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THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. A meeting of several eminent publicists was convened, by invitations issued by M. Rolin Jacquemyns, agreeably to previous arrangement, at Ghent (Belgium), on 8-12th of September. The result was the inauguration of a permanent Institute of International Law. The number of members is limited to fifty, of whom thirty-eight have been elected. these thirty-eight, five are from America, viz.: Mr. Lawrence, President Woolsey, Mr. Washburn, Professor Wharton and Mr. Field. Mancini, of Italy, was elected President; Bluntschili, of Germany, and de Parieu, of France, Vice-Presidents; Rolin Jacquemyns, of Belgium, and Pierantoni, of Italy, Secretaries. The first meeting is to be held at Geneva in 1874. Three subjects have been submitted for consideration on that occasion: 1st. Arbitration. 2d. The three rules of the Treaty of Washington; and 3d. Codification, by means of treaties, of the fundamental rules of private International Law.

In connection with this subject we have the pleasure of publishing the following correspondence between those eminent publicists, M. Rolin Jacquemyns and Mr. William Beach Lawrence:

[Translation.]

GHENT, 30th of July, 1873.

Dear and Honored Sir: You will receive by the to-day's mail the following communications, which are entirely private:

(a) A confidential note concerning a proposed plan of International Conference, having in view: 1. To put into form certain principles of international law; 2. To constitute a permanent corps or Academy for the study and advancement of International Law.

(b) A report on the opinions expressed in answer to this note by Messrs. Asser (Amsterdam), Montague Bernard (Oxford), Blunschili (Heidelberg), Carlos Calvo (Paris), R. de Mohl (Carlsruhe), Drouyn de Lhuys (Paris), Goldsmith (Leipzig), Vernon Harcourt (London), Heffter et de Holtzendorff (Berlin), le vicomte d'Itajuba (Paris), de Laveleye (Liege), Lorimer (Edinburgh), Chs. Lucas (Paris), Mancini (Rome), Moynier (Geneva), de Parieu (Paris), Sir Robert Phillimore (London), Pierantoni (Naples), Count Sclopis (Turin), Chs. Verge (Paris), Westlake (London).

(c) A (projet) of statutes of the Institute or International Academy of the law of nations.

(d) A (projet) of statutes of the International Association for the progress of the law of nations.

(e) An article which appeared in the last number (III, 1873) of the "Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee" on the necessity of organizing permanent scientific action to promote the study and progress of international law.

All these papers (pieces) are, as you will see, connected with a project which has been welcomed with great sympathy by the eminent Europeans to whom I submitted it in the first instance. The conclusions of the majority of them are that a meeting should be held at Ghent, in the month of September, to deliberate upon the organization of a collective scientific action in international law, and particularly with respect to the establishment of an international institute of the law of nations.

Making myself the medium of communication of their common wishes, I unite with the honorable European friends who have hitherto co-operated with

me, in praying you to join us. Your name is naturally pointed out among the most eminent representatives of the science of the law of nations, as well in America as in Europe, and to whom it belongs to take the initiative in the affair. I, therefore, invite you to take part in a private conference which will be opened at Ghent, in the "Hotel de Ville," on Monday, the 8th of September next, and will continue during the following days.

Order of the day: I. Organization of a collective permanent and scientific action for the purpose of promoting the study and progress of the law of nations. Discussion of the principle of that organization and of the propositions communicated or which will be communicated by the members relative to the constitution: (a) Of an international Institute or Academy of the law of nations; (b) Of an International Association for the advancement of the law of nations.

II. In case the institute should be constituted with the members present: (a) Organization; (b) Propositions to be made for the addition of new members; (c) Distribution of the subjects to which the labors of the society ought first to be directed; (d) Different measures of execution.

I venture to hope, dear and honored sir, that in acknowledging the receipt of this letter you will inform me, as soon as possible: 1. If you will personally be present, agreeably to my invitation. 2. If, in case you shall be prevented from attending in person, you will give full power to represent you at the conference to one of your friends who are also invited and who may intend to be here. (The persons in the United States who are invited, beside yourself, are Messrs. Bancroft Davis, D. Dudley Field, F. Wharton, and Woolsey.) 3. What is your opinion on the fundamental idea which is to be discussed in the conference, and on the proposed mode of its execution.

