« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
would exercise in his own affairs, failure to bestow as was given in this case, for the purpose of taking that amount of care is called ordinary negligence. care of his stock on the train, is a passenger for In each case the negligence, whatever epithet we give hire. it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which the These conclusions decide the present case, and resituation demands; and hence it is more strictly quire a judgment of affirmance. We purposely accurate perhaps to call it simply “negligence.” And abstain from expressing any opinion as to what this seems to be the tendency of modern authorities.* would have been the result of our judgment had we If they mean more than this, and seek to abolish the considered the plaintiff a free passenger instead of a distinction of degrees of care, skill and diligence re- passenger for hire. quired in the performance of various duties and the fulfillment of various contracts, we think they go too far; since the requirement of different degrees of
CURRENT TOPICS. care in different situations is too firmly settled and The judicial affairs of Utah are in such a hopeless fixed in the law to be ignored or changed. The com- | muddle that an intelligible statement concerning them pilers of the French civil code undertook to abolish is almost an impossibility. As we recently announced, these distinctions by enacting that “every act what the clerk of the district court (pending an application ever of man that causes damage to another, obliges for a mandamus against him) issued a venire for a grand him by whose fault it happened to repair it."' + jury. The jurors were summoned by one McAllister, Toullier, in his commentary on the code, regards this who claims to be the Territorial Marshal. The array as a happy thought, and a return to the law of of the grand jury was challenged and sustained by Mr. nature. But such an iron rule is too regardless of Justice McKean, on the ground that the court had the foundation principles of human duty, and must decided that there was no such officer as “Territorial often operate with great severity and injustice. Marshal.” A challenge was also made to the array
In the case before us, the law, in the absence of of the petit jury, which was overruled, pro forma, by special contract, fixes the degree of care and dili- | the same justice; but, at the same time, counsel were gence due from the railroad company to the persons informed that no cause would be forced to trial, and carried on its trains. A failure to exercise such care that all cases in which a challenge to the array was and diligence is negligence. It needs no epithet not waived would be continued for the term. There properly and legally to describe it. If it is against | has seldom, if ever, been witnessed in any civilized the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will country such a complete collapse of the judicial relieve the company from the exercise of that care machinery as that which has existed in Utah during and diligence, or which, in other words, will excuse the last three years. them for negligence in the performance of that duty, then the company remains liable for such negligence.
The Common Pleas Bench of England has suffered The question whether the company was guilty of a serious loss in the death of Chief Justice Bovill. negligence in this case, which caused the injury sus- He had a reputation as a jurist second to very few tained by the plaintiff, was fairly left to the jury. It | living men, and one to which his successor, Sir John was unnecessary to tell them whether, in the lan | Duke Coleridge, can hardly hope to attain. As guage of law writers, such negligence would be Attorney-General, Sir John Coleridge was brilliant, called gross or ordinary.
being probably the greatest advocate at the English The conclusions to which we have come are
bar; but he has never been regarded as a profound First. That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipu- / lawyer. It seems a little singular that the English late for exemption from responsibility when such have made it a rule to elevate the Attorney-General exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of to the first desirable vacant judicial position. The the law.
qualifications essential to the office of AttorneySecondly. That it is not just and reasonable in the General would seem to be quite different from those eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for essential to the judge. Erskine and Curran were exemption from responsibility for the negligence of
great as advocates, and would have been great as himself or his servants.
Attorneys-General, but as judges they were hardly Thirdly. That these rules apply both to carriers of medium. goods and carriers of passengers for hire, and with special force to the latter.
The recent vote on the constitutional amendment, Fourthly. That a drover traveling on a pass, such
though not large, was sufficiently pronounced against
the amendment to settle the question for this genera*1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 420, 6th Am. ed.; Story on Bail
tion. The people have faith in their own judgment ments, $571; Wyld v. Pickford, 7 M. & W. 460; Hinton v. | as to judges, and if it be always so well exercised as Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 661; Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 115; Beal v. South Devon R. Co., 3 Hurlst. & Colt. 337; L. R., 10. B. 600 ; it has been this fall there will be little occasion to re14 How. 486 ; 16 id. 474. + Art. 1382.
gret the failure of the amendment. Of the nine su*Vol. 6, p. 243.
