In Allen v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2 Md. 111, the defendant's charter authorized it "to make insurances on any kind of property," and the court was asked to restrict its meaning to real estate only. The court refused to do this, saying that to do so "would be to violate one of the plainest, well-settled rules of construction"; citing 6 Bacon's Abridgment, 380, in which it is said: "Where words in a statute are express, plain, and clear, the words ought to be understood according to their genuine and natural signification and import, unless by such exposition a contradiction or inconsistency would arise in the statute, by reason of some subsequent clause from whence it might be inferred that the intent of Parliament was otherwise." In Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, Judge Legrand said: "The language of a statute is its most natural expositor, and, when the language is susceptible of a sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by extraneous considerations. We are not to be at liberty to imagine an intent, and bind the letter of the act to that intent,

with the view of making the letter express an intent which the statute in its native form does not evidence." And in Smith v. State, 66 Md. 217, 7 Atl. 49, the court said: "Even when a court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity." So in Hawbecker v. Hawbecker, 43 Md. 519, Judge Miller said: "It would be dangerous or unwarrantable for a court to grope for an intent, or to make one from their own ideas of policy or morals, and on that ground say that a particular case is withdrawn from the operation of the plain and unambiguous language of a statute." In the very recent case of Agricultural College v. Atkinson, 102 Md. 561, 62 Atl. 1035, Judge Burke said: "Beyond the words employed, if the meaning be plain and intelligible, neither officer nor court is to go in search of legislative intent; but the Legislature must be understood to intend what is plainly expressed, and nothing then remains but to give the intent effect." We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned judge below in restricting as he did the broad and unqualified language of this charter.

But we have yet to inquire what is the true meaning of the term "lateral railroad." In the view taken by the circuit court, it was not necessary for it to make this inquiry; but it is necessary for us, and we are not without ample recourse to cases in other courts of high authority. Before referring to these it may be well to observe that there is nothing peculiar about the charter of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad which would discriminate it in respect to branch roads from the charters considered in those cases. The charter of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad

was one of the earliest granted in this country, and is believed to have been the model of many of the later organized roads. In most of them the same general power is given to construct lateral roads, and in many the language used is very nearly the same. In almost all an important city of the state granting the charter is made one of the termini, so that the views expressed by the courts of those states in which the meaning of this term has been considered should be especially worthy of our consideration. In Newhall v. Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co., 14 Ill. 273, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from connecting a lateral road from the main line towards Dixon, on the ground of want of power. The language of the charter was: "And they may also construct, maintain, and use such other lateral routes as may be deemed advantageous, and expedient and necessary, under the same rights and privileges as by this act is provided for the construction of the main route." The proposed road contemplated a connection at Dixon with the Rockford & Rock Island Railroad, then in course of construction, and the court said: "The question is: Is this a lateral road within the provision of the charter above quoted? We think it is. A lateral road is one proceeding from some point on the main trunk between its termini. This is a road lateral to, and proceeding from, the main road. This is a simple fact. Ingenuity cannot remove or disprove it.. * We were asked in argument, if the defendants may build a road 40 miles in length, and terminating or connecting with another road, at a distant point from the main trunk of this road, of what length, or to what point, may they not build a lateral road? We do not feel called upon to answer the question. The Legislature has not seen fit to fix limit, and we do not feel called upon in this case at least to do SO. *

* I fully recognize the propriety, and even necessity, of applying the rule of strict construction to the powers granted in these railroad charters; but the rule can only be applied in cases of ambiguity, or where a power is claimed by inference or implication, and is not expressly given by the charter. Where a power is expressly given, a strict construction maintains it. There must be ambiguity to give room for construction. The Legislature takes the responsibility of granting these charters, and it is for them to see that too much power is not expressly given. * The Legislature has

no right to give a power without restriction, relying upon the courts to restrain its exercise within judicious limits."

