international maritime rights, inferior to that of no one of his contemporaries at home or abroad.

I had an opportunity to answer Judge Nelson's inquiry as to the result of the case, by announcing to him that his opinion had been sustained by awards to the claimants of the Circassian for $225,264.

It is due to Judge Nelson to add, that this was the only case in which the decision of the Commission was in direct contradiction to a judgment of the Supreme Court. W. B. LAWRENCE. OCHRE POINT, NEWPORT, R. I., 16th December, 1873.

OCHRE POINT, NEWPORT, R. I.,
June 16th, 1873.

DEAR JUDGE NELSON-I have had occasion recently to examine the case of the "Circassian" (2 Wallace, 156). As it was not decided till 1864, and consequently not till after the publication of the second edition of Lawrence's Wheaton, which appeared in 1863, there is no notice of it in my book, and what is pretty strong evidence that Dana took all his authorities from me - it is not alluded to in the spurious one of 1866, published more than a year after the second of Wallace.

It is, however, referred to by Tudor, in the edition of "Leading Cases of Mercantile and Maritime Law," 1868, p. 837. I inclose a copy of so much of his note, as relates to the cessation of a blockade, when the port falls into the possession of the blockading power, and which shows how the respective opinions of the judges, who decided that case, are regarded abroad.

I cannot give any other plausible solution to the opinion of the Chief Justice than that he decided the case, not by the law of belligerent blockade, but by the act of 13th July, 1861, authorizing, among other things, the closing of the ports by executive authority, which he had drawn and under which he had acted whilst in the treasury. Indeed, I notice that, when the point was before the court, in the case of the "Gray Jacket " (5th of Wallace), as to the application of that act to the remission of forfeiture of a vessel on the high seas, bound to a foreign port, the counsel referred, for precedents, to remissions made in similar cases by Secretary Chase.

Of course, I had the highest regard for the late Chief Justice, and in dicussing his views I shall refer to them with respect, but it is impossible for me to recognize his law in this case, especially when I have before me the unanswerable argument by which it was controverted. It has been to me inexplicable that there should have been no other dissentient than yourself, though that with jurists will little affect the intrinsic weight of your opinion.

I trust, my dear judge, that you will not deem my inquiries intrusive. For the reputation of the court I should regret that there was but one judge who held that a blockade ceased when the blockaded port came into the possession of the blockading power.

I am, with sincere veneration,

Very truly yours,

W. B. LAWRENCE.

COOPERSTOWN, August 4th, 1873.

DEAR SIR-I have read your argument before the Mixed Commission, in the case of the Circassian, with very 'great interest, and barring the compliments to me, I regard it as unanswerable.

You refer to the allegation on the other side, that there was but one dissent in the decision of the case in

the Supreme Court. The truth is, that the feeling of the country was deep and strong against England, and the judges, as individual citizens, were no exception to this feeling. Besides, the court was not then familiar with the law of blockade. As evidence of the latter, the Chief Justice had put the decision of the case in his opinion mainly upon the proclamation of the president, fixing the time when the blockade should cease at New Orleans. But, after hearing my dissenting opinion, he asked permission to modify it, as it now appears in the report, which was readily granted.

As to the feeling of hostility to England at the time, Judge Black told me that, after my dissenting opinion was read, one of the most eminent members of the bar said to him, “that the delivery of it was the greatest mistake of my life."

Now that the passions and prejudices of the hour have passed away, there are not, or cannot be, two different opinions in that case.

Have the Mixed Commission passed upon the case? I should be pleased to be advised of the result. Very truly,

1. Escape: execution against body: power of Supreme Court to set aside. -This action was brought against defendant, as sheriff of Montgomery county, for an alleged escape on June 4, 1866. Plaintiff, in an action for breach of promise to marry, obtained a judgment against W.; April 12, 1869, plaintiff had said W. arrested upon an execution against the person, issued upon said judgment, and committed to jail. He gave bail for the liberty of the yard. April 29, 1869, upon application of W., without notice to plaintiff, an order was made at special term setting aside the execution against the person of W., and discharging him from custody. Upon the presentation of the order to defendant he released W. Held, that the order, being valid upon its face, is a justification to the sheriff for the release. (Bullymore v. Cooper, 46 N. Y. 236, distinguished.) Pinckney v. Hegeman, Sheriff, etc. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. Also, held, that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction and full control over his own process, and may set aside an execution against the person issued upon a judgment therein, after an imprisonment and an arrest of the judgment debtor under and by virtue of the execution. Although the execution is completely executed by such arrest and imprisonment, yet it is not annulled. The writ is still the authority for the detention of the prisoner, and an order setting it aside takes away that authority and obligates his release. Ib.

