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of mother that my wife has beaten her, just so well we can believe that mother said, 'E (meaning plaintiff) has penned up pigs belonging to T, and has knocked them on the head, and devouringly eaten them up:"" Held, that such words are not actionable per se, and, in the absence of anything to show the circumstances leading up to the alleged charge, and by way of innuendo, the complaint was demurrable.-PANDO v. EICHSTED, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 284.

120. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Sufficiency of Contract. -An agreement to supply water "for three years or longer," at the option of one of the parties at a fixed compensation per annum, is not void for indefiniteness as to duration, and constitutes one contract, which can be specifically enforced. CHRISTIAN & CRAFT GROCERY CO. V. BIENVILLE WATER-SUPPLY CO., Ala., 17 South. Rep. 352.

121. STATUTE-Appeal.-An objection that a statute is unconstitutional because the manner prescribed by the constitution was not observed by the legislature in its passage, cannot be raised for the first time in the Appellate Court.-SARGENT V. BOARD OF COM'RS OF LA PLATA COUNTY, Colo., 40 Pac. Rep. 366.

122. TAXATION Recovery of Taxes Paid County.Where a town treasurer collected taxes, and appropri ated them, but returned them to the county treasurer as unpaid and delinquent, and, on this being found out, the amount thereof was charged back to the town, and added to the county tax apportioned to the town for the following year, and collected and paid to the county, the town cannot sue to recover them of the county, because they never belonged to the town, as they were raised directly from the taxpayers for the county, the town treasurer acting as the county's agent in collecting them.-TOWN OF WESTBORO v. TAYLOR COUNTY, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 287.

123. TAXATION OF CATTLE OF NON RESIDENTS.- Act Feb. 1, 1879, § 1, providing that non residents grazing cattle in any county in the state shall pay certain fixed sums per head therefor in lieu of taxes on such animals, is void, as conflicting with Const. art. 10, § 3, which declares that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and shall be levied and col· lected under general laws."-BOARD OF COM'RS KIOWA COUNTY V. DUNN, Colo., 40 Pac. Rep. 357.

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124. TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE. - The provision of Laws 1891, ch. 40, § 48, that the assessor shall determine the value of each piece of real property listed for taxation,and shall enter the value thereof opposite each de scription of property, is for the benefit of the property owner, and therefore mandatory, and a failure to comply therewith invalidates the assessment.-LOCKWOOD V. ROYS, Wash., 40 Pac. Rep. 346.

125. TOWN Defective Highway. In an action against a town for injuries received by plaintiff while driving onto a highway from a way which had been cleared by the side of the highway for the passage of teams, owing to the presence of impassable snowdrifts on the highway, it was proper to charge that the town would not be liable if the highway at that point was, under all the circumstances, in a reasonably safe condi tion for the passage of teams.- VASS V. TOWN OF WAKUKESHA, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 280.

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126. VENDOR AND PURCHASER — Insane Grantor. deed of an insane grantor is absolutely void, and therefore a bona fide purchaser from the grantee takes no title.-GERMAN SAVINGS & LOAN Soc. v. DE LASH MUTT, U. S. C. C. (Oreg.), 67 Fed. Rep. 399.

ing on appeal in the Circuit Court, defendant may have the place of trial changed to the county where he resides, if he resided there when the action was commenced, secures an absolute right to change of venue in such case, and it is not modified or repealed by Laws 1891, ch. 139, § 2, providing that a petition for a laborer's lien shall be filed in the county where the labor was performed, or, when the property has been taken to another county, that the petition may be filed, and an action to foreclose the lien brought in such county. -RAYSON V. HORTON, Wis., 63 N. W. Rep. 278.

129. WARRANTY-Damages.-In an action against a railroad company for breach of warranty in a conveyance of land, defendant may show that the consideration paid was unmatured junior bonds of defendant worth less than par, as the measure of damages is the value of the bonds given for the lands, with interest.MONTGOMERY V. NORTHERN PAC. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (Oreg.), 67 Fed. Rep. 445.

