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2. Loss of freight : right of charterer to throw up char- the packages which had been actually in contact with ter-party where vessel disabled. - The plaintiff, on the sea-water, and not in respect of the loss occasioned by 9th of November, 1871, effected an insurance “on injury to the reputation of the remainder; and, semchartered freight valued at 2,9001. at and from Liver ble, that the effect would have been the same even in pool to Newport in tow, whilst there, and thence to the absence of the special warranty. Cator v. The Sau Francisco," etc. The ship left Liverpool on the Great Western Insurance Company of New York, L. R. 2d of January, 1872, and on the 4th, before arriving at 8 C. P. 552. Newport, took the rocks in Carnarvon Bay. She was
MASTER AND SERVANT. got off much damaged, and returned to Liverpool on Liability of master for negligence of his servant: scope the 12th of April, where she was sold under circum of employment. — A stevedore employed to ship iron
hich the court held not to be justifiable; rails had a foreman, whose duty it was (assisted by there being no satisfactory evidence of a constructive laborers), to carry the rails from the quay to the ship total loss. She was repaired by the purchaser, and was after the carman had brought them to the quay and still under repair at the time of the trial, the 16th of | unloaded them there. The carman not unloading the April, 1872. By the charter-party the vessel was to rails to the foreman's satisfaction, the latter got into proceed with all convenient speed (dangers and acci the cart and threw out some of them so negligently dents of navigation excepted) from Liverpool to New- | that one fell upon and injured the plaintiff, who was port, and there load a cargo of iron rails for San Fran- passing by. Held (per Grove and Denman, JJ., Brett, cisco. After the vessel took the rocks, and before she J., dissenting), that there was evidence for the jury was got off, viz., on the 15th of February, the charter that the foreman was acting within the scope of his ers threw up the charter, and, on the following day, employment, so as to render the stevedore responsible ther hired another ship to carry the rails (which were for his acts. Burns v. Poulsom, L. R. 8 C. P. 563. wanted for the construction of a railway) to San Fran
MEASURE OF DAMAGES. cisco. The plaintiffs sued the underwriters for a loss
Contract in the alternative: judgment by default. – of the chartered freight. The jury found that the time
The declaration stated that the plaintiff, having shipped necessary for getting the ship off and repairing her was
certain goods to a place abroad, drew against the shipso long as to make it unreasonable for the charterers
ment, and intrusted the drafts to the defendant for to supply the agreed cargo at the end of such time, and
presentment for reward to the defendant, on the terms so long as to put an end, in a commercial sense, to the
that the defendant should return the drafts, if not paid commercial speculation entered upon by the ship
after acceptance, to the plaintiff, or pay the plaintiff owner and the charterers. IIeld, by Keating and
the amount of them; that all conditions were perBrett, JJ., that the charterers were absolved from
formed, etc., necessary to entitle the plaintiff to a loading the vessel, and that the ship-owner, therefore,
return of the drafts or to payment of the amount of might recover for the loss of freight. Held, contra,
them, yet the defendant did not return the drafts nor per Bovill, C. J., that the charterers were not entitled
pay the amount of them. Judgment was signed for to throw up the charter, and that, consequently, the
want of a plea. Held (per Keating, Brett and Grove, plaintiff could not recover against the underwriters,
JJ., Bovill, C. J., dissenting), that the damages on the and that the findings of the jury were immaterial. Jackson v. The Union Marine Insurance Company,
contract alleged in the declaration must be the amount Limited, L. R. 8 C. P. 572.
