means that it was a probable event that, had I taken his advice, I should have gained a hundred guineas; but the expression

"I could have put a hundred guineas into my pocket," &c.

reduces the probability to a certainty.

Proverbs are the traditions of language as well as of thoughts. Thus, the impropriety of procrastination is expressed in the adage

“He that will not when he may, may not when he will.”

And, when we say " Might creates right," we assert, whether mistakenly or not, that, in this world, "Right is wholly dependent on power."

MUST expresses necessary action; but the necessity may either be the consequence of outward compulsion, or of internal conviction. The German müssen, to be obliged (bound), is an irregular verb, having all the variety of conjugation usually found in that language; and the Saxon most, although imperfect, has its different tenses; but the English must never changes its orthography. In consequence of this defect, we can only learn, from the other words in the sentence, at what time the compulsion takes place.

"I must walk" is equivalent to "I feel the necessity of walking," or "I am compelled to walk."

"I must have walked" denotes that, at some past time, I had been obliged to walk. "I must walk to-morrow" foretells a future necessity: future, in consequence of the word to-morrow.

TO DARE (Saxon dearran), is to risk the exertion of an assumed but uncertain power, and is more appropriately connected with verbs that indicate opposition or danger :

"If I dare eat, or drink, or breathe, or live,

I dare meet Surry in a wilderness."

The imperfect tense is DURST in all the three persons, both singular and plural, as "I durst," "Thou durst," "He durst," &c.

When it is not employed as an auxiliary, the verb To dare is regular in the past as well as in the present tense, as "I dared," "Thou daredst,” “He dared," &c.; but the construction of the two forms of conjugation are diffe

rent. In the one case we say, "I durst meet him," or "He durst meet him," and in the other, "I dared To meet him," or "He dared To meet him."

Durst is not limited, like dared, to past time, but has a contingent application, similar to that of could and might, without regard to tenses.-"I durst as soon hang myself as contradict her," might be the melancholy speech of a henpecked husband.

It must have been already observed that the auxiliaries, which we have mentioned, coalesce more closely to the infinitives that follow them than other verbs can be made to do: it is a distinguishing characteristic of the class. "I wish to read," "I learn to read," and "I love to read," show the manner of the junction of ordinary verbs; while "I may read," "I can read,” and “I must read," show that of the auxiliaries. In the former case, the to is prefixed to the infinitives in the latter it is discarded. The arrangement of our language, by placing the auxiliaries before, instead of after, the principal verbs, has prevented that closer union which, in the form of contractions, would have given us moods and tenses in the shape of terminations. It is the tendency of all languages to combine monosyllables into polysyllables,-roots into compounds; and to untie the rudely-twisted knots is the fruitless never-ending labour of the etymologist.

There are a few other words which belong to an intermediate tribe between ordinary verbs and auxiliaries. They, too, dispense with the prefix to in their following infinitives; but, being transitive, they require an interjected accusative. The following are of this class: To hear, to let, to make, to feel, to see, and to bid. Thus :

I heard him say so,

I let him do it,

I made him do it,

I felt him touch me,

I saw him steal,

I bade him go away.

There are, however, occasional deviations from this practice, especially in the verb To bid. Smollett writes "He bade them to open their bundles ;" and Goldsmith, more harmoniously,

"Those gentler hours that plenty bade to bloom."

To NEED, to want, or to be in want of, is akin to those above-mentioned, but is something different in its usage. The to of the succeeding infinitive is requisite in the affirmative sentence, but not in the negative. Thus we say, "He needs to go," or "I need to go;" but "He needs not go" or "I need not

go " when the negative intervenes. Young writers are apt to confound the third person singular of this verb with the adverb NEEDS; because the words have the same orthography: "He must needs "He must needs go" signifies signifies "He must necessarily go:" a necessity, however, arising from some want, or need of his own rather than from outward compulsion. Shakspeare seems to consider it as dependent on the will:

"He was a foole,

For he would needs be vertuous."

The extensive application of the word need, (from the slightest occasional use to the most urgent necessity,) gave frequent opportunities to our great Bard for exhibiting his punning propensities: Thus, in Timon of Athens,

"Oh you gods, what need we have any friends; if we should nere have need of 'em? They were the most needlesse creatures living; should we nere have use for 'em."

And again in Hamlet,

"And hitherto doth Love on Fortune tend,

For who not needs shall never lacke a Frend:
And who in want a hollow Friend doth try,
Directly seasons him his Enemie."

OF THE FUTURE TENSE.

When speaking of tenses we have hitherto confined ourselves to the present and the past. In reality there are no future actions: they exist only in anticipation. Nevertheless, those embryo beings,-the creations of hope or of fear, -play a splendid part on the theatre of human thought. The past soon loses its interest;—the present (if there be a present) has only a momentary duration; and we may, truly, be said to live among the non-entities of the future.

