persons, spoke the following words concerning the plaintiff: "He is a forger." III. That the said words were false. IV. That in consequence of the said speaking of said words the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his good name and reputation, to his damage......dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 89. Actionable Language.--When language imputes a charge which, if true, will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, it is actionable per se: Townshend on Slan. and Lib. 152. And this rule has been followed in most of the States: See Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188; Young v. Miller, 3 Hill, 22; see, also, 36 Barb. 438; 19 Johns. 367; 9 Wend. 141; 23 Conn. 585; 3 Serg. & R. 255; 10 Serg. & R. 18; 2 Harrison (N. J.) 12; 1 Dutcher, 116; 3 Rich. 242; 3 Harr. 77; 9 Porter, 525; 1 Doug. (Mich.) 67; 21 Penn. 522; 7 Vt. 439; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 113 (3d Ed.) In some of the States it seems that all oral language which imputes an indictable offense, or an offense punishable at law, is actionable per se: Poe v. Grever, 3 Sneed, 666; Dunnell v. Fiske, 11 Metcf. 551; Edgerley v. Swain, 32 N. H. 481; Tenney v. Clement, 10 N. H. 57. Or an indictable offense: Kinney v. Hosea, 3 Harr. 77. While in some other States, to be actionable they must impute not only an indictable offense, but such for which corporal punishment may be inflicted as the immediate penalty: Birch v. Benton, 26 Mo. 153; Billings v. Wing, 7 Vt. 439. Words which impute trespass, assault, battery, and the like are not actionable per se, and yet those offenses are punishable by indictment: Smith v. Smith, 2 Sneed, 478; Dudley v. Horn, 21 Ala. 379; Billings v. Wing, 7 Vt. 439; see note 49. 90. Words subjecting Plaintiff to Criminal Prosecution.-Words imputing to plaintiff an act subjecting him to a criminal prosecution, must also impute moral turpitude, or something infamous or disgraceful, detracting from the character of the offender as a man of good morals: Quinn v. O'Gara, 2 E. D. Smith, 388; Pike v. Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. 171; Dias v. Short, 16 How. Pr. 322; Weed v. Bibbins, 32 Barb. 315. No. 346. xvi. For Slander-Words Directly Charging a Criminal Offense-Several Causes of Action. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: 187., at .. I. That on the .... day of the defendant, in a certain discourse which he had with one A. B., in the presence and hearing of divers persons, spoke the following words concerning the plaintiff [set forth the words]. II. That on the......day of... ..., 187., at......, the defendant, in a certain other discourse which he then had in the presence and hearing of divers other persons, spoke concerning the plaintiff the following other words [set forth the words]. III. That all said words were false and defamatory. IV. That in consequence of the said speaking of said words, etc. [Demand of Judgment.] 91. Words Charging Offenses.-Words charging a burning amounting to arson, whether by common law or by statute, are actionable. So of a general charge of forgery. So of a general charge of being a murderer. So of a general charge of being a thief. So of a charge of larceny, or a taking animo furandi, the personal property of another. Or imputations charging a person with being a receiver of stolen goods: Dias v. Short, 16 How. Pr. 322. As to the imputation of stealing goods, when and where not slanderous per se, and to what extent, see Coleman v. Playsted, 36 Barb. 26; Maybee v. Fisk, 42 Barb. 326. So of a direct charge of perjury: See Townshend on Slan. and Lib. 165, et seq., and the cases there cited, Wilbur v. Ostrom, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 275. So of an imputation of willful perjury in a suit pending: Walrath v. Nellis, 17 How. Pr. 72; Baker v. Williams, 12 Barb. 527. No. 347. xvii. Slander-For Words Directly Charging Perjury. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That on the........day of........, 187., at the defendant, in a certain discourse which he then had concerning the plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of divers persons, spoke and published concerning the plaintiff the words following: "You perjured yourself." II. That said words were false. III. That in consequence of the said words the plaintiff is greatly injured in his good name and reputation, and has been rendered liable to prosecution for perjury, to his damage... ...dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 92. Construction of Words.-In an action for slander, in charging the plaintiff with perjury, if it appears that the words used to express the charge are such, in the sense in which they would naturally be understood, as to convey to the minds of those to whom they are addressed the impression that the plaintiff had committed perjury, and that the defendant intended to be so understood by those who heard him, such words will of themselves warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, in case the jury find that they were uttered with the intention above stated, and were so understood; and it is not necessary to give additional evidence that the suit was in a court of competent jurisdiction, or that the plaintiff swore falsely, with a corrupt intent: Kern v. Towsley, 51 Barb. 385. 93. Perjury in Another State.-In a declaration for slander, in charging the plaintiff with perjury in another State, it must be averred that, by the laws of such other State, perjury is an offense to which is annexed an infamous punishment: Sparrow v. Maynard, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 195. As to the charge of false swearing, and the extent of the responsibility of the defendant, see Wilbur v. Ostrum, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 275. No. 348. xviii. Slander-For Words Charging Perjury, and Containing Special Inducements. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That on the... . . . . day of... ... .., 187., at.... gave a certain action was pending before A. B., a Justice of the Peace in and for the county of.... wherein C. D. was plaintiff and E. F. was defendant, and in which suit the plaintiff was duly sworn before the said justice, and his evidence as a witness, on the trial of said action, and testified that he "did not know that one M. had run away;" the fact whether the said M. had run away or not, being material in said action. 