of the bills. Per Bovill, C. J.: The contract as alleged
in the declaration being a contract in the alternative, 3. Sea damage to part of goods insured : consequent
it might be performed by performance of either branch depreciation in value of remainder.- A policy of marine
of the alternative at the election of the defendant, insurance was expressed to be “ on 1,711 packages teas,
and, therefore, the damages might be the value of the valued at the sum insured, viz., $31,000," and contained
bills, if of less value than the amount for which they a special warranty in the following terms, viz., “ war
were drawn. Deverill v. Burnell, L. R. 8 C. P. 475. ranted by the assured free from damage or injury from dampness, change of flavor, or being spotted, discol
MATRIMONIAL SUIT. ored, musty or mouldy, except caused by actual con Alimony pendente lite: allowance under separation tact of sea-water with the articles damaged occasioned deed. - Under a deed of separation, executed by the by sea perils. In case of partial loss by sea damage to parties many years previously, the husband had covedry goods, cutlery, or other hardware, the loss shall be nanted to pay an annuity to his wife in accordance ascertained by a separation and sale of the portion with the amount of his income at that period, which only of the contents of the packages so damaged, and annuity he had continued to pay up to the present not otherwise, and the same practice shall obtain as to time. He subsequently acquired a very large increase all other merchandises so far as practicable." The of fortune, and finally instituted a suit in this court to ship met with bad weather, and shipped large quanti dissolve his marriage, by reason of the adultery of his ties of sea-water, by contact with which 449 packages wife. Held, that the wife had no claim to alimony of the tea insured were greatly injured. When teas pending suit estimated on the present income of her are sold they are usually sold in the order of the con husband. Powell v. Powell and Jones, L. R. 3 Prob. & secutive numbers marked on the packages, and if the Div. 55. numbers be broken by some being omitted, or if some
REPLEVIN. of the chests be marked as damaged, a suspicion is cre- Judgment recovered: special damage: trespass to land: ated that the other packages may be damaged, and mortgagor and mortgagee. --Certain premises were let they do not command such high prices as if none of to the plaintiff by P., who had previously mortgaged the shipment had been damaged. In consequence of them to the defendants, the trustees of a benefit this the remaining 1,262 packages, which had not been building society, to secure payment of subscriptions, in contact with sea-water, sold for less than they would etc., which might become due from him to the society. otherwise have fetched. Held, that the assured could The mortgage deed gave power to the defendants to only recover in respect of the damage occasioned to distrain the goods of P. on the premises, for arrears of
subscriptions due to the society, as for rent due on a which was not of a testamentary character. Held, that demise. The defendants distrained on the premises the revocation of the will was absolute, and not defor subscriptions due from P., and seized the plaintiff's pendent on the incorporation of the settlement in the goods. The plaintiff replevied the goods, and recov papers admitted to probate. In the Goods of Gentry, ered in the action of replevin, in the county court, as L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 80. damages, the amount of the expenses of the replevin 4. Revocation, total, partial, or contingent: dependent bond. Having sustained further consequential dama relative revocation.- The testatrix, having her will in ges by reason of the seizure of his goods, he subse her hand, dictated the alterations she desired to be quently brought an action of trespass in the superior made in the first part of it to a friend, who wrote them court to recover these damages, and also in respect of down. Testatrix, feeling unwell, desired her friend the trespass to the land. Held, that the judgment in to stop there, and then tore off and burnt so much of replevin was a bar to the action in respect of trespass her will as had been covered by the memorandum to the goods, inasmuch as the special damage was written at her dictation. This memorandum, together recoverable in the action of replevin. And, with with the rest of the will, which contained the residuary respect to the trespass to the land, that the judgment clause and the signatures of the testatrix and witnesses in repleviu was no bar to the action; but that the and the attestation clause intact, was placed in a desk defendants were entitled to the verdict on a plea of | by the testatrix and locked up, and she believed when not possessed, inasmuch as they had done no act to she did so that these papers constituted a new will, and recognize the plaintiff as a tenant. Gibbs v. Cruikshank | were not merely instructions for such a will. Held, and others, L. R. 8 C. P. 454.
