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· 3. The payment of two sums; the this state, possessions of the one are one of 600 millions, under the deno.' occupied by the forces of the other, mination of indemnity; the other of these possessions are under conquest, 200 millions, to serve for the construc.' by right of which the occupier action of fortresses in the countries cón. quires the full enjoyment of them duterminous with France.

ring all the time that he occupies them, 4. The military occupation, during or until the re-establishment of peace. seven years, of the fortresses of Valen. He is entitled to demand as a condiciennes, Bouchain, Cambray, Mau- tion of that re-establishment, that the beuge, Landrecy, Lequesnoy, Avesne,' territory which he occupies should be Rocroy, Longwi, Thionville, Bitchie, ceded to him in whole or in part; and and the Tete-du-pont of Fort Louis,' the cession, when it has taken place, as well as of a line along the northern transforming the enjoyment into proand eastern frontiers, by an army of perty, from a mère occupier of it he 150,000 men, under the orders of a becomes the sovereign. This is a general nominated by the allies, and mode of acquisition which the law of to be subsisted by France.

nations authorises. His Majesty, ardently desirous of But the state of war, conquest, and hastening, as far as lies in his power, the right of exacting cessions, are the conclusion of an arrangement, the things which proceed from and depend delay of which has caused to his peo.' upon each other, in such way that the ple so many evils which he daily de- first is an absolute condition of the se. plores, and has prolonged in France, cond, and the latter of the third ; for and still prolongs, that internal agita-' out of the state of war, there can tion which has excited the solicitude be no conquest made ; and where con. of the powers, but still more animated quest has not been made, or no longer by a desire to make known his good exists, the right of demanding territodispositions to the sovereigns his allies, rial cessions cannot exist, since a claim has wished that the undersigned should cannot be made to retain that which communicate without delay to their one has not, or that which he no longexcellencies the plenipotentiaries of the er has. four courts, the principles on which . There can be no conquest where he thinks the negociation ought to be there is no state of war, and as you prosecuted, relatively to each of the cannot take from him who has nobases proposed, by ordering the un- thing, you can only make conquest of dersigned to present the following what a man possesses

; hence it folconsiderations on the first of these lows, that in order to constitute the bases, that respecting territorial ce possibility of conquest, there must sions,—in which that important object have been war by the occupier on the is examined, in the twofold relations possessor, that is on the sovereign ; of justice and utility, which it would right of possession of a country and be so dangerous to separate.

sovereignty being things inseparable, The wunt of a common judge, ha- or rather identical. ving authority and power to terminate If then you make war in a country, the disputes of sovereigns, leaves no and against a number more or less conother course, when they cannot come siderable of the inhabitants of that to an amicable agreement, but that of country, while the sovereign is exceptreferring the decision of such disputes ed therefrom, you do not make war to the fate of arms, which constitutes on the country, the latter word being between them the state of war. If in merely a trope by which the domain


is put for the possessor. A sovereign, complices of that crime, whom it was however, must be considered as except. necessary to combat, to put down, ed from the war which foreigners and punish, circumstances which irre: carry on in his country, when they ae. fragably exclude every supposition knowledge him and maintain with him that such men could naturally either the accustomed relations of peace. acquire, or coofer, or transmit any The war is then made against med, to right. the rights of whom he who combats The allied powers have not, for an them cannot succeed, because they instant, ceased to recognise his most have no rights, and from whom it is Christian Majesty as King of France, impossible to conquer what does not and consequently to recognise the rights belong to them. Neither the object which belonged to him in that capa. nor the effect of such a war can be to city; they have not for an instant make conquests, but to recover. He, ceased to be with him in relations of however, who recovers that which peace and amity, which alone conveydoes not belong to him, cannot recom ed with it the engagement to respect ver it but for him whom he acknow, his rights; they took upon them this ledyes as the legitimate possessor. engagement in a formal though impli.

To entitle you to deem yourself at ed manner, in the declaration of the war with a country, without being so 13th of March, and in the treaty of with him who has been previously ac. the 25th. They rendered it more knowledged a sovereign, two things strict by making the king enter, by must necessarily happen ; the one is, his accession to that treaty, into their that of ceasing to hold him as such, alliance against the common enemy; and to regard the sovereignty as for if you cannot make conquests from transferred to those whom you fight a friend, you can still less do it from against, by the very act for which an ally. And let it not be said, that you fight against them ;--that is to the king could not be the ally of the say, you then recognize, pursue, and powers, but by co-operating with sanction those doctrines which have them, and that he did not do 80; if overthrown so many thrones, shaken the total defection of the army, which, them all, and against which all Eu. at the time of the treaty of the 25th rope was under the necessity of arm- of March, was already knows and ing itself: or, you must believe that decmed inevitable, did not permit him the sovereignty can be double, while it to bring regular troops into action, is essentially one, and incapable of din the Frenchmen, who, by taking up vision; it may exist under different arms for him to the number of 60 or forms, be collective or individual, but 70,000, in the departments of the not each of these at once in the same West and the South, those who sbew. country, which cannot have two sove, ing themselves disposed to take them teigns at the same time.

