nuisance to the bar and an evil to society. He is a fraud upon the profession and the public; a lawyer among clowns and a clown among lawyers.

There is a variety of the animal, known by the classic name of Shyster. He has forced the word into at least one dictionary, and I may use it without offense. This is still a lower specimen; the pettifogger pettifogged upon; a troglodyte who penetrates depths of still deeper darkness. He has all the common vices of the family, and some special vices of his own. This creature frequents criminal courts, and there delights in criminal practice. He is the familiar of bailiffs and jailers; and has a sort of undefined partnership with them, in thieves and ruffians and prostitutes. These he defends or betrays, according to the exigencies of his relations with their captors or prosecutors. He has confidential relations with those who dwell in the debatable land between industry and crime. He is the friend of pimps and fences. He has intimacies among the most vicious men and women. He is the standing counsel of gambling dens and houses of ill-fame. He knows all about the criminals in custody, and has extensive acquaintances among those at large. He is conversant with their habits of life, and calls them familiarly by their Christian names. He prowls around the purlieus of jails and penitentiaries, seeking clients, inventing defenses, organizing perjury, tampering with turnkeys, and tolling prisoners. He levies blackmail on all hands. His effrontery is beyond all shame. He thinks all lawyers are as he, but not so smart. believes in the integrity of no man; in the virtue of no woman. He loves vice better than virtue. He enjoys darkness rather than light. His habits of life lead him to the back lanes and dark ways of the world. He is the counsel of guilt. He is the attorney-general of crime.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-PRIVILEGE.

He

The circumstances under which a solicitor cannot be compelled to disclose his client's address were discussed by James, L. J., in Ex parte Campbell, In re Cathcart, 18 W. R. 1056, L. R. 5 ch. 703. In his lordship's view, if a solicitor knows where his client is from some source other than the confidential statement of the client himself, made sub sigillo confessionis for the purpose of obtaining the solicitor's professional advice and assistance, the solicitor cannot protect himself on the ground of his client's privilege; and in such a case it is immaterial that he gained his knowledge of his client's residence solely in consequence of being his legal adviser. If, however we continue to state his lordship's view - the client is in hiding, or is concealing his residence, and the solicitor is in a position to say that he only knows his client's residence because the client had communicated it to him confidentially as his solicitor for the purpose of being advised by him, then the client's residence is a matter of professional confidence.

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motion were Ramsbotham v. Senior, 17 W. R. 1057, L. R., 8 Eq. 575, and Burton v. Earl Darnley, 17 W. R. 1057, L. R., 8 Eq. 576, in note. In both these cases the whereabouts of wards of court was being concealed for the purpose of keeping them out of the reach of the court, or of the guardian appointed by the court; and it was held by Vice-Chancellor Malins that a solicitor is not at liberty, in consequence of any privilege of the client, to conceal any fact which may enable the court to discover the residence of its wards. It is plain that these cases afforded no support to the present application.-Solicitors' Journal.

FOREIGN NOTES.

Dr. Facustie, the Bavarian minister of justice, is preparing a report upon the judicial laws of the German empire, which he will submit to parliament on its reassembling in autumn.

An advertisement lately appeared in the London Times calling a meeting of all persons who have claims against the United States which arose after the terminal date fixed in the treaty of Washington for the purpose of taking joint action for the advancement of their interests.

The queen has replied to the vote of the commoners on international arbitration as follows: "I have received the address of my faithful commons praying that I would be graciously pleased to instruct my principal secretary to enter into communication with foreign powers with a view to further improve international law, and establish a general and permanent system of arbitration. I am sensible of the force of the philanthropic motive dictating that address. I have at all times desired to extend the practice of closing international controversies by their submission to impartial friends, and to encourage the establishment of rules intended for the benefit of all. I shall continue to pursue the same course, with due regard to time and opportunity, whenever it is likely to be attended with advantage." The house received the document with hearty cheers.

LEGAL NEWS.

The Cincinnati Times thinks the elective system has not kept up the character of the Ohio judiciary. David Dudley Field, Esq., of New York city, will shortly start upon an extended foreign tour.

It is reported that Mr. Whalley, a member of the British Parliament, will soon visit this country to solicit subscriptions in aid of the Tichborne claimant.

A complimentary dinner was recently given in honor of the Hon. Emory Washburn, by the bar of St. Johns, N. B., a number of whom were former pupils of Governor Washburn's, at Harvard Law School.