that it was a case of dependent relative revocation, a revocation dependent on the papers locked up consti
tuting a new will, and probate was granted of the 1. Capacity: delusions in respect to the conduct of chil original will as contained in the portion which redren: will pronounced against : executor's costs: prac mained and the draft of the part which was destroyed. tice.- A man, moved by capricious, frivolous, mean or Dancer v. Crabb, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 98. even bad motives, may disinherit wholly or partially 5. Revocation on erasure: words erased not apparent: his children, and leave his property to strangers. He dependent relative revocation: parol evidence.- The may take an unduly harsh view of the character and principle of dependent relative revocation applies to conduct of his children, but there is a limit beyond the case where a testator has so entirely erased the which it will cease to be a question of harsh unreasona name of a legatee that it is no longer apparent, and has ble judgment, and then the repulsion which a parent substituted another nanie for it. The court will reexhibits to his child must be held to proceed from some ceive evidence to show what the original name was, mental defect. If such repulsion, amounting to a and restore it to the probate if satisfied that the tesdelusion as to character, is shown to have existed pre tator only revoked the first bequest on the supposition vious to the execution of his will, it will be for the that he had effectually substituted a new legatee. In party setting up that document to establish that it was | the Goods of McCabe, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 94. inoperative when the will was made, and the jury, in 6. Sheet interpolated: presumption. The will of the determining whether or not the delusion was opera deceased had been engrossed by a law stationer on fiftive, will have regard to the contents of the will and teen brief sheets of paper, consecutively numbered. the circumstances surrounding the execution of it. On the sixteenth sheet the testator had written a Prima facie, an executor is justified in propounding codicil, and on the eighteenth and last, a schedule of his testator's will, and if the facts within his knowl property, referred to in the will. On the death of the edge at the time he does so tend to show eccentricity testator, it was found that the original fourth sheet merely on the part of the testator, and he is totally had been removed and placed loose in his desk, and ignorant at the time of the circumstances and conduct that the original seventeenth sheet had been used by which afterward induce a jury to find that the testa the testater in substitution of the fourth. The several tor was insane at the date of the will, he will, on the sheets were tied together with tape. Held, that principle that the testator's conduct was the cause of the legal presumption that papers bound together and litigation, be entitled to receive his costs out of the constituting the will, as found at testator's death, were estate, although the will be pronounced against. Bough so bound together at the time of execution and atteston v. Knight, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 64.
tation was not rebutted by the circumstances of the 2. Execution: attestation and subscription. — The de case. Rees v, Rees and Rees, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 84. ceased executed his will in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom also made a mark in attestation of the signature of the deceased. The second witness
GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT. then wrote the names of the deceased and the witness opposite their respective marks, and also the word wit
SUPREME COURT-FOURTH DEPARTMENT, OCTOness, but he did not subscribe his own name. Held,
BER, 1873. that he did not, by any word he wrote, attest the signature of the deceased, and that the execution was invalid. In the Goods of Eynon, L. R. 3 Prob. &
APPEAL. Div. 92.
Practice.-In an appeal froin an order at special term, 3. Revocation.- The testator, having executed a will setting aside a judgment entered upon a remittitur and codicil, signed a second codicil, in which he ex from the court of appeals on account of irregularity in pressed a desire to cancel his will, and that a document the remittitur, and that it did not conform to law. Held, which he described as a will of earlier date, and the that this court, at special term, has no right to set aside first and second codicils, should together stand as his a judgment regularly entered up upon a remittitur last will and testament. The only document executed without the request or direction of the court of appeals. at the earlier date was a settlement on his marriage, | Miller v. Eggert. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.
ex parte statements evidence, it must be strictly com1. Where in an action on a check against the drawer, plied with. Ib.
