form, but the station was not called, and the passenger attempted to alight and was injured. It was held that a nonsut was improperly directed. It was held, "that there was evidence from which the jury might have properly found that the plaintiff was invited or had reasonable ground for supposing she was invited to alight by the company's servants." The language of the courts in Curtis v. Detroit, etc., Co., 27 Wis. 158, clearly states a general principle applicable to this case: "If, under the circumstances of this case, the train in being brought to a stop in such a manner as to induce the belief on the part of the passengers in waiting on the platform that it had stopped for the reception of passengers, and then, when the passengers, acting on this belief, were going aboard, started again without caution or signal, that would constitute negligence on the part of the company, and be so without regard to the question whether the starting was one of necessity or not, or whether the stop was an actual or only an apparent one. It was the duty of the company, if the passengers were not to enter the cars under such circumstances, to have some one there to warn and prevent them." In our own case of Evansville, etc., Co. v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 444, a complaint, after alleging that the plaintiff took passage for Fort Branch and like matters, stated that, by the carelessness of the defendant, the train stopped at the town of Fort Branch before that part of the train on which the plaintiff was seated had reached the depot, and that by reason thereof the plaintiff was compelled to jump from the car to the ground, and the complaint was held sufficient, the court saying: "As to the second objection, it is sufficient to say that we do not understand from the averments that the rash conduct of the plaintiff produced the injury." In the Columbus, etc., Co. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408, the general doctrine we have is recognized and enforced. In Jeffersonville, etc., Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48, the court said: "Was not the attempt of the deceased to leave the cars, under the facts stated, made under such circumstances that a person of ordinary caution and care would not have apprehended danger therefrom? If it was, then the deceased was without fault or negligence, and in our opinion the decedent was not guilty of negligence in attempting to leave the train under the circumstances." The question stated in the quotation is that which arises in all cases of kindred character, and is one, as a general rule, to be left to the jury. The principle that a man is not guilty of contributory negligence who acts upon a reasonable belief arising from surrounding circumstances is one of wide application, finding, perhaps, one of its most striking applications in that class of cases where a passenger leaves a train in order, as he believes, to escape impending danger. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Twombly v. Central Park, etc., R. Co., 69 N. Y. 168; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 26 Minn. 278; Iron R. Co. v. Morrey, 36 Ohio St. 481.

In all such cases the passenger is excused, even though his belief was an erroneous one, and but for his leaping from the train no injury would have resulted. Without going further into the subject, although many more authorities might be cited, we conclude by a quotation from a recent English author, who, after a thorough review of the adjudged cases, says: "But the question of what circumstances amount to an invitation to alight, is clearly one for a jury, and although there seems to have been difficulty felt in times past by some of our judges in reference to this point of law, it seems impossible that any further doubt should exist." Browne on Carriers of Passengers, 507. The principles we have stated rule the case and dispose of all the questions presented, whatever form they may assume.

Judgment affirmed.

Proximate and Remote Cause.-The opinion in the principal case contains so complete a collection of the authorities on this subject, that we deem it sufficient to refer our readers to it for information on that point. See Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, infra, and cases cited in note. When Passenger is Justified in Presuming that Train has Reached Station. As to when a passenger is justitied in assuming that a train has reached a station and when he may therefore undertake to alight in the dark. Mitchell v. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. and note, supra.

SEVIER

V.

VICKSBURG & MERIDIAN RAILROAD COMPANY.

(61 Mississippi Reports.)

If a man enters a car while sick, and goes to sleep, the conductor is not bound to wake him at his stopping-place. The conductor's agreement to arouse a sleeping passenger imposes no obligation on the railroad company. The company is not, therefore, liable in such case for carrying the passenger beyond his destination.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Hinds county.

The appellant's declaration in trespass on the case, to which the appellee's demurrer was sustained, stated that the plaintiff paid his fare from Vicksburg to Jackson, Mississippi, and the defendant corporation, being a common carrier between Vicksburg and Meridian, promised and agreed to convey him to Jackson, which is on the line of its railroad, "and accordingly, said plaintiff, who was sick with fever, got on one of the defendant's cars at Vicksburg, to be transported, and his ticket was duly taken from him by the conductor of the train as the agent of said defendant, whereupon said plaintiff, long before arriving at Jackson, informed the

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defendant, through its said agent and conductor, that he was quite sick with fever and wanted to sleep as he felt very drowsy, but feared he might not awake at Jackson, where he was compelled to leave the train; and thereupon the company through said agent and conductor told the plaintiff that he could safely sleep and should be awakened by said agent and conductor when the train arrived at Jackson, and to lie down on the seat and sleep; and, accordingly, the plaintiff, who was very sick with violent fever, did, relying on the defendant's promises, lie down and sleep, and gave no thought to being awake when the train should reach Jackson, and remained sleeping and did not awake at Jackson, and continued sick and asleep; but said defendant, disregarding its duties and obligations to plaintiff, did not awaken said plaintiff at Jackson, and transported him so asleep and continuing sick," four miles east of Jackson, and then stopped the train and let him get off at night in the woods, and he was compelled to walk back sick, late at night, at the risk of his life.

Calhoon & Green, for the appellant.