"An extraordinary flood of blackguardism" is the term used by the Pall Mall Gazette in speaking of Caleb Cushing's recent work on the Geneva Arbitration.

ing the suit; and the plaintiffs, being desirous of serving notice of a subpœna ad testificandum upon him personally, made the present application.

The principal authorities adduced in support of the

The Washington Chronicle doubts the truthfulness of the report that either Conkling or Howe will be ap

court of the United States, and says: "The leading lawyers in the country seem pretty generally to adhere to the conviction that Mr. Justice Miller ought to be promoted to the high position."

In the United States Telegraph Company v. Gildersleve, 29 Maryland, 232 (1868), the above dictum is re-asserted, although quite unnecessarily. There Gildersleve left a message at defendants' office, in Baltimore, to be sent to New York. It was written upon the blank of another company, having upon its face this: "Send the following message, without repeating, subject to the conditions indorsed on the back." What these conditions were does not appear in the report, except that they were intended to relieve the company from liability in case of nonrepeated messages; but whether for delay or mistakes in transmission or for non-delivery, also, is not apparent. The party to whom the message was directed failed to get it; but from what cause the case does not clearly inform us; but we gather from the argument of plaintiff's counsel that it was from a failure to deliver it after it had reached the New York office. It appeared that the defendant had regulations as to repeating similar to those on the message sent. The court held that neither the conditions on the message nor their own regulations would relieve the company from their own willful misconduct or negligence; that such negligence must be established before there could be a recovery, and that, as the court below had refused defendants' prayers for instructions based upon this assumption, a new trial should be had. There was nothing calling for a decision as to whether the plaintiff would have been bound by defendants' regulations without being made aware of them, since the plaintiff, in having written his message upon the blank of another company, very clearly made the conditions thereon his own, and proffered them with his message - and, as must be presumed, with a knowledge of them.

In the case of Ellis v. The American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226 (1866), the sole question was, as stated by Chief Justice Bigelow, "whether that portion of the terms and conditions prescribed by the defendants is reasonable and valid which provides that the defendants will not hold themselves responsible for errors and delays in the transmission and delivery of messages, unless they are repeated." The mistake in the case consisted in making the message read $175, instead of $125, as it was written. There was "no evidence of carelessness or negligence, except the error in the sum, which was made by some agent of the company in transmission." The court held the regulation as to repeating the message reasonable; and that one injured by a mistake in an unrepeated message could not recover, beyond the amount paid for sending the same, without some further proof of carelessness or negligence on the part of the company than that resulting simply from error; that is, that there must be proof of negligence distinct from the "natural infirmities of telegraphing;" and the judgment, which was for the plaintiff, was reversed on the ground that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff ought to have shown carelessness on the part

of the company, and that, as the message was not repeated, negligence could not be inferred (as the court below had instructed) from the mere fact that a mistake in the sum had been made.

In Wann v. The Western Union Telegraph Company, 37 Mo. 472 (1866), the plaintiff delivered to defendants a message directing salt to be sent by "sail;" the message, when delivered, read "rail." The blank on which the message was written provided that the company would not be responsible "for mistakes or delays in the transmission of unrepeated messages from whatever cause they may arise." Of this condition the plaintiff had actual knowledge when he delivered his message, and the court held the condition reasonable and the plaintiff bound by it. The report informs us that the only evidence introduced on the trial to sustain the charge of carelessness was the mistake above stated. So that the case is "on all fours" with the Ellis case, but, as in that case, the court stated that the company would not be protected by their regulations from the consequences of their own gross negligence.

In Bryant v. The American Telegraph Company, 1 Daly, 575 (1866), the loss occurred through a delay in delivering the message after it was received at the office of destination. The company was fully informed of the importance of the message and of its prompt transmission. There were the usual regulations as to repeating, to guard against "mistakes or delays in transmission." The company was held liable.

In De Rutte's Case, 1 Daly, 547; 30 How. Pr. 403 (1866), the injury occurred through an alteration in transmission of "twenty-two" to " twenty-five." The company had regulations relieving them from liability for unrepeated messages, but this dispatch was not written on a blank of the company containing the ordinary conditions, and the court held that the plaintiff was not bound by such conditions unless they were brought home to his knowledge.

In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525 (1867), regulations as to repeating were held to be reasonable, and binding upon one who writes his message upon a blank containing such regulations, whether he reads them or not. In that case there was no evidence of negligence upon the part of the company.

