Nov. Term, 1854. HEADY V. WOOD. Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. D. D. Pratt and S. C. Taber, for the appellants. Wednesday, HEADY V. WOOD. The Supreme Court do not regard it their duty, under the rules of the Court, minutely to examine instructions, for abstract errors, where no specific errors are pointed out. To recover damages for an assault and battery, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should have fled to avoid injury: if he used ordinary care to prevent injury, but it ensued from the wrongful act of the defendant, he is entitled to recover. APPEAL from the Hamilton Court of Common Pleas. HOVEY, J.-Wood sued Heady in an action of trespass. The declaration charges that Heady assaulted, beat and pushed Wood into and against the running cars on the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad, whereby the left arm of said Wood was broken and mashed, &c. The defendant pleaded the general issue; the cause was submitted to a jury, and a verdict returned in Wood's favor for 70 dollars. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, but both motions were overruled, and judgment rendered on the verdict. Heady appeals. The counsel for the appellant contends that the Court erred in giving instructions; but, as no specific error is pointed out in their very brief brief, we do not deem it our duty, under the rules of this Court, to sift all of the instructions for abstract errors. The whole of the evidence not appearing in the record, it would be difficult for us to say whether the instructions were properly given or not. The 94th section, 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, the only authority cited, has been examined, and we find nothing in it that conflicts with the ruling of the Court below. 1854. V. Upon the partial view of the evidence which the bills of Nov. Term, exceptions present, we would be inclined to the opinion that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to au- THE State thorize them to find the verdict. The law does not require SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP, that a plaintiff should flee to avoid injury, before he is entitled to recover damages for an assault and battery. If he use ordinary care to prevent injury, and injury ensue from the wrongful act of the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover. Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs. &c. THE STATE OF INDIANA and Others v. SPRINGFIELD The sixteenth section in the several congressional townships in this state was granted by congress to the inhabitants of such townships respectively, for the use of schools therein and not elsewhere; and the grant was accepted by the state on the terms in which it was made. By the sale of the sixteenth section in the several congressional townships in this state, under the act of congress of 1828, the proceeds became trust funds, to be applied for the use of schools in such townships respectively, and not elsewhere. The act of congress of 1828 authorizing the sale of the sixteenth section in the several congressional townships in this state, and the several acts of congress reserving, and also those granting, the sixteenth section in the several townships in this state and other states for the use of schools, being in relation to the same subject-matter, are to be taken in pari materia and construed as one act, in ascertaining the purpose of the grant of the sixteenth section of the several townships in this state. The circumstance that when the sixteenth section in the several townships in this state was granted by congress to the inhabitants for the use of schools therein, there were, in some of the townships, no inhabitants, did not affect the validity of the grant. A repeal by the legislature of the act creating congressional townships, could not affect the validity of the grant by congress of the sixteenth section in Nov. Term, 1854. V. those townships to the inhabitants for the use of schools therein, nor give the state any better right than it otherwise would have had to divert the funds derived from the sale of such sections. The grant in question was THE STATE a contract executed and incapable of revocation by the legislature. SPRINGFIELD Semble, that so far as the corporate capacity of the several congressional townTOWNSHIP, ships relates to the funds derived from the sale of the sixteenth section in such townships, they are private corporations created to meet the terms of the grant by congress of said sections, and their powers can not be repealed by the legislature. &c. Thursday, The school law of 1852, so far as it diverts the proceeds of the sale of the sixteenth section in the several congressional townships from the use of schools in such townships respectively to the use of the school system of the state at large, is in contravention of section 7 of article 8 of the constitution. APPEAL from the Franklin Circuit Court. STUART, J.