and all persons claiming under it, for recovery of possession of the old United States mint property, situate at Philadelphia and for which this agreement shall be a sufficient warrant.'

The

"In July or August of 1903 complainants entered into actual possession of the property, removed the old structure, and proceeded to erect the building now on the premises. On December 14, 1903, $50,000 having already been paid on account of the purchase money, the sum of $250,000 additional was paid by the complainants to the United States, and a contract was made extending the time for the payment of the balance of the consideration money, viz., $1,700,000, and providing that of this sum $100,000 should be paid March 22, 1904, $100,000 December 22, 1904, and $1,500,000 on February 21, 1905, and extending to complainants the privilege of paying the amount in full at any time. Upon completion of the building it was rented by complainants to various tenants. Assuming the complainants to be the owner of the property by virtue of the contract of sale, the city of Philadelphia caused an assessment for taxes to be made from the date of November 1, 1902, and for the entire year of 1903. These taxes remaining unpaid, a levy was made on the tenants, pursuant to the terms of the act of April 19, 1883 (P. L. 9). Application was made on behalf of complainants for an injunction to restrain the collection of the taxes on the ground that the title to the property is vested in the United States of America, and so remains until the final payment of the entire consideration money. contract of sale between the United States and the Mint Realty Company not having been presented at the registry bureau of the city of Philadelphia, the tax was assessed in the name of the United States of America, the last registered owner, but was levied on the tenants of complainants. It was argued on behalf of the city that upon the execution of the agreement of sale, which vested in the yendee the right to possession under the terms of the contract of August 21, 1902, the Mint Realty Company became the owner of the property, and the United States retained only a vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase money, to enforce which provision was made in the agreements for forfeiture of complainants' title and the entry of an amicable judgment in ejectment, and that as the real owner complainants are liable for taxes, although assessed in the name of another; that, if complainants' title is hereafter forfeited to the government, the rents accrued belong to complainants, and the rights of the government are not affected by the pending levy upon the tenants of complainants. The tax is assessed upon the land itself. The entry upon the assessor's book for 1902, is as follows: 'Chestnut street, north side, west of Thirteenth street, northwest corner of Juniper street, United States of North America, 2 sty. marble Mint build

ing, with mansard roof. Lot 152x204. Exempt $1,250,000. Taxable as of November 1, 1902. Valuation $208,333, added by certificate 11/8/02.' And for 1903: 'Chestnut street, north side, west of Thirteenth street. N. W. cor. Juniper street, United States of North America, lot 152x204, valuation $1,250,000.'"

It appears by the testimony that the property was considered by those interested in it to be of much greater value than the figure at which it was assessed, but no evidence was presented which indicated that the assessment was made upon any less interest than the entire property. The court entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, and STEWART, JJ.

J. Howard Gendall, Mayne R. Longstreth, James Alcorn, and John L. Kinsey, for appellants. John G. Johnson, for appellee.

ELKIN, J. This is a proceeding in equity to restrain the city of Philadelphia from the collection of taxes levied against the appellee company for the years 1902 and 1903. The appellee is a private corporation, and has entered into an article of agreement for the purchase of the old mint site from the United States government. The legal title to the property is in the United States, and will remain there until the final payments are made and all the precedent conditions are performed. The general rule is that real estate, the title to which is in the United States, is not subject to taxation for state and local purposes. It is familiar law that in dealing with the taxation of real estate belonging to the United States the decisions of the federal courts are final and conclusive in all jurisdictions. Starting, then, with the conceded fact that the title to the property attempted to be taxed in this case is in the United States, and therefore ordinarily not subject to municipal taxation, the appellants must show that they come within some exception to the general rule in order to give them any standing to assert a claim for taxes against the appellee company. The attempt is made to take this case out of the general rule by showing that the United States by article of agreement had sold and agreed to convey the property to the appellee, and this company being in possession, receiving rents, and exercising all rights of ownership, has such an equitable title as to subject the property to taxation in its name. This contention would be perfectly sound if the rule of taxation applicable thereto could be determined by Pennsylvania law. The difficulty, however, is that in the present case our state law has no application, and it becomes necessary to look to the decisions of the federal courts in order to determine the rights of the parties.

