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406 LIFE OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Happy the Sovereign that has at command, the right arm which has carried in triumph the English standard all over the globe-happy the people who may yet again confide, not their liberties indeed, for that is a trust which he would spurn from him with indignation-but who would confide in his matchless valour for their safety against all the perils which Providence may have in store for them. You of the Cinque Ports stand at the advanced post of danger; if that danger should ever approach, through your lines the enemy that would dare to defile our shores, must pierce; and over your bodies I know he will walk should he pursue his career towards the heart of the realm. But upon whom have we placed the command, and who is he whom we oppose face to face to the peril? As some gallant ship which is destined to convey the thunders of England against any hostile power, has planted on her prow the image of a Nelson, or a Jervis, but only, as they have been taken from us, to remind their descendants of their great feats in arms, to stimulate them to exertion, whereby those deeds may be emulated, so have you not the lifeless image, but the living warrior-the conqueror of a hundred fields-planted on the outermost point of the island-on the advanced posts-in face and front of all enemies-to command you, encourage his country, to make his Sovereign secure, to make the independence of England perpetual, and to hurl as great dismay among all ranks of the landtroops as the cannon and the might of Nelson and Jervis hurled defiance and destruction among the fleets of our enemies. Then would be seen-what God forbid I should ever live to witness the necessity of, or feel the occasion for-Wellington coming forth a veteran warrior, to add one bright page more to the history of his imperishable renown.'

APPENDIX.

I.

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF ASSAYE.

"THE information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out

natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ as hircarrahs the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where I knew the infantry was posted; and Colonel Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to Assaye, where was its left; it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

"My march on the 23rd was so directed that I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I here received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or stay, I must have reconnoitred. I could not have reconnoitred without taking the whole of my small force; and when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning according to the plan. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack on the 23rd the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel

Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and that they would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack.

"The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information concerning the enemy's position, and consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c. &c.

"The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Pepulgaon and Warsor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Pepulgaon. I determined at that time to throw my right up to Assaye.

"For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assaye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assaye; but in more than one line. Luckily they did not occupy the ford at Pepulgaon : if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack. When I saw that they had got their left to Assaye, I altered my plan, and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the Nullah, knowing that the village of Assaye must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were accordingly given. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the picquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of As

saye; the 74th regiment, which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support the picquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line between those corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assaye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the Campoos; consequently, in the picquets and the 74th regiment we sustained the greatest part of our loss. One company of the picquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file, lost one officer and forty-four rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th and the picquets. It was thus, brought into the cannonade; men and horses were lost; it charged amongst broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assaye was not defeated till worked on by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movements of the picquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.-N. B. The Juah river, or Nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses."

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