Coil v. State. and since he was passed the state has been required to exercise two of its peremptories." The court overruled the challenge, to which ruling defendant duly excepted, and assigned the ruling as one of his grounds for a new trial. The ruling, it is argued, is error with prejudice to the defendant. Whether the court erred in overruling the challenge is dependent on the question of the defendant having waived or lost the right to challenge the juror for cause when he was examined on his voir-dire examination and passed without objection being raised as to his qualification to sit in the trial of the cause. The right of a defendant to challenge a juror in either a civil or criminal cause, on the ground that he has been summoned and served as such in the same court within the two preceding years, must be conceded without discussion. The right is given by statute, has been confirmed by the decisions of this court and is held to extend to those who have been called to serve as talesman as well as those summoned on the regular panel. Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 665; Criminal Code, sec. 468; Northeastern N. R. Co. v. Frazier, 25 Nebr., 42, 48; Wiseman v. Bruns, 36 Nebr., 467, 468. A defendant may waive his right to interpose challenge on the ground stated, and will be held to have absolutely waived the right unless the objection is presented before the jury is sworn. This is made so by statute. Whether he will be deemed to have waived the right or allowed to interpose a challenge after he has examined and passed a juror for cause must, we think, rest upon the circumstances of each particular case and to a degree rests unquestionably in the sound discretion of the trial court. The proceedings being under the control and direction of the court, an orderly presentation of all matters for consideration and action requires that the successive steps be taken one after the other in regular order until the cause is finally disposed of, and that when one stage of the case has been passed it be not gone over again, except for sufficient reason. If a challenge for cause is not presented in apt time, or if a party has Coil v. State. been lacking in diligence in discovering the causes for challenge, it would seem very proper to hold him to have lost the right when subsequent to the proper time a challenge is sought to be interposed. It is quite probable also that the nature of the objection to the juror may have some bearing in determining the propriety of a ruling disallowing it. If a juror is manifestly unfair, or is dis qualified for reasons which would ordinarily influence his conduct as a juror to the prejudice of one of the parties, by all means the utmost latitude consistent with regularity of proceedings should be given to a challenge for cause, in order that a fair and impartial jury may be secured. Where the ground of objection is more technical than substantial, the reason for relaxing the method of procedure is not so cogent. Ordinarily it is said “the ruling of a trial court in deciding a challenge for cause will not be disturbed, unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Whether the facts and circumstances in the case at bar render the overruling of the challenge proper or the reverse, must be answered by an examination of the record to ascertain whether sufficient cause existed or is shown for the interposition of the challenge after the juror had been passed and the parties were engaged in the exercise of their right to challenge peremptorily the number allowed by statute of those called to sit in the case. The error alleged will not be presumed. Before the defendant can rightfully claim a reversal on the ground advanced, it is incumbent upon him to present a record from which it appears affirmatively that the court erred. and abused its discretion in regard to the ruling complained of. This is an elementary rule of practice in the review of proceedings, both civil and criminal in their nature. As presented in the record before us, we are wholly unable to ascertain therefrom the reason why the defendant's counsel did not interpose the challenge at the time the opportunity arose and the examination of the juror as to his qualifications was engaged in. Whether he had knowledge of a cause existing for a Coil v. State. challenge or made any reasonable effort to inform himself or omitted to inquire regarding the matter through caprice or for some unknown purpose does not appear. Nor did he offer any explanation or advance any reason why the challenge was not sooner and in more appropriate time interposed. In the absence of any showing of diligence or explanation of a reason for not making the objection in apt time and before passing the juror for cause, and in view of the presumption of the correctness of the ruling of the trial court, the question, perhaps, should be disposed of on the proposition that error and abuse of discretion is not made to appear affirmatively by the record before us. We do not, however, directly decide the point, because the defendant has failed to present us a properly authenticated record which can avail him as a bill of exceptions containing the evidence and the rulings of the court