dence was justified in the earlier cases, and the actual character of the evidence which is in fact now admitted to prove trade usages in mercantile cases. The kind of evidence which, within the experience of every one who has been frequently at Guildhall, is constantly given in mercantile cases of trade usage, is certainly somewhat calculated to clash with the original idea that the evidence of the custom was admissible, because the custom was so well ascertained and almost universal that every one making a contract with reference to the particular business might be presumed to have intended that it should apply. Such evidence is very frequently of a loose and inaccurate character, and sometimes even conflicting and contradictory. It expresses sometimes, what mercantile men, engaged in a particular kind of business, consider to be right as between persons engaged in business, a sort of trade equity in fact. If in two or three instances within their own experience the witnesses have seen the particular course followed, this is sufficient ground, in their estimation, for proving that some vague, ill-defined fluctuating sort of custom exists in the trade in relation to the matter. Frequently, too, it may be suspected that the evidence of mercantile men in respect of trade customs, such as those, for instance, by which an agent may be made personally liable as principal, merely expresses a layman's confused and imperfect notion of the law in relation to the particular subject-matter. Take again the cases with relation to contracts on the stock exchange. More wonderful examples of the uncertainty of trade customs could hardly be imagined. Of course contracts may be inaccurately and ambiguously expressed or complicated if written, and it may be difficult, on the facts, to say exactly what the contract between the parties is, if the contract be unwritten; and so where the question depends on the construction of the written contract that the parties have made for themselves or the effect of the words and acts of the parties, it may well be expected that there should be doubts and differences in the minds of the judges; the ambiguity is of the parties' own creating. But the practice by which a custom is imported into a written contract, or as against a party not, in truth, cognizant of the custom, would appear to be based on the notion that there is some certain definite custom, the limits and conditions of which are capable of being accurately expressed in words, whereas the spectacle presented by these decisions is that of judges not merely determining whether a custom definitely and distinctly put before them can or cannot legally be imported into a contract, but endeavoring, not without much doubt and difficulty, and even disagreement, to determine what the custom put forward really is.

An important question has frequently been mooted but we imagine never finally settled, with reference to trade usages, viz.: the question whether it is necessary as a matter of law that a usage should be reasonable in order to be imported into a contract as against a person employing an agent to contract, or contracting himself with relation to a particular business, such person being ignorant of the existence of any such usage. The unreasonableness of any alleged usage may be a strong ground for coming to the conclusion that it does not exist in point of fact, which the jury, or the judges in deciding whether a verdict is against evidence, are entitled to take into consideration, but assuming that the usage, though unreasonable, is proved to exist, i. e., to be the constant established

practice of a particular trade, it is somewhat difficult to see why it should not be imported into the contract according to the ordinary rules on the subject. The ground of importing such usages is the notion that being well known to all the persons dealing in a particular way of business, and not being excluded by the contract, the parties must be taken to have meant to contract with reference to them according to the ordinary practice, and a person entering into a transaction in such a line of business, or empowering some one else to do so for him, must be taken to know of their existence. If the practice be well established as a fact, how does its reasonableness or unreasonableness affect the application of this principle? Why should its unreasonableness or reasonableness affect the presumption of knowledge on the part of the contracting party, which is based on the generality of the usage, not its reasonableness? It is clear if two parties contracted, knowing the custom, even though unreasonable, they would be bound by it. On the other hand, there is manifestly a certain injustice in affecting a person with knowledge of an unreasonable custom of which he was really ignorant. The custom may be an unreasonable one in the interest of the party not belonging to the particular trade, but strongly for the interest of the person belonging to it, and to allow such a custom to be imported is obviously to deliver over laymen to the mercy of such rules as brokers and other mercantile men may establish for their own convenience and profit.

The truth is that the implication of the usage against the party ignorant of it is somewhat in the nature of an estoppel. There is no real aggregatio mentium in the case as to the usage, but the principle must be that the contracting party is bound to consider the probability that there are certain established practices and customs in a business, and if he does not make himself acquainted with them, but goes into the market and contracts with some one in the trade, he induces that party to suppose that he is contracting according to the ordinary modes of doing business. But all estoppels depend very much on equitable considerations drawn from the conduct of both parties. It may be said that the laymen is not bound to expect that there are unreasonable usages connected with any trade; and the man of business, in contracting, is not entitled to assume that the layman is acquainted with or supposes himself to be contracting on the terms of an unreasonable usage. It would seem, on the whole, that the latter is the most expedient view, but the question is, as a matter of principle, not without difficulty. Solicitors' Journal.