up, placed the usurper under the neThe allied powers, however, havecessity of dividing his forces, and those neither done nor believed either the who after the defeat of Waterloo, inone or the other of these two things. stead of the resources in men and mo

They have considered the enterprise ney which he demanded, left him no of Buonaparte as the greatest crime other but that of abandoning every that could be committed by men, and thing, were, for the allied powers, a the very attempt of which alone pla- real co-operation, who, in proportion ced him without the law of nations. as their forces advanced into the French In his adherents they viewed only ac. provinces, re-established there the king's

äuthority, a measure which would have firmation of the royal government, so caused conquest to cease, had these important for the legitimate dynasties; provinces been really conquered. It and so necessary to the repose of Eu. is evident, then, that the demand which rope, in as far as that repose is connect is made of territorial cessions cannot ed with the internal tranquillity of be founded upon conquest.

France. Neither can it have as adequate rea- In fine, the exaction of cessions son the expenditure made by the allied from his most Christian Majesty, powers ; for if it be just that the sa- would destroy, or at least alter, that crifices to which they have been for- equilibrium, to the establishment of ced by a war, undertaken for the com- which the powers have devoted so mon good, but for the more particu- many sacrifices, efforts, and cares. It lar benefit of France, should not re- was themselves who fixed the extent main chargeable on them, it is equal- that France ought to have. How ly just that they should satisfy them. should that which they deemed necesselves with an indemnification of the sary a year ago, have ceased to exist ? same kind with the sacrifices. The There are upon the continent of Euallied powers, however, have made no rope two states that surpass France in sacrifice of territory,

extent and in population. Their reWe live at a period, when, more lative greatness would necessarily in than at any other, it is important to crease in the same proportion as the strengthen confidence in the word of absolute greatness of France should kings. The exaction of cessions from be diminished. Would this be conhis most Christian Majesty would pro. formable to the interests of Europe ? duce a quite contrary effect, after the Would it even be suitable to the pardeclaration in which the powers an. ticular interests of these two states, in nounced, that they took up arms only the order of relations in which they against Buonaparte and his adherents; are placed towards each other? after the treaty in which they enga- If in a small democracy of antiquity, ged to maintain against all infraction the people in a body, learning that one the integrity of the stipulations of the of their generals had to propose to 30th May, 1814,which cannot be them something advantageous but not maintained unless that of France is so ; just, exclaimed unanimously, that they after the proclamations of their gene- would not even hear it mentioned, is rals in chief, in which the same assu- it possible to doubt that the monarchs tances are renewed.

of Europe should not be unanimous The exaction of cessions from his in a case where that which is not just most Christian Majesty would deprive would even be pernicious ? him of the means of extinguishing to- It is therefore, with the most entire tally and forever among the people confidence, that the undersigned have that spirit of conquest, fanned by the the honour of submitting to the al. usurper, and which would inevitably lied sovereigus the preceding observare-kindle with the desire of recovering tions. that which France would never believe Notwithstanding, however, the inshe had justly lost.

conveniences attached in actual cir. Cessions exacted from his most cumstances to every territorial cession, Christian Majesty would be imputed his Majesty will consent to the re-esto him as a crime, as if he had there. tablishment of the ancient limite, in all by purchased the aid of the powers, the points in which additions were and would be an obstacle to the con- made to Old France by the treaty of the 30th May. His Majesty will al- tive arrangement. They have been so consent to the payment of such an surprised to find in it a long series of indemnity as shall leave means of sup. observations on the right of conquest, plying the wants of the interior admi- on the nature of those wars to which nistration, without which it would be it is applicable, and on the reasons impossible to arrive at that settlement which should induce the contracting of order and tranquillity which has powers not to recur to it in the prebeen the object of war.

sent instance. His Majesty will likewise consent The undersigned consider themselves to a provisional occupation. Its dura. so much the more fully exempted from tion, the number of fortresses, and the the necessity of following the plenipoextent of country to be occupied will tentiaries of France in their reasoning, be the subject of negociation, but the inasmuch as no one of the propositions King does not hesitate to declare at which they have made, by command present, that an occupation of seven of their august sovereigns, with a view years, being absolutely incompatible to the regulation of the present and with the internal tranquillity of the future relations between Europe and kingdom, is utterly inadmissible. France, was founded on the right of

