of other property is admissible as evidence of the value of the property in question. In answering this question, it is found that the two leading principles already expounded come into joint application--the principle of Relevancy and the principle of Auxiliary Policy. According to the former, the value or sale-price of the other property is irrelevant unless the property is substantially similar in conditions; according to the second, it may also be excluded, though relevant, if it involves in the case in hand a disproportionate confusion or issues and loss of time. The latter consideration has weighed so much with a few courts that they have treated it as requiring the absolute and invariable exclusion of such evidence. *** It is enough to note (1) in answer to the argument from Relevancy, that since value is a money-estimate of a marketable article possessing certain definable qualities, the value of other marketable articles possessing substantially similar qualities is strongly evidential and is so treated in commercial life; all the argument and protestation conceivable cannot alter the fact that the commercial world perceives and acts on this relevancy; (2) in answer to the argument from Auxiliary Policy, it may be noted that this objection may or may not exist in a given instance, and that the rational and practical way of meeting it is to allow the trial court, in its discretion, to exclude such evidence. when it does involve a confusion of issues, but otherwise to receive it." In the case before us, the trial court did receive it, and it is plain that in this particular case it did not introduce a confusion of issues; therefore, it is unaffected by any argument based upon the policy which excludes evidence which tends to a confusion of issues. In the case of Presbrey v. Old Colony & Newport Ry. Co., 103 Mass., it is said: "The price paid for lands purchased for the location of a railroad, designated by lines run according to the exigencies of that location, and without reference to the convenience of the land-owner, is generally affected by a consideration of the disadvantage to the whole tract resulting from the manner in which the location is made. It includes all incidental injuries to the remaining land. It is in effect a settlement of all damages which would otherwise be recoverable by the proceedings provided for that purpose. Where the transaction is free from such considerations, so that it may fairly be regarded like an ordinary sale, between seller and purchaser, the evidence would be competent in the assessment of damages for other lands, to show the value of the land; and none the less so because the purchaser was a railroad corporation and the respondent in the proceedings." Commenting upon Wyman, v. Lexington & West Cambridge R. Co., 13 Met. 316, the court said: "In that case, a witness was asked and allowed to state what was given by the respondents for land next adjoining the land of the petitioner, The situation and circumstances are not stated, and no ground is shown against the propriety of the ruling of the sheriff admitting the testimony, except the fact that it was a purchase by the railroad corporation for the purposes of its location. The opinion of the court apparently assumes that it was merely a purchase of land with only the ordinary incidents of a purchase. The case did not turn upon that point; and the decision cannot be regarded as settling anything more upon this question than that such evidence is not necessarily incompetent, and that exceptions will not be sustained on account of a ruling admitting it, unless they show some ground upon which the court can see that the ruling was erroneous upon the facts of the case." May v. Boston, 158 Mass., 21; Langdon v. Mayor &c. of New York, 133 N. Y., 636. Without undertaking to say what the rule would be, as applied to a different state of facts, we are of opinion that the railway company having purchased an undivided one-half interest in real estate at a specific price, under circumstances which show that the purchase was made without compulsion, and not by way of compromise, is admissible evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the market value of the remaining undivided fee simple one-half of the same property, in a proceeding instituted by the company for its condemnation. But, if that were not so, we are of opinion that the railway, having itself introduced the evidence, cannot be heard to object to its consideration. In its petition, it vouches the deed from John Chamblin to it of the interest acquired from him, in which the consideration is stated to be $27,500. Without pursuing this branch of the case further, we are of opinion that the judgment of the hustings court should be affirmed. Affirmed. BURTON v. HADEN, ET ALS. (Richmond, March 12, 1908.) 1. DEEDS-Compromise of Doubtful Rights.—Where H. conveyed to B. her whole interest in land, reciting in the deed that "It is conceeded by said Eugenia L. Haden, party of the first part, that said E. H. Burton has title to an undivided two-thirds interest in the above described property. And the said Eugenia L. Haden hereby disclaims any interest or claim to the said undivided two-thirds hereby admitted to be vested in said E. H. Burton;" and it afterwards developed that H. was the owner in fee simple of the entire tract; Held, that the language quoted does not indicate the compromise of a doubtful right, but is the recognition of an undisputed right which H., acting under a mistake as to her title, was of opinion had already vested in her grantee. 2. EQUITY JURISDICTION-Mistake-Ignorantia juris non excusat.-In general, a mistake of law pure and simple, is not an adequate ground for relief; but the general doctrine of Ignorantia juris non excusat, is confined to mistakes of the general rules of law and has no application to the mistakes of persons as to their own private legal rights and interests. 3. DEEDS-Mistake-Case at Bar.