No. 185. xi. Hire of a Piano-forte, with Damages for not Returning it. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: First.-For a first cause of action: ..... the I. That on the......day of......., 187., at.... defendant hired from the plaintiff one piano-forte, the property of the plaintiff, for the space of [six] months then next ensuing, to be returned to this plaintiff at the expiration of said time in good condition, reasonable wear excepted, for the use of which he promised to pay this plaintiff a reasonable sum [or state how much]. II. That .... dollars was a reasonable sum for the hire of the same. III. That he has not paid the same. Second. And for a second cause of action: ...... I. That the value of the piano-forte so hired by the defendant, as above alleged, was .... dollars, and that the defendant, in violation of his agreement, has not returned the same, although he was, on the ...... day of ... 187., at ... ......... requested by the plaintiff so to do; to the damage of the plaintiff ... ... dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] No. 186. xii. Hire of Furniture, etc., with Damages for Ill-use. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: 187., at I. That on the .... day of .... the plaintiff rented to the defendant, and the defendant hired from the plaintiff, household furniture, plate, pictures, and books, the property of the plaintiff, to wit: [describe the articles], for the space of .. .... then next ensuing, to be returned by him to the plaintiff at the expiration of said time, in good condition, reasonable wear and tear thereof excepted. II. That he promised to pay the plaintiff for the use thereof...... dollars [in equal quarterly payments, on the days of ... .... thereafter]. III. That no part thereof has been paid. Second.-For a second cause of action: I. The plaintiff further alleges, that the value of the property so hired by the defendant, as above alleged, was dollars. II. That the defendant, in violation of his said agreement to return the same in good condition, neglected the same, and through his negligence, carelessness and ill-use, the same became broken, defaced and injured beyond the reasonable wear thereof, and in that condition were returned to the plaintiff, to his damage .... dollars. The plaintiffs complain, and allege: I. That at the times hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs were partners, doing business at the city and county of San Francisco, State of California, under the firm name of A. B. & Co., and the defendants were partners doing business at the said city and county of San Francisco, under the firm name of C. D. & Co. .., 187., at .... ......... First.-For a first cause of action, the plaintiffs allege: I. That on the ...... day of at the request of the defendants, the plaintiffs deposited with the defendants the sum of ...... dollars, gold coin of the United States, which sum the defendants promised to pay to the plaintiffs on demand. II. That on the .... day of ... 187., at the plaintiffs demanded payment of the same from the defendants, but they have not paid the same. Second-And for a second cause of action, the plaintiffs allege: I. That on the....day of.. 187., at the defendants received .... to be paid to the plaintiffs. dollars from one E. F., II. That the defendants have not paid the same. Third. And for a third cause of action, the plaintiffs II. That the defendants have not paid the same. [Demand of Judgment.] CODES.-The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint where they all arise out of: 1. Contracts, express or implied; 2. Claims to recover specific real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, or for waste committed thereon, and the rents and profits of the same; 3. Claims to recover specific personal property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; 4. Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law; 5. Injuries to character; 6. Injuries to person; 7. Injuries to property. The causes of action must belong to one only of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated; but an action for malicious arrest and prosecution, or either of them, may be united with an action for either an injury to character or to the person: Cal. Code C. P., sec. 427; N. Y. Code Proc., sec. 484. The Ohio Code, sec. 80, permits the joinder of causes of action for injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either. The Wisconsin Code, sec. 31, is the same as the Ohio Code. The Iowa Code, sec. 2630, is as follows: "Causes of action of whatever kind, where each may be prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings, provided that they be by the same party, and against the same party in the same rights, and if suit on all may be brought and tried in that county, may be joined in the same petition; but the court, to prevent confusion therein, may direct all or any portion of the issues joined therein to be tried separately, and may determine the order thereof." Under this section, tort and contract may be joined: Turner v. First Nat. Bk., 26 Iowa, 562. Code of Dakota, sec. 136, is copied from the Ohio Code; Nevada Code, sec. 64; Oregon Code, sec. 91. 1. Accounts.-As to when separate accounts between the same parties are separate causes of action, and may be separately stated, see Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Stevens v. Lockwood, 13 Wend. 644; Staples v. Goodrich, 21 Barb. 317; Secor v. Sturgis, 2 Abb. Pr. 69. 2. Accounting and Refunding.-The plaintiff may demand in the same action that defendant account for, and refund a proportion of the outfit and advances made on a joint adventure: Garr v. Redman, 6 Cal. 574. 3. Causes of Action may be United.-The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they arise from and constitute part of the same transaction: Cal. Code C. P. sec. 427. If such union does not amount to a misjoinder, in which case the objection can be raised only by demurrer: Fritz v. Fritz, 23 Ind. 388. But actions so united must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial; but the defendants need not be all equally affected: Earle v. Scott, 50 How. Pr. 506; see Van Wageman v. Hunt, 7 Hun. 328; Ladd v. James, 10 Ohio St. 437. An action for goods sold, and for the price of goods wrongfully taken from a third person and sold, may be joined; the tort in the latter having been waived by its assignment: Hawk v. Thorn, 54 Barb. 164; and must belong to the same class: Cleveland v. Barrows, 59 Barb. 364; and must be consistent with each other: Smith v. Hallock, 8 How. Pr. 73; see p. 172, ante. 4. Claims in two Capacities.