66. Special Damages.-The loss which ensues as a necessary consequence is termed damage; the loss which ensues as a natural and proximate consequence is termed special damages: Townshend on Slander and Libel, 148. Special damages consist in the loss of marriage, loss of consortium of husband and wife, loss of emoluments, profits, customers, employment, or gratuitous hospitality, or by being subjected to any other inconvenience or annoyance occasioning or involving a pecuniary loss: Id. 227. Mere apprehension of loss is not such special damage as will maintain an action: Id. 230; Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Wilson v. Goit, Id. 442. Mental distress, physical illness and inability to labor, occasioned by the aspersion of words not in themselves actionable, are no grounds for special damages. The case of Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; and Fuller v. Fenner, 16 Barb. 333; overruled, Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Wilson v. Goit, Id. 442; see post, note 45. 67. Special Damages must be Alleged.-Special damages or those damages which are not the necessary consequence of the language complained of, must be specially alleged in the complaint: Townshend on Slander and Libel, 428, citing various authorities. A pecuniary loss must be shown to entitle the plaintiff to a remedy: Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 309; Herrick v. Lapham, 10 Johns. 281; Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Yeates, 508. The objections that allegations of special damage-e. g., in an action for slander-are not sufficiently specific, cannot be raised by demurrer, but only by motion to make more specific: Hewitt v. Mason, 24 How. Pr. 366. 68. Subsequent Usage.-In slander, allegations of a subsequent usage of the words complained of are inadmissible. A repetition may be proved without such allegation: Gray v. Nellis, 6 How. Pr. 290. If, after a recovery has been had in an action for slander or libel, special damage occurs, no action can be maintained therefor. The first recovery is a bar to any subsequent action: Townshend on Slander and Libel, 231; Cooke Defam. 24; Fittler v. Veal, Cas. K. B. 542. Ordinarily, the repetition of language by another than the first publisher is not a natural consequence of the first publication, and therefore, except in certain cases, the loss resulting from such repetition does not constitute special damage: Townshend on Slander and Libel, 233. 69. Specific Words.-The specific words in which slander is conveyed must be set forth in the petition in an action of slander; and it is not sufficient to state the effect of the words merely, or to allege that the defendant charged the plaintiff with a particular crime: Taylor v. Moran, 4 Met. (Ky.) 127. No. 342. xii. For Slander-Words Spoken in a Foreign Language. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That on the... . . . . . day of........, 187., 187., at... the defendant, in the presence and hearing of divers persons who understood the [German] language, spoke concerning the plaintiff the following words in the said [German] language [Here set forth the words in the German or 1 foreign language]; and which said words signified, and were understood to mean, in the English language [Here set forth a correct translation of the words in English]; and the said German words were so understood by the said persons in whose presence and hearing they were spoken. II. That the defendant meant thereby [set forth innuendo]. III. That the said publication was false and defamatory. IV. That in consequence [state special damage]. V. That by reason of the speaking and publication of the said false and defamatory words the plaintiff hath been injured in his reputation, to his damage.. ...dollars. [If special injury as to business is alleged, add, after the word reputation, the words "and business."] [Demand of Judgment.] 70. Foreign Tongue.-Where the slanderous words were spoken in a foreign tongue, they should be set out in the complaint in the original language, accompanied by an averment of their meaning in English, and it should also be alleged that the persons present understood the language used: Keenholts v. Becker, 3 Den. 346; Wormouth v. Cramer, 3 Wend. 394; Lettman v. Ritz, 3 Sandf. 734; Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597. The complaint is, however, amendable in this respect, upon terms: 3 Sandf. 734. 71. Foreign Words.-In the case of foreign words, it must be alleged that the persons present understood them: Wormouth v. Cramer, 3 Wend. 394; Stark. Slan. 360; Zeig v. Ort, 3 Chand. 26; Amann v. Damm, 8 Com. B. (N. S.) 597. But in Ohio, it is held where words are spoken in German in a German county, it will be presumed they were understood: Bechtell v. Shatler, Wright, 107. No. 343. xiii. For Slander-The Words not being Actionable in Themselves. ......... 