employment. and the risk of injury while using the elevator was an incident and hazard of the employment." In the instant cases the employer required the employees to use the place of the accident as a condition of the employment. We may say, having in mind the quotation from the Littler Case, that the place of injury was brought within the scope of the employment because the employee, when she was injured. was on her way to her duty within the precincts of the company, and upon the only way which the employer had made it possible for her to reach her work. I favor an affirmance. FARR v. BABCOCK LUMBER & LAND CO. (No. 594.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION ACT OF TENNESSEE HELD NOT TO PRECLUDE SERVANT EMPLOYED IN TENNESSEE FROM SUING IN NORTH CAROLINA. The Workmen's Compensation Act of Tennessee does not preclude an employee who was employed in Tennessee, but who was injured while working in North Carolina, from bringing action in county in which he was injured for injuries, on the grounds that employer failed to keep a physician at the camp to attend employee after he was injured, that employer employed an incompetent physician. and that employer was negligent in failing to provide employee transportation to his home. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 369.) Exceptions and Appeal from Superior Court. Graham County; Harding, Judge. Action by Ernest Farr against the Babcock Lumber & Land Company. Order overruling motion for nonsuit as to some of the causes of action and defendant excepts and appeals. Appeal dismissed. The plaintiff is a resident of Graham county, and the defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber. with plants in Tennessee. The defendant owned timber lands in Graham county. and operated a railroad for hauling logs from Graham to its plants. The defendant had camps, a hospital. and an office in Graham county. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, was injured while in the prosecution of the work assigned him. The complaint states four causes of action (1) Defendant's failure to provide for plaintiff a safe place in which to work; (2) defendant's failure to keep a physician at the camp to attend plaintiff after he was injured; (3) defendant's employment of an incompetent physician; (4) defendant's negligent failure to provide plaintiff transportation to his home from the junction on the road of defendant and Knoxville Power Company. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had undertaken to provide for the plaintiff and other employees a competent physician and surgeon when needed, and made a monthly charge or assessment which was deducted from the employee's wages. The defendant denied the plaintiff's material allegations and alleged that the contract of employment was made in Tennessee and subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1919, c. 123) passed by the General Assembly of Tennessee on April 15, 1919, and made effective from July 1, 1919. The defendant contended that, upon the face of the pleadings-it having been agreed that the contract of employment had been made in Tennessee-the court had no jurisdiction. The court sustained the motion, as to the first cause of action. and overruled it as to the second, third, and fourth. Upon the intimation of the court the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit as to the first cause, and did not appeal. The court further adjudged that the trial should proceed upon the second, third, and fourth causes. The defendant excepted and appealed. Merrimon, Adams & Johnston, of Asheville, for appellant. R. L. Phillips and T. M. Jenkins, both of Robbinsville. for appellee. ADAMS, J. [1] His honor held that the court had no jurisdiction of the first cause of action. and retained the second, third, and fourth causes for trial by jury. The defendant thereupon excepted and appealed. The order appealed from was not final or of such character as to deprive the defendant of any substantial right, and for this reason the appeal was premature. The defendant can preserve its exception until a final judgment is rendered. In numerous cases this court has held that a premature or fragmentary appeal will not be considered. Hailey v. Gray, 93 N. C. 196; Lane v. Richardson, 101 N. C. 182, 7 S. E. 710; Piedmont Co. v. Buxton, 105 N. C. 74, 11 S. E. 264; Emry v. Parker. 111 N. C. 261, 16 S. E. 236; Ry. v. King, 125 N. C. 454, 34 S. E. 541. [2] We are requested, however, t review so much of the judgment as retains for trial the second, third, and fourth causes of action. As now advised, especially in the absence of an opposing interpretation by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, we are of opinion that the sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act cited and relied on by the defendant do not purport to interfere with the jurisdiction of the superior court of Graham as to the second. third, and fourth causes of action stated in the complaint. and that there was no error in his honor's order that these causes be retained for trial. Appeal dismissed. Walker, J.. concurs only in dismissal of appeal. SOUTHERN SURETY CO. v. BEAIRD. (No. 1192.) (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso. Nov. 10. 1921. Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1921.) 235 Southwestern Reporter, 240. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-NOTICE OF COMPENSABLE INJURY AND CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT HELD WAIVED. Where an injured employee's physician notitied the insurer within 30 days after injury, certified to the Industrial Accident Board within two weeks the necessity for further treatment, and thereafter, at least once a week. notified the insurer through its agent of the employee's condition and treatment, but, acting on such agent's assurances that certification to the Board of the necessity for further treatment wàs not necessary. omitted to further advise it. the insurer waived the giving of such notices and certificates. as required by Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918. arts. 5236-9. to 5246-11, and was estopped from asserting the want thereof, or any action the Board might have taken had notices and certificates been given, even though such notices and actions of the Board with respect to fees and charges for treatment are of the essence of the insurance contract. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT—“HOSPITAL SERVICES” WITHIN COMPENSATION ACT DEFINED. Care, meals, heat, and artificial light furnished to a disabled employee commensurate with his needs are included in "hospital services," to which such employee is entitled under Workmen's Compensation Act (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, arts. 5246-9 to 5246-11), though furnished in a private residence. (For other cases. see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[16].) - 6. MASTER AND SERVANT EVIDENCE AS TO LIABILITY UNDER COMPENSATION ACT FOR HOSPITAL SERVICE HELD ADMISSIBLE. In a suit to set aside an award by the State Industrial Accident Board for hospital services rendered to an injured employee by his father, the court did not err in admitting evidence that the father had furnished his son with board, lodging, and care, nor in permitting the attending physician to testify that the liability insurer's agent, in its behalf, had authorized the rendition of such services without certifying to the Board the necessity for further medical treatment. as required by Vernon's Ann Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 5246-9, the evidence showing that it was within the apparent scope of such agent's authority to so advise the physician. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.) Appeal from Eastland County Court; R. L. Rust. Judge. Suit by the Southern Surety Company to set aside award of Industrial Accident Board to C. V. Beaird. Judgment for defendant. and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. D. T. Mason, of Dallas, T. H. McGregor, of Austin, and E. F. Cameron, of El Paso, for appellant. Harrison, Cavin & Key, of Eastland and H. C. Peyton, of Brownwood, for appellee. WALTHALL. J. This case presents a suit originally in the justice of the peace court by appellant, Southern Surety Company, to set aside and cancel an award made by the State Industrial Accident Board to C. W. Beaird. appellee, for hospital services rendered by him to Chester L. Beaird, his son, in the sum of $168. In the justice court the trial resulted in favor of the Southern Surety Company. An appeal was duly prosecuted by C. W. Beaird to the county court, where a trial de novo was had before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of appellee in the sum of $168, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted. An agreed statement of facts is found in the record. from which we. with some abbreviations, make the following findings of fact: On the 19th day of November, 1918, Chester L. Beaird, while in the employment of the Snow Transfer Company, and while in the performance of his duty, was severely burned by a gasoline explosion. After his injury he was taken from Ranger, Tex., to the home of his father, appellee. near Brownwood, Tex., where he was confined to his bed continuously from the time of the accident to May 24, 1919. During all of the time of his confinement and disability he was under the constant care and treatment of a physician, Dr. Brown. On the 21st day of November, 1918. Chester L. Beaird entered into a verbal contract with his father, C. W. Beaird, appellee, whereby, for and in consideration of $1 per day. appellee was to furnish to Chester L. Beaird during his total incapacity care, meals. fuel, light, and other necessaries incident to his sickness and total incapacity. Appellee furnished his son with a room and bed at his farmhouse, and he and his family constantly waited upon and cared for Chester L. Beaird during his sickness and total incapacity for 168 days. Chester L. Beaird gave no notice to the Industrial Accident Board of the accident or his need of medical attention; nor did he give such notice to the appellant, Southern Surety Company. Chester L. Beaird did not receive authority from the Industrial Accident Board or the Southern Surety Company to contract for the medical services or the care and attention furnished him by appellee. Commencing with the second week after the injury and continuing up to the, date of the trial of this case, the Southern Surety Company has been paying to Chester L. Beaird a weekly compensation of $13.84 per week. said payments were made through E. B. Henly, an insurance agent. Within two weeks after the injury of Chester L. Beaird Dr. Brown certified to the Industrial Accident Board the necessity for further medical treatment of Chester L. Beaird, further certifying that he would be totally disabled for several weeks, but the doctor received no authority from the Board for the continuance of medical care and treatment. Within two weeks after the accident Dr. Brown, at the request of Chester L. Beaird, notified E. B. Henly of the condition of Chester L. Beaird, and of his treatment and the necessity for such treatment. Henly told Dr. Brown that his agency had issued a policy of compensation