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BOOK NOTICES.

A Treatise on the Law of Pleading in Civil Actions under the New York Code of Procedure. By George Van Santvoord, Counselor at Law. New edition enlarged and corrected, by Nathaniel C. Moak, Counselor at Law. John D. Parsons, Jr., Albany, 1873.

New York was the pioneer State in the adoption of a Code of Procedure. Mr. Van Santvoord's volume was the pioneer upon the system of pleading thus adopted, and with the exception of a recent work published in California, was the only work worthy the appellation of a treatise upon that system of pleading. The second and last edition of Mr. Van Santvoord's Pleading was published in 1855, since which the crudities of the earlier decisions under the Code have been elimi

nated by the courts. The publisher wisely selected Mr. Moak, one of the most laborious and accurate practitioners in the State, as the editor of another edition worthy of the author and the time. It has been announced for some four years, during which time we have heard many complaints of the delay. Now that it has made its appearance, we have heard but one opinion and that is that the delay was justified, by the excellence of the edition. In the first place it is an honest book of 1,060 pages, without a particle of jockeying and devoid of booksellers' tricks and devices. The entire work has been thoroughly revised and brought down to the present time. Almost every page of the original bears evidence of Mr. Moak's industry and learning. He has, in addition to the corrections and additions so made, added 200 pages of new matter upon the law of different causes of action, which contain as much valuable matter for the practitioner and student as any 200 pages of matter we ever read. Each subject has at the commencement an elaborate citation of the text-books which treat thereon, for the use of students, which will prove of equal value to the practicing lawyer. There are also some 50 pages upon the law of the various defenses, and an addenda of 50 pages, bringing down the work to the moment the index went to press. The index is one of the best we ever saw. The work will unquestionably become one of standard authority with the courts and prove of great value not only to the pleader but to court and counsel at nisi prius.

We are unable, within the space allowed for review, to speak of the work with more detail, but advise our readers to examine it and judge for themselves.

Hubbell's Legal Directory for lawyers and business men. J. H. Hubbell & Co.: New York, 1873.

The

The directory purports to contain a list of reliable attorneys throughout the United States and Canada, a synopsis of the laws relating to the collection of debts, execution and acknowledgment of deeds, taking of depositions, times for holding courts and other information useful to lawyers and business men. synopsis of the laws of each State has been prepared by a lawyer of the State, and is therefore presumptively correct. The synopsis of the laws of this State is, with two or three exceptions of no particular importance, accurate. Mr. Orlando F. Bump has given also a synopsis of the bankrupt law.

The work will prove useful for reference, especially to lawyers engaged in the collection business.

Cases argued and determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, by Josiah H. Bissell, of the Chicago Bar Official Reporter. Vol. 1, 1851-1867. Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1873. This volume is the first of a series designed to contain the more important decisions of the district and circuit court for the seventh judicial district since the time of McLean's Reports. The seventh judicial district embraces Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, three of the most prosperous of the western States, and in which are continually arising important questions of commercial, maritime and real estate law. The present volume contains an unusual number of admiralty and patent cases and a large number of cases relating to real estate and to carriers. The cases are excellently reported and Mr. Bissell has added some notes of considerable value.

BOOK NOTES.

Judah P. Benjamin, of confederate fame, has recently published in England a treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property. - -The third volume of Phillimore's Commentaries upon International Law has been published. -The English government has donated to the State library of this State a complete set, handsomely bound, of the English case, papers, documents, arguments, etc., before the Geneva arbitration. - Professor Washburne is engaged upon a new edition of his very amiable treatise of Easements and Servitudes.

LEGAL NEWS.

The librarian of congress has issued 9,560 certificates of copyright since January 1st.

Ex-Judge Coke, of Waco county, Texas, has been nominated for governor of that State by the democrats.

Judge Stanley Matthews who has been dangerously ill at Glendale, Ohio, is recovering.

The governor of Indiana has appointed Francis Wilson, Esq., judge of the tenth judicial circuit court, vice Carleton, resigned.

The London Cosmopolitan indulges in the hope of seeing Judah P. Benjamin, lord chief justice of England.

Colonel John S. Mosby, the Confederate guerilla, will resume the practice of the law at Richmond this winter.

According to the Cincinnati Commercial the president has strong inclinations to appoint Mr. Stanley Matthews, of Ohio, to the chief justiceship of the United States supreme court.