Accept, dear and honored sir, the assurance of my high consideration and sincere devotion.

G. ROLIN JACQUEMYNS.

P. S.-I have the honor to send you, besides the "pieces" herein mentioned, the "compte-rendu❞ of the third volume of your "Commentaire" which I wrote for the "Revue de Droit International." I hope you will be satisfied with it.

I would like very much to see you in Ghent in September. We retain the most agreeable remembrance of your first visit. This time you would meet with several distinguished men, some of whom you know, and the others you would certainly deem as worthy to be added to the number of those with whom you maintain relations. What a pity that our excellent friend Lieber cannot be present!

[Translation.]

OCHRE POINT, NEWPORT, R. I. 29th of August, 1873.

My Dear and Eminent Confrere:

It is only to-day that I renounce, with the deepest regret, the hope of replying in person to your very flattering invitation to take part in the assembly of illustrious publicists who are to meet at Ghent. With several of these gentlemen I am personally acquainted, and with all of them I have had agreeable relations arising from the similarity of our studies, and the conformity of our principles in that science of which I am an humble votary.

It is unnecessary to premise that I agree with you entirely on the necessity of "organizing permanent

scientific action to aid the study and progress of international law." I will add, that there is nothing in the programme which I could wish to change.

"La Revue de droit international et de legislation comparie," during the four years of its existence, while making known to us the comparative legislation of the different states of christendom, has largely contributed to the reform of the municipal institutions of the world. We find the most important of these reforms in the late judicial changes in England, which have put an end to the unphilosophical distinction which existed between law and equity. And I cannot speak of the reform in the jurisprudence of our mothercountry, without recalling the work accomplished among us in the same line, by our confrere Mr. Field, who will enjoy the advantage, of which I am deprived, of assisting in your deliberations. As for the law of nations, it is only in your book that may be found the ablest discussions concerning the principles of international law, as well as to those practical questions which have occupied special attention during the period which we are considering. It is to the chief editor himself that we owe several of the most important of the elaborate articles which passed under his inspection. In my "Commentaire," I have shown by numerous references to your review how much I owe to your great labors. Nowhere so well as at Ghent, the seat of the science, could an Institute of International Law be inaugurated.

Although it is impossible for me to avail myself of this new opportunity to enjoy your hospitality, I should be ungrateful, were I to forget the delightful visit to Ghent, the recollection of which, thanks to you and to Madame Rolin Jacquemyns, always affords me pleasure.

Apart from my legitimate desire to assist in the proceedings of your illustrious assembly, there are some points of international law constantly arising, which are of practical application, and to which I would wish to draw the attention of the members invited to the learned congress.

Nothing can interest the civilized world more than the maintenance of the rights of neutrals, and in pro- | mulgating their decision upon these questions, it is the duty of publicists to follow what Sir William Scott affirms that he had done in the judgments rendered by himself (a statement which, by the by, is not always in conformity with the fact). "It was his office," he said, "not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to base his conclusions upon those eternal principles of the law of nations which commend themselves to the approbation of every people."

If new wars are to break out, it is the belligerents alone who should bear the evils which they bring in their train, and the commerce of neutrals should meet with no restrictions that is not absolutely necessary in order to prevent any intervention by third parties of a nature to influence, any manner whatever, the result of the conflict.

As for the United States, the recent civil war placed them in an abnormal position, and, at the close of it, they found themselves engaged in discussions with England, in which they put forward pretensions at variance with those doctrines which, although they had been modified by the respect of their tribunals for the adjudications of the mother-country, went back, at least on the part of the legislative and of the executive departments of the government, to the very origin

of our institutions. On the other hand, the English would seem to have become the most ardent defenders of the rights of neutrals. The result was that the United States, under the influence of the extreme excitement arising from the peculiar character of a civil war, forgetting that during eighty of the ninety years of their national existence, they were neutrals, they themselves proposed as belligerents, apparently in order to obtain a pecuniary indemnity from England for damages claimed against her, for not sufficiently regarding neutral duties, to introduce into the law of nations certain principles which might lay them under a burdensome obligation, during an indefinite future to maintain a naval police throughout the whole extent of their coasts, both on the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans.