187., at.. II. That on the... ... day of........ the defendant, in a discourse which he had in the presence and hearing of sundry persons, spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, and concerning the said trial and testimony of the plaintiff as a witness in relation to said M., the false and scandalous words following: "He swore to a lie at. in the suit between C. D. and E. F.; he said he did not know that M. had run away, and it was a lie, for he did know it;" meaning that the plaintiff, at the trial of the action aforesaid, had, as a witness, sworn falsely, and committed willful and corrupt perjury. ......... III. That in consequence of said speaking of said words, etc. [as in preceding form.] [Demand of Judgment.] the defendant obtained a warrant for the arrest of this plaintiff from [a police justice of the said city, or as the case may be], on a charge of dollars to obtain his release. and the II. That in so doing the defendant acted maliciously and without probable cause. III. That on the......day of..... 187., the said justice dismissed the complaint of the defendant, and acquitted the plaintiff [or the grand jury of the county of .. ignored the bill against the plaintiff, or otherwise show a termination favorable to him]. IV. That many persons, whose names are unknown to the plaintiff, hearing of the said arrest, and supposing the plaintiff to be a criminal, have ceased to do business with him [or that in consequence of the said arrest, the plaintiff lost his situation as clerk to one A. B.], and has been otherwise injured in his good name and reputation, and whereby and by means whereof he hath sustained damage in the sum of dollars. *[Demand of Judgment.] 1. Causes of Action not Assignable.-Causes of action arising out of personal torts which do not survive to the personal representatives of a party, are not assignable: 3 Kern. 322; 36 Barb. 270; 1 Seld. 347; Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 19; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193. So a cause of action for a malicious prosecution is not assignable: Lawrence v. Martin, 22 Cal. 173. 2. Conspiracy.-When two or more persons are sued for a joint wrong done, it may be necessary to prove a previous combination between them in order to secure a joint recovery; but it is not necessary to aver this previous combination in the complaint, and if averred, it is not to be considered as of the gist of the action: Herron v. Hughes, 25 Cal. 560. An allegation that the defendants have fraudulently confederated and conspired together for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff, by prosecuting separate suits against him for the same cause, and that such suits have been commenced, and are prosecuted in pursuance of such conspiracy, is not sufficient to sustain an action, or uphold an injunction, when the defendants claim adversely to each other, as well as to the plaintiff, and no direct fraud is charged; the plaintiff merely averring his belief of such conspiracy, because the defendants have brought separate actions for the same cause, and by the same attorney. Fraud in such a case is not to be presumed; and the conspiracy should be distinctly averred: McHenry v. Hazard, 45 Barb. 657. 3. Conspiracy, Averments in Action of,-In an action for a conspiracy, the rule is to allow a great latitude in setting out in the complaint the particular acts from which the conspiracy is to be inferred, even so far as to allow the individual acts of the conspirators to be averred: Mussina v. Clark, 17 Abb. Pr. 188. So far as the allegations of such acts are scandalous, they should be stricken out, unless they appear to relate to the foundation of the plaintiff's action: Id. 4. Conviction. The fact that the plaintiff was convicted by a jury is conclusive; and, if apparent in the complaint, will be fatal to the suit for damages: Miller v. Deere, 2 Abb. Pr. 1. Nor will a reversal, for error of law, prevent the application of the rule. The only exception is when fraud in obtaining a conviction, by means which prevented the plaintiff from setting up his defense, is set up and proved. In a complaint of this nature, an averment of matter tending to show the defendant's motive was held not to be irrelevant, in Brockleman v. Brandt, 10 Abb. Pr. 141. Nor does suffering default have this effect, where probable cause existed at the first: Gordon v. Upham, 4 E. D. Smith, 9. 5. Corporation.--An action for malicious prosecution will lie against a corporation, if it has power to authorize the act done, and has done so: Vance v. Erie Railway Co., 3 Vroom, 334; see "Assault and Battery," note 18. That a corporation is not liable to such an action, but may be sued in trespass for false imprisonment, see Owlsley v. Montgomery R. R. Co., 37 Ala. 560; see ante, note 30, p. 215. 6. Damages.-The jury are the proper judges of the amount of damages to be allowed in actions for malicious prosecution: Chapman v. Dodd, 10 Minn. 350. Evidence of the general bad reputation of the plaintiff is admissible in reduction of damages: Fitzgibbon v. Brown, 43 Me. 169; see, also, White v. Tucker, 16 Ohio St. 468. 7. Defective Complaint.-In an action for a malicious issuing and prosecution of a writ of attachment, a defect, if any, in the complaint, in not alleging that it was issued without probable cause, and stating instead that it was issued out of wantonness, is cured by verdict, when the defect was not pointed out: Levey v. Fargo, 1 Nev. 415. 8. Essential Averments.--In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must aver and must prove an entire want of probable cause for the accusation, and actual malice of the defendant in preferring it—that is, malice in fact, as distinguished from malice in law: Bulkeley v. Smith, 2 Duer, 261; 11 L. Q. 200; Besson v. Southard, 6 Seld. 236. Both malice and want of probable cause are essential, and must be stated and proved; also, that the prosecution is at an end, and how it was concluded: Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb. 253; Ilull v. Vreeland, 42 Barb. 543; 18 Abb. Pr. 182; Me Kown v. Hunter, 30 N. Y. 625. An averment that the prosecution was |