The committee on the revision of the laws of the United States will hold a meeting in Washington this month, to examine the work of the sub-committee to revise the labors of the commission.

Hon. D. Rings, the first chief justice of Arkansas, and for twelve years United States judge of the eastern district of Arkansas, died at Little Rock on the 3d, aged seventy-five years.

The attorney-general has received the resignation of United States Marshal Patrick, of Utah, to take effect on October 1st. The president has already determined upon a successor, but the commission will not be issued till the latter part of this month.

Judge T. S. Crawford and District Attorney Arthur H. Harris, of the twelfth Louisiana judicial district, were assassinated on the 8th inst., twelve miles southwest of Winnesboro, in Franklin Parish, while on their way to hold court at that place.

Judge Ashur Ware, formerly of the United States district court for forty-four years, died in Portland, Me., Wednesday, aged ninety-one years and seven months. He was noted for his decisions in maritime cases. He was born in Sherburne, Mass., and graduated at Harvard in 1800. He was afterward tutor of Greek in the College, and finally removed to Portland, and edited the Eastern Argus for several years.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1873.

WIVES OF GREAT LAWYERS. Lawyers have the reputation of being a shrewd, practical class of men, devoid of romance or impulsiveness, and of keeping their eyes always on the "main chance," even in the selection of wives. However this may be, it would seem from the biographies of those lawyers who have been so fortunate as to have a "Boswell," that a majority of them chose heiresses or rich widows.

Sir Thomas More seems to have chosen his wife from considerations of compassion, for while loving her younger sister, "yet when he thought within himself that it would be a grief and some blemish to the eldest to have the younger sister preferred before her, he out of a kind of compassion, settled his fancy upon the eldest, and soon after married her with all his friends' good liking." The union was a happy one, though of brief duration, the wife dying. More soon after married again, taking this time a widow named Alice Middleton, neither young nor comely nor well-informed, or as More used himself to say, "nec bella nec puella." Sir Thomas was not so fortunate this time, as the dame was possessed of a rather

band, and too old to make so apt and docile a pupil as was the first wife. But one cannot help believing that she did her best, on the assurance of Erasmus that she was prevailed upon "to take lessons on the lute, the cithara, the viol, the monochord and the flute, which she daily practised."

It is a notorious fact, that those rival lights of the law-Bacon and Coke-were also rivals for the hand of the rich, lovely and capricious widow of Sir William Hatton. Bacon was young and handsome, but without fortune or practice, while Coke was an ungainly, peevish, middle-aged widower, but rich, and the attorney-general. Coke had the misfortune to win, the widow consenting to marry him, on condition that the marriage should be private, and without license or publication of banns. They were so married, and only escaped excommunication by humbly suing for pardon, and pleading ignorance of the law in excuse of their behavior. This was, probably, the only case in which Coke regarded such a plea as good.

The marriage turned out to be a most unfortunate one, the woman being a regular termagant. Coke found her so stormy a partner, that he spent most of his life in his chambers among his books and papers, a fact, by the way, that there has been no occasion to regret, as he might have failed to accomplish much of his most valuable labor had his home been pleasant. Lady Hatton — a name which she persisted is retaining after her marriage-was in the habit of giving masques and balls, to which, by her express commands, neither Sir Edward nor any of his servants were admitted.

Bacon found consolation for the loss of the fair widow, in the rich and handsome Alice Barnham, whom he married soon after; but the marriage was hardly more fortunate than that of Lord Coke, as they lived unhappily and finally separated "for great and just causes," as he expressed it, a little time before his death.

Philip Yorke, who afterward became for many years the holder of the seals, and the father of a Lord Chancellor, married when a young and rising lawyer, a beautiful and wealthy young widow named Lygon, whom he first met at the house of Sir Joseph Jekyll, Master of the Rolls. The widow's father disdained the overtures of the humble lawyer, until Sir Joseph interposed in his behalf. Having won and married the lady, Mr. Philip Yorke took her home to "a very small house," near Lincoln's Inn, the ground floor of which he used for his office.

Hyde, Lord Clarendon was one of the few great lawyers who married for love. His wife was the daughter of a Wiltshire gentleman of good family but small fortune. She died only six months after the marriage, and Hyde was so inconsolable for some time, that he was prevented from throwing up his profession only by the urgency of his friends. Some years after, he married again, his wife being the daughter of Sir Thomas Aylesbury, Master of the Mint, and a most amiable and lovely woman. was the cheerful companion of his exile and sharer of his privations - privations so great, that he wrote to a friend: "All our money is gone, and let me never prosper if I know or can imagine how we can get bread a month longer. I have not, for my life, been able to supply the miserable distress of my poor wife."

