generally irrespective of their employment, and that the accident under the facts in this case did not arise out of the employment. Application of A. M. Worden to the Industrial Accident Board for compensation for injuries claimed to have been received while in the employ of the Commonwealth Power Company. Application denied. Opinion by the Board: The applicant claims compensation in this case for an injury received by slipping and falling on some ice on his own premises, the ice in question being situated about half way between his house and barn. He was employed by respondent repairing and changing lights in its lighting system in the city of Jackson, and in doing this work he used his own horse and wagon, which were kept on his own premises in the barn in question. He received $70 per month for his work, and for the use of his horse and wagon, and had been engaged in this work for respondent for many years. He was 71 years of age at the time of the accident. The sole question in this case is one of law, the facts being undisputed. On the day of the accident, the applicant had finished his dinner and started to go from his house to the barn for the purpose of hitching up his horse to go out and complete the . circuit of lights in the city which it was his duty to care for daily. At a point about half way between the house and barn he slipped and fell upon some ice, which had accumulated, and sustained serious injury. Did this injury arise in the course of his employment? This question brings us very near to the border line of doubt. It is contended that going from the house to the barn in this case should be governed by the same rule that is applied to a workman going from his house to the shop or place of his employment, and that applicant's employment did not commence until he reached the barn. Also, the fact that the distance between the house and barn in this case was small does not materially change the situa tion, as the principle would be the same if the barn was situated in the next block, or several blocks away from applicant's house. On the other hand, it is contended that the applicant had no stated hours of labor; that he had a certain circuit of lights to care for each day, and was in the service of his employer throughout the day until such duties were completed, and that eating his dinner and feeding his horse were mere incidents of such employment. The more serious question in the case is, did the accident arise out of applicant's employment? Under the language of the statute, two conditions must be present to entitle the injured man to compensation, viz., the injury must have happened "in the course of his employment," and it must also "arise out of his employment." The fact that it occurred in the course of the employment merely, if it be a fact, is not enough to entitle him to compensation. It must also appear that the injury "arose out of the employment," and was from a risk reasonably incident to such employment, as distinguished from risks to which the general public is exposed. To illustrate: Falling from his wagon, or receiving an electric shock, would constitute injuries arising from the risks incident to the employment. Many other examples might be given. These would be risks to which he was peculiarly exposed by his employment. On the other hand, it may be fairly said that one of the most common risks, to which the general public is exposed is that of slipping and falling upon the ice. This risk is encountered by people generally, irrespective of their employment, particularly so when the accident happens to the party injured while he is walking on his own premises. It is the opinion of the board that when a man is injured, as in this case, by falling on the ice in his own yard, such injury does not arise out of the peculiar character of his employment, but from a condition and danger that is common to all. It follows from this that applicant's claim for compensation must be denied. It is therefore unnecessary to decide the other question in the case, as to whether the injury arose in the course of the employment. EDWARD F. LARDIE, Applicant, VS. GRAND RAPIDS SHOW CASE COMPANY, and FURNITURE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents. COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF USE OF MEMBER, WHERE MEMBER IS NOT AMPUTATED. Applicant was injured while in the employ of respondent by his hand coming in contact with a saw with the result that his little finger was completely severed, his third finger rendered permanently stiff and the first joint of the index finger likewise became permanently stiff. Compensation was paid for the loss of the little finger, but refused as to the injury to the other two fingers, under a dispute as to whether applicant was entitled to it under the act (Sec. 10 Part II, Workmen's Compensation Law). HELD: 1. That the loss of the use of a member is sufficient to entitle the injured party to compensation as provided in the Act, whether the member is completely severed or not, the action of the surgeon in amputating the finger, or failing to amputate it, not being controlling. 2. The fact that a workman, after suffering the loss of one or more fingers, is able to earn the same wage does not affect his right to the specific indemnity provided in Section 10, Part II of the Law, such indemnity being given because the workman must go through the remainder of his life without the use of the members so lost. Appeal of Edward F. Lardie to the Industrial Accident Board to determine his right to compensation for the permanent loss of use of two fingers. Applicant awarded compensation as provided by the statute. Opinion by the Board: The applicant while in the employ of the Grand Rapids Show Case Company met with an accident by which his right hand was cut on a saw, the little finger being cut off and the first and third fingers permanently injured. The injury to the third finger resulted in its becoming permanently stiff through the destruction of the cord of control, and the injury to the first finger also resulted in permanent stiffness at the first joint from the same cause. The case comes before the Board on written stipulation of facts, and while the stipulation does not describe the injury to the fingers with entire clearness, it was conceded on the argument that the injury to the third finger rendered it permanently useless, and that the injury to the first finger rendered the last joint of the same permanently useless. No part of either the third or first finger was severed from the hand. Compensation was paid for the little finger was was severed, and the matter in dispute here is whether the applicant is entitled to compensation for the loss of the third and first fingers under Section 10. Part II of the Workmen's Compensation Law providing special indemnity for the loss of fingers and similar members. The stipulation shows that the applicant is now receiving the same or better wages than at the time of the injury. Under the stipulated and conceded facts in the case the entire third finger has been rendered permanently useless by the accident, and the last joint of the first finger has also been rendered permanently useless. In other words the applicant has lost entirely the use of the third finger and the injury to the first finger would be equivalent to the loss of one-half of the use of the finger. If entitled to compensation under the specific schedules in Section 10, Part II of the Act, applicant would be entitled to 20 for the third finger and 172 weeks for one-half of the first finger, the weekly rate of compensation being $7.50. Is the loss of the use of a member equivalent to the loss of such member under the Michigan Compensation Law? The Board has decided this question in the affirmative, using the following language: "The action of the surgeon in amputating a finger, or in failing to amputate it, or in choosing the point of amputation, is not controlling in all cases of this kind. The real test in such cases is whether the injured person has been permanently deprived of the use of the finger. If so, then he has suffered the loss of the finger, and the fact that the surgeon failed to remove it does not lessen his loss. If its usefulness is entirely destroyed, he has suffered the loss of the finger as completely as if it had been amputated." The courts have uniformly construed provisions of accident policies insuring against the loss of a member, to cover cases where the usefulness of the member was destroyed by accident without resulting in severance or amputation. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 301. Fuller vs. Ins. Co. 122 Mich. 548; 48 L. R. A. 86; In Fuller vs. Ins. Co., supra, our Supreme Court reviews the authorities bearing upon this point in considerable detail, and declares unequivocally the doctrine that the loss of the use of a member under accident insurance policies is equivalent to the loss of the member. After reviewing the authorities as above, the Court says: "These cases establish the proposition that where an insurance policy insures against the loss of a member, the word 'loss' should be construed to mean the destruction of the usefulness of the member, or the entire member, for the purpose to which, in its normal condition, it was susceptible of application. In all these policies the word 'loss' is used, and it is the loss of the member that is in terms insured against. As indicated in the last authorities cited, the attempts of insurance companies to avoid this construction by so changing the policy that it reads, 'loss by severance,' has failed; the Courts holding, as before, that it is the loss of the use of the member which was the object of the contract." In Sneck vs. Trav. Ins. Co. 34 N. Y. Sup. 548, the same rule has held in the state of New York. There the Court said among other things: |