judice, or any unnatural Straining for a Conclufion, he may proceed to conclude Matters to be in a Reality, according as the Evidence propounded does represent them to be.

In a word, Whatsoever Evidence in any cafe affords all thofe Media, which are necessary to make a perfpicuous natural Conclufion, and to folve whatever Difficulties occur, upon fuch Principles as, in all refembling Cafes, Mankind univerfally agree to argue themselves into a juft Affurance and Satisfaction by: Such an Evidence, I fay, does actually oblige every Perfon, who is duly informed of the Nature of it, and is capable of arguing in a juft and regular Manner thereupon; to affent to the Thing propofed, as real Truth and Matter of Fact.

A

SECT. IV.

S to the Evidence I have here described, there are thefe Things to be observed concerning it. Firft, That this is not the Evidence which accompanies ftrict and perfect Demonftration; as Demonftration is underftood by the Logicians or Mathematicians. For tho' all accurate Demonftration must neceffarily have fuch Properties as thefe; yet every kind of Proof that has these Properties, is not accurate Demonstration: Because compleat Demonstration does in its own Nature involve and require fome peculiar Conditions, which can by no means agree to fome other forts of Proof, which yet may come up to all thofe Conditions, that the Evidence I have defcribed does comprehend.

SECT. V.

Secondly, A does not force or extort the Allent of the

ND therefore, an Evidence of this Nature

Understanding, as that of rigid Demonftration does.

How

Part II. How the Mind is influenced by Demonstration, and how by other fort of Proof; I fhall discourse more at large by and by: In the mean time, this must be laid down as an undoubted Rule, That fome Proofs may oblige us to yield the Affent of our Understandings, which yet do not extort that Affent from us; or (fpeaking in the common Senfe of the Philofophers) inevitably compel us to yield it. Every one will know what fort of Compulfion it is that I do, and muft, intend here: It is fuch as the Understanding fuffers, when a juft and accurate Demonftration is propounded to it. The Power of fuch Proof as this is plainly irrefiftible. It will not fuffer the Mind to remain in Doubt or Sufpence, but with a fuperior Authority exacts its Affent, and reduces it to a Compliance. Inftead of exerting a contrary Act of Diffent, we cannot remain indifferent in fuch a Cafe as this; but yield we muft, even tho' it be never fo contrary to our Inclinations. The Reason of this is from the Specifical Nature of thofe fort of Proofs we call Demonftrations; which proceeding from fuch Principles as are moft deeply radicated in our Minds, and perfectly congenial with them, they affault us with fomething drawn from the inmoft Receffes of our own Constitution, and so make their Way into us with Speed and Facility.

Other Proofs there are, whofe Principles, tho' ftrictly congruous and fuitable to our rational Natures, yet are not fo near a-kin to them as the former; and therefore do not infinuate themselves into us with that wonderful ease and advantage, that those of itrict Demonftration do. From whence it comes to pass, that there is more Scope left us to argue and enquire about them; to examine the Congruity and juft Connection of the Premises one with another, and their Tendency to infer a convincing legitimate Conclufion: Which Difquifition is incomparably abridged, and even almoft quite prevented, in the cafe of rigid Demonftration, by the naturalness of the Principles, and the bright eafy way of difpofing

and

and linking them with one another. However, these other Proofs (I will not fay may perfuade, for that is not the Cafe, but) may peremptorily oblige the Affent of our Minds; tho' they do not command it in that magisterial Way, that fcientifical or demonstrative ones do. For they may prefent Truth to us by fuch a Concatenation of Steps and Confequences, as may render it abfolutely just and rational for us to acknowledge and receive it as fuch; tho' the Procefs be different from thofe, which are formed by the ftrict Rules of Logick or Mathematicks. And if they may do this, they may oblige: For we are under an eternal Obligation to act juftly and rationally.

I have hitherto fhewn, in these two Particulars, what is not intended or afferted in the Evidence mentioned. To fhew therefore what I do intend by it; I fay,

Thirdly, T

SECT. VI.