It is by no means certain that the conductor could not bind the company by telling a person who was not sick that he might sleep. There is nothing to advise passengers of the extent of his authority. He is the company's agent about the management of the train, and his engagements, on which passengers act, are the undertakings of the company. Railroad companies have been held bound by a ticket agent's assurance to a purchaser that he could stop over on the ticket, Burnham v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 63 Maine, 298; by a conductor's promise to put off a passenger at a flag station, Hurt v. Southern Railroad Co., 40 Miss. 391; by an employé's advice to step from one car to another on a moving train, McIntyre v. New York Central Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 287; and by promises about baggage by depot servants. Minter v. Pacific Railroad Co., 41 Mo. 503; Warner v. Burlington Railroad Co., 22 Iowa, 166; Quinn v. Power, 87 N. Y. 535; Treat v. Boston Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 371; s. c. 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 423. But sick, aged, infirm, young or crippled persons are entitled to more consideration from carriers than well persons. Sheridan v. Brooklyn Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 39; New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607. Sickness enlarges the conductor's power to meet the emergency. Story on Agency, Sec. 85. Human freight must be transported under rules adapted to its infirmities. Nugent & Me Willie, for the appellee.

Railroad trains are not hospitals, or conductors nurses of sick people. The duties of this officer are important, public, and well known, and he has no right to encumber himself with the care of a man who is very ill and sleepy too. A person who has to be stirred in order to keep awake, should, before entering a train, provide himself with a stirrer, for he cannot, with justice to the other

passengers, impose on the conductor the duty of stirring him up. Nothing about the conductor's general employment, which is running the train and taking the tickets, could induce an observer to infer that a part of his duty was to shake sleepy men. His duty is to see that the train is stopped at each station and the name of the place called out. The human freight is expected to get up and walk out at the right place. Wabash Railway Co. v. Rector, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 264. The conductor cannot neglect his duties to all the passengers in order to accommodate one. He must not take the risk of inconveniencing the public for the sake of a single passenger. Ohio Railway Co. v. Hatton, 6 Cent. L. J. 389; Ohio Railway Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540. A ticket gives the right to the accommodation of the train only according to the usual regulations. Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 340; Loyd v. Hannibal Railroad Co., 53 Mo. 509; Beauchamp v. International Railroad Co., 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 307. A passenger has no right to ask a conductor to do what is not his duty and may cause a neglect of his business, and if the officer does agree, he does not bind the railroad company. Running a train on schedule time, making all the stops and taking all the tickets, require the officer's undivided attention. The lives of the passengers as well as their convenience in making connections and the like are in his care. And it is a violation of his obligations to the company and the public for him to fill his mind with engagements to awaken men at this and that stopping-place. The points decided in the cases cited for the appellant are not analogous to this question.

CAMPBELL, C. J.-It was not the duty of the conductor to arouse the appellant on the arrival of the train at Jackson by any special means applicable to his condition as being sick and drowsy. The business of the conductor was to manage the train according to the established regulations, and not to vary them for an individual. Regulations are made for the traveling public, and should be reasonable as adapted to the convenience of this public. If persons sick or under any disability which renders them unable to conform to the reasonable regulations for the community generally are inconvenienced by this inability, they have no legal cause of complaint against a carrier who undertakes to carry the public generally, according to a plan adopted to suit persons, generally, in a condition to travel, and not designed to meet the wants of those not in such condition. The obligation of the carrier was to carry the appellant safely to Jackson, and on arrival there to announce the fact, and afford an opportunity for him to leave the car. That he was asleep, and that his sleep was induced by sickness did not entitle him to special attention. It was his misfortune to be sick, and yet called on to act as a well man, being on a train run

for those able to travel on cars and conform to the regulations for their operation. One too sick or unable from any cause to do as travelers usually do, in conforming to the usage in running trains for the traveling public, should avoid them or secure the assistance necessary to enable him to accomplish what is required of passengers generally. Carriers are not required to adapt their methods to the circumstances of those not in condition to comply with the requirements made of travelers generally.

The agreement of the conductor to rouse the appellant at Jackson did not impose any obligations on the railroad company. The appellant was bound to know that the conductor had no authority to incur an obligation to that effect for the company, and that his duty was to the passengers generally, and not to him particularly. He must be held to have known the established usage of calling out the name of the station and for the passenger to leave the car on its arrival at his destination, and that the promise of the conductor was his personal obligation, and was not the promise of the company, which he had a right to bind by an undertaking in behalf of one of many passengers, to all of whom, respectively, the company owed the same duties.

Whether sudden illness occurring to one on board a train after going upon it, and made known to the conductor, would create such an emergency as to impose the duty on him to give such passenger needed attention and vary the course of dealing with passengers, is purposely left an open question to be decided when it arises. This case does not present it, for the averment of the declaration is that the plaintiff was sick when he went upon the car. This being his condition, he must be held to have taken the risk of an increase of his malady to such an extent as to disable him from performing the part of a traveler on the train. Judgment affirmed.

ST. LOUIS, KANSAS CITY & NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

V.

MARSHALL.

(78 Missouri Reports, 610.)

In an action against a railroad company for carrying a female passenger beyond her station, the circumstances were such that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover for the loss of time and expense incurred in being taken past her station and back, and the jury were so instructed. The evidence showed that she lost two or three hours' time and paid $1.50 for a returning conveyance. There was a verdict for $1,000, reduced by remittitur to $750, and judgment accordingly. Held, excessive, and judgment reversed.

A passenger buying a ticket to D. station on defendant's road, was told by the ticket agent to take a particular train. She did accordingly. The