relating to the impaneling of the jury and their voir-dire examination, by which their qualifications to try the issue may be determined. In Durfee v. State, 53 Nebr., 214, it is held in the second paragraph of the syllabus: "The certificate of the trial judge to a bill of exceptions that the foregoing is all the evidence offered by either party on the trial of the cause' is not sufficient to embrace the voir-dire examination of a juror, or the evidence adduced on the hearing of a challenge to the whole panel or array of jurors." Says NORVAL, J., in the opinion, in speaking of this form of the certificate: "This is insufficient to show that the bill of exceptions contained either the testimony on the hearing of the challenge to the panel, or the voir-dire examination of the jurors. Those matters did not occur during, but preceded, the trial." The rule thus announced was reiterated in the case of Dinsmore v. State, supra, very recently decided by this court. In the present case the certificate of the trial judge settling the bill of exceptions is as follows: "Now, I, the said judge, do hereby certify that this bill of exceptions contains all the testimony adduced or offered by the plaintiff and defendant on the trial of said Coil v. State. cause, all of the objections to the admission of testimony, all the rulings of the court on such objections, and all of the exceptions taken to such rulings at the time," etc. The certificate does not embrace the proceedings had and taken in impaneling the jury to try the case, and its insufliciency becomes at once obvious under the rule announced. Numerous objections are urged to the admission and rejection of certain of the evidence received and offered in the trial of the cause, some of which will be noted. Regarding much of the evidence received, to which objections are made and argued in this court, we find that when offered and during the trial no objections were of fered or exceptions taken; and it is now too late to have the same properly presented for review. As to all such we have not taken the time to examine the evidence or the grounds of objections. A witness, Anna E. Rhyan, was allowed to testify as to statements made by the defendant to her while he was confined in the county jail awaiting trial. The sheriff was also present and gave testimony regarding the same statements. It is contended that the statements should be regarded as made under coercion and that no sufficient foundation was laid, inasmuch as it is not shown that the defendant knew or was told that the statements would be used against him. The objection is not well grounded. It is clearly shown that the statements were entirely voluntarily made and without inducement of hope of reward or fear of punishment. It is not required that he be informed that the statements would be used against him. Declarations or admissions against interest would be of little or no practical value if it were necessary to advise those making them that the statements could be used against them, before being admissible as evidence. Objection is also made because the testimony of a witness was excluded as to alleged threats made by the deceased and coming to the knowledge of the defendant, on Coil v. State. the ground that no proper foundation had been laid. The witness was re-called later on and testified regarding the same statements first inquired about, which cured any error, if any existed by reason of the ruling complained of. Other similar objections are presented for consideraiton, but we find in them nothing prejudicing the substantial rights of the defendant. He has no meritorious ground of complaint on account of the admission or rejection of the evidence offered during the trial of the cause. The defendant justified the homicide, which was admitted, on the ground of self-defense. On this point, by the 16th instruction, the jury were told: "The jury are instructed that in this case the defendant sets up the plea of necessary self-defense. The rule of law on the subject of self-defense is this: Where a man in the lawful pursuit of his business is attacked, and where from the nature of the attack there is reasonable ground to believe that there is a design to take his life, or to do him great bodily harm, and the party attacked does so believe, then the shooting of the assailant under such circumstances will be excusable or justifiable although it should afterwards appear that no injury was intended, and no real danger existed. The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence and believe that at the time the defendant is alleged to have shot said Thomas E. Rhyan, the circumstances surrounding the defendant were such as in sound reason would justify or induce in his mind an honest belief that he was in danger of receiving from the said Thomas E. Rhyan great bodily harm, and that the defendant in doing what he then did was acting from instinct of self-preservation, then he is not guilty although there may in fact have been no real or actual danger." An exception was taken to this instruction and it is here argued that because of the language, “as in sound reason," the instruction is erroneous; that the word "sound" when applied to the word "reason," as a |