evidence of the exact situation and location of the lands and their identity was held admissible to relieve and cure whatever indefiniteness and discrepancy there was in the other descriptions.

b. Illustrations of Innocuous Error.-1. In Whitehead v. Lane & Bodley Co., 72 Ala. 39, the description of the property as situated in square No. 4 in lieu of No. 7 did not harm the security.

2. In Parker v. Teas, 79 Ind. 235, the land was misdescribed as "in” a village, whereas it was "without."

3. In Wilson v. Brown, 82 Ind. 471, the land was erroneously described as "a part of Broad Ripple float." The court, in upholding the mortgage, said: "It will hardly do, as we think, to call a mortgage void because by mutual mistake of the parties it contains a mistaken and meaningless description, if that mistake is such as the mortgagee might have corrected. Equity treats as done what ought to be done, and consequently such mortgage, as between the parties and as to all who have notice, is a valid lien upon the land intended to be described."

4. In Pence v. Armstrong, 95 Ind. 191, "west" was written for "north" and "ground" for "right of way."

5. In Hannon v. Hilliard, 101 Ind. 310, in which the errors in the mortgage were held nonvital, the court emphasized the rule that "to enable the court to enforce the mortgage upon particular land under the averment of extrinsic facts, the extrinsic matter must not contradict the mortgage or produce a description of other property than that described therein, but it must merely explain the description in the mortgage, and point out the property by the means of identification indicated in the mortgage; that the mortgage may not be void, it must furnish such means of identification. It should be apparent that the mortgage and the complaint alleging extrinsie facts designate the same property."

6. "Lot 2 in Square 9" in place of "Lot 2 in Square 5": City Bank of New Orleans v. Denham, 7 Rob. (La.) 39, followed in Thornhill v. Burthe, 29 La. Ann. 639, in which the range was wrongly numbered. 7. In Laforest v. Barrow, 12 La. Ann. 148, it was laid down that notwithstanding article 3273 of the Civil Code required that a mortgage should describe the nature and situation of the property, yet where a sale of the mortgaged property had been effected, and possession given, an error in some of the boundaries ought not to be permitted to defeat the title.

8. The case of Kernan v. Baham, 45 La. Ann. 799, 13 South. 155, is rendered interesting for rather unique circumstances created in consequence of an erroneous survey of a right which called for a location of six hundred and fifty acres on a certain river. The land was located altogether wrongly as to sections, township, range and numbers. The owner mortgaged it, using these wrong descriptions. Subsequently the government resurveyed and properly located the land, and it was held such resurvey and relocation bound the owner and inured to the benefit of the mortgagee, on the ground that there was in this no change in the thing mortgaged, no substitution of one tract for another, but a mere yielding of some incorrect calls, by replacement, to bring them to conform to others, which, having been correct all the time, were not altered, but adhered to, by the government.

9. "Section 28" in lieu of "Section 18": Cooper v. Bigly, 13 Mich. 463.

10. Incorrect metes and bounds not vital to the description rejected: Boon v. Pierpoint, 28 N. J. Eq. 7.

11. In People v. Storms, 97 N. Y. 364, there occurred what justified the court in saying that it is not easy to find two cases alike. At the end of the description of a piece of land mortgaged was written: "The intention of this last-mentioned piece of land is to mortgage 46 acres of land on the south side of it next to Mr. Norton's to secure a part of the above consideration." The court, in curing the error, said the words should be read as if they said, "The intention is to mortgage 46 acres of land on the south side of it [the land described previously to the maldescription] next to Mr. Norton's." The description was inartificial and imperfect, but the intention was more apparent than in many of the cases in which the courts afford relief.

12. "Lot No. 1 in Block 209" in lieu of "Lot No. 6 in Block 209." The court applied the maxim of Lord Bacon, "Falsa demonstratio non nocet," that the farm A, otherwise accurately described, though referred to as being in possession of B, in the deed, if actually in possession of C, is not so misdescribed as to render the deed void. The court followed the doctrine announced in Berry v. Wright, 14

Tex. 270.

