between the stockholders and the corporation; and that frequently
such courts alone possess power adequate to the enforcement of all
decrees that justice may require. (II.) Babcock v. Farwell, 284.
39. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Jurisdiction Over Internal Affairs.
It is the inability of the court to do complete justice by its decree,
not its incompetency to decide the question involved, that determines
the exercise of its power to entertain suits affecting the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation. (Ill.) Babcock v. Farwell, 284.
40. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Jurisdiction Over Internal Affairs.
The general statement that courts will not interfere with the man-
agement of the internal affairs of foreign corporations must be con-
strued in connection with the particular facts. The rule rests more
on grounds of policy and expediency than on jurisdictional grounds;
more on want of power to enforce a decree than on jurisdiction to
make it. Where the wrongs complained of are merely against the
sovereignty by which the corporation was created or the law of its
existence, or are such as require for their redress the exercise of the
visitorial powers of the sovereign, or where full jurisdiction of the
corporation and of its stockholders is necessary to such redress, the
courts will decline jurisdiction. (Ill.) Babcock v. Farwell, 284.
41. FOREIGN CORPORATION Jurisdiction Over Internal Affairs.
Acts which affect the relation of stockholders to one another or to
the corporation as individual stockholders or as classes of stockholders
must be regarded as acts of internal management of the corporation,
relief against which must be sought in the courts of the country
where the corporation was organized. Where, however, the relief
sought is within the general jurisdiction of a court of chancery, where
all the parties necessary to the full and proper adjustment of the
rights involved are before the court, and where the relief sought does
not require the exercise of the visitorial power of the government,
the court should exercise the power of determining controversies
brought before it instead of remitting suitors to a foreign jurisdic-
tion. (II.) Babcock v. Farwell, 284.
42. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Jurisdiction Over Internal Affairs.
Where minority stockholders in a foreign corporation seek by suit in
equity to have restored to the corporation property fraudulently
appropriated to their own use by directors who, together with the cor-
poration itself, are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court,
the court should exercise its jurisdiction for the determination of
the controversy. (Ill.) Babcock v. Farwell, 284.
43. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Jurisdiction.--The Term "Internal
Affairs," in the rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction of the
internal affairs of foreign corporations, must be confined to relations
affecting only the stockholders and the corporation among themselves.
(Ill.) Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
44. FOREIGN CORPORATION.-If a Court can Make No Effective
Decree, it will not assume jurisdiction of a suit affecting a foreign
corporation. (Ill.) Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
45. FOREIGN CORPORATION.-Courts cannot Exercise Visitorial
Powers over corporations of other states, such as requiring them to
pay such dividends as on an accounting of the affairs of the cor-
poration may appear to be proper, nor to determine whether a stock-
holder has been wrongfully excluded from his privileges, and matters
of that kind. (Ill.) Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
46. FOREIGN CORPORATION.-If a Court has Jurisdiction of the
Necessary parties and of the subject matter, and has power to grant
an effective remedy, it may assume jurisdiction of a suit involving a
foreign corporation, but it will not afford remedies denied the parties
in the foreign state which will operate with hardship on citizens of
the domestic state. (Ill.) Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
47. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Laws of Foreign State.-A court
will not decline to take jurisdiction of a suit affecting a foreign cor-
poration, on the ground that the laws of the foreign state are un-
known, when such laws can be pleaded and proved as facts. (Ill.)
Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
Foreign Corporation—Service of Process.
48. FOREIGN CORPORATION-Service of Officer Temporarily in
State. If a foreign corporation confines its operations to the state
within which it was created, does not transact any business in another
state, and has no office or agent located there, jurisdiction cannot
be obtained by serving process upon an officer or agent temporarily
in the latter state. (Ill.) Edwards v. Schillinger, 308.
See Evidence, 4; Process, 11.
1. COSTS-Appeal Bond.-Under the Statute Providing that any
receiver, assignee, executor, or other fiduciary may include as part
of his lawful expenses a reasonable sum paid for his bond, and that a
party entitled to recover costs may include the expense of his bond
in the action or proceeding pending, costs are allowable for the
premium paid on an appeal bond given by the fiduciary. (Wash.)
Church v. Wilkeson-Tripp Co., 1059.
2. APPEAL Costs on Failure to File Brief.-Where the respond-
ents fail to file any brief after being granted permission, costs will
not be allowed to them on affirmance of the judgment. (Wash.)
McCormick v. Sorenson, 1047.
1. COUNTY-Estoppel to Recover Money Illegally Expended.-
Where the fiscal court of a county and the taxpayers have for many
years allowed public money to be expended in an irregular manner,
the county is estopped to recover the money from the officer making
the expenditure, if he has made it in good faith for an authorized
purpose and the county has received the benefit. (Ky.) Flowers v.
Logan County, 347.
