It was not competent to show that, since the plaintiff's injury, contracts had been drawn up by the defendant, and the men required to sign them, waiving all damages on account of injuries that might be received from the poisonous qualities used in their work; nor that danger signals had been put up in the shops. This proffered testimony was properly rejected.

The plaintiff's counsel attempted to show by some of their medical experts that certain medical works, naming them, were standard authorities. No previous mention of these works had been made, or reference to them by any of the medical witnesses. The court committed no error in refusing to permit the witnesses to answer the questions. The counsel's object, as they state in their brief, was to show that their witnesses were sustained in some of their testimony by standard medical authorities. We have held that this could not be done. The contents of medical books are not competent testimony. Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148; People v. Millard, 53 Id. 63, 77; People v. Vanderhoof, 71 Id. 158, 179. It would be difficult, we think, to show that a medical witness was sustained by a medical book, to which he had not referred, without showing what the book contained, or that it held what the witness testified, which would be the same thing.

The court was correct in charging the jury that it was not the duty of the defendant to inform the plaintiff of the particular ingredients or the formula used in the manufacture of Paris green, if he was notified of their poisonous character, and the precautions to be used against the dangers of working at the vats.

It is complained that the circuit judge practically told the jury that, if they found that the plaintiff knew Paris green was a poison, this would defeat his action, although he was not aware of its effect upon the system if handled as he was working with it. The instructions, taken as a

whole, may be open to this complaint. A man might know that Paris green was a poison if taken internally, but not know that it would cause pustulation by handling, or be absorbed into the system, and cause poisonous effects, from contact with the outer surface of the body. It was the duty of the defendant not only to inform the plaintiff that it was a poison, but of the effect it might produce to one working in its manufacture without taking due precaution; and the precaution necessary to be taken should have been pointed out, if known to the defendant, and all proper and reasonable appliances and facilities provided to guard against the dangers to be encountered in the employment. Then the person taking the employment would assume the risks of it.

We find but one other error necessary to be noted. The action of the circuit judge in entering the jury-room, and giving them instructions, without the presence of counsel or the court stenographer, is properly brought before us by the writ of certiorari in aid of and in connection with the writ of error, and we think such action was

error.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs of this Court to the plaintiff.

CHAMPLIN, C. J., MCGRATH and LONG, JJ., concurred. GRANT, J., did not sit.

INDEX.

Head-note references are to pages.

Cross-references are to subjects; and the number of the note is
added in parenthesis, unless the reference is to all.

ABANDONMENT-See HIGHWAYS (5).

ACCOUNTING-See EQUITY PLEADING; PARTNERSHIP (3).

ADVERSE POSSESSION-See EJECTMENT.

AFFIDAVIT-See ATTACHMENT SUIT (2).

AGENT-See FIRE INSURANCE (6).

ALLOWANCE TO WIDOW-See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.
AMENDMENT-See PARTIES (3); PLEADING (4).

APPEAL.

Error cannot be assigned upon the refusal of the circuit court
to vacate a statutory judgment rendered against a surety in
an appeal-bond on his petition and accompanying affidavits.
Buehler v. DeLemos, 554.

APPOINTMENT-See ELECTIONS (1).

ARBITRATION-See FIRE INSURANCE (3).

ASSAULT AND BATTERY-See EVIDENCE (8, 9, 12, 13); SELF-
DEFENSE.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-See CONTEMPT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNT-See CORPORATIONS.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

1. An assignment of error that the judge erred in giving that
portion of his charge commencing, "I give you these requests
on the part of the plaintiffs," and ending with, “I give you
these requests on the part of the defendant," is too general,
where twelve requests are involved, the most of which were
correct propositions of law. Pratt v. Burhans, 487.

2. Error cannot be assigned upon the refusal of the circuit
court to vacate a statutory judgment rendered against a
surety in an appeal-bond on his petition and accompanying
affidavits. Buehler v. De Lemos, 554.

ATTACHMENT SUIT.

1. A return by an officer to a writ of attachment, issued
against two joint debtors, that he had attached the goods of
one of them, upon whom he had made personal service, and
that after diligent attempts he was unable to find the other
defendant in his county, and had left a certified copy of the
attachment and inventory with the defendant in whose
possession he found the attached goods, the other defendant
having no last place of residence in the county, is in accord-
ance with How. Stat. § 6841, and authorizes the justice to
proceed under How. Stat. § 6845. Buehler v. DeLemos, 554.
2. An averment in an affidavit for attachment that there is a
debt due to the plaintiff from the defendants upon express
and implied contract is equivalent to averring that the debt
is due upon express and upon implied contract, and is
sufficient.

Id.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGE (1).

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. The receipt by a plaintiff of the money due upon a judg-
ment rendered in his favor, and its discharge by indorsing a
satisfaction thereof upon an execution issued for its collection,
estop him from denying the authority of the attorneys to act
for him in its procurement, and, if their original employment
is not shown, such acts are a full and complete ratification
of their acts and services in obtaining the judgment. Lind-
ner v. Hine, 511.

2. The lien of an attorney at law attaches to the money paya-
ble to his client upon a judgment if it is the proceeds of the
attorney's labor and skill, and to moneys received by the

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Continued.

client by way of a compromise of such judgment, who, if he
settles the case after judgment, so as to deprive the attorney
of his costs and fees, is liable to him in the proper action. Id.

ATTORNEY FEES-See COSTS (3).

AUDITOR OF WAYNE COUNTY-See ELECTIONS (1).
AUTHORITY OF AGENT-See INSURANCE (1).

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT (1).
BILL OF PARTICULARS.

1. A specification in a bill of particulars of an item of plaintiff's
demand as two-thirds of whatever sum remained in defend-
ant's hands of $412,250, received by him for certain bonds
and stock of a specified railroad company, after paying cer-
tain notes, describing them, but not giving their amount, is
too uncertain and indefinite in the amount claimed, and
should be amended or made more specific in this respect.
Hamilton v. Peck, 393.

2. An order requiring a plaintiff to file an amended or more
specific bill of particulars, under a common-count declaration
in assumpsit, showing how and by what right and when the
plaintiff or his assignors became entitled to each item of
plaintiff's claim as stated in his original bill of particulars,
and how and when he acquired such right, calls for informa-
tion not required to be given in a bill of particulars. Id.
3. The following general propositions are summarized from the
opinion:

a-By the practice of this Court, certain items are prove-
able under the common counts in assumpsit, and upon
demand a bill of particulars of such items must be furnished,
which must be sufficiently specific and certain to apprise the
defendant of what the demand is, and when the items
accrued, and how it arose, and the amount claimed.

b-The object of the practice for the production of bills of
particulars is to obviate the uncertainty of general pleading.
The intent is to secure such information as will enable the
parties to make an intelligent preparation for trial, and to
enter upon the investigation before the court or jury with an
understanding as to what is really in controversy.

c--If the specifications in a bill of particulars do not
accord substantially with the facts, or omit essential matters,