13. In the comparatively recent case of Anderson v. Casey-Swasey Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 120 S. W. 918, a deed conveyed "an undivided interest of 160 acres of land in the W. P. Kincannon's headright in Navarro county, Texas," and described the metes and bounds. In an action of trespass to try title it was discovered that the description in certain of the muniments of title did not close, a call evidently having been omitted, and that the lot referred to contained three hundred and twenty acres, and not as might be read from the deed one hundred and sixty acres. The sheriff having sold all the right, title and interest of the then owner "in 160 acres of land on the W. P. Kincannon Survey," the court held that the interest levied upon and sold was whatever interest appellant had in the tract of land actually described, whether it were one hundred and sixty or three hundred and twenty acres. The court also repeated the rule which we now reiterate, that if the description is such that with the aid of extrinsic evidence the land can be identified and located, the description is sufficient, and cited in support: Hermann v. Likens, 90 Tex. 448, 39 S. W. 282, Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex. 414, 55 S. W. 559, and Pierson v. Sanger Bros., 93 Tex. 160, 53 S. W. 1012.

HAGINS v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. [134 Ga. 641, 68 S. E. 428.]

MASTER AND SERVANT-Danger in Felling Trees—Warning. When a servant is engaged with others in pulling down, by means of a rope attached thereto, a tree being felled in an open space, the danger of his being injured by the fall thereof is an obvious one, and known, or should be known, to the servant; and in the absence of an express contract on the part of the master to give warning when the tree begins to fall and in what direction it will fall, there is no duty on him to do so. (p. 271.)

MASTER AND SERVANT-Felling Trees-Warning-Fellowservant. The failure of foremen in charge of the details of such work (who at the time of the injury, because of the absence of other employés, are engaged with the servant who is injured in pulling on a rope to guide the direction of the fall of the tree) to warn the servant when it begins to fall and in what direction it will fall, or to station themselves or others elsewhere to give such warning, cannot be charged against the master as negligence entitling the servant to recover damages for injuries received by reason of the tree falling on him. There being no nondelegable duty resting on the master to thus warn the servant, the negligence of the foreman, if any, is that of a fellow-servant. (pp. 271, 272.)

APPEAL-Error in Dismissing Petition.-The court committed no error in dismissing the petition upon the general demurrer filed thereto. (p. 272.)

(Syllabi by the court.)

Gignilliat & Heidt and Travis & Travis, for the plaintiff.

Osborne & Lawrence, for the defendant.

642 HOLDEN, J. The gist of the plaintiff's allegations may be stated as follows: With other servants of the master, he was engaged in pulling down, by means of a rope, a tree which was being felled. The tree was to be so pulled as to fall within a space of about eighty feet between the wires of the defendant company on the one side and a railroad track on the other. The work was under the charge and direction of one who was a general foreman over several gangs, and another employé who was immediate foreman over the gang in which the plaintiff worked. Usually six men pulled the rope; but at the time of the injury for which suit is brought, only four had hold thereof, two of them being the foremen above referred to. The tree in falling struck and injured the plaintiff. He claims the company is liable to him in damages, because it was negligent in not warning him when it began to fall and in which direction it was falling, which he alleges it was the duty of the foremen in charge of the work to do, and their failure to do so was the sole cause of his injury, he being free from fault. He alleges that the immediate foreman was the alter ego of the company, and that he had a right to rely, and did rely,

on receiving warning from him, or the other foreman, or the master, or some one by them provided for that purpose, when the tree began to fall and in what direction it was falling in time for him to escape injury, for which reason and the fact that he was engaged in pulling on the rope he did not discover that the tree was falling until it was halfway down. The allegations above stated are amplified, but it is unnecessary to state them more in detail, as the plaintiff's right to recover depends upon whether the facts above set forth give him a cause of action.

