tion of damages. The question is whether the substantive causes of
action relied on are essentially the same, not whether they grew out
of transactions which occurred at the same time and had a close rela-
tion to one another. (Mass.) Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co.,
9. RES JUDICATA.—A Judgment for the Defendant in a suit in
equity by the purchaser of stock to rescind on the ground of false
and fraudulent representations is not a bar to his subsequent action
at law against the corporation to recover what he paid for the stock,
on the ground that he purchased treasury stock but the agent of the
corporation delivered his own stock instead. (Mass.) Newhall v.
Enterprise Mining Co., 461.
10. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata-Probate Proceedings.-The ap-
proval by the probate court of such dispositions as the executor and
devisee of an estate for life has made is not res judicata in a subse-
quent suit in equity upon the question of the construction of the will.
(Mich.) Farlin v. Sanborn, 525.
11. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata-Principal and Agent.-A judg-
ment on the merits in favor of an agent is a bar to an action against
the principal for the same cause, but a judgment against the agent
is not conclusive in an action against the principal, nor will a judg
ment against the principal conclude the agent unless the latter has
been vouched or given notice and opportunity to defend. (S. C.)
Rookard v. Atlantic etc. Ry. Co., 839.
12. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.-A verdict
and judgment is conclusive evidence, between the same parties in a
subsequent suit, of whatever it was necessary for the jury to find in
order to warrant the verdict. It is not necessary that the issue
should have been taken in the former action upon the precise point
controverted in the subsequent suit. But every point that was ex-
pressly or by necessary implication in issue, which must necessarily
have been decided in order to support the judgment, is concluded.
(Vt.) Wells v. Boston & Maine R. R., 987.
13. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.—A judgment
is not evidence in a subsequent suit of any matter which came col-
laterally in question merely, nor of any matter incidentally cogniz-
able, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument upon the judg-
ment. (Vt.) Wells v. Boston & Maine R. R., 987.
14. JUDGMENT — Estoppel - Right of Defendant.-Where the
plaintiffs have introduced a former judgment in evidence, the defend-
ant cannot take advantage of it by way of estoppel if he has not
pleaded it as such. (Vt.) Wells v. Boston & Maine R. R., 987.
15. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata-Who Treated as Parties.-A court,
upon proper invocation, will look beyond the record and treat as
parties all who in fact are found to have acted a part, and this
whether their interference was irregular or not. (Ala.) Hudson v.
Wright, 55.
16. JUDGMENT-Conclusiveness.-A Judgment is the Law's Last
Word in a judicial controversy, and if valid, no issue of fact can be
tendered thereon. (Ala.) Hudson v. Wright, 55.
Judgment, clerk's fees on execution on, how recoverable, 1093, 1094.
for purchase money, effect on vendor's lien, 207, 208.
interest is not recoverable after satisfaction of, 1099.
municipal corporation giving unauthorized consent to, 372.
sale under after discharge in bankruptcy, when void, 1097.
sale under is void after payment of note given for judgment,
Judgment, sale under is void after payment to authorized official, 1096.
sale under is void after payment to judgment creditor's attorney,
1095.
sale under is void after payment to the sheriff, 1096.
sale under is void if satisfied of record though clerk's fee remains
unpaid, 1093.
sale under is void when appeal is successful, 1098.
sale under is void when paid but not satisfied of record, 1094.
sale under is void where satisfied of record, 1093.
sale under is void where there are two judgments for same cause
and one is paid, 1097.
sale under when not void in England, 1095.
sale under when paid between execution and confirmation will be
set aside, 1095.
sale under, when voidable, 1098.
sheriff's fees on, cannot be recovered by sale after judgment satis-
fied, 1096.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Evidence, 1.
1. JUDICIAL SALE.--After a Judgment has Been Paid it ceases
to be operative, and no sale based upon it can confer title. (Wash.)
McLiesh v. Ball, 1087.
2. JUDICIAL SALE-Confirmation Where Judgment was Paid.—
A judicial sale based on a judgment which had been paid is not
cured by confirmation. (Wash.) McLiesh v. Ball, 1087.
3. JUDICIAL SALE-Contract for Redemption-Deed Absolute.-
When a purchase is made, not from the owner, but at a judicial or
execution sale under an agreement that the owner may redeem, this
agreement, although not in writing, is enforceable, though the result
will be to change a conveyance absolute on its face into a mortgage
or deed of trust. (Ky.) McKibben v. Diltz, 408.
4. JUDICIAL SALE-Contract for Redemption - Statute of
Frauds.—When one purchases land at a judicial sale under an agree-
ment with the owner to allow him to redeem, the agreement is en-
forceable although not in writing. The purchaser holds the land in
trust for the former owner, and the statute of frauds presents no
obstacle to a recovery. (Ky.) McKibben v. Diltz, 408.