preme court judges elected, five are the present incum
bents, to wit: Justices Gilbert, Mullin, Boardman, essary to hold that the money was not the master's Rumsey and Talcott. Messrs. Lawrence and Dono- | money; for if, by law, the money had been his mashue in the first district, Westbrook in the third, and ter's money, it would be difficult to say that he had Landon in the fourth, are new men. The defeat of not received it "for" his master, unless indeed, which Judge Fancher is to be regretted. He is an able can hardly be contended, the words used by the statute judge, and very greatly respected by the bar. are to be referred wholly to the intention with which
the servant received the money. But the broader
ground of the judgment (in which, indeed, Bramwell, An English contemporary gives some figures which
B., seemed also to concur) was that which was most show a remarkable decrease in litigation and judicial
clearly expressed by Blackburn, J., that the money business in England during the last few years. For
was not in fact the master's money, and that the instance, the number of actions commenced by writ
case, therefore, did not fall within the mischief which of summons, in 1872, was less than half the number
the technical doctrine of trespass created with respect commenced in 1866. The number of judgments in
to larceny, and which the statute of embezzlement the superior courts of common law was 44,316 in
was designed to meet. “The test of the matter," 1866, and in 1872 it was only 23,554. The execu
says Blackburn, J., “really would be this — if the tions issued numbered 30,153 in 1866, and only 15,304
person to whom the manure (the load carried by the in 1872. The fees of court amounted to £188,295 in
prisoner) belonged had not paid for the carriage, 1866, and to £127,918 in 1872, and the dealings with
| could the master have said, "There was a contract the suitors' fund show a decrease of about fifty thou
with you which you have broken, and I gue you for sand pounds, both in receipts and payments. This
it.' There would have been no such contract." decrease appears the more remarkable when we con
This case is the more important as it corrects a corsider the fact that the commercial business and popu
rection which the editor of "Russell on Crimes" lation of the country have steadily increased.
thought fit to make to an observation of that much
more accurate writer, Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis had The Tribune states, editorially, that the stories of
rightly said that the omission in the recent statute of
rightly said that the an offer of the chief justiceship to Senator Conkling,
the words " by virtue of his employment," did not or to any one, are unfounded. Up to this time, it
take away the necessity that the money received states, the President has made no tender of the place, 1 nor committed himself in any form. The latest and
excepted, and appears to have based his correction most extraordinary of the many rumors started by on the erroneous view that Reg. v. Harris (2 W. R. the inventive Washington correspondents is that the
413, Dearsley C. C. 344) was decided upon the Office is to be tendered to Secretary Richardson to in
omitted words, whereas it was clearly decided on duce him to resign from the Treasury.
the words still retained “on account of," and is, in principle, an authority in support of the present
decision, NOTES OF CASES. The case of Reg. v. Collum, C. C. R., 21 W. R. 687, Doepfner v. The State ex rel Altland, 36 Ind. 111, is L. R. 2 C. C. R. 28, decides an important point in the | a curious decision. The relator was a constable, and law of embezzlement, and indirectly also decides a had in his hands several executions, the return day of point in the law of contract. The latter point, which which had passed. Doepfner was a justice of the indeed could not well have been doubted, is this, that peace, and the executions were issued by him on if a servant makes use of his master's goods to earn a judgments on his docket. The relator, happening to reward for himself; if, for instance, a flyman in an call at Dapfner's office, the latter ordered him to reunauthorized way carries passengers upon his own turn the executions, and, on his refusing, committed account in his master's carriage; the master cannot him for contempt. The action was brought for false claim the money as upon a contract made with him imprisonment against Doepfner and the surety on his self. The application of this proposition of law to the official bond. A majority of the court held that the case in question was as follows: The prisoner had, l justice of the peace had no jurisdiction or power to against his master's orders, carried a load on a certain cause the arrest and imprisonment of the constable; journey upon his master's barge, and had received that it was an act for which, as justice of the peace, and not accounted for the money. He was indicted he had no legal authority whatever; and, therefore, for embezzlement; but the Court on a case reserved, as the security is only bound that he shall faithfully held that the case did not come within the statute discharge his duties as justice of the peace, and as this (24 & 25 Vict, chap. 97, § 68). It was pointed out by was not a duty which he did or could legally do as Bramwell, B., that, in terms, he had not received the justice of the peace, that the surety is not responsible. money “ for," or "on account," or "in the name " of | Downey, C. J., dissented, and wrote an opinion rehis master; but, in truth, to decide this it was nec- / viewing a number of authorities,
COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
paper, and is transferred to a bona fide purchaser dis
charged of all equities. Ib. ASSESSMENT — PRACTICE.