In Pa. R. R. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Pa. 9, the effort was to extend by construction the corporate powers of the railroad company, and in refusing this Judge Black, in the strong sententious language which marked his opinions, said: "The privileges of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company may

be too rigidly restricted. If the usefulness of the company would be increased by extending them, let the Legislature see to it. But let it be remembered that nothing but plain English words will do it, and, when called on by counsel to enlarge corporate powers by construction, we can only repeat again and again that our duty imperatively forbids it." To this we may properly add that, when powers have been granted in `plain English words, our duty imperatively forbids us to curtail them by attempted construction. In B. & O. R. R. v. Wheeling, 13 Grat. (Va.) 40, the same question now before us arose under the Virginia charter of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, which was contained in the act of March 6, 1847. Laws 1846-47, p. 86, c. 99. This act authorized the company to complete their road through the territory of the state to a depot to be established on the northern side of Wheeling creek in the city of Wheeling. The second section (page 87) provided "that to secure to the said city of Wheeling the benefit of the western terminus, all parts of said railroad between the Monongahela river and said terminus shall be opened simultaneously for the transportation of freight and passengers"; and then made certain regulations as to tolls to be charged. The sixth section (page 88) subjected the company to the provisions of the general railroad laws of 1837 (Acts 1836-37, p. 101, c. 118), by which authority was given to any railroad, subject to that law, to make lateral railroads in any direction whatever, not exceeding 10 miles in length, and the court said that provision was as much a part of the act of March 6, 1847, as if embodied therein in totidem verbis.

The Central Ohio Railroad established its terminus at Belair on the west side of the Ohio river, opposite Benwood, a few miles south of Wheeling, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, desiring to connect directly with that road, began the construction of a branch from a point before reaching Wheeling, to Benwood, where the connection would be made by a ferry. After the passage of the act of March 6, 1847, in order to induce the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to accept said act, an agreement was made between the railroad and the city of Wheeling by which said city engaged to do certain things, and the agreement set forth "the intention of the parties to the agreement, among other things, to secure to the city of Wheeling the practical benefits of the terminus of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad according to the provisions of said law." The city of Wheeling claimed that the construction of this branch would deprive her of the practical benefits of the terminus, and prayed an injunction to restrain its construction. Two great roads were at that time in course of construction in Ohio and approaching the Ohio river. The Central Ohio passing through the center of the state, and the Cincinnati & Marietta passing 66 A.-44

through the southern part, and the Baltimore & Ohio desired to connect with both. The court said: "In this state of things it was important that the act should plainly express the intention of the Legislature, that nothing should be intended which was not expressed, and nothing expressed which was not intended, in order that there might be no mistake on either side. When, therefore, the Legislature by that act gave to the company the branching power without any express restriction, it cannot fairly be presumed that they intended to restrict it. If they had so intended, they ought and would have said so expressly." The court, therefore, held the provision applicable, and that it authorized the connection in question. The physical situation will appear from the plat annexed hereto.

It was urged in argument that the city of Wheeling was not only entitled to the benefit of a direct and continuous railway to one of the largest and most important Atlantic cities, and all the local benefit incident to the terminus of a great railroad, but also to the benefit of connection between that and other roads within her limits, and the court answered this by saying: "She expected to obtain these by the advantages of her position, her wealth, trade, population, and importance; which she hoped and expected would be sufficient to attract to her limits all connections which might otherwise have been made at some other point of the road within Its limited river front of 10 or 20 miles. For these expected benefits the company did not stipulate by the acceptance of the act, except to the extent of a compliance with its terms." In Blanton v. Richmond, F. & P. R. R., 86 Va. 618, 10 S. E. 925, the charter gave power to construct branch or lateral roads, and it was held that this power gave authority to construct a branch line running in the same general direction as the main line, and the fact that the new line will connect the main line with another railroad makes it none the less a branch road. The language of the charter was: "They may make or cause to be made, branches or lateral railroads, in any