5. JUDICIAL SALE-Contract for Redemption-Time Limited.-
Although an agreement by a purchaser at a judicial sale with the
owner to allow him to redeem limits the time for the redemption, he
will be allowed to redeem after the expiration of the time. (Ky.)
McKibben v. Diltz, 408.
6. JUDICIAL SALE-Contract for Redemption-Costs and Pur-
chase Price. When one purchases at a judicial sale under an oral
agreement with the owners to allow them to redeem, they will be re-
quired, in enforcing the contract, to pay the purchase price with
interest and the costs incurred. (Ky.) McKibben v. Diltz, 408.
JURISDICTION.
See Corporations, 30-48.
1. JURY TRIAL.-The Constitutional Right of Trial by Jury is
not a right to command the services of a jury without cost, but is
of the same nature as the right to have official services performed by
public officers, and a requirement for the payment of a reasonable
amount for jury fees, such as will necessarily be required in every
jury trial, is not a denial or encroachment upon the right. (Ill.)
Morrison Hotel etc. Co. v. Kirsner, 335.
2. JURY TRIAL-Statute Requiring Payment of Fees.-The pro-
visions of the municipal court act requiring a party who desires a
jury to file a demand therefor with the clerk and pay six dollars for
jury fees, at the time of entering his appearance, are valid. But the
statute should be liberally construed in favor of the right, and the
inclination of the court should be to protect and enforce it. (Ill.)
Morrison Hotel etc. Co. v. Kirsner, 335.
3. JURY TRIAL-Confession of Judgment.-A Statute Providing
that a cause shall be tried by the court unless a demand for a jury
trial is filed at the time the defendant enters his appearance and pays
the jury fees can have no application to the confession of a judgment.
(Ill.) Morrison Hotel etc. Co. v. Kirsner, 335.
4. JURY TRIAL-Demand for After Vacation of Judgment by
Confession. When a judgment by confession under power of attorney
has been vacated on motion, because the power was not sufficient to
authorize the attorney to appear for all the defendants, a demand by
them for a jury trial, with a tender of fees therefor, is in apt time
if made immediately upon the vacation of judgment. It need not be
made at the time the court is asked to set aside the judgment.
(Ill.) Morrison Hotel etc. Co. v. Kirsner, 335.
5. JURY-Misconduct in Criminal Case-Review.-Matters re-
garding the misconduct of the jury in reaching a verdict in a criminal
case are particularly cognizable by the trial court, and unless the
conclusion reached thereon by it on the hearing is clearly wrong and
unsupported by the testimony, an appellate court will not interfere.
(Tex. Cr.) Douglas v. State, 930.
6. TRIAL-Counsel Conversing With Juror.-The court has a dis-
cretion to deny a new trial on the ground that counsel conversed with
a juror, the conversation being in a public place, in the presence of the
opposing counsel, and no reference being made to the case. (Wash.)
Deighton v. Hover, 1035.
1. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE--Civil Liability.-No Action can be
supported against a justice of the peace, acting judicially, who has
not exceeded his jurisdiction, however erroneous his decision or ma-
licious his motive. (Ala.) Lacey v. Hendricks, 45.
2. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-Civil Liability-Pleading.—Where
it cannot be determined from the complaint, in an action against a
justice of the peace for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment,
that he was not acting judicially and that the act complained of was
not within his jurisdiction, the complaint is open to demurrer. (Ala.)
Lacey v. Hendricks, 45.
3. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-Power to Impose Sentence.-A
justice of the peace is without jurisdiction to sentence a person to
hard labor because in default in payment of a fine assessed against
him two months before upon his conviction. (Ala.) Lacey v. Hen-
dricks, 45.
4. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-Jurisdiction After Appeal.-After
an appeal has been perfected from a judgment of a justice of the
peace in a criminal case, he has no power to take any further steps
than to certify the papers to the criminal court. His issuance of a
mittimus on the sentence is without his jurisdiction. (Ala.) Lacey
v. Hendricks, 45.
Justices of the Peace, personal liability, are exempt from, where there
is jurisdiction of the subject matter, 49.
personal liability for ministerial acts in cases of intentional or
gross negligence, 49.
Laches, doctrine of as applied to vendor's lien, 205, 206.
1. LEASE-Rent After Destruction of Premises.-Where a lot
with the building thereon is leased for saloon purposes, the lessor
covenanting for a quiet enjoyment and the lessee to keep the premises
in repair, and the building is destroyed by fire before the expiration
of the term, the lessor may recover the insurance and the stipulated
rent for the period after the fire, the lot being larger than the build-
ing and it being possible for the lessee to rebuild without trespassing.
(Mich.) Bowen v. Clemens, 521.
