Homestead entry.

3. The right of entry given by the act of Congress of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat. at L. 141, chap. 89, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1392), § 2, to a contestant who procures the cancelation of a homestead entry, inures to the benefit of one who, by his contest, induced the relinquishment in the local land office of a homestead entry of land in Oklahoma territory prima facie valid, but made by one in fact disqualified to make the entry, although a settlement was made intermediate the homestead entry and the initiation of the contest; since such entry, though ineffectual to vest any rights in the entryman, was sufficient to prevent the acquisition of homestead rights by another until it had been set aside. Hodges v. Colcord, 677 Timber culture entry.

7. The right of a member of one of the confederated Indian tribes residing on the Umatilla reservation, to insist upon her original selection, made under the allotment act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. at L. 34, chap. 319), as against a subsequent allotter, where the Land Department has corrected it mistake of law which denied her right to allotment because of her absence from the reservation when the census was taken, is not lost by her selection of other land after the Department had reconsidered her case when such selection was made after advisin ? with the Indian agent, and upon his statement that it would not affect her claim for the land she had previously selected, and from which she had been ordered by the officers of the government. Id. Railway land grants.

8. Lands 20 miles distant from a railroad right of way are not "adjacent" within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. at L. 482, chap. 152, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1568), § 1, granting to certain railroad companies the right of way through the public lands to the extent of 100 feet on each side of the central line of the road, with the right to take materials for its con

4. The policy of the timber culture act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 113, chap. 190), cannot be deemed to have been violated by an agreement by one who had made an entry thereunder to convey his claim to a proposed partnership as soon as he should acquire title from the government, in view of the failure of that act to require, as in the case of homestead entries, that the entryman shall make affidavit before final certifi-struction from the public lands adjacent to cate that no interest in the land has been the line of the road. United States v. St. alienated. Adams v. Church, Anthony R. Co. 548 Indian allotments.

769

5. Only a right of occupancy for life, with the additional privilege secured in case of allotment, was acquired by the registered Delaware Indians in the lands which the Cherokees agreed, in their contract of April 8, 1867, with the Delawares who were to be incorporated into the Cherokee Nation, to sell to such Delawares "for their occupancy," to be equal in the aggregate to 160 acres for each individual registered Delaware, with a guaranty to each of not less than 160 acres, with improvements, in case of the allotment of the Cherokee lands among the members of that nation, and with a stipulation that the lands sold were to be held on the same terms as the Cherokee citizens held their lands, and that the children thereafter born of such Delawares should, in all respects, be regarded as native Cherokees. Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation,

646

9. No such reservation of lands within that portion of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company under the act of July 2, 1864, (13 Stat. at L. 365, chap. 217), which was forfeited to the United States by the act of September 29, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 496, chap. 1040, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1598), as to except from the grant made to that company by the joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. at L. 378), the lands common to both grants, was effected by the transmission to the Secretary of the Interior in 1865 by the president of the company of a map of the general line of the road, which was not authorized by the company, and which was not accepted by the Land Department, and the filing, two months after the date of such resolution, of two maps of general route, which included the line authorized by the resolution. United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 593

6. Actual residence on the Umatilla In- 10. The protection afforded by the adjustdian reservation at the time of the passagement act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat at L of the allotment act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. at L. 340, chap. 319), cannot be deemed essential to give the right of allotment to a member of one of the confederated Indian tribes mentioned in the act as residing on the reservation, where such condition would exelude from the benefits of the aet a majority of the members of the different tribes. Hy-Yu-Tae-Mil-Kin v. Smith, 1039

556, chap. 376, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1595), § 4, to bona fide purchasers from any grantee railway company to whom lands had been erroneously certified or patented, does not extend to one who purchased, after the date of that act, certain unearned lands included in the grant made by the act of May 12, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 72, chap. 84, §§ 1, 2, 3), to the state of Iowa, in aid of railway

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 8-13.
Adverse Possession of Land within, see
ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1.

RATES.

ING, 3.

Finality of Judgment of Circuit Court
of Appeals in Case Removed from
State Court, see APPEAL AND ER-
ROR, 14.

1. A case cannot be removed from the state court to a Federal circuit court, as one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, unless plaintiff's statement of his own claim shows it to be a case of that character. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. 870

2. A recovery against one only of several defendants charged with joint and concurring negligence does not deprive such defendant of any Federal right because, if it had been sued alone, the diversity of citizenship existing between it and the plaintiff would have authorized the removal of the cause from the state court to a Federal circuit court. Southern R. Co. v. Carson, 907

REMOVAL OF PERSON.

From One Federal District to Another for Trial, see CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 5. Indictment as Evidence of Probable Cause in Proceedings for, see EVIDENCE, 9, 11.

REPEAL.

Allowance to Naval Officer for, see
NAVY, 2.

SEARCH.