INSANITY. 1. This is a writ of certiorari to review an assessment. It appeared that in 1868, defendants were the assessors
Plaintiff in error was indicted for murder in the first of the town of Howard, Steuben county. Relators, who
degree for killing his wife. The defense interposed were non-residents of the United States, were the own was insanity. The judge among other things charged ers of certain debts owing from inhabitants of said
the jury, that “to establish a defense on the ground town. In 1867, the assessors valued these debts at
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the timo $30,000, and by mistake assessed them to “B. F. Young,
of committing the act (the subject of the indictment), agent of Pulteney estate." Three tax payers of the
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of town made application to defendants, under the pro
reason from disease of the mind as not to know the visions of the act for the correction of assessments,
nature and quality of the act he was doing, and if he etc., chapter 453, laws of 1865, to have the same assessed
did know it, that he did not know he was doing to the relators upon the roll of 1868, and defendants
wrong.” To this part of the charge the prisoner by his
counsel excepted. Held, that the test of responsibility, made an assessment against the relators as follows: "Omitted in 1867, $40,000.”
where the defendant interposes insanity as a defense Held, that whenever it is ascertained that the prop
to an indictment, is defendant's capacity to distinguish erty has been omitted, and application is made as pre
between right and wrong at the time and with respect scribed by the statute, the duty of the assessors is
to the act complained of. The law does not recognize ministerial, and they have no discretion, and they
a form of insanity in which the capacity of distinguishmust enter the property at the valuation of the year
ing right from wrong exists, without the power of preceding, if it was valued upon the assessment roll of
choosing between them. Flanagan v. The People. that year; if not, of the year preceding, that they can
Opinion by Andrews, J. not change the valuation. If the property was not
NEGLIGENCE. valued in one of those years, the assessors have no Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's power to enter it upon the assessment roll. People ex intestate, alleged to have been occasioned by defendrel. Oswald et al. v. Golf et al. assessors, etc. Opinion ants' negligence; the deceased was killed by falling by Church, Ch. J.
through a hatchway in the hall of a building owned by 2. Where a clause is inserted in a judgment without defendants, the third and fourth floors of which had authority, the proper remedy is by motion in the court been leased by them to T. Defendants occupied the below to correct the judgment, not by appeal. Ib. lower part of the building. The means of access to the EVIDENCE -SALE.
upper part of the building was through the hall in 1. Action upon two promissory notes which were
which was the hatchway – closed by a trap-door, given in part payment for a distillery and other prop
occupying nearly the whole of the passage-way. erty. Defendant's answer alleged a failure of title to
This trap-door was used by defendants, and was kept a portion of the property, by reason of a violation by
open during the day. It was customary to shut it for the vendor of the revenue laws of the United States,
the night at from six to eight o'clock every evening. in consequence of which the property was seized and
T. went to the premises between eight and nine o'clock condemned, and sold by the officers of the United
P. M., and the trap-door being open, fell through tho States. Defendant upon the trial put in evidence the
hatchway and was killed. Held, that T. had an easerecord of the seizure and condemnation. The record
ment in the passage-way at all times for ingress and did not disclose by whom or at what time the penalty
egress, and while defendants could use the trap-door which worked a forfeiture and loss of the property,
consistently with T's rights, it was their duty to exerwas incurred. He offered to prove by extrinsic evi
cise proper care; that T. was not guilty of negligence dence that the illegal acts established by the decree
per se in entering the hall, after the usual hour for were done by those operating the distillery before the
closing the hatchway, without ascertaining by propurchase by defendant. This evidence was excluded
curing a light or otherwise, whether it was open; but upon the ground that defendant could not contradict
that the questions of negligence and contributory the record, and that the defense was not available as
negligence were questions of fact for the jury. Totten, defendant had not attempted to rescind. Held, error,
adm'x, etc., v. Phipps et al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J. that the evidence was not in contradiction of, but
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS. in aid of, the record, and that he was not bound to Practice: affidavit: certiorari. – A writ of certiorari rescind. Also, held, that the exclusion of the evi was issued, upon the application of relator, to review dence could not be sustained upon appeal, upon the a judgment of a justice of the peace in summary proground of a defect in the answer, as the objection was ceedings instituted under the provisions of chap. 384, not taken upon the trial. McKnight v. Devlin, im title 5, $ 33, Laws of 1854, by the grantee of a tax title pleaded, etc. Opinion by Allen. J.