2. LEASE-Construction by Parties-License to Sell.-Where the
terms of a lease of personalty do not authorize the lessee to sell the
property, evidence is admissible that, after conferring with the drafts-
man, the parties adopted his view and construed the lease otherwise,
in an action of trover by the lessor against one who subsequently
purchased the chattels from the lessee, as tending to show a license
to sell. (Vt.) Prouty v. Nichols, 996.
3. LEASE-Varying Terms by Showing License to Sell.-Where a
lessee of chattels sells them under a verbal license from the lessor,
when the lease, which is under seal, does not permit the sale, the
lessor cannot maintain trover against the purchaser. (Vt.) Prouty
v. Nichols, 996.
4. LEASE-License to Lessee to Exchange Property.-A license
to a lessee of personal property to make an exchange does not author-
ize him to sell it. (Vt.) Prouty v. Nichols, 996.
See Adverse Possession, 1.
1. THEFT-False Pretexts.-Under an Ordinary Indictment for
theft, charging a fraudulent taking without the consent of the owner,
it is competent to prove that the taking was with the owner's con-
sent but obtained by false pretexts. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v. State,
970.
2. THEFT-False Pretexts.-Where an Information contains
three counts, first, swindling by false pretexts, second, ordinary
theft, and third, theft by conversion as bailee, and the case is sub-
mitted to the jury on the second count, with evidence that the ac-
cused took money from the owner with his consent but by false pre-
texts, a conviction will be sustained. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v. State,
970.
3. THEFT.-False Pretexts.-One Who Obtains Money from an-
other under the false pretext that he will obtain alcohol with it for
the latter and return in a moment with it, but never returns, may
be convicted of theft. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v. State, 970.
4. THEFT-False Pretexts-Demand for Return.-In a prosecu-
tion for theft by obtaining money by false pretexts, it is not neces-
sary to prove that demand by the prosecuting witness has been made
for the return of the money. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v. State, 970.
5. THEFT-False Pretext - Evidence.-In a Prosecution for
theft in obtaining money by false pretexts, evidence is admissible
that after procuring the money the defendant, on meeting the prose-
cuting witness in the street, ran. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v. State,
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 187-74
6. THEFT-Instruction Singling Out Fact.-A court is not re-
quired in a trial for theft to single out a particular fact and elimin
ate it from the consideration of the jury. (Tex. Cr.) Hawkins v.
State, 970.
LESSEE RAILWAY.
See Railroads, 1.
1. LIBEL-Words Libelous Per Se.-A Discommendatory State-
ment, general in its terms, which charges neither the commission of
crime nor the possession of specific offensive characteristics, may or
may not be libelous per se, depending upon the circumstances and
conditions under which the statement is made. (Minn.) Cole v.
Millspaugh, 546.
2. LIBEL-Clergyman.-It is Libelous Per Se to write of a clergy-
man, an applicant for a pulpit, "I would not have anything to do
with him or touch him with a ten foot pole," if under all the cir-
cumstances the words used would expose the person written of to
hatred or contempt, or injury in his business or occupation. (Minn.)
Cole v. Millspaugh, 546.
3. LIBEL-Sufficiency of Complaint Against Demurrer.-Com-
plaint held to state a cause of action, and presenting the question of
fact whether the words used were intended to and might be under-
stood to charge conduct or characteristics inconsistent with good
character or plaintiff's profession. (Minn.) Cole v. Millspaugh, 546.
4. SLANDER OF WOMAN-Privileged Communication.-Where
one, in conversing with a father about matters not at all relating
to his daughter, makes statements imputing to her a want of chastity,
the communication is not privileged. (Tex. Cr.) Richmond v. State,
973.
5. SLANDER OF WOMAN - Inquiry into Reputation. In a
prosecution for slander in charging a woman with being unchaste,
any inquiry into her reputation for chastity should be limited to the
time of uttering the words, or at least to a time reasonably approxi
mating thereto. (Tex. Cr.) Richmond v. State, 973.
6. SLANDER OF WOMAN-Evidence of Reputation.-In a
prosecution for slander in charging a woman with being unchaste
and with going to a certain place to be delivered of a child, it is
error to permit a witness to testify that while the prosecutrix stayed
at her house at that place she saw nothing in the conduct of the
prosecutrix indicating that she was not a virtuous woman. (Tex.
Cr.) Richmond v. State, 973.
1. PAROL LICENSE-Right to Revoke After Improvements
Made. A parol license, not coupled with an interest nor based on
any consideration, to construct a dam and irrigating ditch is revocable
at the pleasure of the licensor, although the licensee has made the
improvements and expended money in so doing. (Mont.) Archer
v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 692.
2. PAROL LICENSE-What Constitutes Revocation.-An appro
priation of lands to a use inconsistent with the enjoyment thereon
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