This system of maritime law would be no less prejudicial to the country of the illustrious jurist who presided at the conference at Geneva than to my own country. If I should go to Ghent, however bold it might be in me to oppose the authority of Count Sclopis, I could not consent to recognize as an integral part of the International Law the three rules established by the Treaty of Washington, to govern the decisions of the arbiters in the "Alabama Claims. " They have even become less acceptable than their original text purported, on account of the interpretation given by the council at Geneva to the term "due diligence," and which would seem to make neutrals responsible to one belligerent for the acts of the other belligerent. "The due diligence," it is said, “referred to in the first and third of said rules, ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations on their part."

I would also have liked to draw the attention of the congress to the encroachments made upon the neutral commerce by the unjustifiable application of the law of blockade to vessels seized at the moment of their departure from a neutral port, bound for another neutral port, however remote it may be from a blockaded port, under the mere suspicion that their cargoes, after having been discharged at a neutral port, may be ultimately destined for a blockaded port, or otherwise placed at the disposition of the enemy. This pretense carried to the extreme would annihilate the commerce of neutrals; it is totally opposed to the doctrine of the Declaration of Paris, which, by requiring a force before the blockaded port sufficient to effectually prevent ingress to it, would appear to indicate that it is only in the surrounding waters that the police of the blockade can be exercised.

The opposition made by English courts of admiralty to "continuous voyages' "owed its origin to the rule of "1756," which has now become obsolete in consequence of changes in the colonial policy of Great Britain. It is unnecessary to remark that this rule could never have existed in our times, if the doctrine had been maintained, which required that a previous notice of the blockade should be given to every vessel, a doctrine sustained by the publicists of the continent, and to the time of our civil war by the United States, who have moreover repeatedly given to it the sanction of treaties. It was our rule during the war with Mexico, and, however it may since have been disregarded by the tribunals, it was likewise declared to be the rule by the proclamation of the president, and in the communications of the Secretary of State with Lord Lyons at the beginning of the recent war.

Considering as exceptional those decisions rendered by the supreme court during the war of secession, under the influence of that excitement which exists to a greater degree during a civil war than during any other war, I believed that I could serve my country in no better way than by making every possible effort before a tribunal, which is invested with the authority to revise even the decisions of the highest courts of England and of the United States, to prevent decisions so opposed to our permanent interests and so injurious to the rights of neutrals from being recognized as precedents in the law of nations.

That is my apology for having undertaken to argue before the Mixed Commission now meeting in this city, a case in which certain questions of maritime law arise that cannot fail to interest every individual who considers the maintenance of the rights of neutrals as essential to civilization. I cannot better make known my views than by sending to you and to our illustrious" confrères" the pamphlet which contains my argument in the case of the Circassian." In granting indemnities to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the decision of the arbiters may well be considered as a reversal of the decree of the supreme court, in so far as it depends upon an International Tribunal.

I cannot close this communication without alluding to the necessity of calling the notice of those governments which are about to establish Mixed Commissions to some suggestions relative to their constitution, and to the mode of deciding the questions which may be brought before them. I cannot but believe that such regulations are essential to the recognition of arbitration as a permanent system for the purpose of settling international contests. The arbiters, as well those who are citizens or subjects of one or other country as the foreign members, should be regarded as vested with a judicial character, and should be confined as the rule of their decisions to the generally recognized principles of international law, or to such rules as may be established, in particular cases, by the authority of the parties in litigation. Their decisions should, moreover, in every case, be furnished in writing to the respective governments.

Such reports would be of incalculable value in the elaboration of an International Code, which can only be advantageously adopted after a previous assimilation of the rules of conduct of the different States of Christendom.

The arbitrations which the United States had with Great Britain, previous to the Treaty of Washington, met with little success. It would even appear that the question of ascertaining how far the arbiters are judges of the powers which are conferred upon them, is not yet settled. The arbitrament of the King of Netherlands, to whom recourse was had in the case of our north-east boundary, did not succeed, because the award went beyond the limits of the reference. Our late arbitrament of the "Alabama Claims" at Geneva, nearly failed on account of the "Indirect Claims." A statement which appears to be taken from a report of Mr. Henry Bellaire, "à la séance du Congrès de l'alliance universelle de l'ordre et de la civilisation," and which has been extensively published, has been brought to my notice. This statement contains so many mistakes that I have had a memorandum prepared to point them out. I inclose it, though the memorandum itself may not be quite exact.