Compulsory Production of Documentary
Evidence before Interstate Com-
merce Commission, see CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 5.
Admissibility of Evidence Secured by,
see EVIDENCE, 5.

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
Regulations for Collection of Chickasaw
Privilege Tax, see TAXES, 2.
SELF-INCRIMINATION.

Of Accused, see CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
SHIPPING.

Canal Boats as Ships or Vessels, see
ADMIRALTY, 1.

Master's Duty to Injured Seamen, see
APPEAL AND ERROR, 82.

Harter act.
Sufficiency of Evidence to Show Perform-
ance of Duty under Harter Act, see
EVIDENCE, 16.

1. The furnishing of a refrigerating apparatus in good order and repair, competent for the safe transportation of a cargo of dressed beef which a vessel has undertaken

Of Statute, When Implied, see NAVY, to carry, is within the obligation to use due

1216

2.

diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, im

posed upon the owner by the Harter act | SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
(Feb. 13, 1893) as a condition precedent to
the enjoyment of the benefits of that act
in limiting the owner's liability as provided
therein. Martin v. The Southwark, 65
2. Stipulations in a bill of lading cannot
relieve a carrier from the discharge of his
initial duty under the Harter act to use
due diligence to furnish a seaworthy vessel.
Id.

Master's duty to injured seaman.

3. The master of a sailing vessel bound for San Francisco is not chargeable with fault in failing to put back 480 miles from the place of accident to Port Stanley, in the East Falkland islands, to secure surgical attendance for a seaman who was disabled by the accident while the vessel was rounding Cape Horn, although, with the winds then prevailing, it would have been possible to reach that port in three or four days, where the return from the port to the place of the accident, in view of the head winds, might have taken as many weeks. The Iroquois,

955

4. The obligation of the master of a sailing vessel bound for San Francisco, toward

Public policy precludes a decree for the specific performance of a covenant in a deed of a railroad's right of way not to build or establish a depot within 3 miles of the one therein stipulated for,-especially where the erection of the structure in dispute has been ordered by the state railroad commission. Beasley v. Texas & P. R. Co. STAMP TAX.

274

Recovery Back of Illegal Taxes, see IN-
TERNAL REVENUE, 6.

As Direct Tax, see TAXES, 9.

STATE.

Regulation of Interstate Commerce, see
COMMERCE, 3-15.

Taxation of Property in Hands of Trus

tee in Bankruptcy, see TAXES, 3. Taxation of Liquors in Bonded Warehouses, see TAXES, 4.

Taxation of Imports, see TAXES, 4. Taxation of Personal Property of Nonresident, see TAXES, 6-8. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court over Controversies between States, see SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES. No waiver by the state of its constitu

a seaman disabled by an accident while the tional immunity from a suit in a Federal

ship was rounding Cape Horn, does not require him to stop at the Evangelist islands, at the western end of the Straits of Magellan, which could have been reached by sailing one or two days out of the vessel's course, where the only building there was a lighthouse from which a small steamer was accustomed to put out to passing vessels in case a signal for relief was hoisted, and nothing could be done there except, possibly, to place the injured man upon a steamer bound north to Valparaiso or east to Sandy Point, near the middle of the straits.

Id.

court to set aside the title of the state to
lands sold for unpaid taxes can be gathered
from the provision of Mich. Pub. Acts 1899,
act No. 97, for making the auditor general
a party defendant to all actions or proceed-
ings to set aside a sale for delinquent taxes
on lands held as state tax lands, or which
have been sold as such, or which have been
sold at annual tax sales, since the statute
makes such requirements with reference to
procedure and costs as to indicate that the
legislature had in mind only proceedings in
the state courts. Chandler v. Dix, 1129
STATE COURTS.

Review of Decisions of, in Federal Su-
preme Court, see APPEAL AND ER-
ROR, II. b, 2, 55, 63, 70-80, 85, 86.
Conclusiveness of Decisions of, in Fed-
eral Courts, see APPEAL AND ER-
ROB, 70-80; COURTS, 19-21.
Change of Decision by, as Impairment
of Obligation, see CONTRACTS, 4.
Enjoining Proceedings in, see INJUNC-
TION, 4.

STATION AGENT.

As Fellow Servant of Fireman, see
MASTER AND SERVANT, 3.

STATUTES.

Implied Repeal, see NAVY, 2.

Validity of Territorial Legislation, se
TERRITORIES.

1. Contemporaneous construction is an

available aid in construing a statute only where the language of such statute is ambiguous, and susceptible of two reasonable interpretations. Houghton v. Payne, 888 2. The title of an act cannot be resorted to in aid of its construction where the act is free from doubt or ambiguity. Cornell v. those acts. Coyne,

504

laws then in force so far as not inconsistent with treaty obligations, on the theory that SURETY. such section was inconsistent with the