DAMAGES. the check was made and dated March 8, 1871, to order of H., and left with his attorney to be delivered,
Where plaintiff purchased certificates of stock of and it was delivered on the 2d day of May, 1872, and
defendant to be thereafter delivered by defendant, and presented the next day for payment at the bank on
paid him an agreed price therefor, and defendant failed which it was drawn and payment refused, and the ac
and refused to deliver the stock upon repeated detion was tried at the circuit, where a verdict was
mands; in an action brought by the plaintiff the cirdirected for the plaintiff, and the case ordered to the
cuit judge directed judgment for the plaintiff for the general term upon exceptions. Held, that the circuit amount of the principle with interest, to which judge erred in taking the case from the jury and di defendant excepted, and defendant offered no evirecting a verdict for the plaintiff. Checks are required
dence, and did not ask to go to the jury, and on a to be presented immediately, in the sense of and accor
motion for a new trial being denied and judgment ding to the usage of banks; they are payable on
entered, the defendant appealed to this court. Held, demand, and require the drawee to pay forthwith the
that it was an action on contract, and the facts not sum specified therein; they are not intended for circu
being denied a jury would have been bound to find as lation. A party taking a check like this, long over due,
above. The refusal of defendant to deliver the stock, is put upon inquiry, and is not a bona fide holder. He
implies that it was of more value than the amount of is in the position of a purchaser of a promissory note
plaintiff's money paid for it, and the recovery simply over due, and takes it subject to all equities existing
of the money advanced is certainly not erroneous, as between the parties. It is impossible, in a case like
it is for a less amount than the plaintiff was entitled this, to hold, as matters of law or fact, that the holder
to recover. Judgment affirmed. Graves v. Wait. of the check is a bona fide holder, and the question
| Opinion by E. D. Smith, J. should have been submitted to the jury. Coning v.
DRAINAGE OF LANDS. Allman. Opinion by Smith, J. 2. It appearing that the consideration for the check
1. Certiorari. - This is a certiorari brought to review was an allowance agreed to be paid the payee for ser
the decision of the county court made in a special provices as an assignee in bankruptcy, over and above the
ceeding, upon appeal from an assessment made by the fees, etc., allowed by law. Held, that the considera
| relators as commissioners, under an act of the legislation was illegal and the check void as a violation of
ture passed in 1864, chapter 577, providing for the section 45 of the general bankrupt act. New trial
drainage of certain lands. An appeal was given in granted. Ib.
these cases, by act of 1868, chapter 180, to the county
court of the county where the lands are situated. On CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.
appeal, the county court set aside the assessment with 1. Evidence: marriage certificate.- Where in an action costs, on the ground that the rule of apportionment of for criminal conversation with the plaintiff's wife, the the assessment, adopted by the commissioners, was plaintiff offered himself as a witness to prove the mar erroneous, and the commissioners sued out a certiorari riage and was objected to by defendant and the evi to this court. It appears that the land affected by the dence excluded; on appeal, Held, that the plaintiff was drainage and acts of the commissioners embraced a not a competent witness to prove the marriage in a large tract bordering on the banks of a lake and its case like this, being clearly excluded by the act of tributaries. The assessment was levied upon about 1867. Dunn v. Kingdom. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J. | 300 parcels of land belonging to different owners,
2. Plaintiff called his brother, and offered to prove and, with several exceptions, was assessed equally upon that he left home with the intention of being married each acre; portions of the land were arable, and some to his present wife, and returned, accompanied by her, comparatively worthless, yet nearly all were assessed and introduced her as his wife and represented that at a uniform rate per acre. The act authorizing the they had been married by one S., a justice of the appeal to the county court provides that “said court is peace, and that they commenced living together as authorized and required to review such assessment on husband and wife, and so lived until he separated from such appeal, upon such proof as may be presented at her on account of the matters involved in this suit. the hearing, and shall have power to affirm, reverse, On objection the testimony was excluded. Held, that set aside, or modify the said assessment, if it shall be in actions of this nature an actual marriage must be found that the lands assessed are not and will not be proved, and that the admissions of parties and their benefited by the work, or if it shall appear that the cohabitation is not sufficient. Ib.