The court said the charter placed it entirely in the power of the president and directors to say how many and in what directions branches or lateral roads should be run; "that a lateral railroad is nothing more or less than an off-shoot from the main line or stem. And this is the meaning attributed to it by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in McAboy's Appeal, 107 Pa. 558." It was contended in that case that the proposed road would change the terminus of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad from Richmond where it was fixed by the charter, but the court denied this result, saying: "It simply proposes to build this branch for the purpose of carrying through business outside of the limits of the city, leaving the passengers and freight destined for Richmond to be delivered there. * As it does not change the terminus, serves as a feeder to the main stem, assists the company to develop the country through which it passes, and tends to promote the public convenience both as to trade and travel, it cannot be regarded as obnoxious to any of the objections that have been raised against it." The same views have been held and expressed in a number of other cases, among which may be cited Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, 48 Pa. 355; Price v. Pa. R. R., 209 Pa. 81, 58 Atl. 137; Biles v. Tacoma R. R., 5 Wash. 514, 32 Pac. 211; Howard Co. v. Booneville Bank, 108 U. S. 316, 2 Sup. Ct. 689, 27 L. Ed. 738. We have been referred to Akers v. Union N. J. R. R., 43 N. J. Law, 110, as furnishing the best test of what is a lateral road, in which the court said: "It denotes a road connected, indeed, with the main line, but not a mere incident of it, not constructed simply to facilitate the business of the chief railway, but designed to have a business of its own, for the transpor tation of persons or property to and from

places not reached by the principal route." This language was used in reference to what were shown to be mere side tracks leading to freighthouses on or near the line of the road. In Grey v. Greenville & Hudson R. W. Co., 59 N. J. Eq. 385, 46 Atl. 638, Vice Chancellor Emery, following that case, and speaking of a road, which he said "begins and ends on the main line, and, so far as yet appears, reaches no other points for railroad service than those on the main line as located, and distant throughout its whole length only about 225 feet from the main line," held this was not a lateral line, and granted a preliminary injunction. Subsequently an answer was filed, and the case came up on appeal in 62 N. J. Eq. 768, 48 Atl. 568, and the court, while approving the opinion of the vice chancellor as the case was presented to him, reversed the decision, because the answer averred, and the proof showed, that the purpose of the branch was to connect with the Jersey City Belt Line, and in so deciding used this language, which is most pertinent to the case before us: "It is no objection to the legality of the proposed branch railroad that it will leave the main line on one side of the connection and return to it on the other. To compel traffic to be inconveniently carried past a natural point of departure on one side or the other and then be sent backward to the connecting point, with the alternative of laying out two branches, one from each direc tion, would be an unreasonable construction of the act. The authority is to construct a branch railroad or railroads so as to effect such connection and a connecting loop is within the authority." This language is directly in point, in view of the connection to be made by this loop with the three railroads which it crosses. The learned judge below concedes in his opinion that the Court of Appeals in this state has never specifically decided what are lateral railroads under the charter of this defendant, though he refers to the case of State v. B. & O. R. R., 48 Md. 79, as throving some light upon the subject. The distinguished counsel for the appellee, however, in their brief, and in the argument, contend d that almost the identical question has a ready been decided in that case; and in sup port of their contention refer to the language of Judge Robinson on page 78 of 48 Md. The question under consideration in that portion of the opinion was whether the gross receipts of the Metropolitan Road were exempt from taxation, and it was held that they were not. In so holding, Judge Robinson said: "The original charter, it is true, authorized the appellee to build lateral roads, and this power is not limited to the construction of roads leading to lime kilns, factories, and distilleries, as was urged in argument by the Attorney General, but authorizes the appellee to build such roads for the transportation of freight and passengers. The Metropolitan Road was not built, however, under this pro