-Claims against trustees, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law, may be joined: Cal. Code C. P., sec. 427. So, a trust and a vendor's lien may be united in one action: Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632. 5. Counts on Promises to the testator and to his executor in his representative capacity may be joined: Brown v. Webber, 6 Cush. 571; Sullivan v. Holker, 15 Mass. 374. Counts on promises made by the testator may be joined with counts on promises made by the administrator, as such: Hapgood v. Houghton, 10 Pick. 151; Dixon v. Ramsay, 1 Cranch C. Ct. 472. After counts by the plaintiff, as executor, for an excessive distress, and for distraining for more rent than was due, the declaration proceeded thus: "And the plaintiff, as such executor as aforesaid, also sues the defendant for money paid by the plaintiff as such executor as aforesaid, for the defendant, at his request, and for money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff, and for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on an account stated between them. And the plaintiff, as such executor as aforesaid, claims, etc.: Held, on demurrer, that the declaration was bad for misjoinder; Davies v. Davies, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 451; see ante, p. 174, pars. 37 and 38. 6. Class. Where the form of the action is the same, and where the same plea may be pleaded and the same judgment given on all the counts, they are well joined: Fairfield v. Burt, 11 Pick. 244; Worster v. Canal Bridge, 16 Pick. 541. 7. Common Counts.-So, the common counts may be united in one complaint, if separately stated: Freeborn v. Glazier, 10 Cal. 337; De Witt v. Porter, 13 Id. 171; Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Id. 146; Keller v. Hicks, 22 Id. 457; Birdseye v. Smith, 32 Barb. 217. But they cannot be united in one count as one cause of action, without any specification of the sums due upon each several cause: Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Cal. 146. 8. Contracts.-Contracts, express or implied, may be united. For sums due in damages for delay, and a demand to set aside an award, all growing out of the same contract, may be united in one action: See v. Partridge, 2 Duer, 463. To reform a written contract, and for judgment thereon, when reformed: Story's Eq. Jur. sec. 157-161; 2 Johns. Ch. 585; 4 Id. 144; Gooding v. McAlister, 9 How. Pr. 123. For reformation of a contract, and for damages for breach of it: Bidwell v. Astor Mut. Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 263. Damages for false representations, and for breach of contract: Robinson v. Flint, 16 How. Pr. 240; 7 Abb. Pr. 393; see, however, Waller v. Raskan, 12 How. Pr. 28. Loss of goods by carrier, and also for freight overpaid: Adams v. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382. As to contracts, with allegations of matters of fraud: Roth v. Palmer, 27 Barb. 652. A cause of action for false representations in inducing the plaintiff to enter into a contract, and a cause of action for a breach of the same contract, may be joined: Robinson v. Flint, 7 Abb. Pr. 393, note; and see, also, Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492. On the joinder of ordinary claims in contract with claims for which defendant is arrestable, the plaintiff may waive arrestability in the latter case: Hickox v. Fuy, 36 Barb. 9-14. 9. Contract of Partners.-A complaint, after stating cause of action on a contract against partners, and demanding judgment therefor, contained also allegations that the defendants were insolvent, and had fraudulently confessed judgment to hinder their creditors, and demanded an injunction and a receiver: Held, that although the last matter might be obnoxious to a motion to strike out, its insertion did not render the complaint demurrable; Meyer v. Van Collem, 7 Abb. Pr. 222. In Massachusetts, a surviving partner may join in the same action a demand due to the firm, and another due to himself in his own right; or demands due to him as the surviving partner of two firms: Stafford v. Gold, 9 Pick. 533. 10. Each Cause Complete.-Each separate cause of action, as stated, must be complete in itself, and must stand by itself: Lattin v. McCarty, 17 How. Pr. 239; 8 Abb. Pr. 225; see, also, 41 Cal. 17; Harsen v. Bayaud, 5 Duer, 656; Dorman v. Kellam, 14 How. Pr. 184; and directly, that numerous items of a distinct class should be stated in distinct counts: Adams v. Holley, 12 How. Pr. 326; Hillman v. Hillman, 14 Id. 456; and see, also, Longworthy v. Knapp, 4 Abb. Pr. 115; see ante, p. 172, pars. 29 and 30. 11. Injuries to the Person.-Claims for injuries to character, or injuries to character and malicious arrest and prosecution, may be united: Cal. Code C. P., sec. 427; 6 How. Pr. 229; 10 Barb. 656; Hull v. Vreeland, 42 Barb. 543; 18 Abb. Pr. 182. Plaintiff may recover in an action for the combined injury to character and person, when the matters arise from and constitute a part of the same transaction: Jones v. Steamship "Cortes," 17 Cal. 487. Criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife, held to be an injury to the person: De La Mater v. Russell, 2 Code R. 147. So, also, is seduction: Taylor v. North, 3 Code R. 9. 12. Injuries to Person and Property.-It seems that negligence and the damage arising therefrom, both to the person and property of plaintiff, may be united: 10 Bing. 112, 117; 14 Johns. 433; 10 Wend. 328; 1 Chitt. Pl. 127; Howe v. Peckham, 6 How. Pr. 229. For one injury, all the acts of negligence should be alleged in one count: Dickens v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 13 How. Pr. 228. Injuries resulting to both person and property, from the same negligent act, constitute but one cause of action: Howe v. Peckham, 10 Barb. 656; 6 How. Pr. 229. * 13. Injuries to Property.-Actions for injuries to property may be united: Cal. Code C. P., sec. 427; Moore v. Massini, 32 Cal. 590; Howe v. Peckham, 6 How. Pr. 229. The union in one count of a complaint of an allegation that defendants "have wrongfully built dams and flumes across said Mormon creek so as to turn the water of said creek out of its natural channel," etc., and thus divert it from plaintiff, with an allegation that defendants "have constructed gates, etc., in their said dams and flumes, which they # hoist for the purpose of clearing out said dams and flumes of slum, stone and gravel, the accumulation of which renders the water useless to plaintiff," does not make the complaint demurrable, on the ground that it unites several distinct causes of action in one count: Gale v. Tuolumne Water Co., 14 Cal. 25. In an action for injuries to a mining claim, a claim for damages to the plaintiff by reason of the breaking away of the * |