Thus the King admits in principle, 'conquest, and because they have careterritorial cessions as to what did not fully avoided in their communications appertain to Old France ; the payment whatever might lead to a discussion of of an indemnity; and a provisional oc. that right. The allied powers always cupation by a number of troops and considering the restoration of order, for a period to be determioed. and the confirmation of the royal au

His most Christian Majesty flatters thority in France, as the principal obhimself, that the sovereigns, his al. ject of their proceedings, but persua. lies, will consent to establish the ne- ded at the same time that France can. gociations on the footing of these not enjoy a solid peace whilst neighthree principles, as well as to carry in. bouring nations continue to cherish to the calculation of conditions that with regard to her either bitter anispirit of justice and moderation which mosities or perpetual alarms, have reanimates them, in order that the ar. cognised the principle of a just satisrangement may be brought to a con- faction for losses and past sacrifices, clusion speedily, and with mutual sa- as well as that of a sufficient guarantee tisfaction.

for the future security of neighbourIf these bases should not be adopt. ing countries, as the only means of ed, the undersigned are not authorised putting an end to all discontents and to receive or propose any other. apprehensions, and consequently as the

only true bases of every solid and durable arrangement.

It is only upon these two principles that the allied powers have fixed their

propositions, and in drawing up the Paris, Sept. 22, 1815. projet which the undersigned have had The undersigned, &c. &c. have re- the honour to transmit to the plenipo. ceived the note in which Messieurs the tentiaries'of France, they were distinct. Plenipotentiaries of France have repli. ly expressed in every one of its articles. ed to the communications made to The plenipotentiaries of France them in the conference of the 20th of themselves admit the first of these prin. this month, with reference to a defini- ciples, whilst they remain silent with



respect to the second. It is, however, points remote from her territory ; abundantly clear, that the necessity of they cannot really weaken her in any guarantees for the future, has become relation either administrative or mili. more sensible and urgent than at the tary, nor can her defensive system be period of the signature of the treaty of affected by them. France will remain Paris. The subsequent events have not the less one of the best rounded and carried consternation and alarm to eve. best fortified states of Europe, as well ry part of Europe ; at a moment when as one of the richest in means of every the sovereigns and their people flatter- description for resisting the danger of ed themselves, that, after so many af. invasion. Aictions, they were about to enjoy a Without entering into these higher long interval of peace, these events considerations, the plenipotentiaries of have every where produced agitation, France admit, however, the principle as well as the burthens and sacrifices of territorial cession, as far as respects inseparable from a general arming. It the points added to Old France by the is impossible so soon to efface from the treaty of Paris. minds of cotemporaries the recollection The undersigned find it difficult to of such a convulsion. That which was understand upon what this distinction sufficient to satisfy them in 1814, can- can be founded, or under the point of not content them in 1815. The line of view adopted by the allied powers, in demarcation which appeared to gua. what the essential difference between rantee the security of the states bor. ancient and recent territory consists. dering on France, at the epoch of the It is impossible to suppose, that the treaty of the 30th of May, can no plenipotentiaries of France wish to longer satisfy the just pretensions which revive in the actual state of affairs the they now prefer.

doctrine of the pretended inviolability It is indispensable that France should of the French territory. They too offer some new pledge of security. She well know that this doctrine, put ought to take this step, as well from forward by the chiefs and apostles of sentiments of justice and expediency, the revolutionary system, formed one as from her own interest well under of the most revolting chapters in that stood. For, in order that the French arbitrary code which they wished to may be happy and tranquil, it is abso- impose on Europe. It would be to lutely necessary that their neighbours destroy entirely every idea of equality should be happy and tranquil also. between the different powers, if it

Such are the powerful considera- were once established as a principle, tions that have induced the allied that France may without difficulty ex. powers to demand of France some tend her limits, acquire new provinces, territorial cessions. The inconsider. and unite them to her territory either able extent of these cessions, and the by conquest or treaty, whilst she selection of the points upon which alone shall enjoy the privilege of never they bear, sufficiently prove, that they losing any of her ancient possessions, have nothing in common with views either by the misfortunes of war, or of aggrandizement and conquest, and by the political arrangements that may that the security of bordering nations result from it. is their only object. These cessions With regard to the latter part of are not of a nature to compromise the the note of the plenipotentiaries of substantial integrity of France. They France, the undersigned reserve theme embrace only detached districts or selves for a serious explanation in the

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