The rule which denies the right of a state or municipality to tax the property of the

United States is founded on the principle which inheres in every independent government, that it must be free from any such interference of another government as may tend to destroy its powers or impair their efficiency. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 10 Sup. Ct. 341. 33 L. Ed. 687. The power to tax implies the power to divest the title by a tax sale when there is default in the payment of the taxes levied. Hence the federal government has most carefully guarded its property from the vigilance of the local tax gatherer. There is, however, an exception to the general rule recognized by the federal courts, and that is, where Congress has prescribed the conditions upon which portions of the public domain may be alienated, and provided that upon the performance of the conditions a patent of the United States shall issue to the purchaser, and all such conditions have been complied with, the land alienated being distinctly defined, it only remaining for the government to issue its patent, and until such issue holding the legal title in trust for the vendee, who has gone into possession and is exercising the rights of ownership therein, the purchaser will be treated as the beneficial owner of the land, and the same may be subjected to taxation for local purposes. The appellants rely upon this exception to the general rule to support their contention in the present case. It must not be overlooked, however, that this exception is only recognized where Congress has prescribed the conditions upon which portions of the public domain may be alienated, and directed that upon the performance of these conditions a patent shall issue. In these exceptional cases the federal courts have distinctly held that all of the precedent conditions must have been complied with so that nothing remains on the part of the purchaser to be done before he is entitled to the legal title in order to subject the property to local taxation. Railway Co. v. Prescott, 83 U. S. 603, 21 L. Ed. 373; Central Pacific Railroad Co. V. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. 885, 40 L. Ed. 1057; Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589, 19 Sup. Ct. 276, 43 L. Ed. 564. In other words, even in these exceptional cases it has been uniformly held that, if any part of the purchase money remains unpaid, or anything remains to be done by the purchaser, or any precedent condition has not been performed, the right to subject the property to local taxation does not exist.

Let us see, then, whether the case at bar comes within the exception to the general rule as defined by the federal courts.

The pur

chaser, the vendee company here, has agreed to pay the United States for the property the sum of $2,000,000, on which it had only paid at the time of the filing of this bill $250,000, leaving a balance unpaid of $1,750,000, so that all of the money has not yet been paid. Then, again, under the terms of the

agreement the government expressly reserved the right to declare a forfeiture of the contract, as well as of all moneys paid on a> count thereof, if all of the conditions contained were not performed by the purchaser, so that if the balance of the purchase money is not paid, or if any of the conditions are not performed, the purchaser will forfeit his equitable interest in the property. Clearly, therefore, the facts of this case do not bring it within the exception to the general rule. The appellants, however, rely upon one of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to support their contention that the rule of the earlier cases hereinbefore cited has been modified or changed. In Baltimore Shipbuilding, etc., Company v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 50, 49 L. Ed. 242, it was held that the real estate of the shipbuilding company was subject to taxation by the city of Baltimore. After a careful consideration of that case we have failed to discover that the rule of the earlier cases has been changed, either in express terms or by necessary implication. In that case, however, it must not be overlooked that the title to the property was not in the United States, but in the shipbuilding company. There was a duty on the part of the company to allow government vessels to put into dry dock for repairs, and there was a condition subsequent of defeasance, and these were the distinguishing features of that case clearly pointed out by the court in rendering the decision. The legal title was in the shipbuilding company, and therefore under the law of the state it would be subject to local taxation just like the property of any other private corporation or individual unless entitled to exemption for some sufficient reason. It undertook to evade the payment of local taxes on the ground that the United States had an equitable interest in the title to the property, and therefore claimed that the case came within the general rule of taxation of property belonging to the federal government. The court very properly held that under such circumstances the shipbuilding company could not be permitted to avoid its share of the burdens of local taxation, because it had entered into an agreement with the United States providing that if the conditions there of were not kept and performed a defeasance would result. Another ground upon which the right to impose the tax in that case was predicated was that under the laws of the state of Maryland even an equitable interest in the title to real estate may be taxed, and in default of payment thereof a tax sale would only divest the equitable interest against which the tax was assessed." The answer to this position is that in Pennsylvania this is not now, and never was, the law. In this state the rem is taxed, and, if a tax sale results from default in the payment of the taxes levied, the title to the rem is sold. It is true that in our state a vendee of land purchased by article of agreement