130. WATERS-Irrigation-Private Ditch.-Act Feb. 12, 1881 (Sess. Laws, p. 164; Gen. St. 1883, § 1716 et seq.), provides that no person having constructed a private irrigation ditch through land of another shall prevent another person from enlarging or using such ditch in common with him on payment of a reasonable compensation: Held, that the ditches subject to enlargement are strictly private ditches, and therefore a city cannot compel an irrigation company carrying water for sale to its patrons to permit it to enlarge its ditch for the purpose of supplying its citizens with water for the same purposes.-JUNCTION CREEK & N. D. D. & I. DITCH CO. V. CITY OF DURANGO, Colo., 40 Pac. Rep. 356.

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131. WATERS- Overflowing Land Damages.-The doctrine of this court is the rule of the common law that surface water is a common enemy, and that an owner may defend his premises against it by dike or embankment; and, if damages result to adjoining proprietors by reason of such defense, he is not liable therefor.-CITY OF BEATRICE V. LEARY, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 370.

132. WILLS-Bequest.-A husband executed a bond for $6,000, payable upon his death to the wife, or her heirs, in full of all other demands of dower or otherwise," in his property, and secured the same by mortgage on his property. Subsequently he executed a will with a provision as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath, in lieu of all other allowances, to my wife the sum of $6,000.00," for her own use and during her life: Held, that the bequest in the will was a substitute for the amount due by the bond.-GRAVES V. GRAVES' EX'R, Wis., 63 N. W, Rep. 271.

133. WILL.-Where testator devised his property to be equally divided between his son and his wife, with a provision that, if the wife died without issue, the property should go to the son if living, and, if dead, to his nearest heirs, the property passed, on the death of the widow without issue, after the son's death, to the heirs of the son.-CHACE V. GREGG, Tex., 81 S. W. Rep. 76.

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127. VENDOR AND VENDEE Exchange - Assumption of Mortgages.-Where two persons exchange property, each assuming mortgages of the other thereon, in equal amounts, and both make default in the payment of the obligations assumed, neither party, nor his mortgagee standing in his stead, can recover anything from the other, as the obligations mutually cancel each other.-EPISCOPAL CITY MISSION V. BROWN, U. S. S. C., 15 S. C. Rep. 833.

128. VENUE.-Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 2624, declaring that where an action begun in the municipal court is pend

135. WILLS-Election by Devisee.-A clause in a will bequeathing to a certain legatee "one thousand dollars, either in stocks or money," entitles him, in case of his election to take stock, to $1,000 worth of such stocks at their market value.-GRAHAM V. DE YAMPERT, Ala., 17 South. Rep. 355.

136. WITNESS-Husband and Wife.-Neither husband nor wife can be examined in any case as to any communication made by the one to the other while married. Nor shall they, after the marriage relation ceases, be permitted to reveal in testimony any such communication made while the marriage subsisted.BUCKINGHAM V. ROAR, Neb., 63 N. W. Rep. 398.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 26, 1895.

judgment of the lower court being reversed. Justice Gray, who read the opinion, said the general rule was, as laid down in the old books, both English and American, that the existence of a foreign judgment was prima facie evidence of the justice of the claim upon which it is founded; but the question was, how far should it be deemed to be conclusive? In the case under consideration the parties affected charged that fraud had been perpetrated in procuring the judgment. The laws of France gave no weight to judgments of courts in this country against citizens of that republic, especially if the correctness and virtue of the judgment are attacked, as they had been in this case, without an examination of all the facts connected with the proceedings. The operation of this law, the justice said, should be mutual; and interna