187., at The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That on the ...... day of ..... the defendant said to one C. D., concerning the plaintiff ["He is a young man of remarkably easy conscience"]. II. That the plaintiff was then seeking employment as a private secretary to the said C. D., and the defendant meant by the said words that the plaintiff was not trustworthy as a private secretary. III. That the said words were false. IV. That in consequence of the said words [the said C. D. refused to employ the plaintiff as private secretary], to his damage.. ... dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 72. Innuendo.--Where the words themselves are ambiguous, and do not necessarily impute a crime, the innuendo cannot enlarge the meaning of the words spoken beyond the averment of the intention by which the speaking of the words is introduced: Weed v. Bibbins, 35 Barb. 315; and see Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54. As to the office of the innuendo as employed prior to the code, consult Mott v. Comstock, 7 Cow. C. 54; Id. 658; Tyler v. Tillotson, 2 Hill, 507; Butler v. Wood, 10 How. Pr. 222; Tillotson v. Cheatham, 3 Johns. 56; Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Id. 211; Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Id. 359; Vaughan v. Havens, 8 Id. 109; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54; Andrews v. Woodmansee, 15 Wend. 232; Cornelius v. Van Slyck, 21 Id. 70; Croswell v. Weed, 25 Id. 621. It may be averred that the defendant, by means of the words, insinuated and meant to be understood by the hearers as charging the plaintiff with the crime imputed: Rundell v. Butler, 7 Barb. 260. But if the words are unambiguous, such averment is unnecessary: Walrath v. Nellis, 17 How. Pr. 72. And where the innuendo extends the meaning, the excess in meaning may be disregarded: Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615; Weed v. Bibbins, 32 Id. 315. 73. Tenor, Import and Effect. It is bad pleading to aver in the complaint that defendant uttered "certain false and defamatory words and statements, of the following tenor and import, and to the following effect; that is to say," etc., though an allegation of their "substance" might be sufficient: Forsyth v. Edmiston, 2 Abb. Pr. 430; Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426; Cook v. Cox, 3 Mau. & S. 110. Of the former rules of pleading and evidence in actions of slander, and their operation: Bisbey v. Shaw, 2 Kern. 67. 74 What Words are Actionable.-Although words spoken of a party do not necessarily import anything injurious in themselves, yet they may when taken in connection with other charges made against the party at the same time. The whole being spoken of the party as a merchant, and with intent to affect his credit, have a very different meaning from their ordinary one, and so taken may sustain an action: Beardsley v. Tappan, 1 Blatch. 588. 75. Words of Disgrace.-Mere words of disgrace, unless written and published, are not actionable: Johnson v. Brown, 4 Cranch C. Ct. 235. 76. Words not per se Slanderous.—In actions of slander for words not in themselves actionable, the right to recover depends upon the question whether they caused special damage, and the special damage must be fully and accurately stated: Linden v. Graham, 1 Duer, 672; Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Evans v. Harries, 1 H. & N. 251: Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130; Harrison v. Pearce, F. & F. 567. [TITLE.] No. 344. xiv. For Slander Respecting Plaintiff's Trade. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the time of the commission of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff was engaged in business as merchant [or as the case may be], and had always maintained a good reputation and credit as such [merchant]. II. That on the ...... day of 187., the defendant, in the presence and hearing of a number of persons, maliciously, and with intent to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff kept false and fraudulent books of account in his said business, published the following words concerning this plaintiff, and concerning his said business: "He keeps false accounts, and I can prove it" [or state the words complained of]. III. That the said words were false. IV. That in consequence of said words, a number of persons, and in particular [name the persons referred to], who had theretofore been accustomed to deal with the plaintiff in his business aforesaid, ceased to deal with him, and the plaintiff was thereby deprived of their custom, and of the profits which he would otherwise have made by a continuance of such dealing, and was otherwise injured in his reputation, to his damage ........ ... dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 77. Clerk or Tradesman.-In an action for slander, where words are charged to have been spoken of and concerning a defendant, as a clerk or tradesman, which, it is alleged, was his profession, it is unnecessary to allege special damage: Butler v. Howes, 7 Cal. 87. 78. Dishonesty.-Imputations charging dishonesty against an individual in connection with his business are slanderous per se: Fowles v. Borcen, 30 N. Y. 20. 79. Ignorance and Want of Skill. - Gross ignorance and want of skill in his profession, as against a physician: Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425; Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615. 80. Insolvency.-An imputation of insolvency against a petty trader is actionable: Carpenter v. Dennis, 3 Sandf. 305. 81. Mechanical Trade.-Words imputing to a mechanic want of skill or knowledge in his craft, are actionable, per se, if they are clearly shown to have been spoken with reference to the plaintiff's occupation, and the employment is one requiring peculiar knowledge and skill: Fitzgerald v. Redfield, 51 Barb. 484; S. C. 36 How. Pr. 97. 82. Physician.—Where words are actionable only because spoken of the plaintiff in his business or profession, averments by way of inducement and colloquium should be inserted. If a physician brings an action for the speaking of words which are disgraceful to him in his profession, he must aver in his complaint that he was a practicing physician at the time the words were uttered, and that they were spoken of and concerning him in his profession; otherwise it is demurrable: Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615. 83. Special Averment-Discharge from Employ. That by reason, etc., one A. B., who had theretofore retained plaintiff in the capacity of .........2 mitting of the said grievances by the defendant, E. F., G. H. [etc., who had theretofore dealt with the plaintiff in his trade of a by him then and since carried on], afterwards declined to have any dealings with the plaintiff. 85. Special Averment-Refusal to Employ.-That by reason of said slander, one E. F., who before was about to employ, and would have employed the plaintiff as his servant for certain wages, afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, refused to employ the plaintiff in his service; and the plaintiff from thence remained out of employment for ..... months. 86. Special Averment-Refusal to Retain in Employ. — That by reason [etc.], one .... .... . ., who otherwise would have retained the plaintiff in the capacity of in his business of ......... for wages, afterwards declined so to do; whereby the plaintiff lost [etc.], which would otherwise have accrued to him [etc.] ......... 87. Special Averment—Refusal to Sell.—That by reason [etc.], one A. B., who would otherwise have sold to the plaintiff certain goods, to wit [mention goods], on credit, afterwards refused so to do; whereby, etc. 88. Special Damages.—In an action for slander for words spoken of the plaintiff in his trade or business, with a general allegation of loss of business, jury may assess damages for a general loss or decrease of trade. As a general rule, the customers so lost should be named: Mayne on Damages, 278, 317; 2 Phil. on Ev. 248; Feise v. Linder, 3 B. & P. 372; Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537; Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630. The loss of a customer is special damage, although if the dealing had taken place, the plaintiff would have lost by it: Storey v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234. For cases on the subject of averring special damages in actions of slander, see Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Keenholts v. Becker, 3 Den. 346; Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 309; Herrick v. Lapham, 10 Johns. 281; Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend. 506; Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Id. 291; Williams v. Hill, 19 Id. 305; Shipman v. Burrows, 1 Hall, 399; Harcourt v. Harrison, Id. 474. For averment of special damages, see Turner v. Foxhall, 2 Cranch, C. Ct. 324; see ante, note 24. [TITLE.] XV. No. 345. For Slander-Charging a Criminal Offense. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the time of the commission of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff sustained a good name and character among his neighbors and acquaintances, for moral worth and integrity, and was never suspected of the crime of forgery. II. That on the...... day of..... 187., the de ......... .......... fendant, in the presence and hearing of a number of |