plosion of one of them took place about ten years ago, the ashes from which covered the whole of Sumbawa: in extent it is inferior only to Timor of the whole group of islands to the eastward of Java. The natives live chiefly in the interior, except at the east end, whilst the sea coast and ports are occupied to the westward by colonies from Sumbawa and Celebes. Very little is known of the manners and customs of the natives: in their appearance they approach more, nearly to the Papuans than the natives of Timor, both in form of countenance and hair.

There are a great number of petty states, (many of them not consisting of more than one village), who are constantly at war for the purpose of making slaves, for whom they always find a ready sale on the coast; they are much esteemed as slaves, and become very good artificers; they are also uncommonly faithful to their masters, and quietly behaved. Great numbers of them were imported annually at Macassar, before the prohibition of the slave trade; numbers are, however, still introduced in those parts of Celebes not under the authority of the European government.

SUMBA, OR SANDAL WOOD ISLAND.

Sandal Wood Island (the native name for which is Sumba) was formerly under the authority of the Dutch, but about twenty years ago, they threw off their allegiance in consequence, of the Dutch cutting sandal wood there as they have a belief that for every tree of it which is cut down, some one of the natives is deprived of life; the tree is held sacred. Since that time there seems to have been little communication, and that only by the way of Ende. The natives. are the same in appearance as those of Ende, but are said to be extremely savage, daring, and treacherous, in consequence of which, the vessels trading with them must be well armed, as they often attempt, and sometimes succeed, in cutting them off; trade is, however, carried to a considerable extent with them by the Buggese, at Ende, and large quantities of birds' nests, and bees' wax, are obtained from thence annually.

The island is rather low in its appearance from the sea, not being much higher than Madura, like which there does not appear to be a single high hill on it. This island and Floris appear to be the westernmost islands on which the natives have frizzled hair, as the natives of Sumbawa and the islands to the westward of it have invariably straight hair. The form of countenance is also entirely different, and the manners and customs of the different natives much less savage and ferocious.

46

On the Foundation of Morals.

THE actions of moral agents, when viewed with attention, awaken certain sentiments in our minds which are called moral, on account of the nature of the objects to which they relate. The chief of these are approbation and disapprobation, merit and demerit. They are the phenomena which we now propose to consider; and that supposition concerning their origin, which accounts for it in the most rational and satisfactory manner, is the best and most satisfactory theory respecting the foundation of morals. It will appear, on careful examination, that they would lead us to regard moral actions, the objects to which they relate, and the causes by which they are excited, as not exclusively distinguished by a tendency to produce pleasure or pain.

The

It is, in general, the tendency of vice to produce misery, and of virtue to produce happiness, both to the individual by whom they are practised, and to those who are placed within the sphere of his influence. These tendencies are not fully developed in the present state. Here, men frequently suffer on account of their virtue, and derive advantage from the practice of vice: but this is only a partial and temporary disorder, which will be rectified, and all the inequalities which it has occasioned, compensated, in the world to come. tendency of actions, also, is often capable of being discovered; and is, sometimes, so obvious, as to exert a powerful influence on the opinions which we form of their nature. We consider a sentinel who sleeps on his post, for example, as worthy of the severest punishment, not merely because he has betrayed the trust reposed in him, since there are many cases in which a slight chastisement is deemed a sufficient punishment for the breach of trust; but principally, because of the imminent danger to which his negligence exposes the army which he was appointed to guard. It does not, however, follow from this fact, that actions differ only in their tendency. An object may possess several essential properties; and it is only when qualities are inconsistent, that we can infer from the presence of one the absence of another.

It is presumed that the following considerations prove the tendency of actions, alone, to be insufficient to account for our moral sentiments.

1. If the only reason why we approve of virtue be its tendency to produce happiness, it is the same with that for which we approve of a machine which is adapted to answer some useful purpose. This, at first sight, seems improbable;

and the improbability is strengthened when we advert to the circumstance, that we confine our notion of good and evil desert to intelligent and voluntary agents; and that we consider them as worthy of praise or blame, according to the nature of the motives by which they have been actuated, and not merely according to the tendency of their actions. It is not simply their putting others to pain, which awakens our indignation against them; but their putting those to pain from whom they have received no injury, and whom they have no right to punish. All this is so different from the ground on which we form a judgment of the nature of a machine, that we feel ourselves obliged to conclude, that the grounds of our judgment cannot be, in both cases, the same; although we should feel ourselves unable to point out the precise circumstance in which they differ.

