one of which is called the English and one the American doctrine.

English Doctrine. -The earliest case on the subject is that of Bayley v. Alexander, which arose in Bengal in 1818.11 Here it was held that a recovery might be had in spite of the clause in question, if the assured was insane at the time of the commission of the act, on the ground that the word suicide must be taken in its criminal sense.

Bayley v. Alexander was not referred to either by the court or in the arguments of counsel in the next case that arose on the question-Borradaile v. Hunter, 12 which established the English doctrine. The clause here used was "die by his own hand." The assured destroyed himself by drowning, and the jury found that he "voluntarily threw himself into the water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life, and intending thereby to do so, but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." Here the question of moral insanity was squarely raised, and the court, Maule, Erskine and Coltman, JJ. (Tindal, C. J., dissenting), held that there could be no recovery. Erskine, J., said: "The only qualification that a liberal interpretation of the words with reference to the nature of the contract requires is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and wilful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequence of such an act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act, and the question whether at the time he was capable of understanding the moral nature and quality of his purpose, is not relevant to the inquiry further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the act itself."

The next English case was Clift v. Schwabe, 13 where the clause in the policy was

11 East's Notes, 79; 1 Morley's India Dig. 352, cited in Biddle on Ins. 832.

12 5 M. & G. 639.

18 3 C. B. 437, reversing 2 Car. & K. 134.

"commit suicide." It was attempted in the argument to differentiate this case from Borradaile v. Hunter, supra, on the ground that while the words "die by his own hand" might be broad enough to include all cases of intentional self-destruction, the phrase, "commit suicide," had a technical signification, indicating only the self-destruction of one conscious of the moral character of his act; but the court considered the two expressions equal and, by a majority decision of five to two, re-affirmed Borradaile v. Hunter. Rolfe, B., after reviewing the authorities and concluding from them that the word "suicide" 'did not necessarily, ex vi termini, import a criminal act, and therefore the act of a responsible moral agent,' continues as follows: "But after all our decision must rest entirely on what is the ordinary meaning of the term. In my opinion, every act of self-destruction is, in common language, described by the word suicide, provided it be the intentional act of a party knowing the probable consequences of what he is about. This is, I think, the ordinary meaning of the word, and I see nothing in the context enabling me to give it any but its ordinary signification." These decisions established the English rule which has been subsequently adhered to.14 It has also been followed in two or three States in this country. The earliest case in this country arose in New York in 1843,5 and seems to have laid down what has been subsequently known as the American doctrine, that death by one's own hand imported a felonious self-destruction; but it has been practically overruled by Van Zandt v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co.,16 and New York may now be said to follow the English doctrine." This is also true of Massachusetts, 18 and possibly of

14 Dufaur v. Professional L. Assurance Co., 25 Beav. 599; 4 Jur. N. S. 841; 27 L. J. Ch. 817; White v. British Empire Mut. L. I. Co., 38 L. J. Ch. 53; 17 W. R. 26; 19 L. T. N. S. 306; 7 L. R. Eq. 394; Stormont v. Waterloo L. & Casualty Assur. Co., 1 F. & F. 22.

15 Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73, 8 N. Y. 299.

16 55 N. Y. 169.

17 Weed v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 561, affirming 41 N. Y. Super. 476; Newton v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 426; Fowler v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 Lans. 202; Mecham v. N. Y. State Mut. Ben. Ass., 46 Hun, 363, affirmed in 120 N. Y. 237. See, also, McClure v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 651; Koenig v. Globe Mut. L. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. Super. Ct. 558.

18 Dean v. American Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), 96; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227.

Vermont;19 while a similar ruling was given in several of the lower federal courts before the Supreme Court of the United States had passed upon the question. 20 The same doctrine is also found as a dictum in an early Pennsylvania case, which has been subsequently overruled. 21

23 the

American Doctrine.—The case of Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,22 which was stated above to be the earliest case in this country on the clause in question, although subsequently discredited, if not overruled, in the State in which it arose, was cited as an authority in favor of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Life Ins. Co. v. Terry,2 leading case in American law on the matter under discussion. The rule is stated by Hunt, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: "If the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches, and there can be no recovery. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable." The rule thus laid has been several times affirmed by the Supreme Court in later cases,24 and has been adopted

19 Hathaway v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335. But see Billings v. Accident Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 78.

20 Gay v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., 9 Blatch. 142; Minnick v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 3 Brews. 502; Bill. meyer v. Guardian L. Ins. Co., cited in Bliss on Ins. § 237.

21 Hartman v. Keystone Iron Co., 21 Pa. St. 466. 22 4 Hill, 73, 8 N. Y. 299.

23 15 Wall. 580, affm'g 1 Dill. 403.

24 Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232; Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121; Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 527, affm'g, 27 Fed. Rep. 40; Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468; Conn. Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U. S. 612, also, Waters v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 892, wherein Nixon, D. J., defines insanity as follows: "In law a man is insane when he is not capable of understanding (1) that a design is unlawful or that an act is morally wrong; or (2) understanding this, when he is unable to control his conduct in the light of such knowledge." Jarvis v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 5 Ins. L. J. (N. D. III.), 507.

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