32. Innuendo.-The office of an innuendo is to explain, not to extend, what has gone before; and it cannot enlarge the meaning of words unless it be connected with some matter of fact expressly averred: 2 Gilm. 720; 5 Johns. 211. Nor can it change the ordinary meaning of language: Hays v. Mitchell, 7 Blackf. 117. Nor introduce new matter: 16 Vt. 83; 6 Ala. 881. It is only a link to attach together facts already known to the Court: Cooke on Defamation, 94. It cannot attribute to words a meaning which renders them actionable (Holton v. Muzzy, 30 Vt. 365), without a prefatory averment of extrinsic facts which makes them slanderous: 2 Dev. 115; 2 Shep. 317; 8 N. H. 256; 8 B. Monr. 486; 16 Penn. 204; 2 Bibb. 319. 33. Innuendo, Office of.-The use of innuendoes is in part retained and in part dispensed with under our system of pleading. If the words used are not libelous per se, but are made so by some extrinsic matter alleged by way of inducement, innuendoes are necessary to show the connection of such words with the intrinsic facts. So, also, where the publication is made libelous by reference to extrinsic matter not necessary to be alleged. In such case, the extrinsic fact should be suggested by an innuendo. Where words are not libelous per se, the extraneous facts must be stated in the introduction or inducement; as an innuendo cannot extend, but only apply the words: Nichols v. Packard, 16 Vt. 83; Brown v. Brown, 2 Shepley, 317; Harris v. Burley, 8 N. H. 256; Linville v. Earlywine, 4 Blackf. 469; Tappan v. Wilson, 7 Ohio, 190, Part 1. The employment of the innuendo will be indulged where the convenience of pleading demands it, though in some cases it may not be strictly proper: See Blaisdell v. Raymond, 4 Abb. Pr. 446; Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Id. 193. 34. Innuendoes, when not Essential. When the language is not in itself applicable to the plaintiff, no innuendo can make it so: Townshend's Slan. and Lib. 114, 426. But if the plaintiff is designated by another name in the libel, his real name may be desiguated by an innuendo: Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts, 392. Where it is desired to connect the words charged with the colloquium, or to show the meaning imputed to words libelous, per se, we consider that innuendoes may be dispensed with; and it will always be unsafe to rely on an innuendo, unsupported by a distinct prefatory averment, to show a libeous meaning not evident from the words used. As to proof of libelous meaning by extraneous evidence, and as to sufficiency of innuendo drawn, see Wachter v. Quenzer, 29 N. Y. 547; Butler v. Wood, 10 How. Pr. 222. 35. Letter.--A complaint which alleges that defendant sent a letter to plaintiff, and that the same was, by means of such sending thereof, received and read by plaintiff, and thereby published by the plaintiff, is not good; for the letter is presumed to be sealed, and sending a letter is not publication: Lyle v. Clason, 1 Cai. 581. But reading aloud a letter containing libelous matter amounts to publication: Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43. 36. Libelous Imputations.-Imputations which are libelous-an imputation of the receipt of money for procuring a public appointment is said to be libelous. An imputation of insanity: Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461. Corruption against a member of the Legislature: Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41. A statement of the keeper of an intelligence office, reflecting on the business capacity of the partners of a mercantile firm: Taylor v. Church, 4 Seld. 452; see, further, Townshend on Slan, and Lib. -- 37. Libelous Intent and Meaning. Where a complaint only averred a libelous intent and meaning on the part of the defendant, in the composing and publishing of the words, without averring that they were so understood by those to whom they were published: Held, that a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that the written and published words set forth do not constitute a libel, was properly sustained: Maynard v. F. F. Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48. 38. Special Damage. When the words are, in the natural and obvious construction, injurious, some damage is to be presumed, and it is not essential to allege special damage (Perkins v. Mitchell, 21 Barb. 461; Hicks v. Walker, 2 Greene (Iowa) 440), but when the Court can discern no injurious meaning in the plain and natural purport of the publication itself, the plaintiff must aver and prove special damage: Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Abb. Pr. 193; Stone v. Cooper, 2 Den. 299; Bennett v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. 60. 39. Of and Concerning Plaintiff. Although inducement may be necessary to explain the matter alleged to be libelous, it is enough to state in the declaration that the publication was "of and concerning" the plaintiff: Townshend Sland. and Lib. 406. The court assumes the words complained of do in fact refer to the plaintiff: Wesley v. Bennett, 5 Abb. Pr. 498. By section 460, Code C. P. Cal., the averment that the same was published concerning the plaintiff supplies the place of all averments of extrinsic facts, which might otherwise be necessary to show the application of the words charged to the plaintiff. This averment is essential, and cannot be supplied by an innuendo: See ante, note 31. 40. Reputation-Character.-Reputation is the estimate in which an individual is held by public fame in the place where he is known: Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Den. 347. And it is not necessary to prefix the word general: French v. Millard, 2 Ohio St. R. 50. The words "character" and " reputation," though often used synonymously, are in fact not synonymous: 20 Ohio, 18; 2 Ohio St. R. 50. That they are the same, see 3 Serg. & R. 337. That character is a term convertible with common report: Id. And that general character is the estimation in which a person is held in the community where he resides, see Douglass v. Tousey, 2 Wend. 354. It is the result of general conduct: Sharp v. Scogin, Holt's N. P. C. 541; 3 Am. Law J. (N. S.) 145. While "chaste character" means actual personal virtue— not mere reputation: Carpenter v. The People, 8 Barb. 603; Crozier v. The People, 1 Park. Cr. 453; Safford v. The People, Id. 474. 41. Words with a Covert Meaning.