A servant assumes the ordinary risks of his employment, whether or not such employment be of a dangerous character. One who is pulling on a rope fastened to a tree being felled in an open space, 643 for the purpose of pulling the tree down and so guiding it that it may fall in some general direction, incurs an obvious danger of the tree falling on him, and he either knows of such danger or is chargeable with knowledge thereof. Under such circumstances there is no hidden danger, but one which is as obvious to the servant as to the master. Such danger is an accident to the very work in which the servant is engaged, and does not come from an independent agency. A case of this character differs from that class of cases in which the danger arises from sources disconnected with the details of the work upon which the servant at the time is employed; as, for instance, where an employé is working in a mine, and the danger is occasioned by the firing of a blast by other fellow-servants at irregular intervals in other parts of the mine. Among the nonassignable duties of the master are those of furnishing the servant a reasonably safe place in which to work, and to give the servant warning of dangers incident to the employment, unknown to the servant, of which the master knows or ought to know. When a tree being felled in an open space is guided in the direction in which it falls by at rope which the servant is pulling, there is no duty imposed upon the master to warn the servant when the tree begins to fall and in what direction it is falling, in order that the servant may escape being injured by its fall. In this connection, see Anderson v. Columbia Improvement Co., 41 Wash. 83, 82 Pac. 1037, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 840, and authorities cited in note; Melton v. Jackson Lumber Co., 133 Ala. 580, 31 South. 848; Allen v. Augusta Factory, 82 Ga. 76, 8 S. E. 68; Holland v. Durham Coal & Coke Co., 131 Ga. 715, 63 S. E. 290. The petition alleges that it was the duty of the foreman in immediate charge of those engaged in the work of felling the tree to warn the latter when the tree began to fall and in what direction it was falling. As there was no duty on the master to give such warning, the failure of the foremen to thus warn the servants, if any such duty

rested on them, is not chargeable to the master, being an act of negligence by a fellow-servant for which the master, is not responsible: Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609, 56 S. E. 839, 10 L. R. A., N. S., 772; Dennis v. Schofield's Sons Co., 1 Ga. App. 489, 57 S. E. 925. The court committed no error in dismissing the petition upon general demurrer thereto.

Judgment affirmed.

All the justices concur.

The Doctrine of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Master and Servant is discussed in the notes to Houston etc. Ry. Co. v. De Walt, 97 Am. St. Rep. 886; Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gibson, 98 Am. St. Rep. 289.

A Master is not Under an Obligation, according to Anderson v. Columbia Improvement Co., 41 Wash. 83, 82 Pac. 1037, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 840, to instruct employés as to the danger incident of felling trees in a forest, for the danger is open and obvious to ordinary inspection. And in Melton v. Jackson Lumber Co., 133 Ala. 580, 31 South. 848, it is decided that the foreman of a gang of men clearing trees from a railroad right of way is not required to warn one of the men who is a deaf-mute, but whose sight is unimpaired, of the danger incident to the work.

As to Who is a Vice-principal, see the note to Mast v. Kern, 75 Am. St. Rep. 584.

ELLIOTT v. HIPP.

[134 Ga. 844, 68 S. E. 736.]

MANDAMUS-Issuance by One Judge Against Another. When duties are imposed on a judge of a superior court as an officer, another judge of the superior court has no power to issue a mandamus to compel the performance of such duties. (pp. 273, 274.)

JUDGES-Appointment of Registrar as Official Act.-The duty devolving upon the judge of a superior court under the Political Code, sections 50, 51, providing for the appointment of a board of county registrars, is an official act. (p. 274.)

MANDAMUS-Issuance by One Judge Against Another.— Where the judge of another circuit to whom such application was presented refused a mandamus nisi against the judge named in the petition, and granted a restraining order and mandamus nisi against the registrars, it was proper for the judge granting the order and mandamus nisi to subsequently revoke the same and refuse to take further action on such application, for the reason that the same should be presented to the judge referred to in the application, who had jurisdiction to act thereon and who was not disqualified from so doing. (pp. 275, 276.)

JUDGES-Disqualification Through Political Interest and Activity. The allegation that a judge is active in aiding one faction of a political party in a county to gain control of the party and the politics of the county, in order to further his political purposes and interests and those of a faction with which he is in sympathy, does