may be assessed for the full taxable value of the land, although he bas only paid a portion of the purchase price. Indeed, this very frequently happens; but the right to do so is founded on the principle that the tax is against the rem, and it is a matter of no importance whether the tax is assessed in the name of the legal or equitable owner, so long as it is assessed against the whole title to the land. Some confusion about this matter may have arisen because our courts have always recognized the right to impose a tax upon the holder of the legal title to different strata within the boundaries of a particular tract of land. As, for instance, it frequently happens that the legal title to the surface is in one owner, the title to the coal in another, and the title to the ores in still another. In such a case the surface is taxed to its owner, the coal to its owner, and the ores to their owners, but this is because there has been a severance of the legal title to the different strata, and each stratum is subject to taxation in the name of its owner just as much as if it represented a distinct and separate acreage. In the taxation of the coal, for instance, in such a case, the legal title might be in one owner and the equitable title in another, but the tax would be levied and assessed against the rem, that is, all the coal; and, if a tax sale resulted from default in the payment of these taxes, the whole title to the coal would pass.

Another answer to the contention made by the appellants in this respect is that the learned court below has found as a fact that there was no assessment or attempt to assess the property otherwise than as a whole in the name of the United States until after the filing of the present bill. Of course, the rights of the parties to this controversy must be determined upon the facts as they stood at the time the bill was filed. On this ground, as well as for the other reasons set out in this opinion, we are compelled to hold that the property was not subject to taxation for municipal purposes, and that the decree entered by the court below must be sustained. Decree affirmed.

MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ., dissent.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS.

(69 N. J. Eq. 839)

ACKERMAN v. CROUTER et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by James T. Ackerman against Cornelius P. Crouter and others. Bill dismissed (59 Atl. 574, 68 N. J. Eq. 49), and complainant appeals. Affirmed. James T. Ackerman and David D. Ackerman, for appellant. Cornelius Doremus, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion

of the chancellor, delivered in the court below. 59 Atl. 574, 68 N. J. Eq. 49.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ..

concur.

AMOLE et al. v. MEYERS et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 26, 1905.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by one Amole and others against one Meyers and others. From an order striking out a demurrer to the bill, defendants appeal. Affirmed. John C. Reed, for appellants. Eli H. Chandler, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. We concur in the view of the Court of Chancery that the demurrer is frivolous. The order appealed from should be affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, and GRAY, JJ.,

concur.

ANDREWS v. CAMDEN & S. RY. CO. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 7, 1907.) Error to Supreme Court. Action by Clayton L. Andrews against the Camden & Suburban Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed. E. A. Armstrong, for plaintiff in error. Samuel H. Richards, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The assignments of error argued before us are conspicuously lacking in merit. The testimony which, it is contended, was improperly received, was clearly competent; and if the instruction to the jury, as to the method by which they should admeasure the. damages in case their verdict should be for the plaintiff, was inaccurate in the respect pointed out in the assignment, the error was harmful to the plaintiff below, rather than to the defendant. The judgment under review will be affirmed.

(69 N. J. Eq. 834)

AVAKIAN v. AVAKIAN. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Louisa Avakian, by Mariam Boyajian, guardian ad litem, against Hagop Avakian. Decree for complainant (60 Atl. 521), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Weller & Lichtenstein, for appellant. Eusebius W. Arrowsmith, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Pitney. 60 Atl. 521.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur. DIXON, J., dissents.

(69 N. J. Eq. 842)

AYRES v. AYRES. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Lydia Y. Ayres against John H. Ayres, administrator. Decree for plaintiff (60 Atl. 422), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Hervey C. Scudder and Edwin Robert Walker, for appellant. Linton Satterthwait, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Bergen. 60 Atl. 422.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, and GRAY, JJ., concur.

(69 N. J. Eq. 832)

COSTELL v. COSTELL. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Annie E. Costell against Smith Costell. Decree for complainant (60 Atl. 49), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. William T. Hilliard, for appellant. Howard L. Miller, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Grey. 60 Atl. 49.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ.,

concur.