vision in the original charter, but under Act 1865, p. 106, c. 70, which authorized the appellee to construct a road between Knoxville and the Monocacy Junction to the boundary of the District of Columbia, and for the purpose, as the act expressly declares, of providing a more direct communication from the west and northwest with the city of Washington. At this latter place it forms a junction with the Washington Branch, thus making a route distinct from and independent of the main line of the appellee. In no just sense can this road he considered a lateral road within the meaning of the original charter." But this language must be read in the light of, and with reference to, the particular question under consideration, as well as with reference to the act under which the company elected to build the road. There is a clear intimation that it might have been built under the broad provision of the original charter, which the court there says "authorized the appellee to build such roads for the transportation of freight and passengers"; and there is a strong presumption that the gross receipts were held taxable because it was not built under that provision, but under a special act, both the title and body of which indicate that the branching power was not invoked in its construction, and that the road was deliberately built as a new and independent line. This view of the language above cited is confirmed by reference to the case of the Mayor and City Council of Balt. V. B. & O. R. R., 21 Md. 50, in which it was held that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had the right under Act 1836, c. 276, to subscribe towards any lateral or connecting road not exceeding two-fifths of its estimated cost, and that the Central Ohio Railroad, which connects with the Baltimore & Ohio at Benwood by means of a ferry and the lateral road mentioned in the case of B. & O. R. R. y. Wheeling, supra, was a connecting road within the meaning of Act 1836, c. 276. This conclusion could not have been reached unless our own Court of Appeals had agreed with the Virginia Court of Appeals that the short link from the Baltimore & Ohio to Benwood was a lateral road within the meaning of the Virginia act of 1847, which we have seen was, in that respect, identical with the Baltimore & Ohio Maryland charter of 1826.

The conclusions we have drawn above cannot be fairly weakened by the fact that the Washington Branch and the Metropolitan Branch were built under special acts. The Washington Branch was built under Act 1832, c. 175, and the Metropolitan Branch under Act 1865, p. 106, c. 70. The financing of new railroad lines often compels resort to the Legislature, where there is lack of money to justify the undertaking, though there may be no lack of power, and a reference to the legislation under which the Washington Branch was built shows that in that case the financial questions

involved were ample reasons for proceeding under a special act granting express power, and avoiding the question of pre-existing power, which when raised, however needlessly, must injuriously affect the credit of the securities offered the public for the prosecution of the undertaking. The Philadelphia Branch was begun without any special legislation therefor-in reliance upon the power in the original charter. Whether, since the building of the Washington and Metropolitan Branches, the company had grown bolder or wiser as to the extent of this power, we do not know, but the question is not what they thought they had, but what they had in fact. The appellee argues that they secured subsequently a legislative recognition of the fact that it was being built as a lateral. Chapter 223, p. 349, Act 1882, both in its title and in the body of the act, does recognize that fact, but it also contains a number of provisions for which legislation was necessary. Corporations are not often lacking in worldly wisdom, and it is sometimes wise to "make assurance doubly sure"; but it would be an unwarrantable reflection upon the legislative body to assume that this recognition was given without due consideration and advice from its judiciary committee as to its propriety. Moreover, the courts were open. during the construction of this branch to any challenge of its right, and we are not advised that any such was made.

For the reasons we have given at so great length, we cannot doubt that the proposed road is a lateral road within the meaning of the charter of 1826. Notwithstanding this be so, the appellee contends that its construction is effectively forbidden by Act 1906, p. 838, c. 457, which declares it to be unlawful for any person or corporation to lay any track for a steam railway within certain described portions of Howard county and of Baltimore county, the property of the appellee proposed to be taken under these condemnation proceedings being within the described area of Baltimore county. The plaintiff's bill avers that the defendant proposes to lay four parallel tracks along said line, which, when laid, may be used for freight and passenger traffic, not only by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, but also under trackage agreements by any other company. It avers that "the section of country through which said tracks are to be laid is a highly developed part of the suburbs of Baltimore City, in which are many beautiful and costly homes, the value of most of which would be largely diminished, if not destroyed, by the building of said railroad without any possibility of recovering any damages in any condemnation proceeding." It further alleges that the Pennsylvania Railroad had intended building a somewhat similar line near the line of the now proposed road, and that upon the representation of many citizens of Baltimore City and county