ASSESSMENT.

National banks. - Plaintiff is a national bank in the city of Elmira; it has a capital stock of $100,000, invested in U. S. government bonds. In 1868 the assessors of Elmira assessed plaintiff $5,000 on real estate and $95,000 on personal property; the latter being the capital stock. The assessors' affidavit attached to the roll was sworn to before the deputy county clerk of Chemung. Upon such assessment a tax was imposed upon plaintiff of $2,080; a levy was made upon a quantity of bank bills belonging to plaintiff; they were sold, and the amount of the tax paid over to the city treas

urer, and the balance to the county treasurer. Plaintiff then brought this action for the unlawful taking and conversion of the property levied upon. Held, that the assessment upon the capital stock and the tax against plaintiff, in violation of the provisions of the act "authorizing the taxation of stockholders of banks," etc. (§ 1, chap. 761, Laws of 1866), which prohibits the assessment of a tax upon such capital stock were void, and an action on behalf of the bank would lie against defendant to recover the amount collected by it upon such assessment. The remedy by certiorari is not adequate in such case. That is appropriate to review erroneous assessments, not where property has been taken in violation of law under an illegal assessment.

The assessor's oath to the affidavit attached to their assessment roll must be taken before a justice of the peace (§ 8, chap. 176, Laws of 1851); the deputy county clerk has no authority to administer the same. Church, Ch. J.

Assessors are subordinate officers and must act within the authority conferred upon them. When in a given case they have no power to act at all, either as to persons or property, their acts are void, and where their right to act depends upon the existence of some fact, an assessment founded upon an erroneous determination by them as to the existence of such fact is illegal. They cannot acquire jurisdiction by determining that they have it. Assessors have no power to determine what property is taxable; that is the province of the legislature, and they are as liable for an erroneous decision on their part, as to what is taxable, as for one as to who is a taxable inhabitant and an assessment founded thereon is void. A decision of assessors in these cases may be attacked collaterally. National Bank of Chemung v. City of Elmira. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

BROOKLYN-EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. The board of water and sewerage commissioners of the city of Brooklyn, in carrying out their plan of sewerage and drainage, constructed a sewer in an unopened portion of Dean street, but through or upon which the municipal corporation had not yet acquired a right of way. After such construction an application was made at the special term of the Supreme Court, in conformity with the provisions of section 8, chapter 521, Laws of 1857, to lawfully open Dean street at the points under consideration. The application was opposed, principally upon the ground that, as the sewer had already been built, there was no necessity for the application, and the authority of the board was spent. Held, that the power of the commissioners was not spent; that the authority to apply was based solely upon the finding by the commissioners of the necessity of the construction of the sewer, and that there was nothing in the act requiring the opening of the street before building the sewer; that, for the purpose of maintaining and preserving the sewer, it was as necessary that the municipality should have the lawful use of the street as for the purpose of building it, and that therefore the application was properly granted. The Supreme Court cannot, upon an application under section 8, chapter 521, Laws of 1857, inquire into or pass upon the question of the necessity of opening the street, further than may be incidentally involved in the determination of the question whether it is for a public use. The phrases "to construct" and "be constructed," as used in said section, are not confined to the mere act of building the sewers; they include the maintenance,

preservation and protection as well as the erection thereof. In re Application of Fowler et al. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. As the exercise of the right of eminent domain may be delegated by the legislature to municipalities, to boards of officers and to public agents, the necessity of an appropriation of lands by them cannot be inquired into by the courts. If the lands are to be put to a public use, the legislature, or the instrumentality it employs, is the sole judge of the necessity, unless the enactment provides otherwise. Ib.

CONVEYANCE.