HAT which I have defcribed, is fuch an Evidence in general, as obliges the Underftanding of a reasonable Creature to yield its Affent in all Cafes where we have not the Teftimony of Senfe or rigorous Demonftration to convince us of the Truth of things.

And, I say farther, that no fort of Evidence below or fhort of this is fufficient to engage the Affent of our Minds; has Force or Authority enough to challenge us as rational Creatures, to receive that as Truth, for the Proof of which, fuch Evidence is alledged. An Evidence of an inferior Character may represent Things fo far plaufible and credible, as to be a fufficient Ground for us to proceed upon in ordinary Cafes; but it does not lay an Obligation, or make it ftrictly juft and neceffary for us to yield the Affent of our Understandings, and receive thofe Things as pofitively true and real. Becaufe no Confiderations can be fufficient Grounds for the

entire Acquiefcency and Repofe of our Minds in any thing as Truth; but fuch as are plain and perfpicuous, will hold firm and good under all Examinations, and are no way liable to solid rational Exceptions.

I

SECT VII.

fhall now, in the fecond Place, demonstrate the obligatory Nature of an Evidence which is thus qualified, or which comes up to these Conditions. Ând this I fhall do from these two general Confiderations, viz. The Conftitution of Human Nature; and the ftrict Obligations we lie under to own or fubmit to moral Proof and Evidence. Thefe Topicks will abundantly furnish us with Matter to conclude the indifpenfible Obligation fuch an Evidence lays on Mankind.

I fhall begin the Argument from the first of these Confiderations, namely, The Frame and Conftitution of Human Nature. And that I may do this with more Advantage, it will not be amifs to divide the Work into these three Branches.

First, I fhall fhew, That the infinitely perfect and glorious Author of our Being must needs have established a certain Law or Order in the reasonable Nature of Man, with refpect to the Acts and Operations of his Mind; according to which be fhould be obliged to exert his Faculties upon proper Motives and Inducements, when prefented to him. That he would not fail, in our very Creation, to make fuitable Impreffions upon our Natures for that end and purpose; and confequently not leave us to acquire Difpofitions and Inclinations to act as intelligent Creatures fhould do; merely from Art and Education, from Custom and Practice, or the Examples of others,

Secondly, That however Human Nature be fo made and conftituted, yet it is in our Power to invert that Order, or to proceed contrary to the Obligation of that Law, which God has established in us.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I shall evince that it is apparently agreeable to that Order, which God has establifhed in the reasonable Nature of Man; and that it must of Neceffity be according to his original Intent and Defign (in giving us fuch a Power, as that we call Understanding) that we should yield the Affent thereof, or receive Things as true, upon fuch an Evidence as I bave already defcribed.

And from hence it will be an unavoidable Confequence, that an Evidence of this Nature whenever propounded to us, ought not to leave us hefitating and indifferent; but, as it does in the Nature of things oblige us, fo it fhould fully determine us, actually to yield our Affent.

SECT. VIII.

Begin with the first of these Propofitions, which being the Foundation on which the prefent Argument is built, requires that we bestow fome particular Care and Application upon the Proof of it.

Whether it be what the Deifts would folemnly and pofitively deny or no (at least all of them) I will neither affirm, nor am I concerned to know. I am fure it is of great Importance to me; and how plain foever it may appear, it is not felf-evident; and these are sufficient Grounds to justify a formal Proof of it. Besides, it is a common Practice with fome People to be as ready to deny, whatever is not made manifeftly abfurd for them to deny; as to disclaim all Doubt about it, when once they fee it fo well proved, that it must be ridiculous for them to do so. In order to the clearing this Point therefore, I fhall offer the following Confiderations.

Firft, It cafts an Imputation of downright Folly and Imprudence, or of Weakness and Impotence on God, to fuppofe him to make any fort of Being fo, as to be unfit to answer what must be his End in creating fuch a Being, if we allow bim to have any End at all therein.

For