that it would be destructive of the suburban development of Baltimore and its vicinity, and that the railroad could just as well accomplish its purpose by building a line further away from the city, the Legislature passed the act above mentioned, and that said act was passed in the bona fide exercise of the police power with which it is constitutionally clothed. The defendant in its answer alleges that it located and adopted the line mentioned before the passage of the act mentioned; that its estimated cost of construction will be approximately $9,000,000; that the reasons for its construction are the necessity of relieving the obstruction of the tunnels in Baltimore City of the volume of through freights, now passing through them, and the need of lower and more uniform grades than those now used in approaching and leaving the city, as set forth in the first part of this opinion, and the need of connection with the Maryland & Pennsylvania Railroad which can be effected by the new line, but which does not exist and cannot be secured under the present arrangement. It further alleges that the section traversed by the proposed line is, except at Pikesville, a rural district of farms and woodland sparsely settled, and in no sense a highly developed part of the suburbs of Baltimore City, but is distinctly separated from the city and its suburbs by large tracts of land, of low price, used for farming, and sold by the acre, and that said road is at its nearest point three miles from the legal limits of the city, and more than five miles from the built up part of the city. It denies that said act was passed in the exercise of the police power, or that it bears any real relation to the preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare of the people, and that its only purpose is to relieve the property of a few large landowners from liability to be taken for public use, though such use is necessary to enable property owners on both sides of the favored few to enjoy railroad facilities, and that it will operate, if allowed to stand, as a grant of special and unusual privileges to a few individuals at the expense of the rest of the public. It denies that it is practicable to build anywhere outside of the prescribed area, except at a cost nearly, if not quite, double the cost of the proposed line, which would be absolutely prohibitive. It alleges that, by virtue of the location and adoption of the line laid down, it has acquired under its charter vested rights of which it cannot be deprived by the subsequent act of the Legislature, the effect of which would be to impair the obligations of a charter contract; and, further, that said act is invalid because it violates section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution of Maryland, (1) because the act embraces more than one subject; (2) because the criminal provisions of the act are not described in its title; (3) be

cause it is not enacted in articles and sections to conform to the Code.

acres.

The testimony taken has been carefully examined, and shows quite clearly that, except in the immediate vicinity of the vil lage of Pikesville and Sherwood, the ter ritory traversed is almost wholly, in the language of the answer, "a rural district of farms and tracts of woodland sparsely settled, and in no sense a highly developed part of the suburbs of Baltimore City." This appears not only from the testimony of the defendant's engineers who surveyed and located the line, but from the testimony of the real estate brokers produced by the defendant, whose evidence was not attempted to be rebutted, except by Mr. Preston, inspector of buildings of Baltimore City, whose testimony was confined to the sale in October, 1906, of a single piece of property of 64 acres on Park Heights avenue (which is crossed at right angles by the proposed line) about half a mile from the plaintiff's property and which sold for $2,000 per acre. Upon cross-examination it appeared that the property on Park Heights avenue below Mr. Preston's property in the direction of the city is not laid off for building purposes. The only witnesses for the plaintiff were the plaintiff himself, and Mr. Samuel M. Shoemaker, who resides in Green Spring Valley, near the Reistertown turnpike. The plaintiff owns a tract of 540 From this tract he sold 20 acres six years ago to the suburban club, which is now occupied by it, and he has platted for sale in lots two parcels, one of 14 acres and another of 18 acres, for the latter of which he has had an offer of $1,500 an acre. Mr. Shoemaker's property is used for farming and dairy purposes, and is occupied as his own residence, but is not stated to be platted or designed for sale for suburban homes. The testimony of these gentlemen make it abundantly appear that the property of the plaintiff will be damaged by the construction of the proposed road, and it appears from all the testimony on both sides that there are some others, comparatively few in number, and almost exclusively in the vicinity of Pikesville, Sherwood, and perhaps Ruxton, whose property will also be damaged thereby. Wherever any property is actually taken for such purposes, compensatory damages are allowed, and it is common experience that juries rarely fail to exercise a wise and just liberality in awarding these damages, not only upon the basis of value of the land actually condemned, but with a view to the injurious effect upon that which is not actually taken. The repugnance of those who own and occupy attractive homes to have them actually invaded, or their comfort and attractiveness diminished by railroad construction, is so natural and rational as to compel the sympathy of courts and juries, but it is just because this natural feeling, which extends