Exception of highway from grant. — This action was for an injunction restraining defendant from digging upon two strips of land formerly a highway extending through defendant's lands, who claimed title through a deed from F. R. Tillou given in 1836, which after a description of the premises contained the following clause, "but saving and excepting all and so much and such part and parts thereof as has or have been lawfully taken for a public road or roads." At the time of the conveyance there were two highways running through the land, which were used until 1840, when they were abandoned. The lands covered by these roads were conveyed by Tillou to plaintiff, and are the strips of land in question.

Held, that the exception in the deed was of the land covered by the highways, not simply of the public easement therein, that the fee of the lands so covered remained in the grantor and passed by the conveyance to plaintiff. Munn v. Worrall. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

EVIDENCE.

This action was brought upon a joint promissory note for $1,000 made by L. G. M. and his co-defendant, G. L. M. The defense was substantially that the note had in fact been paid from the joint funds of the makers, that plaintiff was not a bona fide holder, but that the note was nominally assigned to him under a pretended arrangement between him and G. L. M. which was, in fact, a sham and a fraud upon defendant. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that G. L. M. had in the hands of an agent, one N., of Syracuse, the sum of $1,055, the proceeds of the sale of certain real estate in that city, the title to which, prior to sale, was in said G. L. M., who transferred the same to plaintiff, his son, to pay a debt he owed him of about $400, and the balance as a loan, and that N. with these funds, by plaintiff's direction, purchased the note in suit. Defendant proved that he and G. L. M. had been partners and had been operating in real estate, and by articles of agreement between them it was agreed that the real estate and the interest of the parties therein, whether standing in the name of the one or the other, should be for their joint benefit. Evidence was given as to their joint interest in the Syracuse property. Defendant offered to show that the accounts of the receipts and disbursements in respect to that property were entered in the partnership books as partnership accounts, also that the property was in fact joint property. Plaintiff objected to this evidence, and it was excluded.

Held error; that the evidence was proper as tending to show that the note was purchased with joint funds, that no question of a trust was involved, and the provision of the statute of uses and trusts abolishing resulting trusts, arising from the payment of the purchase money of lands by one, the title being taken by another, did not apply, that that provision could not defeat an express covenant, or be made the instrument of fraud,

also that the evidence was competent upon the question as to the bona fides of the transaction between plaintiff and G. W. L. Marvin v. Marvin, Impl'd, etc. Opinion by Allen, J.

JURISDICTION.

of State court at suit of assignee in bankruptcy. This action was brought in the Supreme Court of this State by plaintiff as assignee in bankruptcy of C. to recover money and property alleged to have been transferred to and converted by defendants with the view of preventing its coming to the assignee. Defendants insisted that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, and hence the complaint should be dismissed. Held, that the Supreme Court has, under the constitution and laws of this State, jurisdiction of all cases in law and equity, and there being nothing in the bankruptcy acts limiting such jurisdiction, plaintiff, as assignee of C., had a right to bring an action, either legal or equitable, in that court, to recover the property of the bankrupt. The State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the United States courts in such action. Cook v. Whipple et al. Opinion by Grover, J.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE.

This action was brought to restrain defendant from selling certain real estate situated in Rochester, N. Y., belonging to plaintiff. The wife of E. had title to two pieces of real estate, one known as the H street, and the other as the S street property. She gave to C. a mortgage upon the former. An action in the nature of a creditor's bill was commenced by K. against E. and his wife upon a judgment against E., alleging that this property had been conveyed to Mrs. E. in fraud of the creditors of her husband. C. was not made a party. The judgment in this action declared the deeds to Mrs. E. to be fraudulent, and void as to creditors, and the property was adjudged to belong to E., and to be subject to K.'s judgment, and was ordered to be sold to satisfy the same. Mrs. E. subsequently executed a mortgage on the S street property to W. which was foreclosed and the premises bid off and conveyed to defendant. K. was not made a party to the foreclosure. C. afterward foreclosed his mortgage and did not make K. a party. Upon the sale plaintiff's intestate purchased the premises. Defendant thereupon purchased and took an assignment of K.'s judgment, and was proceeding to enforce it by a sale of the H street property, when plaintiff brought this action to restrain him. Held, 1st, that the lien of C.'s mortgage was paramount to K.'s judgment, and that the equity of redemption of Mrs. E. in the H street property only became subject to the lien of the judgment; that by omitting to make K. a party to the foreclosure it was void as to such lien, and the equity of redemption still remained subject thereto; and that plaintiff by his purchase became the owner of the fee, subject to the lien of the judgment upon the equity of redemption. 2d. That the S street property and such equity of redemption in the H street property, were subject to an equal liability upon K.'s judgment, that the mortgage given to W. alienated pro tanto the interest of Mrs. E. in the former, and created an equity in his favor to have the judgment satisfied out of her remaining interest in both parcels, that the foreclosure of said mortgage extinguished and was in effect an alienation of all her title to the premises, leaving her still the owner of the equity of redemption in the H street property. 3d. That under the rule that where a portion of lands subject to an incumbrance have been