in the city of Brooklyn. The relator was the owner 2. A vendee of personal property, in case of failure of the premises in question at the time the tax was of title to a portion thereof, is not bound to rescind the levied. The proceedings were instituted against R., contract in toto, but may retain so much as he has who was in possession of the premises as tenant of secured a title to, and have his damages for the loss of the relator. The affidavit upon which the proceedings the residue. Ib.
before the justice were instituted was made by defend3. It is optional with him to recoup such damages in ant, and stated that he was the lessee of the premises an action against him for the purchase-money, or to under a lease from the city of Brooklyn, executed by bring an action therefor, and this option is not defeated the collector of taxes and assessments of said city, by a transfer of the claim against him, and the bring for the non-payment of a tax. That R. was in possesing of an action in the name of the transferrer, except sion, that defendant had demanded possession of said in cases where the claim is in the form of negotiable , R., who refused to deliver possession thereof. A summons was issued upon this affidavit returnable the Also, held, that there was no error in polling the same day. Upon the return of the summons R. failed jury, or in the instructions of the court to them. Ib. to appear, and the justice rendered judgment giving
WILL. defendant possession of the premises. Held, that the 1. This action was brought by the executors to procure affidavit was insufficient, that it must show that the a construction of the will of C, which contained applicant is entitled to the actual possession of the among other bequests, one to the U. F. Seminary of premises, and that the occupant holds in hostility to $10,000 to be expended in the erection of a new buildsuch title. Also held, that the summons was irregular ing, etc., and one to the R. D. Church of $10,000 to be and gave no jurisdiction to enter judgment upon expended in the erection of a church edifice. The default of appearance on the part of the occupant. residuary clause of the will gave the residue of the The summons must be returnable in not less than
estate to the several legatees thereinbefore named in three days or more than five days. Also held, that the proportion to the amounts of the specific bequests. In writ of certiorari was properly granted; that the grant a codicil C stated that she had advanced $3,000 upon ing of it was in the discretion of the court, if improvi the legacy to the U. F. Academy, and therefore she dently granted it may be quashed upon motion, and, revoked so much thereof; she also stated that it appearwhere no motion to quash or supersede it is made, and ing probable that the purpose of the bequest to the R. judgment is passed upon the questions raised by the D. Church would soon be accomplished, and having return, the objection that the relator is not the person concluded to give at that time $3,000, she therefore entitled to sue out the writ will not be entertained revoked the legacy to said church. Held, that the upon appeal. People ex rel. Sheridan v. Andrews. reference in the residuary clause of the will to the prior Opinion by Andrews, J.
legatees was simply for the purposes of identity and STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
description, the legacies were independent. That said Chapter 844, laws of 1868, which is an act providing
clause spoke from the date of the revocation and did for the changing of the name of a portion of Middle not affect the interests of the two legatees named in street in the city of Brooklyn, and for its widening, the residuary estate, but that they were entitled to and directs the expenses of the improvement to be
their proportion thereof the same as if no codicil assessed “upon the property adjoining;” (section 3)
had been executed. (Rapallo, J., dissents as to only authorizes an assessment of property contiguous
R. D. Church.) Wetmore et al., ex'rs, etc., v. Parker et to the avenue, not of property adjacent, but separated
al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J. from it. The fact that under the city charter the com
2. A codicil will not operate as a revocation beyond mon counsel has power to fix an assessment district, the clear import of its language, and an expressed where a local improvement is made under it, does not
intention to alter a will in one particular negatives aid in the construction of this statute or vary its terms.
| an intention to alter it in any other respect. It is In re Wade to vacate assessments. Opinion by
a general but not a universal rule that a will speaks Andrews, J.
