her father, he cannot sue for seduction: Briggs v. Evans, 5 Iredell R. 16; Hewit v. Prime, 21 Wend. R. 79; Martin v. Payne, 9 J. Rep. 387; 2 A. K. Marshall, 128; 7 Wend. R. 193; 2 Id. 459. 17. Minor.-As regards a minor, it seems that one standing in loco parentis has a right to maintain an action for seduction: Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 Comst. 38 (43); Bracy v. Kibbe, 31 Barb. 273. 18. Mother, Action by.-Under statutory provision, such action may be maintained by a mother keeping a boarding house on her separate account, though the father be living at the time, if the father has abandoned his family: Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577; see also p. 65, ante, and sec. 375, Cal. Code C. P. 19. Nature of Action.-The action is not maintainable by a parent as such, but as master, entitled to services of child: White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405. 20. Stepfather.-A stepfather cannot sue for seduction of his stepdaughter while living in the service of another: Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 Comst. 38; Bracy v. Kibbe, 31 Barb. 273. No. 375. V. For Seduction of Plaintiff's Daughter or Servant. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the time hereinafter mentioned, one A. B. was the servant [and the daughter] of the plaintiff. II. That on the........day of........, 187., at............. the defendant, well knowing the said A. B. to be the servant [and daughter] of the plaintiff, and wrongfully contriving and intending to injure the plaintiff, and to deprive him of her assistance and service, did, wickedly, and maliciously, and without the privity or consent of the plaintiff [forcibly and against the will of the said A. B., abduct her, or entice and persuade the said A. B. to leave the residence and service of this plaintiff, and did] then and there debauch and carnally know her. III. That by reason of the premises the said A. B. became pregnant and sick with child, and so remained for the space of........months; that during that time she was unable to attend to the duties of her service, and the plaintiff was thereby deprived of her service, and was obliged to and actually did expend...... dollars in nursing and taking care of her in her said pregnancy and sickness, and was otherwise greatly injured, to his damage......dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] NOTE. This form is from Abbotts' Forms. [TITLE.] No. 376. vi. For Seduction, by Female Seduced. The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That at the time of the commission of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff was and still is an unmarried woman, and at all times prior thereto had been chaste and virtuous. II. That on the...... day of........, 187., at. the defendant, with force and violence, made an indecent. assault upon the plaintiff, and then and there wickedly seduced, debauched and carnally knew her, whereby she became sick and pregnant with child, and so remained for a long space of time, to wit, for the space of nine months; at the expiration of which time, and on the ...... day of 187., she was delivered of the child of which she was so pregnant. III. That by reason of the premises, and in consequence of the seduction aforesaid, the plaintiff has suffered greatly in her health, and became sick, and was prevented for a long space of time, to wit, for the space of... . . . . . months, from attending to her ordinary business and affairs, and was greatly afflicted in body and mind, and has been put to great expense for medical attendance and nursing, and has been otherwise greatly injured, to her damage dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] No. 377. vii. For Refusal to Permit Passengers to Ride in Car. [TITLE.] The plaintiff complains, and alleges: I. That the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of ... II. That the said defendant is engaged, and has for upwards of one year last past been engaged as a common carrier of passengers by railroad for hire, from the [south] end of ... street, along said street to ... [or otherwise designate the route], upon its cars drawn by horses. ...... III. That heretofore, to wit, on the .... day of........... 187., at ... the plaintiff entered and went upon one of the passenger cars of the said defendant at street, at the corner of street, for the purpose of being carried by said defendant upon and in said car, from the place last above mentioned to .... .... street, at the corner thereof and ..... .. street, in said city; and that plaintiff so entered and went upon said car with the knowledge and assent of said defendant, for the purpose aforesaid, and then and there became and was a passenger on board the car last aforesaid of said defendant. IV. That immediately after this plaintiff had so entered into and upon said car, at said ... street, at the corner of street, the said defendant, without any lawful cause, with great force and violence [and at a place other than a usual stopping place for leaving passengers whose destination was corner thereof and .... street, at the street], ejected and turned plaintiff out of and off from said car which she had so entered and went upon, and then and there declined and refused to carry or transport her on their said road, and greatly injured this plaintiff in her person. V. That at the time plaintiff so entered upon said car, the said car was upon a trip upon defendant's said road, from a point where it then was to a point upon said road beyond the corner of said ........ and ... streets; and the said plaintiff then had in her possession a ticket which she had before that time purchased of defendant, which ticket entitled plaintiff to be received, considered, and conveyed as a passenger upon the cars of defendant upon their said railroad, and upon the said car upon which she had so taken passage as aforesaid, which it was the intention then and there of this plaintiff to give over unto the defendant's conductor of the car last aforesaid, in payment of her fare as such passenger. VI. That by means of the premises this plaintiff has sustained damages to the amount of dollars. [Demand of Judgment.] 21. Additional Fare.- Railroad passengers who have not purchased tickets before entering the cars, having had a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be charged a larger fare, and be ejected for refusal to pay: St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute R. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176; see Chicago and Alton R. R. Co. v. Flagg, Id. 361; and Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 III. 438. 22. Bound to Carry Passenger.-If a passenger is ready and willing, and offers to pay the legal fare when demanded by the conductor, the railroad company is bound to carry him, provided there is room and the passenger is a fit person to be admitted: Tarbell v. Cent. P. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. 23. Legal Tender Notes.-A railroad company is not justified in refusing to convey a passenger already admitted into its cars, and the journey is commenced, who upon demand of his fare tenders only legal tender notes in payment: Tarbell v. Cent. P. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. Railroad fares are not taxes, and do not fall within the rule in Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318; Tarbell v. C. P. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. 24. Liability of Principal. The rule is well established that the principal is liable for actual damage resulting from the malfeasance, negligence, or torts of his servant or agent, in the course of his employment, subject, however, to the limitation that he is not liable for the torts or negligence of his agent beyond the scope of his authority, unless specially authorized, or unless adopted by the principal: Turner v. N. B. and M. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 599; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343. Hence it is, the principal is never liable for the unauthorized or willful or malicious acts of his servants or agents, done without his authority, and not subsequently adopted by him: Turner v. N. B. and M. R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 599; see, also, Phil. and Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. U. S. 486; Hagan v. Prov. and Worc. R. R. Co., 3 R. I. 88; Wells v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 183, 184; Weed v. Pan. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362; Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385; Mil. and Miss. R. R. Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388. 25. Measure of Damages. -In case of the refusal of a conductor to receive a passenger on the street cars, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages, even in the absence of proof of any actual damage: Pleasants v. N. B. and M. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 586. Where no special damage was alleged or proved by the plaintiff for breach of a railroad passenger contract, and the evidence was only that he was put out of the car at a point about twelve miles from his destination, and five miles from the place of departure: Held, that a verdict of five hundred dollars damages was greatly disproportionate to the injury proved within the rule of Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513; Tarbell v. C. P. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. 26. Refusing Baggage. A railway company refused to carry free of charge a "spring horse" (substitute for a rocking horse), weighing seventyeight pounds, and being forty-four inches long, for a passenger who was entitled to take with him one hundred and twelve pounds weight of "ordinary" or "personal" luggage: Held, that the company had a right to make an additional charge: Hudston v. Midland R. R. Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. 366. 27. Surrender of Ticket.—If a passenger refuses to surrender his ticket to the conductor of a train when called for, as required by the rules of the company, he may be put off at any place not selected as dangerous or inconvenient, and this although the company is forbidden by statute to expel a passenger for non-payment of fare except at a regular station: Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420; see Chicago and Alton R. R. Co. v. Flagg, Id. 364. 28. Tender of Fare.-In an action to recover damages against a common carrier for refusal to carry a passenger, it is not necessary to allege a tender of the fare. It is sufficient to allege that plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the defendant such sum of money as it was legally entitled to charge: Tarbell v. Cent. P. R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. 29. Ticket issued for Previous Day. - Plaintiff was ejected from a car for refusing to pay for his passage except by a ticket issued on a previous day, and marked " good for this day only;" he then showed a good ticket, and attempted to enter the car, which he was forcibly prevented from doing: Held, that his exclusion was justifiable: State v. Campbell, 3 Vroom, 309. |