her father, the loss of service accrues to him. Can she recover for that? May she maintain the action and recover all other damages, and her father maintain a separate action and recover for the loss of services? If so, can he recover anything more unless he has incurred expenses directly caused by the seduction? If the seduction occurs after she has attained her majority, can the father maintain any action therefor? If he can, does the recovery go for his benefit, or only for the daughter's? Would a recovery by him bar an action brought by the daughter? Or a recovery by the daughter, bar an action brought by the father? Sec. 3339 of the Civil Code declares, "the damages for seduction rest in the sound discretion of the jury." Sec. 49 of the Civil Code provides, "the rights of personal relation forbid: 3. The seduction of a wife, daughter, orphan sister, or servant." The rule in relation to actions for torts is that "the person who sustains an injury, is the person to bring an action for the injury against the wrong-doer:" Dicey on Parties, 330.

99. Under the Penal Code of California seduction is a felony. At common law no action could be sustained for damages in cases where the wrong amounted to a felony. These provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, give the right to maintain the action, but whether the common law rule that an action based upon a tort cannot be maintained by any one who has not suffered legal damages, is changed by these provisions, is not free from difficulty.

100. It is true that formerly the woman who was seduced could not maintain the action, having (on the ground volenti non fit injuria) suffered no legal wrong; and the person who can bring an action is the parent or master, who sues, in theory, at least, for the wrong to him, viz., the loss of service. The action, therefore, could be brought by any one who stood in the relation of master to the woman seduced, whether he were merely the master, or the parent, brother, or other near relative of the woman. Nor was it any objection that the woman was of age at the time of the seduction; and it has been held, in a case where she lived with her father and acted as his servant, no objection to the action that she was a married woman: Hooper v. Luffkin, 7 B. & C. 387. But service of some sort was held to be abso

lutely essential. Where, therefore, the daughter was living independently, and supporting herself and the family, neither the parent nor any one else could maintain an action for her seduction: Manly v. Field, 29 L. J., 79 C. P., 7 C. B. U. S. 96.

101. Under section 375 of the California Code, it is plain that the "service," which was formerly essential, is dispensed with as a foundation of the right of the parent to sue; and we may, therefore, conclude that the parent has the right now, independently of any loss of services, to recover to the same extent as formerly. It this be true, it would follow that a recovery by the parent would be a bar to an action brought by the daughter; and that a recovery by the daughter would be a bar to an action brought by the parent for more than special damages (if any were sustained) which from their nature could not have been included in the former recovery. Section 34 of the Oregon Code is identical with section 375 of the California Code, but section 35 of the Oregon Code restricts the right of an unmarried female to sue for her own seduction to those over twentyone years of age; and further provides that the prosecution of an action to judgment by the father, mother, or guardian, as prescribed in section 34, shall be a bar to an action by such unmarried female.

ACTION FOR INJURY OR DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD.

102. A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action for the injury or death of a minor child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Such action may be maintained against the person causing the injury or death, or if such person be employed by another person, who is responsible for his conduct, also against such other person: Cal. Code C. P., sec. 376, effect July 1, 1874.

103. The minor may sue by his guardian and recover for the injuries he has sustained; or, the parent may sue and recover to the same extent. If the minor sue, he cannot recover for the special damages sustained by the parent;

and the parent may bring and sustain his action for such special damages, notwithstanding the recovery by the child. If the child do not sue, it is believed the parent cannot, in the same action, recover his special damages, and also the damages which the child might recover, if he brought suit by his guardian, the action, when brought by the parent, being one of that class which is permitted to be brought without joining the person for whose benefit it is brought; and unless the action, when brought by the parent, is to be regarded as for the benefit of the minor, there would seem to be no obstacle in recovering in an action brought by the child the same damages for the same injury.

104. The guardian may also maintain the action without joining the ward. Where the action is brought for the death of the minor child or ward, there can be no difficulty such as might arise in cases of injury.

TENANTS IN COMMON, ETC.

105. "Any two or more persons claiming any estate or interest in lands under a common source of title, whether holding as tenants in common, joint-tenants, coparceners, or in severalty, may unite in an action against any person claiming an adverse estate or interest therein, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, or of establishing such common source of title, or declaring the same to be held in trust, or of removing a cloud upon the same:" Code C. P. of Cal., sec. 381, effect July 1, 1874; see, also, sections 384, 738 and 1452.