Two cases involving the important question as to the validity and conclusiveness of foreign judgments, have recently been decided by the Supreme Court of the United StatesHilton v. Guyot and Ritchie v. McMullin. In both cases the subordinate federal courts had sustained the judgments of the foreign courts, but while the Supreme Court affirmed one it reversed the other. The case of Hilton v. Guyot, the most important, involved the validity of a judgment of a French court. A French firm had obtained a judgment ❘tional comity did not require courts of the

against an American firm doing business in Paris. Subsequently a record of the French judgment was sent to this country and suit was brought upon it in the United States court. It was contested upon the grounds that the plaintiffs and their witnesses in the French court were allowed to give testimony without being put under oath; that the defendants had no opportunity to cross-examine them; that many documents and letters were admitted in evidence which would not have been admitted in the courts of the United States, and that the defendants were not allowed to inspect the plaintiffs' books and verify certain statements that had been made. The additional point was made that the French courts exercised no comity toward the American courts when judgments were taken and sued upon there, and that the same rule should be applied to French judgments by American courts. It was furthermore alleged by the appellants that many of the accounts and statements introduced in evidence in the French courts were false and fraudulent. Judgment was given for the French firm in the United States Circuit Court at New York. The Supreme Court, upon appeal wrestled with the problem as though it were a difficult one. After the first argument, a reargument was ordered and the court waited a year before rendering its decision, and it was reached by a simple majority, the court standing five to four, the Vol. 41-No. 4.

United States to go further in that respect than the tribunals of other nations. This particular judgment, if the offers of proof which the defendants made, and which the court below rejected, were substantiated, could not be enforced in France nor in England, nor in any civilized country in Europe. If this suit had been brought in any other country, he said, the judgment would have had to be examined, and its value should be recognized in the United States only so far as France exercises judicial discretion in similar cases.

The other case referred to-Ritchie v. McMullin-involved the conclusiveness of a judgment of a Canadian court; but in this case there was no allegation of fraud but only of error on the part of the court and the Supreme Court held that this did not constitute sufficient foundation for a review and affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, holding the Canadian judgment conclusive. The doctrine to be derived from the two cases appears to be that while judgments of foreign tribunals are prima facie conclusive, they are not so where there is a claim that they were obtained by fraud, particularly in the case of countries which do not recognize the principle of international comity.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-MORTGAGE SALE-RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF STATUTE.-The question for determination in the case of Watkins v. Glenn, 40 Pac. Rep. 316, by the Supreme Court of Kansas, was whether a recent statute of that State (Chap. 109, Sess. Laws 1893) relating to the sale and redemption of real estate, in effect changing procedure and enlarging redemption rights, was intended by the legislature to operate retrospectively, so as to apply to mortgage contracts existing at and before its passage. Involved in this was the further question whether, if the act was intended to apply to such contracts, it violates article 1, § 10, of the constitution of the United States, which ordains that "no State * shall pass any * law impairing the obligation of contracts." The contention on the part of the plaintiff below was that the act was not intended by the legislature to apply to mortgage contracts entered into prior to its passage, and that, if such were the intention of the legislature, the act is unconstitutional as to such contracts. was admitted upon the part of the defendants below that if, under the provisions of the statute there is any material change or impairment of the contract rights secured under the mortgage, however slight, it is unconstitutional. But the claim is that the statute acts on the remedy only; that the plaintiff has under that act a substantial remedy to enforce the provisions of his mortgage; and therefore that it is constitutional, and was intended by the legislature to apply to all contracts, whether made before or after its passage. The court in an able and exhaustive opinion by Horton, C. J., lays down the following propositions as decisive of the case. 1st. Any subsequent law of the State, which so affects the remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract, is forbidden by article 1, § 10, of the constitution of the United States, which ordains that "no State * shall pass any *** law impairing the obligation of contracts." 2nd. The statute in question has no retroactive operation, and, therefore, does not apply to mortgage contracts existing at and before its passage. If the legislature intended the act to apply to such contracts, it violates article

