growing out of it, or to relieve himself from the consequences of his own illegal act. Whether the form of the action is in contract or in tort, the test in each case is, whether, when all the facts are disclosed, the action appears to be founded in a violation of law, in which the plaintiff has taken part. We have had occasion, while the present case has been under advisement, to consider this test as applied to actions upon contracts made on the Lord's day. Cranson v. Goss, post, 439. And our books afford several illustrations of its application to actions of tort. A person, for instance, who travels on Sunday in violation of the Lord's day act, cannot maintain an action against a town for a defect in the highway, or against the proprietors of a street railway, in whose cars he is a passenger, for an injury to himself from their negligence, because his own fault in illegally traveling on the Lord's day necessarily contributes to the injury. Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Metc. 363; Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen, 18; Stanton v. Metropolitan Railway Co., 14 id. 485. So no action can be maintained for a deceit practiced in an exchange of horses on the Lord's day, because the plaintiff cannot prove the deceit without showing the terms of the illegal contract in which he participated. Robeson v. French, 12 Metc. 24. But the fact that the owner of property has acted or is acting unlawfully in regard to it is no bar to a suit by him against a wrong-doer, to whose wrongful act the plaintiff's own illegal conduct has not contributed. Thus an action lies against one who takes and appropriates to his own use property kept by the plaintiff in violation of a statute, and therefore liable to be destroyed. Cummings v. Perham, 1 Metc. 555; Ewings v. Walker, 9 Gray, 95."

In McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116, the plaintiff was injured by insufficiency in the highway while traveling on a Sunday to visit his children, who were living away from home. The court held that the travel was necessary, and therefore within the exception of the statute, and that the defendant was liable. The court gave no intimation as to whether the plaintiff could have recovered had the journey been unlawful.

Within the last two or three years, there has been some discussion as to whether shaving by a barber on Sunday was a work of necessity within the meaning of the usual exceptions in Sunday laws, but in Commonwealth v. Jacobus, 1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. Rep. 491, it was decided not to be a work of necessity, and therefore unlawful.

A Washington dispatch says Justice Hunt of the supreme court will preside over the circuit court of Connecticut, which will meet at Hartford on the 15th inst. The suit against the Union Pacific railroad and credit mobilier will be argued on both sides. It is not definitely decided whether Attorney-General Williams will attend in person to represent the government in connection with Messrs. Perry, Ashton and Jencks, government counsel, but it is quite probable that he will do so.

CONCERNING NAMES.

Lord Coke said "a man may have divers names at divers times, but not divers christian names;" and again "regularly it is requisite, that the purchaser be named by the name of baptism; for that a man cannot have two names of baptism as he may have divers surnames." Co. Litt. 3 a. This doctrine was extended unduly in 1 Lord Raymond, 562, where a woman was indicted by the name of Elizabeth Newman alias Judith Hancock, for keeping a bawdy house, and the indictment was quashed "because a woman cannot have two christian names." It is and has been quite the custom for parents to cumber their offspring with double or even treble christian names, and there is a popular notion that all these names, either in full or in initial, are essential to a legal descriptio personis. But such is far from being the fact. That the law knows but one christian name, and that the omission of a middle name or initial is of no possible importance, has been long settled in this and most of the other States. Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns. 84; Roosevelt v. Gardenier, 2 Cow. 463; Van Voorhis v. Budd, 39 Barb. 479; Gotobed's Case, 6 City Hall Rec. 25; Milk v. Christie, 1 Hill, 102; Edmonston v. The State, 17 Ala. 179; McKay v. Spick, 1 Texas, 376; State v. Martin, 10 Miss. 391.

In the first of these cases the plaintiff in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit declared by the name of William Robinson, and the deed under which he claimed title to the locus in quo was to William T. Robinson; the variance was held immaterial. In the second case, in entitling an order staying proceedings the initials "V. S." were omitted from the name of the plaintiff, Cornelius V. S. Roosevelt, but the court held the order to be properly entitled. Gotobed's case was an indictment for forgery- the name forged and set forth in the indictment being "John Wardell"— and the jury were authorized to find that it was intended to forge the name of one John N. Wardell.

In Van Voorhis v. Budd a tax was assessed upon the roll to Henry D. Van Voorhis, while the name of the person intended was William H. Van Voorhis, although he was also known in his town as Henry Van Voorhis; held, that the description was sufficient.

The Massachusetts courts, however, hold that a double baptismal name, as James Edward, is, in fact, but one christian name, and essential to a proper description of the person. Thus Thomas Hopkins Perkins was indicted as Thomas Perkins, and the indictment was quashed therefor. Commonwealth v. Perkins, 1 Pick. 388. So Charles Jones Hall was enrolled in the militia as Charles Hall, and it was held that he was not duly enrolled. Commonwealth v. Hall, 3 Pick. 262. So where property was in a complaint alleged to belong to Nathan S. Hoard, and the proof was that it belonged to Nathan Hoard, the court held the variance fatal. These decisions are not based on authority.