(69 N. J. Eq. 831)

FURNISS et al. v. LEUPP. (Court of Er rors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Grace L. Furniss and another against William H. Leupp, trustee. From the decree (58 Atl. 374, 67 N. J. Eq. 159), defendant appeals. Affirmed. Crouse & Perkins, for appellant. Willard P. Voorhees, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The order appealed from should be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Vice Chancellor, 58 Atl. 374, 67 N. J. Eq. 159. It will appear from an examination of the opinion that the learned Vice Chancellor concluded that the fund in dispute was not within the scope of the "anticipation" clause of the trust deed, and in this conclusion we concur. The case, therefore, does not call for a consideration of the question whether or not that clause is valid. It was assumed to be so by the learned Vice Chancellor. As the question is not involved in the determination of the case, we express no opinion upon it.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ.,

concur.

(69 N. J. Eq. 841)

MONMOUTH COUNTY ELECTRIC CO. v. MCKENNA. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by the Monmouth County Electric Company against Thomas P. McKenna. Decree for complainant (60 Atl. 32, 68 N. J. Eq. 160), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Collins & Corbin, for appellant. Grey, McDermott & Enright, for respondent.

BURGH, VROOM, and GREEN, JJ., concur. DIXON, GARRISON, and SWAYZE, JJ., dis

sent.

(72 N. J. Eq. 435)

SIEGMAN v. ELECTRIC VEHICLE CO. et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 26, 1907.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Richard Siegman against the Electric Vehicle Company and another. From an order of the Chancellor, defendants appeal. Affirmed. Richard V. Lindabury, for appellants. James E. Howell, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This cause was argued together with Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co. and Kissel, 65 Atl. 910, decided by this court at the present term upon an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Pitney. The same question being presented in each of the two cases, the other under review herein will be affirmed, with costs, for the reasons given in that opinion.

: (69 N. J. Eq. 843) UNITED NEW JERSEY R. & CANAL CO. et al. v. LEWIS et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 18, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Suit by the United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company and others against Francis Lewis and others. Judgment sustaining demurrer to complaint affirmed on appeal (59 Atl. 227, 68 N. J. Eq. 437), and complainants appeal. Affirmed. Alan H. Strong, for appellants. George T. Parrot, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree in this case will be affirmed, for the reasons contained in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Bergen. 59 Atl. 227, 68 Ñ. J. Eq. 437.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and GARRISON, FORT, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, and GRAY, JJ., concur.

(69 N. J. Eq. 844)

UNITED NEW JERSEY R. & CANAL CO. et al. v. McCULLY et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 18, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Suit by the United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company and others against William McCully and others. Demurrer to the bill sustained (59 Atl. 229, 68 N. J. Eq. 442), and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Alan H. Strong, for appellants. George T. Parrot, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree in this case is affirmed, for the reasons contained in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice

442.

DIXON, FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, BOGERT, VROOM, GREEN, and GRAY, JJ., concur. The CHIEF JUSTICE and SWAYZE, J., dissent.

(69 N. J. Eq. 833)

SEYMOUR v. GOODWIN et al. (two cases). (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 5, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by James M. Seymour, Jr., against Rebecca Goodwin and others. Demurrer overruled (59 Atl. 93, 68 N. J. Eq. 189), and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Cortlandt & Wayne Parker, for appellants. Louis A. Ziegler and James E. Howell, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The order brought up for review by these appeals is affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Emery, 59 Atl. 93, 68 N. J. Eq. 189.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and FORT, GARRETSON, PITNEY, BOGERT, VREDEN

The CHIEF JUSTICE and GARRISON, FORT, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GRAY, JJ., concur.

V.

and

(69 N. J. Eq. 835) VAN HOUTEN STEVENSON et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 26, 1905.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Aaron Van Houten against Mary B. Stevenson and another. Application to stay proceedings denied. 64 Atl. 1058, 1094, 68 N. J. Eq. 490. Defendants appeal. Affirmed. Preston Stevenson, for appellants. Frederick W. Van Blarcom, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinions of Vice Chancellors Stevens and Garrison, delivered in the Court of Chancery in this cause. 64 Atl. 1058, 1094, 68 N. J. Eq. 490.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and DIXON, GARRISON, GARRETSON, PITNEY. SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, and GRAY, JJ., concur.