Accept, my dear and honored confrère, the assurance of my highest consideration. Yours truly,

W. B. LAWRENCE.

P. S.-I have just received from Mr. Wharton a letter, written under the expectation that I would go to Ghent. He desires me to express his thanks for the honor conferred upon him by the invitation to the meeting. He is very anxious for the success of the plan, and regrets the impossibility of being present at the Congress.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

BRIDGE.

Construction of statute.-Under (Chap. 388, Laws 1837) the act incorporating "The Leicester Bridge Company," a bridge was built by such company over the Genesee river, in the county of Livingston. By section 9 of the act, it was provided that if the bridge should be destroyed and not rebuilt, as specified therein, "the bridge shall thereupon become a public bridge, and may be maintained at the expense of the county of Livingston." The bridge was swept away and abandoned by the company. The county rebuilt it, and the adjoining towns of Geneseo and Leicester, thereafter, kept it in repair. Plaintiff repaired said bridge under a contract with the commissioners of highways of said towns, and brought this action against their successors in office to recover the contract price.

Held, that the word "may," in the statute, was mandatory, and imposed upon the county the obligation to repair; that the commissioners had no authority over the bridge, could not bind their towns for its repairs, and, therefore, plaintiff. could not recover. Phelps v. Hawley et al., Commissioners, etc. Opinion by Peckham, J.

CATTLE IN HIGHWAYS.

1. Action to recover possession of some cattle belonging to plaintiff and alleged to have been unlawfully detained by defendant. The cattle were found by defendant trespassing upon his lands, they having entered from the public highway. Defendant took them into his custody, and the next morning in pursuance of the provisions of the act "to prevent cattle from running at large in the highway," (chapter 459, Laws of 1862, as amended by chapter 814, Laws of 1867), he complained on oath before a justice of the peace, a summons was issued by the justice returnable October 20, 1867, but it did not specify the place for the return, and the summons was not posted as required by the statute. Before the return day specified in the summons, plaintiff demanded the cattle. Defendant refused to deliver them up unless plaintiff paid the penalty under the statute.

Held, that defendant held the cattle by virtue of the original seizure as authorized by the act, and his right to hold them was not affected by any irregularity in the summons issued by the justice to whom the complaint was made, nor by an omission to post the summons as required by the act. Leavitt v. Thompson. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. The right to detain the cattle is not terminated until the owner has paid the justice the several sums specified in the act (section 4), and until such payment is made, this right is not affected by a refusal on the part of the holder to deliver the cattle, except upon condi

tion that the owner shall pay a greater sum than the holder can lawfully demand. Ib.

3. The duty to act is upon the owner, and the refusal of the owner, although coupled with an unlawful condition, is a non feasance, which does not make him a trespasser ab initio. Ib.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. Delivery.- Action against defendant, owner of the ship Carolus Magnus, for an alleged improper delivery of some goods, which were shipped on defendant's vessel by plaintiffs consigned to J. C. McA. at New York. The vessel arrived at New York, August 26, 1860, and the consignee was notified. He paid the duties on a portion of the goods and entered the remainder for warehousing, and received directions for placing them in certain designated United States bonded warehouses, and delivered a permit for the discharge of the goods on board the vessel. Defendant's agent was notified that the goods were perishable and must be discharged on a fine day. The agents of the parties agreed that the goods should be discharged September 20th, if the day was fine. On that day it was raining until 9 A. M., then cleared, it rained again about 2.30 P. M., and from 4.30 P. M., during the day and night. Defendant's agent began to discharge the goods at 9 A. M., and continued until noon, when the consignee was notified. At that time nearly all the goods were unloaded and placed upon the wharf. were unloaded before 2 P. M. Before removal they had to be weighed by a United States officer. He reached the place at 2.30 P. M. The consignee used great diligence, but was unable during that day to secure the goods and a portion of them was injured. Held, that the day selected for the delivery of the goods was not fine, and hence the consignee had no notice that they were then to be delivered, and that defendant landed them without reasonable notice upon an unsuitable day, and was chargeable with a breach of his obligation and duty as a common carrier. McAndrews et al. v. Whitlock. Opinion by Folger, J.