1, § 10, of the constitution of the United States. He cites and reviews the following cases as sustaining the general proposition that if the legislature intended the act to be retrospective in its operation so as to apply to prior mortgages, the act is unconstitutional and void as to such contracts: Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 327; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1-107; Brownson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Gantly v. Emery, 3 How. 716; Ex parte Christy, Id. 328; Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 322; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 461; Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 601; Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, 637; Memphis v. U. S., 97 U. S. 293; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 233, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Mobile v. U. S., 116 U. S. 305, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 319; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 206; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1190; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595. The following cases relied upon by the defendant as sustaining the constitutionality of the statute to prior contracts were distinguished by the court. Insurance Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Morley v. Railway Co., 146 U. S. 162, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91. Allen, J., dissented from the conclusion of the court in a vigorous opinion in which, while conceding the constitutional point, he insisted that the legislature intended that the act under consideration should apply to procedure for the enforcement of contracts made prior to its passage and was therefore void.

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MORTGAGE PENAL PROVISION-INCREASE OF INTEREST ON DEFAULT.-In Krutz v. Robbins, 40 Pac. Rep. 415, before the Supreme Court of Washington, a note payable in five years, bearing interest at 7 per cent. per annum, was secured by a mortgage which provided that, in case default was made in the payment of the principal or interest, or in the payment of taxes or insurance, the debtor should pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum, computed on the principal sum from the date of the note till payment there

of. It was held that the provision for 5 per cent. extra interest in case of default was in the nature of a penalty, and could not be enforced in equity. The court said in part:

If this provision is a penalty, there can be no doubt that it is unenforceable, for it is a universal rule in equity never to enforce either a penalty or a forfeiture. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1319. But what is a penalty, and what is liquidated damages in a given case, it is not always easy to determine. As the question is one of intention, no single rule can be laid down which will furnish a certain and satisfactory criterion for all cases. In most cases many circumstances must be considered in order to ascertain the real intention of the parties. The courts, however, have deduced from the authorities certain general rules, "each having more or less weight, according to the peculiar circumstances of each case." Among these rules is one which is almost universally recognized and acted on, and which is that, where the payment of a smaller sum is secured by an agreement to pay a larger sum, the larger sum will be held a penalty, and not liquidated damages. Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 South. Lep. 149, and cases cited; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 441; Adams, Eq. p. 108; 2 Pars. Notes & B. pp. 413-414; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; 3 Bl. Comm. 432; Holles v. Wyse, 2 Ver. 289; Strode v. Parker, Id. 316; Orr v. Churchill, 1 H. Bl. 227; Bonafous v. Rybot, 3 Burrows, 1370; Parker v. Butcher, L. R. 3 Eq. 762; Tiernan v. Hinman, 16 Ill. 400; Watts v. Watts, 11 Mo. 547: Mason v. Callender, 2 Minn. 350 (Gil. 302); Richardson v. Campbell, 34 Neb. 181, 51 N. W. Rep. 753; Waller v. Long, 6 Munf. 71.

In Alexander v. Troutman, 1 Kelly, 469, this is said to be the settled doctrine. If this case, therefore, falls within the rule stated, the provision in the mortgage for an increased rate of interest in case of default in the payment of principal or specified interest, the trial court was right in refusing to enforce it. While, in construing contracts, due weight will be given to the language used, still courts of equity will not be absolutely controlled by the words employed, when the enforcement of such contract will cause an unconscionable hardship or otherwise work an injustice. Keeble v. Keeble, supra. A penalty has been defined to be an agreement to pay a greater sum to secure the payment of a less sum (Henry v. Thompson, Minor, Ala. 209), and it seems to us that this case clearly falls within that definition and the rule above stated. The additional rate of interest is essentially a penalty, although not designated as such. It could not have been intended as compensation for the use of the principal before maturity, for the reason that 7 per cent. interest was agreed on as the rate of compensation. It could not have been intended as compensation for failure to pay the interest when due, because it is neither proportioned to the amount of interest nor to the length of time the debtor is in default. The provision for 5 per cent. extra interest must therefore be considered as a provision to secure the prompt payment of 7 per cent. interest on the principal debt, and also taxes, insurance, and principal when due. The learned counsel for the appellant cite a large number of cases in support of the proposition that whether a debtor shall pay any interest or a higher or lower rate of interest may be made by agreement of parties to depend upon his prompt payment of the principal at maturity. But most of them are cases where the contracts provided or no interest, if the principal should be paid at

