gaged in farm labor as that term is generally understood. They were at the time of the accident and injury to appellee engaged in the mining business, and subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Laws. There is no evidence to support the claim that appellee's injury was the result of his willful misconduct. The award is affirmed. INDIANA MANUFACTURERS' RECIPROCAL ASS'N ET AL. V. (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. Dec. 9, 1921.) MASTER AND SERVANT-YOUNG PERSON HELD NOT "LAW- COMPENSATION ACT. Where one between the age of 14 and 18 years, defined as a "young person" by Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8038, is employed without the affidavit as to age required by section 8022, the person is not lawfully employed within Workmen's Compensation Act, so as to sustain an award, notwithstanding there was a compliance with Burns' Supp. 1921, § 6674s (Acts 1921, c. 132, § 19), passed after the injury, the new statute having no application to the case. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec: Dig. § 366.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Employed.) Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceeding before the Industrial Board on a claim by David Dolby, father of Myrtle Dolby, deceased, against the Indiana Manufacturers' Reciprocal Association and the Wasmuth-Endicott Company. From an award of compensation, defendants appeal. Reversed, with instructions to dismiss claim. Joseph W. Hutchinson, of Indianapolis, for appellants. Bowers & Feightner and Lee M. Bowers, all of Huntington, for appellee. NICHOLS, J. This was a proceeding before the Industrial Board by appellee, who was the father of Myrtle Dolby, the deceased, against appellants, to recover on account of physical care, and general nursing, and burial expenses of said decedent, it being claimed that her death resulted by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of decedent's employment by appellant Wasmuth-Endicott Company. The accidental injury charged was the taking of typhoid fever germs into the system through the water supply furnished by the company, which resulted in decedent's taking typhoid fever, from which she died. It appears by the evidence that Myrtle Dolby was born July 24, 1902. Her employment with appellant company commenced September 8, 1919, and continued until her death, which was on March 8, 1920. She was therefore during all the time of her employment over the age of 14 years and under the age of 18 years. Before we reach the discussion of the question as to the right of appellee to recover on the merits in this proceeding, we are met by appellant association's contention that the Industrial Board had no jurisdiction of appellee's claim, for the reason that the decedent, Myrtle Dolby, was not lawfully employed by appellant company. Section 8022, Burns' R. S. 1914, expressly requires that an affidavit shall be made by the parents or guardian showing the age, date, and place of birth of a young person before such person can be lawfully employed. If there is no parent or guardian, then such affidavit must be made by the young person to be employed. The father David Dolby, was living and was a witness before the Industrial Board. Section 8038, Burns' R. S. 1914, defines a young person to be one between the age of fourteen years and eighteen years. There is no claim that such an affidavit had been made or that such an affidavit had been placed on file with the employer. To the contrary, the evidence is that no such affidavit was on file. The award is therefore not sustained by sufficient evidence. The question here involved has been definitely decided by this court in the case of In re Stoner, 128 N. E. 938, in which it was held that where a person between the age of fourteen and eighteen years fails to procure an affidavit as required by section 8022, supra, such person is not lawfully employed, and is therefore not an employee, and not entitled to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation. Act. Appellee says that there had been a compliance with section 6674s, Burns' Supp. 1921, and that such a compliance was a substantial compliance with the requirements of said section 8022, Burns', as will entitle the employee to bring an action under the Workmen's Compensation Law, but section 6674s, Burns' Supp. 1921, is section 19 of an act passed by the Legislature of 1921. See Acts 1921. p. 337. Such act was therefore passed long after the death of Myrtle Dolby, and can have no application to the matters in controversy in this case. Upon the authority of the case of In re Stoner, supra. the award of the Industrial Board is reversed, with instructions to the Board to dismiss the claim. MANSFIELD ENGINEERING CO. v. WINKLE. (No. 11238.) (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. Dec. 23, 1921.) 133 Northeastern Reporter, 390. MASTER AND SERVANT-EVIDENCE HELD TO SHOW COMPENSABLE DEATH. In a proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act to recover for death of servant struck on the head with an air hammer, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that death resulted from the accident, though the direct and immediate cause of death was a rupture of the heart. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceeding by Nellie Winkle under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, c. 106) to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, George Winkle, opposed by the Mansfield Engineering Company. the employer. There was an award of compensation, and the employer appeals. Affirmed. Chas. E. Henderson and Chas. Unger, both of Indianapolis, for appellant. Emsley W. Johnson and Joseph W. Hutchinson, both of Indianapolis, for appellee. MCMAHAN, J. The Industrial Board found that on April 23, 1921, one George Winkle, while in the employ of appellant, received a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and resulting in his death. Compensation was awarded to the widow as sole dependent. Appellant's only contention is that there is no evidence to connect the injury with the immediate cause of death. There is evidence tending to show that George Winkle was a structural iron worker, and at the time of his death was a vigorous, well-nourished man, 43 years old, and weighed 160 to 165 pounds; never complained of being sick or of any trouble with his heart. He was in good spirits and feeling well when he went to work on the day he was injured. About 9:30 a. m.. while engaged in his regular work, he was struck on the forehead with an airhammer which he was using. Immediately after receiving the blow he threw his hands over his face, and walked around for a few minutes and returned to his work. The blow was of sufficient force to produce a discolored spot about an inch in diameter and three or four other smaller places around the nose and beneath the eyebrows where the skin was broken. He left his work at noon, and complained that he was getting "awfully sick," and that his head was "hurting fit to kill." A little later he expressed a desire to go to a drug store, where he could get something for his head. He took a car and later went into a drug store, where he complained of a severe plain in the stomach, took a dose of magnesia and peppermint, fell to the floor and within a few minutes after taking the medicine vomited. He got home about 1:30, and died about a half hour later. When he reached the gate at his home he staggered