All

2. A common carrier by water, of goods consigned to one not the owner, is not bound to deliver them personally to the consignee, or at his warehouse. He may land them at a wharf, but before unloading must notify the consignee of their arrival and unloading, and give him reasonable time after notice to take charge of and secure them, and, in case the consignee does not appear to claim the goods or does not receive them, the carrier is obliged to take care of them for the owner. Ib.

the passage of the legal tender act. After the passage of that act, and while a case was pending, having been argued but not decided, in the supreme court of the United States (Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603), involving the question of the effect of that act upon prior contracts, plaintiff received a payment in legal tender notes under an agreement by which the parties, to avoid litigation, stipulated in substance, that if it should, at any time thereafter, be decided by said court that plaintiff was entitled to demand and defendant bound to pay gold; that on such decision being made and becoming the law of the land, defendant would, upon return of the legal tender notes, pay in gold. After the decision in that action, holding the act unconstitutional as to debts previously contracted, defendant refusing to substitute gold as agreed, plaintiff brought an action to recover damages. The decision having been subsequently overruled by the same court (Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457), defendant claimed that the latter decision controlled.

Held, that the contract must be construed, if practicable, with the view to carry out the declared object (i. e., to avoid litigation) and in the light of such existing circumstances as the parties are presumed to have known; that the fact of the pendency of the first action must be presumed to have been known to them, and that the contract had reference thereto and in effect made the decision therein final; that although the subsequent decision was a legal adjudication, that the prior one was not the law at the time it was made, yet it did not affect a right thus acquired. Woodruff v. Woodruff: Woodruff v. Robinson. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

2. Also held, that as the first case (Hepburn v. Griswold) was heard by a full court, was fully considered and was made under circumstances which entitled it to confidence as a final adjudication, there was nothing in the facts or in the merits of the question from which the court would have the right to infer that the parties contemplated any further litigation. Ib.

3. Facts of public notoriety relating to the subject of a contract, must be presumed to have been known to the parties at the time of making the contract, and the language used must be construed in reference to these facts. Ib.

4. Plaintiffs entered into a contract to import for defendants from South America, nitrate of soda, for costs and charges with three and a half per cent commissions and brokerage on entire cost, delivered in New York duty paid. Plaintiffs charged defendants the currency value at the time of payment of the gold

CONTRACT.

1. Legal tender decisions.- Plaintiff was the holder of a bond and mortgage executed by defendant prior to

missions in currency upon the amount of costs and charges thus ascertained. Held, that the account was correct. (Grover, J., dissenting.) Where there are two currencies, in the absence of any provision in a contract, or of any circumstance excluding contracts between citizens of money refer to the ordinary and usual currency in which business is transacted, and a reference in a contract to the cost of a commodity, unexplained, will be deemed to refer to its costs in the same currency. Fabbri et al. v. Kalbfleisch et al. Opinion by Andrews, J.

FERRY.

Action to recover damages for the loss of plaintiff's horse and wagon, alleged to have been caused by defendant's neglect. Plaintiff drove his horse and wagon on board defendant's ferry-boat, at Astoria, to cross to New York. He and his wife remained in the wagon.

When the whistle was blown for the boat to start, the horse became restive, and, upon the blowing of the second whistle, rushed forward, and the establishment with the occupants were precipitated into the river. There was evidence tending to show that the chain at the outer end of the boat was not up, or entirely insufficient.