rule of the apportionment of the assessment is erro3. Plaintiff then offered a certificate of marriage in the neous." The appeal is brought on the ground that the following form: “This certifies that the rites of holy | rule of the apportionment of the assessment is erroneous. matrimony was celebrated between Marcus Dunn, of The county court found "that the land so assessed is the town of Hastings, N. Y., and Sarah of the not equally benefited by said work, and that the comsame place, on the 11th day of October, at Cicero, N. missioners, without examination of each parcel of land, Y. A. SHELDON, justice of the peace. Witnesses." assumed that all the land would be equally benefited Which was objected to, and excluded on exception. per acre, and acted accordingly." Held, that the certificate was insufficient. It does not Held, that the county court had jurisdiction to comply with the statute; does not state that the mag review and set aside the assessment of the relators, istrate knew the parties, or that they were proven by upon the ground stated in the decision. People exc rel. oath to be the parties, and that he had ascertained Parker v. County Court of Jefferson County. Opinion that they were of sufficient age to contract marriage, by E. D. Smith, J. and no witnesses appear on it to have been present, 2. That the county court had no authority to review and it fails to state that there appeared no lawful im- the decision of the commissioners on the facts, but had pediment to the marriage. Where a statute makes | upon the law or principles governing their action and proceedings in making the assessments, and that the the exception well taken. New trial granted. Childs review in this court is limited to the facts appearing in v. Delaney. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J. or upon the return of the county court to the cer 2. Privileged communication : divorce.-Where, in an tiorari. Ib.
action for a divorce on the ground of adultery, the 3. That the findings of the county court, “that such defendant answered, denying the allegations of the estimate was made without examination of each and complaint and setting up adultery of the plaintiff as a every parcel assessed," is not unwarranted by the facts defense, and the issue was referred to a referee for before that court, and that there is nothing before us trial, who directed judgment for the plaintiff, and that would warrant this court in reversing such find judgment was ordered by the court, and defendant ings and decision, and that the judgment should there appealed to this court. Held, that the evidence of a fore be affirmed with costs. Ib.
physician, who was consulted professionally by the EJECTMENT.
plaintiff, that the plaintiff, during the period alleged, Equitable defense.-- Where plaintiff at the circuit
had a venereal disease, which he admitted to him he
had contracted from a female in his employ, being established a legal title to premises, and defendant in
objected to before its delivery, was a privileged comterposed as a defense and proved that, upon the assur
munication, and inadmissible under the statute (3 Rev. ance of the plaintiff's grantor, that he would advance
Stat., 5th ed. p. 690, S 104). Also, that evidence of her money to complete the purchase of the premises,
plaintiff's going into the hall of a house in which was she made a contract for the purchase of the same in
a saloon, not proven to be of bad repute, with a girl, her own name, and that said grantor advanced her the
about eight o'clock in the evening, is not enough to purchase-money and took the title in his name as secu
sustain the complaint. Judgment reversed and a new rity for such advance, and that defendant immediately went into possession, fitted up the house for a resi
trial granted. Hunn v. Hunn. Opinion by E. D. dence, with the knowledge and assent of said grantor,
(Concluded next week.) and under his advice, and he was a constant visitor there from the time of the purchase until his death, some two years after, and defendant resided on said
CORRESPONDENCE. premises until the commencement of this suit, a verdict was directed for the plaintiff, and defendant ex
A POINT OF PRACTICE. cepted, and exceptions ordered to the general term.
SIR– The decision of the Court of Appeals in LudHeld, that the defendant became the debtor of said
ington v. Miller, though not accompanied by a written grantor for the said advances, and he took the title
opinion, will probably be cited hereafter as authority merely as a trustee or mortgagee, for his security, and
upon an important point of practice, and is, therefore, that the defendant had an equitable title which could
deserving of a brief notice. It will be seen by the not be cut off without foreclosure, and that the facts
abstract that the complaint was dismissed at the trial, disclosed made out a complete equitable defense.
and that judgment was entered thereon for defendant. Plaintiff should have been nonsuited or verdict di
After the time limited for appeal had expired, a motion rected for defendant. New trial granted. Hermans v.
was made at Special Term for a new trial, which was Lucy. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.
denied. From the order an appeal was taken to the EVIDENCE.