conveyed, the remainder shall be first applied to discharge the incumbrance, defendant, as purchaser upon the foreclosure of the W. mortgage, was entitled to have Mrs. E.'s equity of redemtion in the H street property first applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and was entitled to sell the same under said judgment, and out of the avails of the sale plaintiff was first entitled to what was due on the C. mortgage, and then defendant was entitled to the payment of the judgment, and the surplus, if any, belonged to plaintiff. Reynolds, adm'r, etc. v. Park. Opinion by Grover, J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

ABSTRACTS FROM 16 WALLACE.

ACTION.

Where an incorporated company undertook to work in the streets of a city, agreeing that it would "protect all persons against damages by reason of excavations made by them in doing it, and to be responsible for all damages which may occur by reason of the neglect of their employés on the premises; held, on the company's having let the work out to a subcontractor, through the negligence of whose servants injury accrued to a person passing over the street, that an action lay against the company for damages. Water Company v. Ware, 566.

ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON.

1. Cannot sue the former administrator or his reprosentatives for a devastavit, or for delinquencies in office; nor can he maintain an action on the former administrator's bond for such cause. The former administrator, or his representatives, are liable directly to creditors and next of kin. The administrator de bonis non has to do only with the goods of the intestate unadministered. If any such remain in the hands of the discharged administrator or his representatives, in specie, he may sue for them either directly or on the bond. Beall v. New Mexico, 535.

2. Regularly, a decree of the Probate Court against the administrator for an amount due, and an order for leave to prosecute his bond, are prerequisites to the maintenance of a suit thereon. Ib.

ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE.

A purchaser at judicial sale by an administrator does not depend upon a return by the administrator making the sale, of what he has done. If the preliminary proceedings are correct, and he has the order of sale and the deed, this is sufficient for him. McNitt v. Turner, 353.

ADMIRALTY.

A statute of a State giving to the next of kin of a person crossing upon one of its public highways with reasonable care, and killed by a common carrier by means of steamboats, an action on the case for damages for the injury caused by the death of such person, does not interfere with the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States, as conferred by the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789; and this is so, even though no such remedy, enforceable through the admiralty, existed when the said act was passed, or has existed since. Steamboat Company v. Chase, 522.

BAIL.

1. The "act of the law" which will discharge bail from an obligaton to surrender their prisoner must be

one which renders the performance impossible, and must be a law operative in the State where the obligation was assumed, and obligatory in its effect upon her authorities. Taylor v. Taintor, 367.

2. The fact that there has been placed in the hands of the bail, by some one, not the person arrested nor any one in his behalf, nor so far as the bail knew, with his knowledge, a sum of money equivalent to that for which the bail and himself were bound, has no effect, in a suit against the bail, on the rights of the parties. Ib.

BANK DEPOSIT- BANKRUPT ACT.

1. A creditor has reasonable cause to believe his debtor "insolvent" in the sense of the, when such a state of facts is brought to his notice respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition of his debtor, as would lead a prudent business man to the conclusion that he, the debtor, is unable to meet his obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of business. Buchanan v. Smith, 277.

2. A debtor "suffers" or "procures " his property to be seized on execution, when knowing himself to be insolvent, an admitted creditor who has brought suit against him—and who he knows will, unless he applies for the benefit of the, secure a preference over all other creditors - proceeds in the effort to get a judgment until one has been actually got by the perseverance of him the creditor and the default of him the debtor. Ib. 3. Such effort by the creditor to get a judgment, and such omission by the debtor to "invoke the protecting shield of the," in favor of all his creditors, is a fraud on the, and invalidates any judgments obtained. Ib. 4. The fact that the debtor, just before the judgments were recovered, may have made a general assignment which he meant for the benefit of all his creditors equally, does not change the case. Such assignment is a nullity. Ib.

