employer shall furnish the injured employe hospital and medical service if the injury requires such, but not exceeding three weeks in point of time. That the commencement of such service to be furnished should be at the time when the injury requires it, which in a vast majority of cases is immediately following the accident. There are, however, certain kinds of accidents where the injury or disability does not develop or become serious until some time after the accident occurs and the medical and hospital service in this class of cases is not required immediately after the accident, but becomes necessary at a later time. It seems apparent that it was not the legislative intent to deprive persons sustaining injuries of the kind last above mentioned of such medical and hospital service for the mere reason that the disability did not immediately follow the accident; and from a careful examination of the language of the statute we are of the opinion that such construction is not required. The language used in the statute is "during the first three weeks after the injury." The word "injury" in its ordinary signification is distinguished from the word "accident," and differs materially from it in meaning. The word "accident" is generally used to designate the cause, and the word "injury" is used to designate the effect. The effect of the accident, (which is the injury) may be and generally is immediate, but in a considerable number of cases the effect of the accident (which is the injury) does not immediately follow in point of time, but develops and produces disability at a later time, in some instances weeks or months after the accident. It is apparent that if we give the word "injury," its ordinary significance as distinguished from accident, the "first three weeks after the injury" would commence to run from the time the accident in cases like this produces the actual disability requiring medical or hospital service. We hold in this case that such service should be paid for by the employer. SUPREME COURT. JOHN KENNELLY, VS. Applicant and Appellee, STEARNS SALT & LUMBER COMPANY, and NEW ENGLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendants and Appellants. EMPLOYMENT EXTINGUISHING FOREST FIRE UNDER ORDER OF STATE FIRE WARDEN. Applicant, an employe of the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company was working with a gang of men constructing a logging railroad, when he and his co-laborers were ordered by the fire warden to aid in extinguishing a forest fire. While engaged in fighting this fire, applicant was struck by a falling tree and the sight of his left eye destroyed. HELD: That at the time of the injury he was not engaged in his regular employment, but was working for the state under the direction and authority of the fire warden. Certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board to review the action of that Board in awarding compensation to John Kennelly for injury received while in the employ of the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company. Reversed. John C. Myers, of Detroit, Attorney for Applicant. BIRD, J. While claimant was in the employ of the defendant, the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company, with a gang of men constructing a railroad, he with several of his co-laborers was ordered by the Fire Warden to go with him and assist in extinguishing a forest fire. The claimant complied with the or der, and while engaged in that work, he was struck by a falling tree, and the sight of his left eye was destroyed. He pre sented his claim to the Industrial Accident Board as a servant of the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company. The Board of Arbitration allowed his claim at $5.02 per week for one hundred weeks. Subsequently, on appeal this award was approved by the Industrial Accident Board. Defendant insurance company has removed the proceedings to this court by certiorari, claiming that the award should not have been made, because claimant at the time of his injury was engaged in work for the State, and not for the defendant, Stearns Salt & Lumber Company. Counsel for claimant insist that that question was one of fact, and the fact having been found by the decision of the Board, it is not reviewable in this court. (1) The real question presented is whether there is any testimony in the record to support the finding of the Board. The testimony is brief, and is set out in the record and there is no disagreement concerning it. It shows that while the claimant was engaged in work for the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company, the Fire Warden came along and ordered him to go with him to assist in extinguishing a forest fire. The record shows that he was not only ordered to go by the Fire Warden, but that his work was directed by the Fre Warden after he arrived there. It is further shown that he was paid his regular wages by the Stearns Salt & Lumber Company, and that it was reimbursed by payment from the state and county, as the law provides in such cases. Section 6 of Act 249 of the Laws of 1903 as amended by Act 317 of the Laws of 1907, confers upon the Fire Warden the following authority: "It shall be the duty of each Fire Warden to take precautions to prevent the setting of forest fires, and when his district is suffering or threatened with fire, to go to the place of danger to control such fires, and each forest fire warden shall have the authority to call to his assistance in emergencies any able-bodied male person over eighteen years of age, and if such person refuses, without reasonable justification or excuse, to assist, * * he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed three months." This provision of the statute clearly authorizes the Fire Warden to exercise the power which he did on this occasion. We do not think it can be said that while claimant was engaged in this service he was engaged in his regular employment. He was ordered by a state officer to leave his work and go to the assistance of the State. After he arrived there he was directed by a State officer, and for his time spent in such work he was paid by the county and State. It would hardly be contended that if he were impaneled to sit on a jury and had met some accident while engaged in that service his employer would be liable therefor. Nor could that contention be made had claimant been injured while assisting the sheriff at his command in quelling a riot. We think this situation is no different. When he was ordered to go with the Fire Warden, he left his work temporarily to discharge a duty which was incumbent upon him as well as upon every other citizen similarly situated. We do not think it can be said that his injury arose out of his employment or during the course of it. The testimony does not support such a finding. Some point is made by claimant that he was paid his reg ular salary by his employer for the time spent in fighting fire. We do not regard this as of importance as the record explains that it was done as a matter of convenience and that his employer was afterwards reimbursed from the public funds for his services. Some point is also made because his foreman or superintendent directed some of his acts while at the fire. This quite likely was the result of habit, rather than of authority upon the part of the foreman or superintendent. The claimant's own testimony shows that his work was directed by the Fire Warden. The conclusion of the Industrial Accident Board must be reversed and the award set aside. ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT and LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents and Appellants. HERNIA ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COMPENSATION LAW. Applicant with the assistance of another man was moving a gasoline engine weighing some 600 pounds, this being a part of his regular work. He was suddenly and accidentally put at a disadvantage in moving the engine by the act of his fellow workman and the sticking of the engine on the concrete floor, and the rupture and immediate protrusion of the abdominal sac were caused by his efforts to retrieve his position and do his work. HELD: An injury by accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board to review the action of that board in awarding compensation to James F. Robbins for injuries sustained while in the employ of Original Gas Engine Company. Modified. Shields & Silsbee, of Lansing, for appellant. Clark, Lockwood, Bryant & Klein, of Detroit, for respond ents. OSTRANDER, J. It is the contention of respondents, plaintiffs in certiorari, that the testimony fails to prove accidental injury. The testimony introduced on the part of claimant tended to prove that on January 22, 1915, while he assisted another in moving a gasoline engine weighing some 600 |