insurance for the Snow Transfer Company, the policy being issued by the Southern Surety Company. Henly suggested that Dr. Brown advise the Industrial Accident Board of the injury and necessity for treatment, which notice was given by Dr. Brown. The Board replied to Dr. Brown that no report had been made of the accident to Chester L. Beaird. Henly advised, Dr. Brown that it would not be necessary to make any report, as he fully, understood about the matter of the medical treatment by Dr. Brown and at the home of his father. and was satisfied with the treatment and instructed Dr. Brown to continue same. Dr. Brown went to Henly at least once a week for the purpose of notifying him of the condition of Chester-L. Beaird and of the necessity for further medical and hospital treatment. Finally Henly notified Dr. Brown that it was not necessary for him to continue to make any further report in regard to the condition and treatment of Chester L. Beaird, as he fully understood the same, and was willing that such treatment, both by Dr. Brown and by the re-. latives of Chester L. Beaird at the home of his father. should be continued as long as same was necessary. Upon this instruction from Henly Dr. Brown discontinued giving weekly notice to Henly, but did make an occasional report to him. In making such reports to Henly Dr. Brown was acting for himself as to medical attention, and at the request and for Chester L. Beaird as to the services and treatmen, then being rendered by his father, appellee, and other relatives. At the request of Henly, on a number of occasions, Dr. Brown carried weekly compensation vouchers issued by the Southern Surety Company to Chester L. Beaird under the terms of its policy and delivered same to Chester L. Beaird at the home of his father. Dr. Brown then knew of claims of other parties against appellant being paid through the agency of Henly at Brownwood. Henly & Co are insurance agents and represent appellant at Brownwood. At the time Dr. Brown first notified Henly of the condition of Chester L. Beaird and of his treatment of him, he also told Henly of the arrangement Chester L. Beaird had made with his father in regard to his father giving him hospital care and treatment. Henly agreed with Dr. Brown that he might go ahead with his medical treatment. and agreed and consented that Chester L. Beaird might be kept at his father's home under the then agreement between the father and son, for a charge by the father of $1 per day for care, treatment, and board. About the 1st of February. 1919, a traveling representative of appellant was in Brownwood at the office of Henly & Co.. and requested Dr. Brown to call at the office for consultation as to Chester L. Beaird. The representative requested Dr. Brown to submit his bill for services rendered and for medicines and dressings used, stating at the time that he did not consider appellant responsible for more than two weeks regardless of the_condition of Chester L. Beaird; that the only notice given the Board by Dr. Brown was the notice of December 2, 1918; that Dr. Brown did not receive any authority or notice from the Board authorizing him to continue his professional services to Chester L. Beaird, or to have continued the care and attention and hospital services then being given by appellee at his home. The reason Dr. Brown gave no further notice was the fact that he relied on the statement of Henly, as above, and to the effect that it would not be necessary to further notify the Board; that notices to him would be all that would be necessary. When Dr. Brown first notified Henley of the accident to Chester L. Beaird and of the medical and hospital treatment he was then receiving, Henly instructed Dr. Brown to continue the medical treatment and hospital services without notifying the Board that he would consent to both the medical and hospital treatment and service without either being ordered by the Board. This Henly repeatedly told Dr. Brown. Both Dr. Brown and appellee relied on the statement of Henly. and for that reason no reports were made to the Board other than the one made about the 2d of December, 1918. The case having originated in the justice court, it was agreed on the trial in the county court that the appellant pleaded orally: General demurrer; special exception to appellee's answer that the services rendered to Chester L. Beaird were not hospital services; that it was not shown that the cause for continued hospital services had been certified to the Industrial Accident Board as required by law; "general demurrer as to the means alleged in the defendant's answer, and defendant authorized by E. B. Henly to bind the Southern Surety Company to waive notice to the Industrial Accident Board." [1.2] There is no merit in the first assignment complaining of the action of the court in overruling its motion to quash appellee's appeal bond in perfecting the appeal from the justice court and dismiss the appeal from the judgment in the justice court. The judgment in the justice court was in favor of appellant, Southern Surety Company, refusing to allow the award of the Industrial Accident Board and that it recover its costs, the costs amounting to $4.50, and paid by defendant, Beaird. Beaird evidently was entitled to appeal. The costs are not estimated as being a part of the "amount of the judgment" in fixing the amount of the appeal bond when one is required to be given. the costs being no part of the "amount" recovered. The bond is exclusive of costs. A fine analysis of the law by Judge Gaines, as it is now written, is found in Yarbrough v. Collins, 91 Tex. 306, 42 S. W. 1052, and later applied by |