She

Francis North, afterward Lord-keeper Guilford, went about marrying in a business-like way. He was a reader at Lincoln's Inn, but much desired to wed, because he had "grown tired of dining in the hall, and eating a cotelet and salad at Chateline's in the evening with a friend." Besides, he wished to mend his fortune in the most summary way. He first tried a rich, coquettish young widow, but she jilted him. Then he found out an alderman who was reputed to be rich, and had three marriageable daughters with

a fortune of £6,000 each. He made his approaches, was favorably received, and proceeded to broach the money question to the alderman. The sum named as the young lady's portion was £5,000; but as North had set his heart on the £6,000, he was disappointed, and at once took his leave. The alderman, running after him (at least so relates Lord Campbell), offered him to boot £500 on the birth of the first child. But North would not take a penny under the sum he had fixed upon, and the match fell through. At last he found a lady with £14,000, one of the daughters of the Earl of Devon, whom he courted in a business style, and ultimately married.

Judge Jeffries, when a dissolute youth, courted an heiress, and in spite of her father's interdict, the young lady encouraged Jeffries and corresponded with him. An elopement was planned

which for some reason failed. Jeffries was waiting in the temple for the letter which should inform him that all was ready for the escapade, when word was brought to him by a young lady - the child of a poor clergyman - who had been the confidential friend and paid companion of his intended wife that the elopement was impossible and the marriage forbidden. The case was a hard one for the messenger, for the father, enraged at her connivance in the plot, turned her from his doors, and she had come to London, penniless and troubled to report the disaster and to seek employment. Jeffries was touched with compassion at her pitiful plight, and married her off-hand. Perhaps his marrying her under such circumstances, was the one generous act of that infamous man's life. She made him an excellent wife while she lived, but before she died Jeffries was already courting another wife, and married her three months after; and in about three months after that, his new wife presented him with certain marital fruits rather prematurely. This woman caused much scandal during her life, and seems to have been as great a disgrace to the domestic conditions of life as her husband was to the bench he occupied.

Neither Lord Somers nor Lord Thurlow were married both having been disappointed in attachments in their younger years. The latter proposed to a young Lincolnshire lady, a Miss Gouch, but she protested "she would not have him—she was positively afraid of him;" so he foreswore matrimony thence forward. We do not remember any other of the lord chancellors who have led a single life.

The story of the elopement and marriage of Jack Scott-afterward Lord Eldon - and pretty Bessie Surtees, is too well known to bear repetition. Lord Stowell, Eldon's brother, married a widow of title, whom he first met while presiding at the trial of her son for forgery. The paternal manner in which the judge addressed the young man on sentencing him touched the mother's heart, and she wrote the judge a note in which she expressed the wish that her son might always have such sage counsels to guide him.

Sergeant Hill, on the morning appointed for his marriage with a wealthy heiress, forgot, amid his business cares, his most important engagement, until his friends came and carried him off to the church, where his bride had been awaiting him above an hour. The ceremony over, he hastened back to his chambers to resume the suspended consultation.

We do not doubt that an interesting chapter might be written about the wives of some of the great lawyers of this country, but as we have not the material at hand, we shall not at present undertake it.

THE MACHINERY OF LAW-MAKING. One of the most serious evils in connection with our American legislation, is the lack of any thing like system or science in the drafting of bills, especially on important subjects. To say nothing of the numerous instances of verbal inaccuracy, and of obscure construction the statute books each year illustrate too frequently the fact that laws are enacted in total disregard or ignorance of existing laws upon the same subject. Nearly every member of a popular legislative body in this country, especially every new member, has some special purpose to accomplish, some object, either public or private, to attain by legislation - and he usually draws and presents his own bill, with a view to that one thing without regard to, or an examination of, the common or statute law upon the matter.