and held to the gatepost. He then sat down on the doorsteps until his wife helped him into the house, when he sank to the floor and complained of pain in the chest and head. He became unconscious, and died within a few minutes after the physician arrived: The body was embalmed by an undertaker, and two days later an autopsy was held. It showed no apparent injury to the skull or brain. The heart was removed, and it was found that the tissue on the posterior side of the right auricle had degenerated to such an extent it was but slightly thicker than paper, and was ruptured. The direct and immediate cause of death was the rupture of the heart. Four or five physicians testified. Two of them in answer to the hypothetical questions testified that in their opinion the rupture of the heart which caused death was a probable result of the shock produced by the blow on the head. Others testified that the blow did not cause the rupture, and that the blow had nothing to do with the rupture There is no necessity for us to enter into a discussion of the law applicable to cases of this character. The right of the board to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and the weight to be given to the finding of the board when there is any evidence to support the finding is settled by the decisions of this court. There is ample evidence to support the finding that the death of George Winkle was caused by an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The award is therefore affirmed. STEVENS v. MARION MACHINE, FOUNDRAY & SUPPLY CO. (No. 11110.) (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. Dec. 2, 1921.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT ONE-EYED WORKMAN'S LOSS OF EYE COMPENSABLE AS PERMANENT LOSS OF "ONE EYE." A one-eyed employee receiving an injury causing permanent loss of his eye is not entitled to compensation for total disability under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 29, and can recover merely for the "permanent loss of the sight of one eye," under section 31, though the loss of his eye resulted in total blindness. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[11].) Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by W. H. Stevens for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Marion Machine, Foundry & Supply Company, employer, in which employer filed a petition for review on account of change of condition. Award for employer and employee appeals. Affirmed. Van Atta & Clawson, of Marion, for appellant. Joseph W. Hutchinson, of Indianapolis, for appellee. On DAUSMAN, C. J. When 11 years of age the appellant lost permanently the vision of his right eye by an accident. On February 16, 1919. being then 48 years of age, while in the employment of the appellee, he received an injury by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment, which resulted, in the permanent loss of his left eye. March 4, 1919, the parties entered into a compensation agreement, by the terms of which the employer agreed to pay compensation "at the rate of $10.53 per week during total or partial disability, not exceeding 500 weeks." The agreement was duly approved by the Industrial Board, and compensation was paid in accordance with the agreement until January 13, 1921, at which time the employer refused to make further payments. Thereupon the employee filed with the Industrial Board his complaint, by which he sought a continuation of the compensation, on the ground that the injury resulted in permanent total disability. The employer then filed a petition for a review on account of a change in condition. After a hearing, the full board made a finding of facts. So much of the finding as is essential to the determination of the question here presented. is as follows: "That under said agreement the defendant has paid to the plaintiff 100 weeks' compensation at the rate of $10.35 per week; that, after entering into the said agreement, the plaintiff's injury resulted in total and permanent loss of the vision of his left eye." The Board ordered that the plaintiff take nothing by his complaint; that the defendant's petition to review on account of a change in conditions be granted; that the compensation liability of the employer to the employee be terminated. and that the plaintiff pay the costs of the proceeding. The statute in force at the time of the accident contains the following provision: "For injuries in the following schedule the employee shall receive in lieu of all other compensation, a weekly compensation equal to fifty-five per cent. of his average weekly wages for the periods stated, respectively, to wit: * * * * * * "(d) For the permanent and irrecoverable loss of the sight of one eye, or its reduction to one-tenth of normal vision with glasses 100 weeks." Section 31, Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, p. 400). The foregoing provision is specific and arbitrary. We have a case, then, wherein the workman lost permanently the sight of one eye, and under the statute he is entitled to compensation for a period of 100 weeks and no more. [1, 2] Counsel for the appellant contend that on the facts of this case the workman is entitled to compensation under section 29, which provides generally that, where the injury causes total disability, compensation shall be paid during the period of total disability. not to exceed, however, 500 weeks. The contention rests on the proposition that, the workman having permanently lost the sight of one eye in the days of his youth, it necessarily follows that the permanent loss of the sight of his other eye, by the industrial accident, resulted in permanent total disability for work. The contention cannot be sustained. The compensation plan is a legislative venture; and, of course, those who are instrusted with the administration of it can do nothing other than ascertain and execute the legislative intent. The rule is fundamental that in the construction and application of a statute specific provisions take priority over general provisions. The concluding sentence of section 31, following the schedule of specific injuries, declares: compen "In all other cases of * * * * * partial disability * sation in lieu of all other compensation shall be paid when and in the amount determined by the Industrial Board," etc. That language indicates unmistakingly that the Legislature regarded the several injuries mentioned in the schedule as injuries which of themselves naturally result in partial disability only, and would not result in total disability in the absence of complications. In the case at bar the injury resulted in "the permanent and irrecoverable loss of the sight of one eye," and nothing more. It is inaccurate to say that the injury resulted in total blindness. The industrial injury plus the injury received in childhood resulted in total blindness. Evidently the Legislature acted on the basis that normally a man has two eyes, either one of which is capable of supplying some light to the body, and that the loss of one constitutes a partial impairment only. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this feature of the statute has been amended to provide compensation for 500 weeks where the loss of the sight of both eyes results from the same accident. Evidently the Legislature did not intend that an industry should be chargeable on account of an injury to an eye which occurred long before the workman came to that industry. The award is affirmed. |