2. COUNTY-Estoppel to Recover Money Illegally Expended.-An
officer who has expended county funds for a legal purpose, but in an
irregular manner, has the burden, in a suit against him by the county
to recover the money, to show a proper application thereof. (Ky.)
Flowers v. Logan County, 347.
3. COUNTY-Recovery of Funds Expended by Officer. The fact
that a public officer, who has been directed to make repairs on certain
roads, in paying the costs thereof uses money appropriated to con-
struct a bridge, does not entitle the county to recover the same from
him, if it is a part of the "road and bridge fund" of the county.
(Ky.) Flowers v. Logan County, 347.
4. COUNTY-Recovery of Compensation Paid Officer.-Where a
member of a fiscal court as committeeman has been paid for services
ordered by the court and rendered in good faith in maintaining roads,
the county cannot recover the money so paid, on the theory that mem-
bers of the fiscal court cannot be allowed anything for their services
except their attendance upon sessions of the court. (Ky.) Flowers
v. Logan County, 347.
See Judges; Justices of Peace.
CREDITOR'S SUIT.
See Corporations, 28, 29.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Offense Against Both State and
United States.-The same act may constitute an offense equally
against the United States and a state, subjecting the guilty party to
punishment under the laws of each government. (Ohio St.) Detroit
etc. Co. v. State, 758.
2. CRIMINAL LAW-Common Law.-If a Statute Fixing a Pen-
alty for an offense does not expressly nor by implication cut off the
common-law prosecution or punishment for the same offense, it is taken
to intend a cumulative remedy only. (Vt.) State v. Hildreth, 1022.
3. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Evidence on Former Trial.-The absence
or inaccessibility of a witness, who is not shown to be dead or with-
out the state, does not render admissible the evidence which he gave
on a former trial. (Tex. Cr.) Wyatt v. State, 926.
4. CRIMINAL LAW.-Confessions Voluntarily made while the
accused was in jail, or in the jail-yard, are admissible in his trial
for murder. (Ark.) Crosby v. State, 80.
5. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Allusion by Counsel to Former Convic-
tion. For the prosecuting attorney to ask the defendant, "Have you
not been convicted and given ten years in this case?" is reversible
error, although the court promptly stops and reprimands him, and in-
structs the jury that the question is improper and not to be considered.
(Tex. Cr.) Wyatt v. State, 926.
See Chattel Mortgages, 9, 10.
1. DAMAGES-Penalty or Liquidated Damages.-An agreement
between the vendor and vendee of a lot that if the vendee fails to
build a specified partition wall, the vendor shall have a lien on the
land for a certain sum, provides for liquidated damages, not for a
penalty, if the damages from a breach thereof would be uncertain and
difficult to prove. (Ark.) Cox v. Smith, 89.
2. DAMAGES-Loss of Profits from Breach of Contract.-The
usual rule of excluding profits in estimating damages does not apply
where the earning of the profits is directly contemplated in the con-
tract which has been breached. (Wash.) Church v. Wilkeson-Tripp
Co., 1059.
3. DAMAGES.-Loss of Ability to Earn is a factor that enters
into an employé's damages for personal injuries. (Vt.) Lincoln v.
Central Vermont Ry. Co., 998.
4. DAMAGES-Whether Excessive Because for Full Amount
Prayed. That the verdict of a jury responds fully to the relief asked
in the petition is not evidence of passion, prejudice, or a welter of
mere sentimental emotion and effervescence. (Mo.) Phelan v. Gran-
ite Bituminous Pav. Co., 582.
5. DAMAGES Measure of Recovery for Loss of Eye.-A verdict
of seven thousand five hundred dollars for the loss of one eye and
the impairment of the other is not so excessive as to bespeak passion
or prejudice, although the injured man lost little time and at the
trial had resumed his work as driver of a laundry wagon at the wages
before received. (Mo.) Phelan v. Granite Bituminous Pav. Co., 582.
6. DAMAGES-Specific Allegations of Injuries.-In an action for
personal injuries it is not necessary for the plaintiff to aver in specifice
terms each injury or pain suffered. The injury, its character and
extent, may be sufficiently averred, without detailing or specifying
each separately. (Ala.) Birmingham Ry. etc. Co. v. Girod, 17.
See Brokers; Death; Husband and Wife; Telegraph and Telephones.
DANCE-HOUSE.
See Disorderly House.
1. DEATH-Survival of Action for Suffering.-An action for caus-
ing pain and suffering does not survive to the administrator under
Code, sections 2486 and 3912, and counts in a complaint by an ad-
ministrator which do not aver that the acts or omissions caused the
death of his intestate, but that they merely aggravated or intensified
his suffering, are subject to demurrer. (Ala.) Whitmore v. Alabama
Consol. Coal etc. Co., 31.