5. The transfer by a debtor who is insolvent, of his property, or a considerable portion of it, to one creditor as a security for a pre-existing debt, without making any provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, operates as a preference, and must be taken as prima facie evidence that a preference was intended, unless the transferee can show that the debtor was at the time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. Wager et al. v. Hall, 584.

6. Such a transfer, if made within four months before the filing by the party of a petition in bankruptcy, is void. Ib.

7. A sale by a retail country merchant then insolvent of his entire stock, suddenly, is a sale "not made in the usual and ordinary course " of his business; and, therefore, prima facie evidence of fraud, within the 35th section of the bankrupt law. Walbrun v. Babbitt, 577.

8. This presumption of fraud can be overcome only by proof on the part of the buyer that he pursued in good faith all reasonable means to find out the pecuniary condition of the vendor. Ib.

9. One purchasing in such a case from a vendee who he knows has used no such means, but on the contrary has bought under other suspicious circumstances, takes with full knowledge of the infirmity of the title. And as against either or both purchasers the assignee in bankruptcy may set the sale aside if made within six months before a decree in bankruptcy, even though a fair money consideration have been paid by each. Ib.

10. The District Courts sitting in bankruptcy have no jurisdiction to proceed by rule to take goods seized, before any act of bankruptcy by the lessees, for rent due by them in Louisiana, under "a writ of provisional seizure" and then in the hands of the sheriff, and held by him as a pledge for the payment of rent dueout of his hands, and to deliver them to the assignee in bankruptcy to be disposed of under the orders of the bankrupt court; neither the sheriff nor the lessor having been parties to the proceedings in bankruptcy nor served with process to make them such. Marshall v. Knox, 551.

11. Where, under the 41st section of the Bankrupt Act of 1867, a trial by jury is had in the District Court in a case of application for involuntary bankruptcy, and exceptions are taken in the ordinary and proper way, to the rulings of the court on the subject of evidence and to its charge to the jury, a writ of error lies from the Circuit Court when the debt or damages claimed amount to more than $500; and if that court dismiss or declines to hear the matter, a mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed to final judgment. Insurance Company v. Comstock, 258.

12. Where the goods of a tenant seized by a landlord for rent, before any act of bankruptcy, have been taken out of his hands and given to the assignee in bankruptcy, by an order of the District Court acting summarily and without jurisdiction, and sold by such assignee, the Circuit Court, having got possession of the case by bill filed by the lessor, to be regarded as one in an original proceeding, will proceed and decide the whole controversy. Marshall v. Knox, 551.

13. And where the seizure for rent has been made under a statute like that prevailing in Louisiana, and where the landlord's lien is a perfected one, in the nature of a pledge or execution, it will give the lessor the full value of the goods sold clear of all expenses, whether the assignee obtained that value or not (limited, of course, by the amount of rent which he is entitled to have paid to him), and also to all the taxable costs to which he has been put by the litigation. Damages may be more appropriately claimed at law. Ib.

BOND.

A bond regular on its face cannot be avoided even by sureties (the obligee not having had knowledge thereof) by the fact that they signed it on a condition that other persons were to execute it who did not execute it. Dair v. United States, 1.

BONUS.

A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but a sum paid for services upon a consideration in addition to or in excess of that which would ordinarily be given. Kennicott v. The Supervisors, 453.

CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY ACT. A claim under, for a vessel taken and sold by the Treasury Department, held to have been rightly dismissed, the property which was the subject of it having been used in waging or carrying on war against the United States; and this so held although the government, in ignorance of the fact just stated, had hired the vessel in a regular way, and used her for a whole year as i she were belonging to a loyal citizen who had never misused her; after which under some general order it disregarded the owner's claims, and turned her over for sale by the Treasury Department. Slawson v. United States, 310.

CHARTER.

An amendment to a charter treated as part of a charter, in a subsequent statute giving certain privileges "granted by the charter." Humphrey v. Pegues,

244.

COLLISION.

Though a sailing vessel having the wind is prima facie bound to adopt such a course as will prevent sollision with other sailing vessels not having it, it is still the duty of these last in an emergency to make their courses so as not to render it difficult for the vessel having the wind to do her duty by rendering it doubtful what movement she should make. The Mary Eveline, 348.