General Term, where the objection was made that it 1. Where plaintiff and defendant had conversation in could not be heard while there was a judgment unaprespect to a settlement of claims between them and re pealed from. The court overruled the objection, and ferred the matters to their attorneys to draw up and pre granted a new trial, from which defendant appealed to pare the proper papers and vouchers; defendant testi- the Court of Appeals, where the decision is now fied that all demands were settled, and plaintiff and his affirmed, but, pursuant to the statutory provision attorney testified to a conversation between themselves applying to such cases, judgment absolute is directed - apart from defendant- wherein plaintiff instructed instead of a new trial. The decision of the court his attorney not to release a certain claim, and defend below (Superior Court, N. Y.) was based wholly upon ant's counsel objected to said evidence as improper and the case of Tracey v. Altmeyer, 46 N. Y. 598. That case, inadmissible, but it was received, and, on judgment for | it will be seen, determined that a motion might be plaintiff, defendant appealed to this court. Held, that made for new trial after judgment, but the question the evidence was inadmissible. It consisted of the de- / was not presented whether an appeal from an order clarations of instructions of the plaintiff given to his granting or denying a new trial is sustainable, without attorney, not in the presence or hearing of defendant, also appealing from the judgment — for there was in but for his private conduct in negotiating and perfect that case an appeal from both the order and judgment. ing the settlement. 2. That the rule “that an excep The present decision, therefore, is, to some extent, an tion is not good when no ground is stated for it” is not entirely new adjudication, that is, there is no preapplicable to the objection taken to this evidence. viously reported case on which this distinct question When evidence is offered which is apparently upon its has come up. What the exact grounds of the decision face inadmissible, as in this case, a general objection to are, do not appear, there being no written opinion of it, as improper or inadmissible is sufficient to call upon this court, and the opinion of the court below being the party offering it to show upon what 'ground it is hardly adequate as an explanation of the views of this offered, if it be only admissible upon some special or court. The following is the abstract: particular ground. This evidence, upon general prin- Ludington v. Miller. – This case, which was decided ciples, was not admissible upon any grounds. It is not at the last term of this court, presenting the following a case of evidence, upon its face, apparently admissible. facts and questions : The custom house placed a storeBeing inadmissible generally, plaintiff was bound to keeper in charge of a bonded warehouse in the city of show its admissibility to exempt it from the general New York - a man near 80 years of age, and subject objection. The evidence was improperly received and to serious infirmity. By the regulations of the Secre
tary of the Treasury, pursuant to a statute of the In United States v. Vermilye (p. 280) it was held that United States, the warehouse cannot be opened, nor a “seven-thirty” note, issued under the act of March any goods be received or delivered, but in the presence 3, 1865, payable to the order of — , and not having of the storekeeper, and all the work done is to be under the name of any person filled into such blank, is payhis supervision. Hatches were used in this, as in other able to bearer and negotiable, and that the writing of warehouses, for hoisting or letting down goods, with any thing on the back of such note (the blank being which the storekeeper was fully made acquainted. No unfilled), does not amount to an indorsement, nor reartificial light was allowed in the building, by the cus strict its negotiability. tom-house regulations, except a lantern. The store Freedman v. Sigel (p. 327) held that the United States keeper met with an accident by falling down one of cannot impose a tax on the salary of a judge of the these hatches while it was in actual use for the hoist- | Superior Court of New York. ing of goods, which accident resulted in his death. No one saw him fall. The testimony was not positive whether the hatch could have been seen by the ordinary
COMMISSION OF APPEALS. light — the deceased had no lantern. At the trial, upon The attention of members of the bar is called to the proof of these facts, the complaint was dismissed, and following order made at the late term of the Commisjudgment entered accordingly for defendants. Two sion of Appeals. The next term will commence on the months afterward a motion was made for a new trial, first Tuesday of January, 1874: which was denied. Plaintiffs appealed to the General
IN COMMISSION OF APPEALS, Term from the order, but not from the judgment. A
ALBANY, October 3, 1873.5 divided court by a majority ordered a new trial, and Ordered as follows: 1. The clerk will make up a calfrom this order defendants appealed to the Court of endar for the January term, 1874, on which shall be put, Appeals.