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That "junior or "senior" is no essential part of a name, was held in People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549; Commonwealth v. Perkins, supra; Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige; Fleet v. Youngs, 11 Wend. 522; Kincaid v. Howe, 10 Mass. 203; Hadley v. Shaw, 39 Ill. 354.

Although the statutes (Laws 1847, chap. 464, as amended 1860, chap. 80) make provisions for changing names by an order of a county court, there appears to be nothing in the law to prohibit a man from taking another name if he so desires. "A name," said Chief Justice Abbott in Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ald. 544, "assumed by the voluntary act of a young man at his outset into life, adopted by all who know him and by which he is constantly called, becomes, for all purposes that occur to my mind, as much and effectually his name as if he had obtained an act of parliament to confer it upon him." And in The Matter of Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, Chief Judge Daly, in an opinion filled with curious and valuable information, held that a man was at liberty to assume another name without the interposition of the court. The practice of having a name changed by or in pursuance of a statute is thought to have arisen from the difficulty of changing one's name where one is known, without the interposition of a power which people are accustomed to respect.

It is very obvious from the earlier books that surnames were, anciently, little regarded, the baptismal name being considered the chief index of identity. "Special heed," said Lord Coke, "is to be taken of the name of baptism," and Chief Justice Popham in Britton v. Wrightman, Poph. 56, speaking of grants, declared that "the law is not precise in the case of surnames, but for the christian name this ought always to be perfect." In fact the origin of the term surname super nomen, or name over or added (Trench, Study of Words), indicates the slight office it filled in the descriptio personis. But the surnames, from their great variety and from the constant repetition of christian names, have become the most certain mark of identity.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Mr. George Ticknor Curtis has recently published a letter, giving some interesting facts in regard to the anxiety of the late Chief Justice Chase, while Secretary of the Treasury, to have the legal tender act sustained by the courts. The legal tender question came before the court of appeals in June, 1863, in a proceeding instituted in the name of the people of the State, to compel a State bank to redeem its bills in specie. The bank pleaded the legal tender act as an excuse for paying its bills in "greenbacks." Mr. Curtis appeared as counsel for the people. He says: "Before going into court on the morning of the day set apart for the argument, Mr. David Dudley Field came to my room and informed me that he and Mr. Foote had been retained by the secretary of the

treasury to intervene and be heard on behalf of the United States in support of the legal tender act. I was aware that I already had to meet a powerful body of antagonists-the late Mr. Noyes, Judge Porter, Mr. Tremain and others who had been retained by some of the banks in this city to argue in support of the law. I did not, however, so much care what number of opponents I might have to meet (for I felt strong in the truth of my position) as I did object to an interference by the United States in a proceeding between the State and one of its own corporations. I told Mr. Field that I could not, standing in the place of the attorney-general and for the time being representing the people, consent to such an intervention, but that he must apply to the chief justice. He said he should do so, at the same time handing me his own and Mr. Foote's briefs, signed by them as counsel for the United States. I thought this a very strange undertaking. I was relieved, however, of all necessity for opposing it, for when Mr. Field spoke to the chief justice (the late Judge Denio) he was told that such an intervention could not be allowed. Mr. Field and Mr. Foote then struck from their briefs the words "counsel for the United States," and at the close of the argument they were handed me as submitted by them in the capacity of amici curiæ. These gentlemen were not heard orally in the case."

There is a disposition on the part of some of the newspapers to charge the late Chief Justice with inconsistency in regard to the legal tender act; but the charge is based on some rather extraordinary theories. Admitting that as secretary his personal opinion was in favor of the validity of the legal tender act, it is not probable that that opinion was founded upon a thorough examination of the subject. When he came as judge to hear it discussed by counsel, and to examine it in its broadest relations, it was certainly not strange nor inconsistent that his opinion changed. It is not a very unusual thing to find in the books cases where judges have overruled their own previous decisions, and no one has thought of charging them with inconsistency; much less ought a man to be so charged whose opinion as a Chief Justice differed from that entertained by him in the function of a Secretary of the Treasury.

Judge-Advocate General Holt has found it necessary to publish a statement defending himself from the charge of having withheld from the President the recommendation of the court which tried Mrs. Surratt, that the sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life. The statement shows very clearly, by letters from those most likely to know, that the recommendation of the court was made known to the President at the time that the record of the trial was presented to him, and was fully considered by him and his advisers before the execution.