-Words which on their face appear to be entirely harmless, may, under certain circumstances, convey a covert meaning wholly different from the ordinary and natural interpretation usually put upon them. To render such words actionable, it is necessary for the pleader to aver that the author of the libel intended them to be understood, and that they were in fact understood by those who read them in their covert sense: Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48; see, also, 7 Barb. 260; 5 Abb. Pr. 498; and Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 618. And when a hidden defamatory meaning is sought to be attributed to words in themselves innocent, and on their face containing no such sense, by extrinsic facts outside and independent of the publication itself, the knowledge of such facts must be shown, by averment, to have existed in the breast of the defendant at the time of the publication: Smith v. Ashley, 11 Met. 367; Dezter v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115. [TITLE.] No. 333. iii. The Same-By an Attorney at Law. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That the plaintiff was, on and before the......day of 187., an attorney at law of the several courts of record of the State of....., duly admitted as such to practice therein, as such attorney, and had practiced, and still continued to practice as such attorney at law, in the several courts of record in said State of. . . . . ., and had always, as such attorney at law, conducted and demeaned himself with honesty and fidelity, and had never been guilty, or suspected to have been guilty, of any misconduct or malpractice, in his said capacity and profession of an attorney at law. the the II. That on the... ... day of......, 187., at... defendant published in a newspaper called the........ following words concerning the said plaintiff, and of and concerning him in his said capacity and profession of an attorney at law [set forth the words used]. III. That the defendant meant thereby that [state innuendo]. IV. That said publication was false and defamatory, and by means thereof the plaintiff hath been and is greatly injured and prejudiced in his reputation aforesaid, and has also lost and been deprived of great gains and profits, which would otherwise have arisen and accrued to him in his said profession and business, to his damage [TITLE.] [Demand of Judgment.] No. 334. iv. The Same--by a Physician. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: dollars. I. That at the time hereinafter mentioned the plaintiff was a physician, practicing as such at 187., the de II. That on the......day of..... fendant published in a newspaper called the. the following words concerning the plaintiff [set forth the words used]. III. That said publication was false and defamatory, and by means thereof the plaintiff was injured in his reputation, and in his said good name and credit as a physician, and in his practice as such, to his damage [Demand of Judgment.] No. 335. dollars. V. For Libel-Charge of Dishonesty, etc., in Business. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the times hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff was a corporation existing by or under the laws of this State, was engaged in business in the city of .... banker and stock broker. II. That the business of this plaintiff as a as a has always depended largely on the good reputation and credit of this plaintiff, and on the trust reposed in it, and by their shareholders and the public, in consequence thereof. III. That the defendant was, at the times hereinafter mentioned, the publisher and proprietor of the a newspaper published in the city of IV. That the defendant, well knowing the premises, did, on the.... day of ..... 187., compose and publish in said newspaper, concerning the plaintiff, and concerning the premises, the false and defamatory matter following, to wit [here insert words of libel, innuendoes, etc.]. V. That by reason of the premises, the plaintiff has been injured in its reputation and credit, to its damage dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 42. Corporations-Special Damage.-Incorporated companies established for the purpose of transacting business, e. g., banks, may maintain actions for libel, the same as individuals, for words affecting their business or property, and without alleging special damages: Shoe and Leather Bank v. Thompson, 23 How. Pr. 253. No. 336. vi. For Charge of Crime-Words not Libelous on their Face. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the time hereinafter mentioned, the [dwellinghouse] of the defendant had been burned down, and it was suspected that it had been feloniously set on fire. II. That on the .... day of .... 187., at the defendant published in a newspaper called the... the following words concerning the plaintiff: "One A. B. kindled the fire, and I can prove it." III. That the defendant meant thereby that the plaintiff had feloniously set fire to said house. IV. That the said publication was false and defamatory. V. That plaintiff hath sustained damage by reason of said false and defamatory publication in the sum of....... dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] No. 337. vii. For Accusing Plaintiff of Perjury in his Answer to a Complaint. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That before the committing of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff had filed his answer in a certain action then pending against him in the District Court of the........Judicial District of the State of.... wherein the defendant herein was plaintiff; and which said answer was verified by this plaintiff. 187., at ......... II. That on the......day of .... the defendant, well knowing the premises, published, and caused and procured to be published, in a newspaper called the.... ..., concerning the plaintiff and his said answer, the following words: [here state the libelous matter]-and in a certain other part of the said libel, the following words: [here state libelous matter.] III. That said publication was and is false and defamatory, and by reason thereof the plaintiff hath sustained damage in the sum of........ dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] No. 338. viii. For Composing a Libel not Directly Accusing the Plaintiff of Perjury. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That before the committing of the grievances by the defendant hereinafter mentioned, a certain action had been pending in the District Court of the........Judicial District of the State of........, wherein one A. B. was plaintiff and one C. D. was defendant, and which action had. been then lately tried in said Court, and on such trial the |