without further notice, all the causes, not previously The questions presented to this court were: First. disposed of, which have been on either of the printed Whether the storekeeper was or was not the principal, calendars of the present year; and also all other and the warehousemen his subordinates. Second. causes pending before the commission which shall be Whether the warehousemen were guilty of negligence, noticed for argument by either party. and if so, whether the deceased was chargeable with 2. All other causes pending before the commission negligence contributing to the injury. Third. Whether, shall be put upon a special calendar, which shall also after judgment, a motion could be made for a new trial, be printed and brought into court at the beginning of and an appeal taken from the order denying such mo the January term, 1874. This special calendar will be tion, without appealing from the judgment, and after called over at the next succeeding term, beginning on the time allowed for appealing from such judgment a day to be hereafter fixed, and to be announced at the had expired.
January term. Cases upon it which shall be answered The Court of Appeals decided all these questions to when called, shall be transferred to the foot of the against defendants, and ordered judgment absolute for general calendar; cases uot answered to will be displaintiffs, and assessment of damages, and this decision missed. was made without a written opinion of any one of the
W. H. BENJAMIN, Clerk. judges.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. Blatchford's Reports. Vol. X. New York: Baker, Voorhis
The following decisions of the Court of Appeals & Co., 1873.
were announced on Tuesday last: This volume contains the cases argued and deter Order reversed and motion for mandamus granted mined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the with costs - People ex rel. Church v. Hopkins, Compsecond circuit, from March, 1872, to March, 1873. This troller.-- Judgment affirmed with costs to all parties circuit is particularly fruitful in litigation, especially to be paid from the estate – Dupuy v. Wurtz.of bankruptcy, collision and patent questions, and this Judgments affirmed with costs - Filike v. Boston & volume contains a large number of decisions on each Albany R. R. Co.; Prendergast v. Borst; Ritter v. of those subjects — some of them important. We have Phillips; Hackford v. New York Central and Hudson space to note only a few of the decisions. In Fraloff River R. R. Co.; Bosworth v. Vandermaker; Dugan v. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (p. 16), valuable laces Champlain Transportation Co.; Sands v. Hill; Long v. were held to be proper baggage for a lady to carry, Western R. R. Corporation; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. reference being had to her social position and wealth, McCall; Rogers v. King; Merchants' National Bank v. and to the object of her journey.
Comstock. Order affirmed with costs - Waring v. In re Sacci, a bankrupt (p. 29), it was held that, in Loder.- Judgments reversed, new trial granted, general, a mortgagee, holding a mortgage on real estate costs to abide event - Gray v. Barton; Hewlett v. of a bankrupt, should not be permitted to foreclose in Wood.- Order reversed and application denied a State court.
with costs. - In the matter of the Boston and Albany In Clark, assignee, v. Iselin (p. 204), it is held that the R. R. Co.- Order reversed and motion granted with mere giving of security on a loan of money is not an costs - People ex rel. Rolton v. Albertson.- Re-arguillegal preference under the bankrupt act.
ment ordered of the following questions - First: Was Martin v. Criscuola (p. 211) holds that the United the title to the money the subject of the controversy States Practice Act of June 1, 1872 (17 U. S. Stat. at in the county of New York. Second: If the money Large), does not authorize the commencement of an was the money of the county, can the Board of Superaction at law in the Circuit Court by a summons visors maintain an action for the cause stated in the issued in the name of the plaintiff's attorney, accord complaint in behalf and for the benefit of the county? ing to the mode of commencing actions in the courts - People, etc., v. Ingersoll, impleaded, etc.— Motion of the State of New York.
denied with $10 costs — Barber v. Coleman.- Judg