from the death of the testator. Whenever a tesVERDICT.
tator refers to an actually existing state of things, Sealed verdict: power of jury to change.- Action to his language will be held to refer to the date of the recover damages for injuries alleged to have been will, not to that of his death. The special term had caused by defendant's negligence. The case was power to make an allowance to the executors for coundelivered to the jury late at night, with permission to sel fees (Grover and Folger, JJ., dissenting), as to bring in a sealed verdict in the morning, if one had whether this court can review on appeal the amount been agreed upon before that time. The jury agreed of such allowance. Quere. upon a verdict, reduced it to writing, sealed it and Also, held, that a corporation created for charity may separated. When it was produced in court the next take by bequest and hold personal property limited by morning, it was for the plaintiff for $6,000. It was so the testator to any of the corporate uses of the legatee, entered by the clerk in his book of minutes. The fore- and a direction of the testator that the principal shall man of the jury explained that the verdict should | be kept inviolate, and the income only be expended bear interest from the date of a former judgment. To will not invalidate the bequest, provided it is fixed and this defendant objected. Plaintiff then polled the certain, and gives an immediate and vested interest. jury, and they not agreeing, the court directed them Such a bequest is not affected by the provisions of the to retire to their room, to which direction defendant statutes against perpetuities. Nor does it create a excepted. The jury afterward came into court for trust as that term is applied to property. The income instructions, asking if they could increase the dama- only of the permanent endowment of such a corporages above $6,000, if they did not add the interest. The tion can be used with safety, and the corporation car court directed them that they had not, as yet, agreed use the legacy in accordance with the law of its creaupon any verdict which was conclusive, and that they tion for its own purposes. The dictation of the donor might decide upon any verdict in the case to which | of the manner of its use within the law does not affect they all agreed; and directed them to again retire to the ownership or make the corporation a trustee. For their room. To this defendant excepts. The jury | the purpose of estimating the value of property held afterward brought in a verdict for the plaintiff for by a charitable corporation, in order to ascertain $7,000.
whether the amount it can take and hold, as limited Held, that the bringing in of the verdict and the by its charter, is exceeded, its debts must be deducted. entry of it by the clerk in his book of minutes was not A citation on proof of a will may be served aud proof such a recording as made the verdict fixed and unal thereof made by an executor or legatee under the will. terable, but that until the jury were dismissed their The probate of a will cannot be attacked collaterally power over their verdict and their right to alter it, so for an irregularity in the service of the citation. Ib. as to make it conform to their real and unanimous 3. Uses and trusts.- Action to determine the validity intention remained, Warner v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. of certain devises and bequests contained in a codicil Opinion by Folger, J.
I to the will of C. The testator devised two parcels of land to trustees to be held during the life-time of M. & as agents for one L., chartered a ship for the conveyW., to be used one as a church and the other as a par ance of a cargo of currants from the Ionian Islands. sonage lot, and upon the death of the longest liver of The charter-party was expressed to be made and was M. & W., to be conveyed to any trustees authorized by signed by the defendants, as “agents to merchants," an act of the legislature to take and hold for church the name of the principal not being disclosed. Held, purposes. In case no such act was passed, then to the on the authority of Humphrey y. Dale (E. B. & E. 1004; rector, etc., of St. Mary's church, Beechwood, if such 27 L. S. (Q. B.) 390), and Fleet v. Murton (Law Rep. 7 church should be incorporated, if not, then to his right | Q. B. 126), that evidence was admissible in an action heirs. He also bequeathed to said trustees $5,000, the by the ship-owners against the defendants upon the income thereof to be paid for the support of the rector charter-party, of a trade usage, by which, if the name for the time being, of said St. Mary's church, or a of the principal is not disclosed within a reasonable clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal church ap- time, the agents themselves are personally liable. pointed to and who shall officiate therein, the principal | Hutchinson v. Tatham, L. R. 8 C. P. 482. to be paid and transferred in like manner as the parcels
EQUITY. of land. Held, that the devise upon the trusts ex
Where, in the making of an agreement between two pressed was void, and the trustees took no title; that
parties, there has been a mutual mistake as to their the bequest considered by itself was valid, but as by
| rights, occasioning an injury to one of them, the rule the failure of the devises, the general scheme of the
of equity is in favor of interposing to grant relief. testator was destroyed, no effect could be given to any
The Court of Equity will not, if such a ground for part of it. As to whether the whole devise failed, or
relief is clearly established, decline to grant relief in case of the appointment by the legislature of trust
merely because, on account of the circumstances which ees, or the creation of a corporation answering the
have intervened since the agreement was made, it may description of the contingent or executory devises,
be difficult to restore the parties exactly to their origiwhether they could take upor the lapse of the two
pal condition. lives named. Quere. Holmes et al., ex'rs., etc. v. Mead
What is the nature of a mistake, and what has been et al. Opinion by Allen, J.