Actions that are to come can only be contemplated through our present conception of how they may be produced. All past actions are necessary, otherwise they would not have been; and the thoughts, or things (termed causes), which preceded and are supposed to have produced them, are left for the investigation of the historian; but, in looking forward to the future, we perceive nothing but causes, for there is no action previous to their exertion.

We may conceive actions to arise from three different sources; and consequently they are divisible into as many kinds:

1. Voluntary, that is, such as follow the Will of the Agent.

2. Compulsory, such as follow the Will, or Power, of a being different from the Agent.

3. Contingent, such as are either not referrible to any known cause, or which we choose to consider as simply future.

To express these three several divisions, we make use of only two auxiliaries, will and shall.

TO WILL (Saxon willan,) with some change of conjugation, though a little antiquated, still exists in our language as a regular verb. "I will," "Thou willest," "He wills," "We willed," &c. express the consent, or desire, of their nominatives; and hence the defective auxiliary is well fitted to mark a voluntary future.

SHALL is the Saxon scealan, to owe, or to be obliged; and therefore properly applies to any prediction of a compulsory kind. In very old English, it was the only future auxiliary, Will being then restricted to its regular meaning.

So far all is well, but how, with only these two words, will and shall, can we designate an act which is purely contingent,—a simple future? The Germans use the verb werden, to become, for that purpose. It is equivalent to the Saxon weorthan; but that verb, (unless perhaps in some anomalous usages of the word were,) has not reached our times. Accordingly, by means of a few dexterous manœuvres, which puzzle the brains of the Scots and Irish, we have contrived to make will and shall answer all the three divisions of futurity. With regard to which of the two shall, in any particular case, become a simple future, our choice is founded on the following principles :

1. Knowing little of the will, or determination, of others, we denote their contingent actions by will, and their compulsory ones by shall.

2. Knowing our own will, we denote our voluntary actions by will and our contingent actions by shall.

3. When we would express our own necessary actions, we use a periphrasis, such as "I shall be forced," or "I shall be obliged" to do such a thing: or, changing the verb, we say "I must do it" or "I am obliged (or forced) to do it."

4. When we would express the voluntary actions of others, we lay an emphasis on the word will, and say "You will do it ;" or we use such prophetical phrases as "You will surely do so," "I am convinced that he will do so," &c.

5. SHOULD and WOULD are the conditionals of shall and will, and follow similar rules of construction. Should is sometimes used unconditionally, and is then equivalent to ought. Would is also used in the same manner, and then

signifies wish. "I should have done that" signifies "I ought to have done that ;" and "I would that you were wise" is equivalent to "I wish that you were wise." In these usages, should and would cease to be conditionals.

The preceding principles are, probably, unexceptionable, but they are too general to be easily referred to, in particular instances. The choice between shall and will depends so much upon the intention of the speaker, that it is scarcely possible to teach a foreigner to distinguish their usage: for even our best writers must be sometimes in fault, seeing that they are not always uniform in their practice. Nevertheless, an attention to accuracy in the use of those words is of the utmost importance; for, on the nice discrimination of the signs of the future tense, much of the precision and elegance of composition depends. As, in incurable diseases, the prescriptions are always most numerous and generally specifics, so, on this subject, every grammarian has promulgated his own infallible instructions; and we have now before us a work, devoted entirely to shall and will, containing no fewer than thirty-five Rules, with numerous observations and examples upon each. However correct these may be, (and we believe that they are correct,) they defeat their purpose by their multiplicity. Mr. Brightland's Rule (from the Latin of Dr. Wallis) has the advantage of being easily retained in the memory; but it is not sufficiently comprehensive :

"In the First Person, simply, shall foretels;

In will, a threat, or else a promise, dwells;
Shall, in the Second and the Third, does threat:
Will, simply, then foretells the future feat."

When it is said that will, in the first person either promises, or threatens, it is understood only in its combination with other words, or from its known connexion with other circumstances. The will or desire of the speaker is all that is expressed in the simple sentence, and this will may promise a favour or threaten a punishment; for we never use will in the first person without assuming that we have power. Shall, in the second and third person, also presumes the power of compulsion; for it would be absurd to say "You shall," or "He shall," act in a certain manner, if we had no power to enforce obedience: it would be an empty threat.

When we would employ shall and will as interrogatories, we find, by a little attention, that the choice for the different futures depends on the same principles as in direct assertions. The expected answer ought always to be made by the same auxiliary with which the question is asked; and the answer will immediately determine the choice. Thus, "When shall we meet again?" is to be answered by "We shall meet again" (at such a time). Had the reply