2. DEATH-Burden of Proof on Plaintiff to Show Care.-The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff in an action for negligent death to
show that the deceased was in the exercise of ordinary care at the
time he was injured. (Ill.) Stack v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 318.
3. DEATH-Exercise of Care a Question of Fact.-Whether the
deceased was in the exercise of ordinary care at the time of his
injury is a question of fact, in an action to recover damages for his
death, to be determined by the circumstances attending the event.
Whether the evidence tends to prove such care is a question of law,
which a court can determine adversely to the plaintiff, only when no
other conclusion can reasonably be drawn from uncontradicted facts
and from the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. (Ill.) Stack v.
East St. Louis Ry. Co., 318.
4. DEATH.-Five Thousand Dollars Damages are not Excessive
for the death of an industrious man, with a wife and several minor
children, who had a natural expectancy of life for nineteen years
and was earning two dollars and twenty-five cents per day. (Minn.)
Peterson v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 537.
DECLARATIONS.
See Evidence, 9-12; Homicide, 3.
DEDICATION-Absence of Signature of Wife.-A dedication
of part of a homestead to the public cannot be implied from a lease
thereof, not signed by the wife of the lessor, to a township for munici-
pal purposes, and the subsequent occupancy of the premises for nearly
forty years for a town hall. (Mich.) Township of Jasper v. Martin,
1. DEED-Evidence as to Date of Execution.-When there are no
indications of falsity on the face of a deed, the presumption of law
is that it was executed upon the day of its date. And while the pre-
sumption is controllable by evidence aliunde, the mere suggestion of
fraud or falsity does not put upon the party producing the deed the
burden of proving that it was actually made upon the day of its date.
(Ala.) Nelson v. Brown, 61.
DEEDS-Reservation of Life Estate.-A deed in the usual
form, except that after the description it recites, "this deed is not to
go into effect until after my death," conveys a fee with reservation
of a life estate. (S. C.) Merck v. Merck, 815.
3. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-Confidential Relations.-The
burden of proving the existence of a confidential relation between
the parties to a voluntary conveyance rests upon the party who asserts
it. (Ala.) Nelson v. Brown, 61.
4. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE Confidential Relations.-Al-
though the relation of stepson and stepmother is not one of those
technical relations from which trust and confidence are presumed by
law to arise, it may in fact be a relation of that character in which
he is the dominant party, so that in case of a voluntary conveyance
by her to him he will have the burden to show her independence at
the time of the transaction. (Ala.) Nelson v. Brown, 61.
5. DEED-Impeachment of Deed by Parties to It.-In a case be-
tween third persons, a grantor or grantee in a deed, under which one
of the parties claims, is a competent witness to impeach it. (S. C.)
Merck v. Merck, 815.
6. DEED-Frau" in Procuring-Estoppel.-An instruction that if
a deed was surreptitiously taken from the grantor, and without his
knowledge or consent placed upon record, it was not delivered and
therefore is not valid, is erroneous in leaving out of consideration his
negligence and consequent estoppel, if such issue is made. (S. C.)
Merck v. Merck, 815.
Consideration and Payment.
7. DEED. The Consideration of a Deed is open to investigation.
(Mo.) Chambers v. Chambers, 567.
8. DEED. The Fact That No Consideration was Paid for a Deed
from a father to his infant child is of no importance in his suit to
cancel the deed. (Mo.) Chambers v. Chambers, 567.
9. DEED. The Clause in a Deed Acknowledging Payment of the
purchase money is somewhat in the nature of a receipt, and is subject
to parol explanation for some purposes. But such explanation, in the
absence of fraud or mistake of fact, should not be so pressed as to
defeat the operative words of the instrument as a grant. (Md.)
Chambers v. Chambers, 567.
10. DEEDS.-The Effect of the Registry Act is to make the record
of a deed take the place of the common-law ceremony of livery of
seisin. It is a solemn proclamation to the world, of which the world
must take notice, that there has been a transfer of title from the
grantor to the grantee, precisely as in olden times there was a sym-
bolical public transfer by delivery of a twig, a clod or a key.
Chambers v. Chambers, 567.
11. DEEDS Delivery.-The Fact That a Deed is on Record is
prima facie evidence of delivery. (Vt.) Morgan v. Morgan, 1006.
12. DEEDS-Delivery.-The Mere Fact That a Deed has Been
Recorded, even if done by the grantor's direction, does not of itself
constitute a delivery. (Vt.) Morgan v. Morgan, 1006.
13. DEEDS-Delivery by Recorder to Grantee.-Where a town
clerk receives a deed from the grantor with instructions to file it but
to delay the recording, the subsequent recording of the deed and its
delivery by the clerk to the grantee at her direction do not constitute
a delivery. (Vt.) Morgan v. Morgan, 1006.
14. DEEDS Delivery.-The Record of a Deed by the grantor is
presumptive evidence of delivery. (Mo.) Chambers v. Chambers,
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