pendency and plaintiffs suffered no pecuniary loss by the death. The Supreme Court, in a well considered opinion citing many authorities, reversed the judgment, holding that the legal right to support coupled with a reasonable probability of receiving it was sufficient to establish plaintiff's case, and that the wife and child could recover for the contributions, voluntary or forced, that would probably have been made by deceased in their favor.

In the case at bar, it is apparent that the wife had separated from the husband under such circumstances as to exclude any claim by her, and that no support or contributions from her could be expected by the applicant. On the other hand, the applicant's father up to the time of his death provided clothing for his son, also life insurance, and assisted the grandparents on the farm. Apparently the grandparents were entirely willing to support the applicant, and we think it fairly appears that had it been otherwise the father would not have permitted him to want. While the father lived the probability of furnishing support together with the legal obligation so to do would continue, and upon this the applicant had a right to depend. By the father's death this guaranty of support is taken away, and the support that was being furnished by the grandparents might be withdrawn at any moment. We think under the facts and authorities that the applicant was wholly dependent. He had a right to look to his father for support, and the probability of receiving it, in the judgment of the Board, was so strong as to amount almost to a certainty. The theory that this four year old child cannot be considered a dependent under the law when his father is taken away by an industrial accident, on account of the fact that he was being supported by his grandparents, such support being voluntary and perhaps temporary, is unsound in the judg ment of the Board and must be rejected. While the fact of support being actually furnished by the deceased workman prior to his death is an important circumstance bearing upon the question of dependency, it is not controlling. Such cir cumstance does not create the dependency in cases of this

kind, but is merely an element tending to show that a state of dependency in fact existed.

LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENT OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF THE STATE.

Respondent was employed as a traveling salesman by applicant, and was injured in Buffalo, N. Y., while in the active discharge of his duties.

HELD: That respondent is not entitled to compensation, on the ground that the provisions of the compensation law do not cover accidents occurring outside of the state of Michigan, even though both parties are residents of this state.

Application of Keyes-Davis Company for ruling on question of injury occurring in another state. Both parties stipulated the facts and waived arbitration proceedings and case was heard by full Board.

Opinion by the Board:

The applicant and respondent are both residents of Battle Creek, Michigan. The respondent was in the employ of the applicant as a traveling salesman, and was injured at Buffalo, New York, by a fall received in the office of the Larkin Com

pany, where he was on the business of his employer. The sole question involved in this case is whether the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Law is operative beyond the boundaries of the state of Michigan. The applicant contends that it is not and that there is no liability for the payment of compensation for an accident occurring outside of the state.

It is a general rule of law that every statute is confined in its operations, to persons, property and rights which are within the jurisdiction of the legislature which enacted it; and if a citizen of the state leaves it and goes into another state he is left to the protection of the laws of the latter state.

Black on Interpretion of Laws, Page 91;

Lewis Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Sections 13 and 14.

This, however, seems to be based upon a rule of statutory construction, rather than upon a lack of legislative power to make such a law operative outside the limits of the state. Under this rule of construction there is a strong presumption in case of every statute that it is intended to operate and be effective only within the limits of the state or country which enacted it, and in the absence of evidence in the law itself that it was intended to have an extra-territorial operation, the presumption seems to be conclusive.

From our examination of the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Law we find no internal evidence of an intent that the law should be operative outside of the boundaries of Michigan. The language used in the act is general and broad enough to include injuries occurring without the state, but under the above rule of construction such general language is limited and held to be intended for application only to persons, property and rights within the state. There is another feature of the act which reinforces this position and indicates affirmatively the intention of the legislature to so limit the operation of the law, and that is the requirement in Sec

tion 8 of Part III that the hearings to adjudicate disputed claims for compensation "shall be held at the locality where the injury occurred." If the act is held to be operative outside of the state, this requirement might make it necessary for members of the Board to go to the most distant portions of the United States, or even to foreign countries, to hear and adjudicate disputed claims for compensation.

The fact that both parties are residents of Michigan and the contract of employment was a Michigan contract will not, we think, change the rule. The obligation to pay compensation is not a matter of contract, or based upon contract, but is a statutory duty, created by statute and existing only by force of such statute. If this is correct, and the statute is inoperaive at the place where the accident happens, the happening of the accident creates no obligation to pay compensation.

2 B. W. C. C.-Page 1.

It is therefore held by the Board that respondent is not entitled to compensation.

In re HARRY HART.

MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED MORE THAN THREE WEEKS AFTER ACCIDENT. Claimant was injured while in the exercise of his ordinary duties, but serious effects did not develop until more than eight weeks after the accident occurred. Payment for medical and hospital services was disputed on the ground that such services were rendered more than three weeks after the accident.

HELD: 1. Sec. 4, Part II, of the Compensation Act, an employer shall furnish the injured employe medical and hospital service

not exceeding three weeks in point of time, and the commencement of such service should be at the time the injury requires it.

2. The words, "injury" and "accident" as used in the act are distinguished thus: the "accident" is the cause of the "injury" and the time is computed from the date of the injury resulting from an accident.

Opinion by the Board:

The question as to the liability of an employer to pay for the hospital and medical services furnished the injured employe is involved in this case. The employe, Harry Hart, on November 16, 1912, while acting in the course of his employment, caught hold of and attempted to stop a barrel of sugar which was rolling down a slight incline. His effort in stopping it caused a strain or rupture in the groin. He experienced some pain at the time, but it did not appear to be serious, and he kept on at work until January 6, when the hernia became more clearly developed and its condition so serious that it necessitated an operation. The operation was succesful and he returned to work three weeks after the sixth of January fully recovered. The doctor's bill for the operation is disputed by the employer upon the ground that it was incurred more than three weeks after the injury.

The determination of this question involves the construction of Section 4, Part II of the Compensation Act, which is as follows:

"During the first three weeks after the injury the employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines when they are needed."

The claim is made on the part of the employer that the injury having occurred on November 16, the three weeks during which medical and hospital service is required to be furnished commenced on that date, and such three weeks' period had expired before any part of the medical and hospital service claimed for in this case was rendered. In the opinion of the Board it is the clear intent of the law that in all cases the