COMMERCIAL BROKERS.

Who act wholly as buyers, not liable under the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, to the tax of onetwentieth of one per cent on the amount of "sales" made by commercial brokers. The Collector v. Doswell & Co., 156.

WAR AND LIFE INSURANCE.

The

The controverted question of the effect of the recent civil war on policies of Life Insurance has been recently passed upon by Emmons, J., of the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennessee. following is an abstract of the decision: CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.

W. E. Tait et al., Heirs of Dr. Samuel Bond, deceased, v. New York Life Insurance Co. Emmons, J. A policy of insurance which indemnifies a public enemy against loss in time of war is unlawful; and where entered into before hostilities, is abrogated when they occur. The relations it establishes are illegal between belligerents.

When a life policy provides that it shall be void upon the non-payment of premiums within the time prescribed, such payment is a condition precedent; time is of the essence of contract, and there can be no recovery if punctual payment is omitted.

Where the performance of a condition precedent becomes unlawful, or by the act of God, impossible, this will not authorize a recovery upon the contract without performance. Such case distinguished from those in which subsequent impossibility and illegality are relied upon as a defense.

A contract of insurance, the continuance of which depends upon the election and acts of the insured, is not like a debt, the obligation of which is absolute, and which is suspended only by war.

The relations between the members of a corporation for mutual insurance present all the evils and are dissolved by war for the same reasons as those between ordinary copartners.

The reasons for the dissolution of executory contracts by war are not alone that such contracts involve inter-communion across the hostile lines, or that they relate to property liable to capture; but more especially because their execution increases the resources of the enemy.

A court of equity has no authority to decree the specific performance of an agreement in favor of a party who has failed to perform a condition which is of the essence of the contract, although prevented by its becoming subsequently illegal or impossible by act of God.

A court of equity will not relieve a party from the effect of omitting to perform an act, although the omission was caused by subsequent illegality or impossibility arising from the act of God, where such act was merely optional, and the other party had no right to enforce its performance.

The agency of one representing an insurance company, authorized to receive premiums and renew policies, becomes unlawful when the insured and insurer become public enemies.

Humes & Posten, for plaintiff; Randolph, Hammond & Jordan, for defendants.

EVIDENCES OF LIFE IN THE NEWLY-DELIVERED CHILD.

BY WM. B. ATKINSON, M. D.,

PHYSICIAN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND DISEASES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN, HOWARD HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA, ETC., ETC.

My opinion having recently been asked as to the fact of a child having life at delivery, in a case involving a large estate, I have been led to investigate the subject, and collate the views and opinions of authorities on this delicate and important point.

First. What are the indications of life? Before delivery the foetus possesses circulation without respiration. While this continues, and while the heart maintains its action, the foetus lives and carries on all the functions of embryonic life. The cessation of the heart's action, and consequently of the circulation of the blood, marks the death of the child, and decomposition soon commences.

So long as pulsation continues in the cord, the fœtus, though inaccessible to the touch, is regarded as possessing life. This belief is so well established that all obstetricians hesitate in the performance of certain operations which may be rendered necessary by malformation of the pelvis, or malposition of the child, when such operation must necessarily lead to the destruction of life in the child. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church provides for the baptism of the undelivered child under such circumstances, and does not hesitate to pronounce such an infant as saved if the ceremony is performed while such pulsations are known to exist, however feebly they may occur.

Now, if the foetus is living as long as pulsation exists, may we not equally claim it as alive if such pulsation exists after delivery, even though respiration has not been established, or even attempted.

Upon this point obstetrical authors maintain a remarkable silence. In works on medical jurisprudence we find more light thrown upon this intricate and important matter. Beck says: "There are two ways

in which a child may be born. When born, the cord may be pulsating, showing that it is alive, and yet it may not respire. In this state it may continue for a sufficient length of time to die from natural causes, or in consequence of criminal interference, before respiration has commenced."-Beck's Med. Juris., eleventh ed., 1860, vol. I, p. 494.

Taylor tells us: "It was formerly supposed that if the lungs contained no air the child could not have respired, and it must have been born dead. But neither of these views is correct; children have been known to respire faintly, and continue in existence many hours without visibly distending the cells of the lungs with air; the absence of air from the lungs, therefore,