2. The sentiment of moral approbation always implies a perception of right, of reasonableness, of suitableness or propriety*, which is quite distinct from the perception of utility. Knowledge is useful; but it is also just and accurate; and it is on this account, as well as from its utility, that it engages the approbation of mankind. This appears from the admiration in which the abstract sciences, and particularly the higher branches of the mathematics, have been held, although their utility, either to the individual, or to the public, is not very evident; and from the desire of knowledge which the youthful mind discovers, before it has become acquainted with the useful purposes to which it may be applied. We approve of prudence, not merely because it is conducive to the welfare of the person who practises it; but also, because we perceive a propriety in it, a suitableness and agreement between it and his character as a moral agent, and the circumstances in which he is placed. All the contempt and detestation with which we contemplate ingratitude,

A distinction is sometimes made between vices and improprieties; the latter term being, in that case, used to denote things which are not wrong to a sufficient extent to deserve to be denominated absolutely criminal. This distinction is mentioned here, merely for the purpose of guarding the reader against the supposition, that the terms proper and improper are used in this essay to denote inferior degrees of virtue and vice. On the contrary, in the sense here affixed to them, they may be employed to describe the highest acts of either. A thing may be proper, as well as beneficial, to a greater or less extent; and the highest degree of impropriety taken by itself, may possess an equal or a higher degree of guilt, than the highest degree of tendency to produce misery. If any of the other terms in the text be used with the same distinction, this explanation, and the ground on which it proceeds, are, mutatis mutandis, equally applicable to them.

cannot be referred to its tendency to impair the comfort of a benefactor, or to impede the performance of acts of benevolence; for while it is condemned as injurious by the intelligent and reflective, it is principally reprobated by the generality of mankind, as mean and base; and as implying the absence of all noble and generous sentiment. It will appear, on a careful examination of the different virtues, that our approbation of them rests on a similar foundation *.

Even in cases in which utility has an evident and powerful influence on our moral sentiments, it is not the exclusive ground on which they rest. To recur to the case of the sentinel already mentioned: were he not entrusted with the safety of his fellow soldiers, their danger in consequence of his sleeping, would not make him criminal. It is because he' is bound in duty to care for their welfare; because there is

suitableness between his situation and a desire to defend them from injury, that his negligence implies guilt. It is true, that breach of trust is also injurious, as it destroys confidence, and occasions suffering to those who are betrayed; but there is also in it an impropriety, a violation of right, which would induce us to condemn it, though it should produce nothing but good. The misery resulting from a breach of trust, is one circumstance in which its criminality consists; and when it is great, and falls on our own heads, or on the heads of those who are dear to us, it may strike our minds as the principal one: but still it is not the only ingredient in the cup of guilt. The character of the person against whom it has been committed, sometimes supplies another, as when a father, a friend, or a benefactor, has been betrayed: and it is a third, to betray a trust which we have engaged to manage with fidelity, not merely in that implicit manner which the undertaking of it supposes, but by pledging our word, or honour, or confirming our promises by oaths and imprecations.

The love and fear of God, and all other pious affections, have a useful tendency; as they dispose us to obey his authority, which enjoins the practice of every virtue. The utility of piety is so great, that civil society could scarcely exist without it. This consideration supplies a powerful recommendation of piety, and is sufficient to vindicate it, even on principles of worldly policy, from the contempt with which it is often treated by men of the world. But it is neither the proper object of these affections, nor the reason

See Dr. A. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 430—440.

of their being approved. He would be a very unskilful preacher who should make their utility, either in respect to this life or that which is to come, the principal topic by which he attempted to awaken them in the minds of his hearers. Fear, indeed, so far as it relates exclusively to selfinterest, might be thus excited; but if piety be explained to include reverence, the greatness and majesty of God must be exhibited in order to draw it into exercise. Love respects the moral excellence and glory of the Divine character; and gratitude, the benefits which have been received. It is the devout contemplation of the various perfections of the Deity, and of our obligations to him, that is adapted to awaken in our hearts pious and holy affections; and it is the perception that there is a suitableness between these affections in us, and the various attributes which exalt and adorn his character, which forms the principal ground of our approbation of them. The want of love and fear in relation to God, would not be so criminal, though it might be equally injurious, if there were less in his nature to excite them. The infinitude of his character raises and magnifies the degree of guilt, attached to every instance in which he is disobeyed, insulted, treated with contempt or ingratitude, and in which a becoming regard to him has not been paid.

3. When the practice of a virtue is rare, it is highly esteemed; when it is common, it is scarcely deemed meritorious; and rare vices are regarded with peculiar aversion, while common ones are but little noticed. Justice is much more frequently practised than benevolence, and to be simply just is hardly considered as entitling a person to commendation; but a character for benevolence, will make him the object of universal and ardent esteem. Were the tendency of actions the only ground of our moral sentiments, it might be expected that our judgment would be the reverse of this; because the more common a vice is, the more evident is the evil that results from it. Frequent opportunity to witness the misery produced by injustice and intemperance, would, in that case, strengthen our disapprobation of them. But, if we suppose inherent evil to belong to an action, we may appeal to the force of habit, in reconciling us to things originally disagreeable, to account for that diminution of strength in our perception of it of which we are conscious in respect to crimes, with the contemplation of which we are familiar. The same principle of habit applies, in some measure, to tendency; but its operation in weakening our perception of the evil of a particular vice, is counteracted by the VOL. IV. No. 7.

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