The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal calls attention to the worthlessness of the so called expert evidence on the recent trial of Wagner for the Isle of Shoals murder. Blood stains were found upon Wagner's clothes, which he accounted for by saying that he had been dressing fish and had gotten the fish blood on his clothes. The expert for the prosecution swore that the stains were produced by human blood, while the expert on the part of the defense swore as positively that it was impossible to tell whether the stains were caused by fish blood or human blood. Expert evidence has never been very highly regarded by the courts, although juries seem to look upon it as infallible, and until some change is made in the method of securing expert witnesses the court ought to especially point out to the jury the fallibility of such

evidence.

Judge Drummond, of the United States circuit court of Illinois, is a very strict constructionist, so far as relates to the bankrupt act. In a recent case, in re Wilson, he held that the non-payment by a merchant or trader for fourteen days without legal excuse, of a single piece of commercial paper, is an act of bankruptcy, and that the defaulter cannot prevent a decree in bankruptcy against him by proving that he is and has been perfectly solvent. Judge Drummond gives his opinion of the purpose of the bankrupt law as follows: "One of the very objects of the bankrupt law was to compel merchants to pay their commercial paper as it fell due, by holding over them the consequences of its non-payment, if continued for fourteen days." We are aware that the bankrupt act is too generally looked upon as a mere collecting engine, but such is not the legitimate purpose of such a law, nor do we believe it was one of the objects of the existing act, that suspension of payment for fourteen days, on even one piece of paper, is prima facie an act of bankruptcy may well be, although we believe the current of authority is to the effect that "suspension of payment" means a general suspension, but when the alleged bankrupt established his solvency and the suspension of payment is not general, his creditor should be left to the ordinary proceedings for redress.

TRIBUNALS OF COMMERCE AS THEY EXIST IN FRANCE.

There appearing to be a serious intention on the part of some commercial men to attempt to carry out a plan for the establishment of tribunals of commerce, which, we must assume, the house of commons is to be asked to ratify, it has occurred to us that it will be worth while to see how these tribunals have worked on the continent; and our readers, as well as their clients, may find it interesting to study with us, in the company of an experienced avocat of Paris, their organization, and the procedure which is adopted in them. Before speaking, however, of the tribunals of commerce, it is necessary to say something on the system of legal administration in France. The decisions of

the tribunals and of the courts do not make the law; so that ten tribunals may deliver ten different and conflicting decisions upon the same question. A court which decides a question one way to-day may, in a couple of days, decide it another way; the result being that judicial decisions are simply useful as records, but cannot, as in England, modify or affect the law.

There are in France three degrees of jurisdiction(1) The tribunals of first instance, (2) the courts of appeal, and (3) the court of cassation. The tribunals of first instance have a jurisdiction from which there is no appeal in cases under £60; while, in cases in which an appeal lies to the courts, they have jurisdiction in all matters, whatever the amount involved. The courts of appeal decide all appeals brought from the courts of first instance. The court of cassation reverses or confirms the decisions of the courts of appeal, and also of the courts of first instance where the amount is under £60, and there is no appeal to the courts, and also where the time for appeal to the courts has expired. This court deals only with questions of law, that is to say, the interpretation of the law, and does not decide questions of fact, the court having been constituted solely for the purpose of securing the due administration of the law.

The tribunals of first instance are of three kinds, magistrates' courts (les justices de paix), the civil tribunals of first instance, and tribunals of commerce. The first named are presided over by a single judge. They decide causes up to £4, without appeal, and, subject to appeal, their jurisdiction is limited to £8, and certain matters which are specially assigned to them. Appeals from these courts lie to the tribunals of first instance, and not to the courts of appeal. The parties conduct their own causes. Solicitors and barristers do not practice in these courts, but they can advise their clients, or represent them as their agents, but not professionally. The procedure is very simple, consisting of a summons delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, the parties are heard, and the judge gives judgment. The costs, consequently, are trifling. The judges of these courts are chosen from the most experienced lawyers without restriction, and their appointments are revocable. The civil tribunals of first instance are composed of a president and two other judges, appointed by the government, and selected exclusively from the bar, that is to say, they must have the diploma of a licentiate in law, and they are appointed for life. Associated with each court of first instance are at least two officers, the procureur de la république and his deputy, whose duty it is, after the advocates on either side have closed their case, to take part in the determination of all matters of legal or public interest. These officers must be barristers, and their appointments are temporary. The number of the judges and of the substitutes of the procureur for each court is fixed by law according to the requirements of the population. There is one court for each arrondissement. Practicing in each tribunal are solicitors and barristers, who alone are heard. The costs of the smallest matter reach £5 or £6, and, in important cases, they amount to £80 or £100, exclusive of fees to barristers, who are paid according to the nature of the case, the wealth of the client, and particularly the reputation of the barrister.

The courts of appeal are composed of a chief (Premier Président), a president and nine councillors, all barristers of high position, who are salaried and appointed for life. Attached to every court of appeal is