maturity, but contained a provision for interest, if payment was not so made. Whether such a contract would be enforced was the question to be determined in the following cases cited by appellant: Rumsey v. Matthews, 1 Bibb, 242; Gully v. Remy, 1 Blackf. 69; Horner v. Hunt, Id. 214; Hackenburg v. Shaw, 11 Ind. 392; Satterwhite v. MeKie, Harp. 397; Wakefield v. Beckly, 3 McCord, 480; McNairy v. Bell, 1 Yerg. 502; Parvin v. Hoopes, 1 Morris (Iowa), 294; Horn v. Nash, 1 Iowa, 204; Fisher v. Anderson, 25 Iowa, 28; Alexander v. Troutman, 1 Kelly, 469; Rogers v. Sample, 33 Miss. 310; Reeves v. Stipp, 91 Ill. 609; Parker v. Plymell, 23 Kan. 402; Main v. Casserly, 67 Cal. 127, 7 Pac. Rep. 426.

For various reasons, some of which are not very satisfactory, these several courts held such a contract valid and enforceable. In some of them the decisions were based on the notion that the contract in controversy was equivalent to an agreement for a specified rate of interest, with a provision that the interest would be remitted if the principal was paid at maturity (see Reeves v. Stipp, supra; Rumsey v. Matthews, supra; Satterwhite v. McKie, supra); and in all of them the conclusion reached was deemed to be in accordance with the real intention of the parties as gathered from the whole agreement. So, in this case, the court, ascertained and gave effect to the primary and principal agreement, and refused to enforce the superaded condition, because such condition was, in effect, a penalty. We think, however. that the above cases are distinguishable from the case at bar in many particulars.

Appellant also cites Daggett v. Pratt, 15 Mass. 177, and Wilkerson v. Daniels, 1 G. Greene, 180, both of which hold that, where a rate of interest before maturity is specified, and the contract provides for a higher rate if payment be not made at maturity, such higher rate is recoverable as upon the contract. The first of these cases is a law case, and the question of penalty does not seem to have been presented or considered; and in the second the decision appears to have proceeded on the theory that the contract to pay the higher rate of interest depended on a condition permitted by law. That argument would seem to be fallacious, for the reason that it assumes that any contract not prohibited by law is enforceable, whereas the rule is that equity will not enforce a penalty even if it be not prohibited by law. But it would appear that that case, as an authority upon the point de cided, is weakened, if not destroyed, by the subsequent case of Conrad v. Gibbon, 29 Iowa, 120. But, whether that be true or not, it seems to us that that case is contrary to the rule generally recognized by courts of equity. And besides, in this case there are contingencies or conditions which were not in that, and which appear to be penal in their nature. For instance, in the case at bar, the higher rate of interest is provided, not only for default in payment of the principal, but for default in the payment of interest or insurance or taxes. Moreover, the consequence is the same whether the least important or the most important of these stipulations is violated, viz., the payment of a higher rate of interest on the principal from date; and this is a further reason why these pro. visions for an increased rate of interest should in this case be considered a penalty. 1 Pom. Eq. 441-444; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 258; Berry v. Wisdom, 3 Ohio St. 241; First Orthodox Church v. Walrath, 27 Mich. 232; Daily v. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 29; Jackson v. Baker, 2 Edw. Ch. 471; Lampman v. Cochran, 16 N. Y. 275; Alexander v. Troutman, supra. It may be said to be a general rule that the only cases in which the courts

will give effect to a contract to pay a stipulated sum as damages are those where the damages provided against are uncertain, and not ascertainable by any satisfactory and certain rule of law. Mason v. Callender, supra; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 259 The case of Galsworthy v. Strutt, 1 Exch. 659, cited by appellant, is one of the numerous cases which might be cited illustrative of this principle. For the non-payment of money the law awards interest as damages, and hence there is no difficulty in ascertaining the damages in this case, and it therefore does not fall within the rule just cited.