the cause of it, will be considered in determining 4. To sustion a trust the beneficiary need not be de
whether relief ought to be granted. The rule ignoranscribed by name, any designation or description by
tia juris neminem excusat applies where the alleged which he can be identified is sufficient; it is not an
ignorance is that of a well-known rule of law, but not objection to the trust, that the trust is for the benefit
where it is that of a matter of law arising upon the of one who shall be for the time performing cer
doubtful construction of a grant. In the latter case it tain duties, and that the beneficiaries may change.
is not decisively a ground for refusing relief. Where such a trust is part of a single scheme, the
Acquiescence in what has been done will not be a bar principal object of which cannot be carried out, because
to relief where the party alleged to have acquiesced of the invalidity of the trust relative thereto, the
has acted, or abstained from acting, through being whole scheme fails, and no effect can be given to any
ignorant that he possessed rights which would be part of it. It is not material to a legacy that at the
available against that which he permitted to be endate of the will, or the death of the testator, the
joyed. Earl Beauchamp v. Winn, L. R. 6 H. of L. legatee should be definitely known and ascertained.
(Eng. & I. Appls.) 223. It is enough if, when the right to receive the legacy
MARINE INSURANCE. accrues, he is so described that he can be ascertained and known. Charitable uses are not exempted from
1. Insurance on ship against fire: construction of polithe provisions of the statute abolishing all uses and
cy: place in which policy attaches. — A fire policy was trusts, except such as are authorized and modified
effected, for a certain period of time, on a steamship thereby (1 R. S. 727, $ 45), and the system of charitable lying in the Victoria Docks, London, with liberty to uses, as recognized in England, has no existence in
go into dry dock. The ship was taken up the river, this State. Ib.
some distance from the Victoria Docks, to the nearest available dry dock; but in order that she might be able
to enter the dry dock it was necessary to remove part DIGEST OF ENGLISH REPORTS FOR OCTOBER.
of her paddle-wheels. This was done in the Victoria CHARTER-PARTY.
Docks. Her repairs being completed, she was taken Lump freight: loss of part of cargo by perils of the sea
out of the dry dock and moored in the river at a place without default of ship-owner: deduction from freight.
a few hundred yards higher up than the dry dock, A charter-party from Riga to London provided that
where she remained ten days, for the purpose of havthe ship should load a full and complete cargo of lath
ing her paddle-wheels replaced before returning to the wood, and deliver the same on being paid freight as
Victoria Docks. Whilst so moored she was destroyed follows: A lump sum of 315l. There was the usual
by an accidental fire. It was proved to be usual to exception of sea risks, and the freight was to be paid
remove the paddles of large steamers to enable them half on arrival, and the remainder on unloading and
to go into dry dock, and that the time occupied in the right delivery of cargo. Part of the cargo, loaded in
river in replacing them in this case was not unusual or accordance with the charter-party, was lost by the perils
unreasonable. Held (affirming the decision of the of the sea, without any default of the master or crew.
court below), that the policy only attached upon the Held, that the ship-owner was, on delivery of the
vessel whilst in the Victoria Docks, or in the dry dock, remainder of the cargo, entitled to the full sum. Rob
or in the river for the purpose of going to and returninson v. Knights, L. R. 8 C. P. 465.
ing from the dry dock, and not during her stay in the
river for a different purpose, and cousequently the CUSTOM OF TRADE.
insurers were not responsible for the loss. Pearson v. Written contract: evidence of trade usage: charter- | The Commercial Union Assurance Company, L. R. 8 C. party : principal and agent. - The defendants, acting | P. (Ex. Ch.) 548.