-Appeal from an order of injunction restraining the auditor, treasurer, and board of commissioners of Franklin county, from distributing the income of a certain school fund, alleged to belong to the appellee. The fund in controversy is the proceeds of the sale of the sixteenth section in Springfield township. It is claimed that by the act of congress of April 19, 1816, that section was granted in every township "to the inhabitants thereof, for the use of schools." The school law of 1852 treats the township fund as the property of the state, and its income subject to her disposal, for the use of the common school system. The complaint is that the defendants are about to execute the law, and thereby divert the income of the Springfield township fund, amounting to 7,423 dollars and 36 cents, from the use of the inhabitants of that township, to the support of schools elsewhere. The prayer of the complaint is, that the defendants be enjoined, &c. A temporary injunction was granted, agreeably to the prayer of the complaint. From that decision this appeal is prosecuted. There are no technical objections raised by counsel on either side. Under the rules of Court, we are thus relieved from taking judicial notice of any formal defects which may exist. We therefore proceed, at once, to the principal matter in controversy. Nov. Term, 1854. The act of the legislature, the validity of which is thus questioned, enumerates the several funds which are to be consolidated under the denomination of the "common THE STATE school fund." First in the list of consolidated funds, is SPRINGFIELD the congressional township fund. Prior to 1852, a separate account was kept with each township. R. S. 1843, p. 254. The income of the fund arising out of the sale of the sixteenth section was expended for the use of schools within the township. Thus the inhabitants of each township enjoyed the income of their own particular fund. The school law of 1852 contemplates an entire change. Civil townships, with different boundaries, are substituted for congressional townships. There is no longer to be any congressional township fund recognized. All the separate funds, the township, surplus revenue, saline, bank tax, &c., are united. The fund of each township is thus commingled with those of other townships, and with other school funds. Pamphlet School Law, notes, p. 26. The income arising from the consolidated fund is to be distributed ratably throughout the state for the support of common schools. In brief, the law diverts the proceeds of the sixteenth section from the use of schools in the congressional township where the land was situated, to the use of the school system of the state at large. And the only question raised is, Was it competent for the state so to divert the township fund? The appellants claim that the title to the sixteenth section was vested in the state; and that it is her right to expend the income of the fund upon such system of common schools as she may deem best adapted to diffuse the blessings of education among all classes. The appellees insist that this diversion of the township fund is in conflict with the acts of congress, and in violation of the constitution of the United States. Counsel on both sides seem to take it for granted that the school law is in accordance with the constitution of the state. The same view of the harmony between the V. TOWNSHIP, &c. Nov. Term, law and the constitution prevailed, of course, with the 1854. majority of the legislature that passed the act. V. Many of THE STATE the leading men who moulded the school law had been SPRINGFIELD prominent members of the constitutional convention. The same opinion seems also to have prevailed in the assembly of 1853. Pamphlet School Law, p. 34. TOWNSHIP, &c. If this opinion be correct, the question now raised on the school law arises on the constitution itself. To show with what warrant the impression of the accord between the law and constitution is so generally entertained, the eighth article of the latter, and the corresponding sections of the former, are inserted in note 1 at the end of this opinion. It is not our province to trace the idea of diverting the township fund to its origin; nor to inquire through what channels, legislative or constitutional, that sentiment seemed to run, further than may be useful to elucidate the pending question. The subject seems to have been broached as early as the session of 1848-9; House Journal, p. 319; and perhaps even earlier. It was also agitated in the constitutional convention. At the session of 1851-2, it came to maturity in the form of the act now under consideration. If the first four sections of article eight (see note 1) stood alone, qualified only by the clause quoted from section twenty-two of article four, the Court would be divided as to whether the constitution itself did not consolidate, and thus divert, the township fund. But the difficulty seems to be removed by a subsequent section. The seventh section of article eight, whatever its history, or for whatever purpose introduced, enjoins that "All trust funds, held by the state, shall remain inviolate, and be faithfully and exclusively applied to the purposes for which the trust was created." On the subject of education, the constitution of 1816, and that of 1851, declare, that education, generally diffused, is essential to a free government. In both its encouragement is enjoined as a duty on the general assembly. The difference seems to be, that the new constitution gives |