In Sweetland v. The Illinois, etc., Telegraph Company, 27 Iowa, 432; 1 Am. Rep. 285 (1869), rules requiring messages to be repeated were held to be reasonable, but it was also held that such rules would not be so construed as to exempt the company from liability for a loss occasioned by its own fault or negligence or for want of proper skill or ordinary care on the part of its operators in transmitting an unrepeated message. In such case, however, the burden of proving negligence is put upon the plaintiff.

In Graham v. The Western Union Telegraph Company, 1 Colorado, 730 (1871), the damage occurred

through a failure to deliver the message after it had been received at the office of destination. There were the usual regulations as to repeating, but the court held these regulations not applicable to the case, and that the company was liable. This is in accordance with the ruling in Gildersleve's case, and in Bryant's case, and, by analogy, with the doctrine in Birney's case.

court of appeals furnishing copies of opinions, certified " a copy, but not for publication." Mr. Howard adds that, in a given case, a copy of an opinion was refused, although the fees were tendered, because the applicant remarked that he intended to have the report published in Howard's Practice. There have never been official reporters of the superior court. The reporters have been either judges of the court, or private gentlemen enjoying the favor of the judges, who per

In Breese v. The United States Telegraph Company, 48 N. Y. 132; 8 Am. Rep. 526 (1871), the commission of appeals decided that regulations of a telegraph company as to repeating are reasonable, and that where a person writes a message upon a blank containing such regulations he will be presumed to know and consent to them. The error, in that case, was in making "700" read "7,000," the precise cause of which error was unknown as the case states. There was no evidence of negligence beyond the fact of the mistake, and the court was not called upon to decide, nor did it attempt to decide, whether the company might relieve itself by such conditions from liability for injuries occasioned by its own negligence.

From this review of the cases it appears that a majority of the authorities hold that regulations of a telegraph company relieving them from liability unless the message is repeated are reasonable, but will not be construed so as to relieve them from liability for injuries occasioned for their own willful misconduct or negligence.

CONCERNING LAW REPORTING.

The fundamental law of the State provides that judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person. So long as official reporters perform their duties properly the bench and bar should support them by all legal means, and frown upon all outsiders. But, if the system of reporting is so faulty that no proper treatment can cure it, it is better to let it grow worse until by natural laws it cures itself. "The night is darkest before the dawn." No good will ever be gained by official reporters endeavoring to prevent the multiplication of reports by illegal means, or by judges favoring certain reporters to the exclusion of others, contrary to the spirit of the constitution and requirement of the laws. There can be no doubt that reporters have adopted a variety of irregular means to protect themselves against outside opposition.

A foot note at page 474 of 38 Howard's Practice complains of the common practice of reporters of the

ought to make them very circumspect in their behavior, but the New York Times, recently, had occasion to state editorially that Messrs. Jones and Spencer, the reporters of the superior court, refused access to the opinions of that court in order to enhance the value of their series. The anxiety of the Times to see these opinions would not have been so great had it known that the 33d Superior Court Reports contains a number of cases reversed by the court of appeals before they were reported by the reporters of the inferior court.

Official reporters should protect themselves as far as possible from the legal pirates, but they should not resort to such unwarrantable methods. As was pointed out by the committee on law reporting in their report to the bar association, it is impossible to look over Barbour's Reports, and see the long succession of opinions furnished by a few judges, without realizing that he has the favor of those judges, and that the official reporter has not. Perhaps those judges were ignorant of the law requiring them to send their opinions to Mr. Lansing, and if so it is likely that, with the withdrawal of their support, Mr. Barbour's Reports will cease. They may have been influenced by a widespread notion that judges have a proprietary right in their opinions after delivery; that they may retain them or give them to whoever they please, or that they may alter them and prepare them for reporting. There are indications that this notion has prevailed even among some of the judges. A letter from a learned justice of the supreme court will be found in 16 Howard's Practice, 288, regretting the publication of two opinions in cases decided by him, on the ground that he did not intend they should ever be reported, certainly not unless revised by him. The note was probably a private one, and does not, perhaps, express the deliberate opinion of the learned justice, who was justly irritated by words being put into his mouth which he never uttered, and reference is only made to it for the purpose of showing the existence of the opinion.