EQUITABLE CONVERSION-THE SURPLUS PROCEEDS OF MORTGAGE SALE OF REAL ESTATE AS REALTY.

An interesting application of the doctrine of equitable conversion arises where a mortgage, executed by mortgagor in his life-time, is foreclosed after his death. The interest of

such mortgagor-his equity of redemption is real estate, and its character becomes fixed as such, for purposes of distribution, by his death. Consequently where, after his death, such mortgage is foreclosed, the surplus money resulting therefrom after the debt and costs are paid is, in contemplation of law, real estate, and descends to and vests in the heirs.

The administrator has no right to demand or recover it, except, as in the case of other real estate, when it is required for the payment of debts of the intestate, and then only under an order of the probate court. If, however, the foreclosure sale takes place in the mortgagor's life-time, though the money is not paid until after his death, the surplus is personalty and the title thereto vests in the personal representative.2 This doctrine is no mere generalization of the text-writers, but has been widely and generally accepted by the courts. Thus in Wright v. Rose, decided by the English Court of Chancery in 1825, the precise question was presented. Intestate died seized of an estate subject to a mortgage. The mortgage deed, which contained a power of sale, provided that the surplus moneys, to arise from the sale, should be paid to the mortgagor, his executors or administrators. The contest was as between the heir and the administrator as to the right to such surplus. Said Vice-Chancellor Leach, in deciding in favor of the heir: "If the

3

1 Schouler, Exrs. and Adm., § 214; Wms. Exrs., bottom p. [690]; Croswell, Exrs., § 342; Jones on Mortgages, § 1695; Woerner Am. L. Adm., § 279.

2 Wms. Exrs., bottom p. [690]; Woerner Am. L. Adm., § 279.

2 Sim. & Stu. 321.

estate had been sold by the mortgagee in the life-time of the mortgagor, then the surplus moneys would have been personal estate of the mortgagor, and the plaintiffs would have been entitled. But the estate being unsold at the death of the mortgagor, the equity of redemption descended to his heir and he is now entitled to the surplus produce." Again, in Bourne v. Bourne, also decided by the English Court of Chancery, in 1842, the real estate in question was conveyed in trust to secure a mortgage, with direction to the trustee, in case of default in payment, to sell the same and pay the surplus to the mortgagor, "his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns." There was default in payment, but no sale took place till after the death of the mortgagor, who devised the estate to plaintiffs. The court held that there was no conversion, but that the surplus proceeds passed by the devise as real estate.

But long before either of the above decisions of the English court the doctrine had been firmly established in this country by the case of Moses v. Murgatroyed, in which Chancellor Kent held that surplus assets arising from the sale of mortgaged premises is to be considered a part of the real estate and goes to the heirs. The same rule is more elaborately discussed in Dunning v. Oceanic Nat. Bank, where Dwight, Commissioner, in a concurring opinion, speaking of the surplus proceeds resulting from the sale of mortgaged premises made after the death of the mortgagor, said: "In order to become personal estate for the purposes of administration, the money must have belonged to the decedent as personalty. Whatever once descended to the heirs or devisees cannot be divested from them except for the purpose of liquidating some superior claim. After that has been satisfied any surplus belongs to the heir or devisee, on the theory that it stands in the place of, and represents the, original fund. The conversion of land into money was only made for a special purpose; and that having been accomplished, the surplus, by fiction of equity, is reconverted into land. The truth of this can easily be shown by supposing that the mortgaged

4 2 Hare, 35.

5 1 Johns. Ch. 119.

To the same effect see also Cox v. McBurney, 2 Sandf. 560; Fliess v. Buckley, 22 Hun, 551.

761 N. Y. 497, 591.

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