-Where H. conveyed to B. her whole interest in a tract of land, recited in the deed to be one-third, for the consideration of $900, and it afterward developed that she owned in fee simple the entire tract, the fair value of which was ascertained to be $5,000: Held, that the deed was not a compromise of doubtful rights, and that the mistake under which the parties acted was as to their own private legal rights and interests, against which a court of equity has jurisdiction to grant relief. Appeal from Circuit Court of City of Lynchburg. Affirmed. Wilson & Manson, F. W. Whitaker, for appellants. KEITH, P.-The bill in this case was filed by Mrs. Eugenia L. Haden against Belle G. Burton and Gabriella T. Burton, heirs at law of E. II. Burton, the object of which is to set aside and annull a conveyance, made May 20, 1904, by Mrs. Haden to E. H. Burton. This deed is as follows: "This deed made this 20th day of May, 1904, between Eugenia L. Haden, party of the first part, and E. H. Burton, party of the second part: "Witnesseth: That for and in consideration of the sum of nine hundred dollars, the receipt of which is herby acknowl edged by the said party of the first part, evidenced by the bond of said party of the second part for the said sum of $900.00, bearing even date herewith and payable to the said Eugenia L. Haden one year after date, with interest from date, for the payment of which a vendor's lien is hereby especially reserved on the land herein conveyed, the said party of the first part hath granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents doth grant, sell and convey unto the said party of the second part, with general warranty of title, all the right, title and interest of the said Eugenia L. Haden, party of the first part, which said party of the first part acquired under the last will and testament of M. L. Burton, deceased, by the exercise of the power of appointment vested in said M. L. Burton, in and to that certain tract of land situate, lying and being in Campbell county, containing 340 acres, more or less and described as follows: * * * * "It being the same tract of land which was conveyed by Madison Haden in trust for the benefit of the said M. L. Burton, deceased, with power in said M. L. Burton to appoint by her last will and testament one of her brothers or sisters to the remainder interest therein, after the death of said M. L. Burton, dceased, by deed dated February 6, 1891, and of record in the clerk's office of the County Court of Campbell in Deed Book 55, page 209. The power of appointment contained in said deed having been exercised by said M. L. Burton, deceased, in favor of the said party of the first part, in her last will and testament, which said will is recorded in the clerk's office of the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg in Will Book J, page 275. To which deed and will reference is hereby made. "To have and to hold unto him, the said E. II. Burton, his heirs and assigns forever. "It is conceded by said Eugenia L. Haden, party of the first part, that said E. H. Burton, has title to an undivided two-thirds interest in the above described property. And the said Eugenia L. Haden hereby disclaims any interest or claim to the said undivided two-thirds hereby admitted to be vested in said E. H. Burton. "But whatever be the interest of the said Eugenia L. Haden in and to said tract of land, it is the intent of this deed to convey the whole of her said interest, be the same one-third or more, to the said E. H. Burton. "The said party of the first part hereby covenants with the said party of the second part, that she is seized of said property in fee-simple; that she has the right to convey the same; that she has done no act to encumber the same; that said property is free from encumbrances; that the said party of the second part shall have quiet and peaceable possession of the same, and that she will execute such other and further assurance of title as may be requisite." Without discussing the pleadings, it is sufficient to say, that the bill claimed that the deed should be set aside, if for no other reason, upon the ground of mutual mistake as to the interest and title of the grantor in the tract of land which was the subject of the conveyance. We do not deem it necessary to set out the wills and deeds, by force of which the title to the 340 acres embraced in the deed from Eugenia L. Haden to E. H. Burton became vested in the grantor in that deed. It is beyond doubt that at the date of that conveyance Eugenia L. Haden was the fee simple owner of the 340 acres of land; that she believed that she had title only to an undivided one-third interest therein; and the most favorable position in which the grantee can be placed is, that the mistake was mutual and that the grantee as well as the grantor dealt with the subject matter in the honest belief that she was the owner of an undivided one-third, and that he was the owner of the remaining undivided two-thirds interest in that tract. It appears from the evidence that this deed was prepared by counsel for E. H. Burton, the grantee; that Burton carried the deed to Mrs. Haden; that he took her before a notary in Campbell county, by whom her acknowledgment was taken; that the relations between the grantor and grantee had been of the most intimate and confidential character; that she had implicit confidence in him and in his judgment, and frequently advised and counseled with him about business affairs. It appears that Mrs. Haden knew that the will of Mrs. Burton, under which this tract of land had passed had been drawn by A. H. Burroughs, one of the ablest members of the Lynchburg bar; she knew also that E. H. Burton had consulted with Burroughs with respect to the title to this land; and when, therefore, in the course of negotiations with her, Burton stated that she owned ouly an undivided one-third interest in the land, she relied on that statement and believed it to be true, and also accepted as |