Held, that the ferrymen are not chargeable, as common carriers, for the absolute safety of property retained by a passenger in his own custody, and under his control; while, from the nature of the franchise they exercise, and the character of the service they render, they are held to extreme diligence and care, and to a strict liability for any neglect or omission of duty; they do not assume all the liability of common carriers. The property, in such case, is not at the sole risk of either part, but the ordinary rules in actions for negligence apply. The ferryman undertakes for the safety of the property, as against defects and insufficiencies of his boat and other appliances, for the performance of the services, and for the neglect or want of skill of himself and servants, while the owner is bound to use ordinary care and diligence to prevent loss or injury; and, if guilty of contributory negligence, he cannot recover. Fisher v. Clisbee (12 Ill. 344); Powell v. Mills (37 Mass. 691), and Wilson v. Hamilton, 8 Ohio (N. S.), 722, disapproved. Where the loss is occasioned by the ferryman's apparent negligence, in omitting to provide safe and sufficient means to perform what he has undertaken, the burden is upon him, to show that the accident was not occasioned by his fault. Wyckoff v. Queens County Ferry Co. Opinion by Allen, J.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Where an agent deposits in a bank to his own account the proceeds of property sold by him for his principal, the debt thus constituted against the bank belongs to the principal, and his right thereto is not affected by the fact that the agent at the same time deposited other moneys belonging to himself. Nor is it affected by the fact that the agent, instead of depositing the identical moneys received by him on account of his principal, substitutes other moneys therefor. And upon presentation for payment at the bank by the principal, and a refusal to pay by the bank, of a check for the amount of said debt, received from the agent, a legal action may be maintained against the bank therefor. (Allen and Grover, JJ., dissenting.) A bank in such case cannot set up the want of privity. Privity has nothing to do with the question. Van Alen v. American National Bank. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. A sold to B certain goods upon credit, B transferred them, with other property, in trust for the payment of antecedent debts. Upon discovering the fraud A accepted as security for the purchase-money of the goods, a written assignment of B's claim to any surplus remaining after payment of the debts, in which assignment was inserted a clause, declaring that the acceptance thereof shall not preclude A from claiming and commencing proceedings to recover the goods. Held, that the assignment taken by A was an unequivocal affirmance of the sale and subsequent transfer to B, and an abandonment of the right to reclaim the goods. The clause as to A not being precluded from claiming the goods, etc., is repugnant to the other parts of the

instrument and is inoperative. Joslin v. Cowee. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. If through fraud a factor is induced to part with his goods to an insolvent purchaser, who, before the fraud is discovered, places them in such a condition that it is difficult, if not impossible, to follow them, if acting in good faith, the factor takes security for the goods and thus affirms the sale, he is acting within the scope of his powers and his principal is bound. Ib.

WILL

1. Execution of. The statute prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills (2 R. S. 63, § 40), is to be construed so as to secure the purposes of its enactment. A substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. The words of request or acknowledgment may proceed from another, and will be regarded as those of the testator, if the circumstances show that he adopted them, and that the party speaking them was acting for him with his assent. To establish the valid publication of a will, the testator must, at the time of subscribing or acknowledging his subscription, in the presence of witnesses, "declare the instrument so subscribed, to be his last will and testament." It is not sufficient that it appears that the nature of the instrument was known to the testator and subscribing witnesses at the time it was executed. Knowledge derived from any other source or at any other time, cannot stand as a substitute for the declaration of the testator. Gilbert, ex'r, v. Knox et al.; American Bible Society v. Knox et al. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. The fact that the testator was fully apprised of the testamentary character of the instrument, may be considered in aid of proof tending to establish a publication. Ib.

WILL CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. Where in a will there are two clauses so inconsistent and irreconcilable that they cannot possibly stand together, the one posterior in position will be considered as indicating a subsequent intention, and will prevail unless the general scope of the will leads to a contrary conclusion; although the latter clause is invalid, yet it must be retained and considered for the purpose of ascertaining the intentions of the testator, and for this it is as effectual and its operation upon the preceding clause is the same as though no leading obstacle to its being carried into execution existed. Van Nostrand et al. v. Moore et al. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. Where from the language of a will the meaning of the testator is apparent, the plain import of the language cannot be departed from, though it result in rendering the will valid. Ib.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTE OF RECENT DECISIONS.
FRAUD.

A, being about to start to Europe, applies to K., a banker, for two five hundred dollar bills, in exchange for one thousand dollars of small notes. K. declines, under pretense of not having the five hundred dollar bills. A. then asks for exchange on New York, and K. gives him a check for one thousand dollars on a bank in New York, knowing at the time that the New York bank had protested his checks, and that he was largely overdrawn. K., at the time of giving the check and receiving the money, being in the act of preparing a