Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease system broke down and insanity followed. He later committed suicide. His widow applied for compensation and the application was dismissed as irrelevant by the arbitrator. It was held on appeal that, without saying whether or not the claim could eventually be made out, the claimant was entitled to go to proof, and the arbitrator ought not to have dismissed the case as irrelevant upon its face. Malone v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co. (1908), 45 Scotch L. R. 351; 1 B. W. C. C. 27. An employé sustained an injury in the course of his employment resulting in temporary total disability. Before he had completely recovered from the injury he suddenly became insane and was committed to an asylum. The wound received had healed at the time of his becoming insane and there was nothing to indicate that the insanity resulted from the wound. It was held that the disability resulting on account of the insanity did not result from an injury sustained in the course of the employment. Re Charles Edner, Claim No. 1320, Ohio Indus. Acc. Bd., 1913. 21. Suicide due to mental condition caused by accident. A workman was injured in his head by a fall. Traumatic neurasthenia supervened and gradually became worse. About eight months after the accident he was found drowned in a canal 400 yards from his home. The County Court judge found that he committed suicide, and that the suicidal tendency was the result of the accident. It was held on appeal that there was no evidence to justify the finding, and compensation was refused. Southall v. Cheshire County News Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 251. See also last preceding paragraph. 22. Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease. Acceleration and aggravation of a pre-existing disease is an injury caused by accident. Willoughby v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1904), 6 W. C. C. 28. An injury may be caused by Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease an accident although no injury would have been thereby suffered but for the existence of disease which was aggravated by the accident. Lloyd v. Sugg & Co. (1900), 81 L. T. 768; 2 W. C. C. 5. A workman, while employed in a colliery, was injured by a stone falling on his knee. The accident occurred on a cold day, and the applicant took over two hours to get to his home, a distance of a mile and a quarter. Chest trouble and pneumonia supervened, and on an application for compensation medical evidence was given that the applicant suffered from bronchitis and chronic asthma and was unable to work. It was held that the test to be applied was not whether the workman's diseased condition was the natural or probable result of the accident, but whether it was the result of the accident in the sense that it was occasioned by the debilitated state of the workman immediately after the accident, or whether the accident had not accelerated an existing tendency to disease, or given life to certain latent causes of disease in the workman's body. Ystradowen Colliery Co. v. Griffiths (1909), 100 L. T. 869; 2 B. W. C. C. 357. "An injury which might naturally produce death in a person of a certain temperament or state of health is the cause of his death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his temperament or previous health had been different, and this is so, as well when death comes through the medium of disease directly induced by the injury, as when the injury immediately interrupts the vital processes.' Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Assn., 156 Mass. 351. Where a man is so afflicted that he will die from such affliction within a very short time, yet, if by some accidental means, his death is caused sooner, it will be death from accident within the meaning of the terms of an accident insurance policy. Hooper v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 000 Mo. 000; 148 S. W. Rep. 116. A physical injury which aggravates a previous ailment so Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease as to disable an employé where disability would not have been caused but for such previous ailment, is an injury within the act entitling the employé to compensation. Re Philip Jarvis, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 181. Applicant slipped and sprained his back and aggravated the condition of direct inguinal hernia from which he had suffered for some nine years. He reported the injury to his back and was treated accordingly. On a subsequent visit to the physician he referred to the hernia. Applicant went to the County Hospital and was operated on successfully by the County Physician. He asked for compensation during the entire period of his disability and also for the expense incurred in securing medical and surgical treatment to cure and relieve the hernia. Held that employés take with them into their employment any physical infirmities which they may possess at the time of entering such employment, and that applicant was entitled to compensation for the full period of disability. It was further held that applicant was ́ not entitled to any allowance for surgical and hospital treatment, because the employer was not given notice of any claim in this connection. The amount awarded applicant was the sum of $75 for five weeks' total disability. Yenne v. Standard Oil Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., July 28, 1913. This case was dismissed but not before an award had been rendered by the Industrial Accident Board. The issue involved was interesting. Applicant had his right foot burned by coming in contact with freshly mixed cement concrete until his shoe and stocking had been thoroughly saturated with the caustic material. As a result, the foot became seriously ulcerated, causing a disability extending over several weeks. In childhood applicant had his foot injured by having a hay wagon run over it, crushing it so seriously that some of the toes and much of the skin were sacrificed. The foot, consequently, was much more susceptible to caustic burns than the true skin. Held that the workman carries his disability with him, as per the English decisions, and that Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease he sustained an injury within the terms of the Act. He was awarded the sum of $100 for medical and surgical treatment, and $13.50 per week for disability, which amount was paid until the dismissal referred to. Leavenworth v. Ransome Concrete Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., May 6, 1913. A laborer in the Mare Island Navy Yard had badly deformed feet which were mechanically inefficient and by reason thereof a slight injury caused incapacity. The examining physician certified that "although the injury damaged the foot temporarily, it was the old condition which interfered with the usual recovery and is responsible for the present state and the necessity of wearing a brace.” The examining physician also stated: "Of course, the injury precipitated the pain and lameness, and without some mechanical aid the foot was not able to properly functionate." It was held under such circumstances that the injury aggravated a previous ailment and that the workman was entitled to compensation. Re J. S. K. Wite, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 183. The claimant, while working on a war vessel in the Boston Navy Yard, was hit by a steel plate on the right lower quarter of the abdomen. The medical officer reported that the man had symptoms of appendicitis. The medical officer also reported that he was inclined to think it improbable that the appendicitis was the result of the injury, although the injury may have aggravated the already diseased appendix. He further stated that the man had had chronic appendicitis for two or three years. It was held under such circumstances that the injury aggravated the old disease and compensation was awarded. Re August Pohl, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 185. The claimant stumbled and fell across a manhole on the ship "Chattanooga" and the attending physician certified that he was immediately thereafter incapacitated on account of a fractured rib, with considerable bruises and contusions of the back. After compensation had been awarded for six months the man complained of pain over the lower ribs and Acceleration or aggravation of pre-existing disease over the heart, with shortness of breath. The attending physician certified that "it would be difficult to state definitely how much the symptoms due to organic heart disease had been aggravated by the fall which he sustained. He is a heavy man, and the concussion must have been considerable. He will never be in condition to perform any hard labor. Denies rheumatism as a cause for heart disease." It was held that as the man apparently had organic heart disease and that it was probable that this condition was aggravated by the severe fall which the claimant sustained, that he was entitled to further compensation. Re William Bunce, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 186. Where it appeared that an employé had been engaged in work for the Canal Commission two and one half years when he met with an accident and was thereafter operated on for hernia, and he stated that he had never had a hernia before, but the physician in the hospital stated that he found an old hernia, it was held that the employé was entitled to compensation as having received an injury in the course of his employment, which aggravated his old ailment. Re Augustin Miro, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 594; s. c. p. 595. As a result of an accident in 1902, a rivetter had the index finger of his right hand amputated. He returned to work with his old employers, not as a rivetter, the rivetter's hammer being too heavy for him, but as a caulker, at the same wages. He worked at this for seven years without difficulty, using a light hammer. In November, 1910, a pneumatic hammer was adopted for caulking, and after working with this for a few days his hand became inflamed and he had to stop work. The direct cause of the inflammation was a piece of dead or diseased bone which was discovered in 1910, but this diseased bone was some distance from the point of amputation, and as the court found, quite unconnected with the effects of the accident. The County judge found that the accident was a contributory cause of the present incapacity, and awarded compensation. The Court of Appeal, however, |