No notion can be more false or dangerous than this. If a good and able judge retains an opinion after judgment for the purpose of giving it polish, an unscrupulous one may keep it back to put the decision upon a different ground, or for some other nefarious motive. It is needless to say that, among the evils which the people of the State have suffered from their judiciary, this is not one. Certainly no danger

of this kind can be apprehended from the enlightened and excellent jurists who now grace our bench. But the very fact that such men countenance this mistaken opinion gives it weight and force, and may enable some future corrupt judge to do harm. The evil is not an imaginary one, but has caused alarm and elicited much comment in England.

In that country the propriety of the custom of judges revising their opinions has been called a vexed question. It is to be remembered, however, that the reasons which exist there in its favor are not applicable here. There the opinions delivered are generally oral and taken by the reporter on the spot. They are much less exact than they would be if written, and, unless revised before publication, are likely to convey mistaken ideas of what was meant. The judge may have used qualified language which escaped the reporter, or he may have been misunderstood, or have spoken hastily, and desire to modify his opinion. The English books are full of expressions of doubt, on the part of judges, as to whether their predecessors used the language attributed to them. The reporter is often literally exact in his report, but the exigencies of British juridical courtesy require the judge to say that it was impossible that Lord

could have

said thus and so, although his dictum has been repeatedly followed. It is little consolation, in such cases, for suitors to be told that the precedents on which they depend are not law, after they have misled half the kingdom.

There can be no room for difference of opinion on this subject in States where written opinions are the custom. No cause is there ready for decision until the opinions are finished; and if long opinions cannot be prepared within the time allowed by statute, and short ones can, a great good will be achieved by abandoning the practice of revision. One of the most striking facts presented by the report of the committee on law reporting is the contrast between the length of the old and modern opinions.

Judge-made law stands upon the same footing as statute law, and is equally to be respected and obeyed. Careless legislation is the greatest evil of our times. In one sense we have thirty-three legislators perpetually in session, making laws, good, bad and indifferent. It is inevitable that we should have indifferent and clashing legislation from so many law makers. But much of the judge-made law is only useful for the particular case it was made for, and should not be perpetuated. If we can reduce the reports to the smallest necessary compass, avoid all repetition, and publication of bad law, we will accomplish a result for which posterity may be grateful. The Lord Chief Baron, in speaking of the English system, before the inauguration of the law reports, said: "Reporting has been a nuisance, and, like sewage, it has become very difficult to know what to do with it."

LEWIS L. DELAFIELD.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Mr. George C. Bates, ex-United States attorney for Utah, has published a letter making some extraordinary charges against the United States judges in that Territory. It is stated that, some little time ago, Mr. Bates was called as a witness in a mining case, and while testifying that he had no knowledge of any corruption upon the part of United States officials in that particular case, appears to have intimated that he had knowledge of such corruption in some other transactions. Chief Justice McKean, in rendering judgment, took occasion to characterize Mr. Bates as a disgrace to the profession, and not worthy of belief either in or out of court. Bates, instead of caning the judge, as some of his friends advised, contented himself with publishing and reiterating his charge of corruption, and expressing his readiness to prove the charge before any proper tribunal. Since then, it is stated, he has been quietly at work gathering proofs, and has now put forth his charges in specific form. The first charge is that all the proceedings in the mining suit of the Silver Shield Mine v. The Velocipede were had before and entertained by Judges McKean and Strickland, although they both, at the time, were pecuniarily interested in one of said mines. The third charge is to the effect that Judge McKean aided and abetted some of his intimate friends in stealing from the government thousands of acres of very valuable coal land, through fraudulent entries, and that he, in order to protect them, refused to allow the impaneling of a grand jury.

The

So far as now appears, the foregoing are the only charges implicating Chief Justice McKean. The sixth charges that a bargain was entered into at the Astor House, New York, between a Utah judge not named, a Nevada Senator and a New England banker, whereby a Long Island villa was made over to a female relative of the judicial gentleman, and he himself returned to Utah to render a decision upon a suit in which the whole of the Emma mining property was at stake, and which was decided as arranged by these three gentlemen at the Astor House. eighth and last charge accuses Judge Strickland of having taken $10,000 in currency, and a bond for $50,000 in consideration that he would grant an injunction, "in accordance with law and justice," in a suit against the "Flagstaff Mining Company," and then refusing the injunction, the other side having paid a larger amount. The story was rather widely circulated through the newspapers, a few months ago, that Judge Strickland had bought his judicial position of his predecessor, Judge Drake, and that an action had been brought upon a note given in the bargain. But Mr. Bates alleges that, after the Flagstaff suit, the judge was very "flush;' bought an expensive house, a "nobby turnout," wedded his servant girl to his quondam partner, and