Judge Edmonds has pointed out, in his Statutes at Large, some curious blunders that have arisen from this method of drafting bills-such for instance as amending an act after it had been for years repealed; but aside from such patent errors, such a method is constantly producing confusion and obscurity in the statute books, and giving rise to expensive and vexatious litigation. The legislator is presumed to have a clear idea of the scope and limit of a measure proposed by him, but it by no means follows that he is the person best fitted to reduce that idea into the form of an act. To suggest a new law very properly falls within his province, but to draft it properly, to give it accurate construction and expression, should be the task of those who have studied the science of drafting. The ordinary checks upon legislation, by special committees or committees of the whole, are entirely ineffectual to work much improvement in the general

structure or language of bills. They usually retain all the characteristics of their origin, and if they have been illy framed and unskillfully composed, having little regard to past or current legislation, they are likely to retain these defects in their ultimate shape. Another serious objection to our present style of legislation, is its piece-meal character — or the habit of amending or extending previous acts by reference only, and of repealing generally all inconsistent acts without specifying them. The first of these objections can be overcome by consolidation only, which, while it will add somewhat to the size of the annual statute book, will afford abundant compensation by the convenience of reference afforded. On the other objection, Lord Chancellor Campbell, when bringing forward his "Statute Law Revision Bill," thus expressed himself: "No lawyer, however laborious had been his studies, could take upon himself to state what statutes were now in force and what had been repealed, particularly after the vicious mode of passing acts of parliament, by which statutes were repealed, not expressly, but by simply enacting that all statutes inconsistent with that particular act should be repealed. The difficulty

of course was to decide what statutes were inconsist

ent with it." The Lord Chancellor regarded the matter as so important that he caused several hundred statutes to be expressly repealed which had been before only virtually or impliedly repealed.

This matter of drafting bills is one to which, unfortunately, our law-makers give no attention. The language used is frequently ambiguous, involved, tautological. It is sometimes extremely technical, and at others loosely popular. Nor is there as a rule any regard paid to the natural order or sequence of parts of the statute, so that one can never feel confident of the interpretation of any section of an act, however long, without reading the whole act.

There are two easy methods of remedying, to a great extent, most of these shortcomings in drafting our laws, either to have all bills, at the proper stage, submitted to the Attorney-General, and his assistants, or to a committee or legal council of three persons to be appointed for the purpose. If we had a Department of Justice, the matter could be safely left with it; but at present the council or committee will probably be found most efficient. With three competent men to revise and reconstruct the bills presented to our legislative bodies after a thorough examination of the prior laws relating to the same matters, and with a view to logical arrangement and accurate expression - our courts would be relieved of much labor, and the people of much costly legis

lation.

It is reported that Ex-President Andrew Johnson will shortly visit Washington for the purpose of examining certain documents connected with the trial of the assassins of President Lincoln, whereby he expects to show that the statements of Judge-Advocate-General Holt, recently published, are erroneous.

CURRENT TOPICS.

The results of the Pennsylvania constitutional convention are not agreeable to some of the politicians of that State. Particular objection is made to the oath to be required of office holders and the power to be given the supreme court of the State to declare null and void any act whose passage or approval has been procured by bribery, fraud, or other corrupt means. It is contended that the latter provision will make the supreme court the actual ruling power, and that the people, who select honest and competent judges, may be trusted to select honest and competent governors and legislators.

The legal profession have thus far manifested but little interest in the approaching election, at which is to be passed upon the question whether the judges shall be elected by the people, or appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Not

even has the Bar Association of New York - the

principal legal organization in the State-taken any action or expressed any opinion on the subject, so far as we have been able to learn. It is surely a matter of primary importance to the profession, and this apathy on their part seems like an abdication of their legitimate position. In 1869, the influence of the bar secured the adoption of the judiciary article of the Constitution. The question to be passed upon now is of at least equal importance to the profession, and one which deeply affects their own interests and dignity, and the same influence, properly exerted, would be equally potent in determining the result. Upon the merits of the question to be passed upon there is, of course, great difference of opinion even among lawyers, but that fact is no suflicient reason why the profession should remain passive. It is a duty which every lawyer owes to his profession and to society, to interest himself in, and exert his influence on all matters connected with the advancement of jurisprudence and the reform of the administration of justice.

Speaking of recent judicial scandals in this country, the London Law Journal says: "The plan of electing judges by popular vote has completely broken down. The men elected are too often the friends and the tools of the wire-pullers of this or that party; and wire-pullers are men who, as a rule, get money by any means that does not involve criminal dishonesty. And if the judges were really chosen by the people, we should have no guaranty that the best men would be selected; for where there is a competition for a paid office, bribery is certain; and, as the cost is not covered by the emoluments of the office, judicial corruption is probable. The remedy is