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1854. RANK

V.

HANNA.

Nov. Term, can affect the interest of the wife. Dower was given by our statutes for the support and maintenance of widows, and to permit any act of the husband to lessen or injure that right would be in direct opposition to the spirit and meaning of the law. The language of the statute itself is a complete answer to the position assumed by the defendants. "No act, deed, or conveyance, performed or executed by the husband, without the assent of his wife, evidenced by her acknowledgment thereof, in the manner required by law; nor any sale, disposition, transfer, or incumbrance, of the husband's property, by virtue of any decree, execution, or mortgage, to which she shall not be party, except as provided otherwise in this article, shall prejudice or extinguish the right of the wife to her dower or jointure, or preclude her from the recovery thereof, if otherwise entitled thereto." R. S. 1843, p. 430, s. 95. See McMahon v. Kimball, 3 Blackf. 1.

The husband was seized, during coverture, of an undivided eighth part of the lands in controversy, and in that the widow is entitled to dower It would be unreasonable and unjust to suppose that any particular mode of using the property by the vendee, could change or affect her rights.

The cases of Matthews v. Matthews, 1 Edwards' Ch. R. 567, and Potter v. Wheeler, 13 Mass. 504, cited by the defendants, have no analogy to this. In those cases the question was as to the rights of the widow in lands which had been divided by partition in the lifetime of the husband.

Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.

D. Newell and E. A. Greenlee, for the appellant.

R. C. Gregory, R. Jones and S. W. Telford, for the appellees.

Nov. Term,

HETZFIELD V. THE STATE.

1854.

BISCHOF

V.

COFFELT.

APPEAL from the Dearborn Court of Common Pleas.
HOVEY, J.-Information for retailing. Plea, not guilty. Wednesday,
Trial by the Court, and a fine assessed of 2 dollars. No December 13.
motions were made. The defendant appealed.

The judgment in this case is affirmed, for the reasons
given in the case of Hornberger v. The State, 5 Ind. R. 300.
Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs.
J. Ryman, for the appellant.

R. A. Riley, N. B. Taylor, and J. Coburn, for the state.

BISCHOF V. COFFELT.

In a suit against the maker of notes given for the price of goods, the defendant having offered evidence of fraudulent representations made to him by the payee concerning the goods at the time of the purchase, offered further to prove a series of sales made by the payee to other persons, in other places, by the same sort of falsehood and misrepresentations; but it was not pretended that the defendant, at the time of his purchase, had any knowledge of the other sales, or was influenced by them. Held, that the evidence was irrelevant.

If, in a civil case, the representations of one party, being calculated to inspire
confidence, are confided in and acted upon by another as true, when they are
really false, and the latter is thereby induced to enter into a contract which
otherwise he would not have made, the law regards the transaction as frau-
dulent and void, without reference to the motive of the party who induced
the fraud.

A verdict supported by competent evidence will not be disturbed on account
of erroneous instructions or the admission of irrelevant evidence.
The assignee of a note given for the price of goods can not, a recovery on
the note being defeated, recover the value of the goods under the common

counts.

ERROR to the Greene Circuit Court.

STUART, J.-Assumpsit by Bischof, assignee of one Billingheimer, against Coffelt, on two promissory notes. Plea,

6b 23 141 277

6b 23

152 131

Thursday,
December 14.

Nov. Term, the general issue, under oath. Verdict and judgment for

1854.

BISCHOF

V.

COFFELT.

Coffelt. The evidence is all properly in the record; and
Bischof brings the case on error to this Court.

The evidence adduced under the general issue, goes to impeach the consideration of the note.

It appears that Bischof and Billingheimer were peddling broadcloths and other articles, through the western counties of the state. They offered the broadcloth at the low price of 2 dollars per yard, representing it to be French cloth, worth 7 dollars per yard, and naming several persons in Greencastle who had purchased from them, and sold at 7 dollars, and even a "higher figure." Coffelt, who was wholly ignorant of the value and quality of such goods, excited by these representations, bought largely of the supposed French broadcloth, and gave the notes now in suit for the purchase-money. It also appears in evidence, that the goods were not French broadcloth, but a very inferior article of English or American manufacture, of little value.