106. Formerly joint tenants were required to join in an action of ejectment, and the failure to do so was fatal to a recovery: Dewey v. Lambier, 7 Cal. 347. While two or more co-tenants could not join in an action of ejectment, the interest of each being separate and distinct: De Johnson v. Sepulveda, 5 Cal. 149; Throckmorton v. Burr, 5 Id. 401; Welch v. Sullivan, 8 Id. 187. But under this provision the right of one tenant in common to recover in an action of ejectment the possession of the entire tract as against all persons but his co-tenants, has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court: Touchard v. Crow, 20 Cal. 150;

Stark v. Barrett, 15 Id. 371; Mahoney v. Van Winkle, 21 Id. 583; Galler v. Felt, 30 Id. 484.

107. Executors and administrators can maintain such action jointly with the other tenants in common in all cases where their testators or intestates could have done so until the administration of the estates they represent is closed, or the property distributed under the decree of the Probate. Court: Reynolds v. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 631.

108. If an estate should be sold in lots to different purchasers, they could not join in exhibiting one bill against the vendor for specific performance; but where there was a contract to convey with but one person, under which the purchaser conveyed his equitable interest of a moiety to each one of two persons, it was held that these two persons might sue the original vendor for specific performance: Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 177.

109. Tenants in common of wool, who became such by one of them letting sheep for a year to the other, with an agreement that the latter was to take care of the sheep, shear them, sack the wool, and deliver it to the owner of the sheep at S., a port, to be by him shipped to a commission merchant at S. F., to be sold, and that when the wool was sold the proceeds were to be equally divided, cannot maintain replevin against each other, nor can one against the vendee of the other: Hewlett v. Owens, 50 Cal. 474.

110. Tenants in common must join in an action for conversion of chattels: Whitney v. Stark, 8 Cal. 514; Rice v. Hollenbeck, 19 Barb. 664; Gock v. Kenneda, 29 Id. 120. Tenants in common must join in an action for an entire injury done to the partnership property, either in tort or assumpsit when tort is waived: Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120. One tenant in common may sue another who sells and destroys the common goods: Yamhill Bridge Co. v. Newby, 1 Or. 173. But for injury to the common interest it seems in New York all must sue: Tanner v. Hills, 44 Barb. 428. One tenant in common may sue a party in possession by adverse claim, and recover possession: Collier v. Corbett, 15 Cal. 183. Or they may sue jointly to recover possession of all their several undivided interests: Goller v. Fett, 30 Cal.

111. One of several tenants in common may sue alone for his moiety: Covillaud v. Tanner, 7 Cal. 38. Or in equity may obtain a partition: Tenney v. Stebbins, 28 Barb. 290; Tripp v. Riley, 15 Id. 333; Beebee v. Griffing, 4 Kern. 235. When one tenant in common sells the right to a stranger to cut timber off the common property, another tenant in common of the same property cannot maintain replevin for the timber after it is cut: Alford v. Bradeen, 1 Nev. 228. After severance of fund held in common, each party may maintain separate action for his ascertained share: Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5 Duer, 168.

112. Joint owners of vessels are tenants in common, and must sue jointly: Buckman v. Brett, 22 How. Pr. 233; 13 Abb. Pr. 119; see Bishop v. Edmiston, 13 Id. 340. All joint owners of vessels should unite in suit for freight: Merritt v. Walch, 32 N. Y. 685; Donnell v. Walsh 33 Id. 43. So, joint charterers are joint owners pro hac vice: Sherman v. Fream, 30 Barb. 478; Coster v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 6 Duer, 43; Dennis v. Kennedy, 19 Barb. 517.

113. Actions of ejectment must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest: Ritchie v. Dorland, 6 Cal. 33. And the person having the legal title to the land, and not the one having an equitable title, is the real party in interest: Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 122; O'Connell v. Dougherty, 32 Id. 462. And to entitle him to sue, he must be out of possession: Taylor v. Crane, 15 How. Pr. 358. So, the heir may maintain ejectment where there is no administrator: Updegraff v. Trask, 18 Cal. 458, approved in Estate of Woodwoorth, 31 Id. 604; Soto v. Kroder, 19 Id. 87. The rule that each of several heirs may sue in ejectment for payment of rent, without joining the others, applies to the case of tenants in common of an incorporeal hereditament of rents charged in fee, and no reversion; the rents are apportioned in either case: Cruger v. McCaughry, 51 Barb. 642.

114. The grantee may bring an action to recover lands conveyed while in adverse possession, in the name of the grantor: Lowber v. Kelly, 9 Bosw. 494. But the grantor cannot maintain an action in respect to the title, he having no title left: Townsend v. Goelet, 11 Abb. Pr. 187. But a trustee of the legal title, holding a quitclaim deed to an