In further support of this part of the defence, Coffelt offered to give in evidence a series of fraudulent sales made by Bischof and Billingheimer to other persons, in different parts of that and the adjoining counties, effected by the same sort of falsehood and misrepresentation. It was not pretended, however, that, at the time of his purchase, Coffelt had any knowledge of these other sales, or that he was in any manner influenced by them. To the introduction of this evidence Bischof objected; but the Court overruled the objection, and permitted these independent transactions to go to the jury. This ruling of the Court was excepted to, and is one of the errors assigned.

The position is sought to be sustained in argument, by its analogy to the course of evidence in forgery. It is argued that the state is permitted to prove the particular case made in the indictment, and then to give evidence of other utterings of similar false instruments about the same time, to show the guilty knowledge and felonious intent. It is urged that the independent transactions here offered in evidence were admissible for the same reason, to answer a similar end.

1854.

BISCHOF

V.

COFFELT.

But we think the argument unsound. The object of Nov. Term, inquiry in civil cases is entirely different from that in criminal cases. In the latter, facts are used chiefly as indices to the motives of the actor. The criminal law does not punish for the act done alone, but for the motive or intent with which it is done. Hence facts are made the means of exploring the intent. But in civil cases it is different. The facts themselves give character to the transaction. The motives of the actors are comparatively immaterial. If the representations of one party, in a case where such representations are calculated to inspire confidence, are confided in and acted upon by another as true, when in reality they are false, and thereby the latter is induced to enter into a contract which otherwise he would not have made, the law will declare the transaction fraudulent and void, without reference to the motive of the party inducing the fraud. It is sufficient, in civil cases, that a fraud has been committed, by means adequate to deceive. That fact, without the motive, furnishes all the elements essential for the law to operate upon.

Hence, in the case at bar, the independent sales, without the knowledge of Coffelt, however fraudulent they might be, could not, giving the argument its full latitude, go further than to point the fraudulent motive of the vendor. And as the motive was immaterial, the evidence was at least irrelevant. But it was more. Its tendency was to bias the jury in weighing the facts before them. We are, therefore, of opinion that the objection to its admission was well taken.

The second branch of the defence is the general issue under oath. There is evidence going to show that the maker of the notes could not read, that at the time of the execution the notes were only partially read, in one instance, and falsely read, as to amount, in the other. This, of itself, was sufficient to support the verdict in favor of the defendant. So that the errors of the Court in the admission of evidence or in the instructions to the jury are wholly immaterial.

Had the payee of the notes been the plaintiff, he might

Nov. Term, have recovered the real value of the cloth under the com1854.

BISCHOF

Y.

LUCAS.

mon count. But Bischof is only assignee.

Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs.
J. P. Usher, for the plaintiff.

G. G. Dunn, for the defendant.

Thursday,

December 14.

BISCHOF V. LUCAS.

In a suit by the assignee against the maker of a note, given for the price of goods sold to the defendant under false and fraudulent representations, the latter, if he did not return or offer to return the goods in a reasonable time, is liable for their value.

A person who not being a judge of an article himself, nor professing to be, purchases it, confiding in the representations of the seller as to its quality, and gives a note for the price, may show, in an action upon the note, the inferior quality of the article, in order to reduce the recovery.

A payment made upon a note after suit brought, is admissible in evidence to reduce the damages.

ERROR to the Greene Circuit Court.

STUART, J.-This case is similar to the preceding one of Bischof v. Coffelt, ante, p. 23. Here, however, the general issue is not sworn to. Trial by the Court. Finding and judgment for the defendant, Lucas.

The evidence is all properly in the record, which, by agreement, is composed partly of the evidence given to the jury in the other case.

The note sued upon was given to Billingheimer, for a parcel of the "French broadcloth" spoken of in the Coffelt case. A series of similar misrepresentations were made as to the character and value of the cloth.

The same kind of evidence in relation to other sales made to other persons, but of which Lucas in this case, like Coffelt in the former, had no knowledge, was permitted to be given. Of course these transactions had no influ

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