HELD: 1. That the injury arose out of the employment and flowed from a danger reasonably incident to it. 2. That under the facts in the case applicant was an employe within the employ of the moving and storage company notwithstanding the fact that he did his work on the streets under the direction of the ward boss. Applicant had been in the employ of the moving and storage company as a teamster doing general teaming work connected with the moving and storage of goods and such other teaming as he was from time to time directed to do. At the time of the injury, he was working with his team on a certain street in the city of Detroit, hauling away "sweepings" under the direction of the ward boss. The nature of the work and the order under which Robinson was acting required him to move teams standing in the street in order to get all of the piles of dirt or sweepings as they went along. Shortly before he was injured, he moved a team which was standing in the street, against the protest of its driver, who became angry and used abusive language. He then proceeded to pick up the dirt and while so engaged the driver of the team which he had moved came up behind and struck him over the head with a pick-hammer inflicting the injuries complained of. It seems clear from the evidence that applicant was an employe of the moving and storage company within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law. The company was his general employer and directed him where to work and could call him off from the city job at any time. Each day after his work for the city was finished he was required to take his team to the office of the company for further directions, and frequently required to haul loads and do jobs for the company after finishing his day's work on the streets. The fact that he was hauling sweepings for the city and while so doing was under the direction of the ward boss does not change the character of the employment. It was essentially the same as if he was hauling garbage or material for any other person having work of that character to do. The busi ness of the company was handling and hauling material for others, such work being done generally in accordance with the wishes of the persons owning the material and under such orders and directions as they desired to give. This case differs from Kennelly v. Stearns Salt & Lumber Company, as in that case the relation of employer and employe was temporarily and completely severed by the command of the State Fire Warden. Kennelly was drafted into the service of the State by such order and entirely taken out of his regular employment. In the Robinson case, the authority and control of his employer continued without interruption, while in the Kennelly case such authority and control was entirely extinguished and so remained until the man was discharged from further duty by the Fire Warden. Did the injury arise out of and in the course of the employment? It is clear that it arose in the course of applicant's employment, it having occurred while he was engaged regularly in his work. The remaining question is whether it resulted from one of the dangers incident to such employment. His work involved the moving of teams where it was necessary in order to get at the sweepings, and this part of the work caused him to incur the possible danger of coming in conflict with the drivers of some of these teams and possible reprisals such as occurred in this case. We think it fairly appears that the risk of injury from irrate drivers of teams so moved in the work was one that arose out of his employment. The case In Re Reithel, 109 N. E. Rep. 951, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts strongly sus tains this view. In the Reithel case it was the duty of the deceased employe to order from his master's premises any person who entered without permission, and in discharging this duty he was shot and killed by one who resented his action in causing him to remove from the premises. In passing upon the question the Court say: "An element inherent in the performance of the duty of excluding trespassers from property and mischief-makers from the company of employes, is that there may be some degree of violence encountered. The precise form which that risk may take is not of consequence. Its unexpectedness and gravity is not the test. * *That murder resulted instead of a broken bone is of slight, if, indeed, it is of any significance. This injury was one to which the employe was exposed by reason of his employment, and, but for the special duty imposed on him respecting Bombard, he would not have been in the way of receiving it. The causative danger was peculiar to his work. It was incidental to the character of the employment and not independent of the relation of master and servant. Although unforeseen and the consequence of what on this record appears to have been a crime of the highest magnitude, yet now, after the event, it appears to have had its origin in a hazard connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence." The award of the committee on arbitration will be reversed and compensation granted. AUGUSTA KUNZE, SUPREME COURT. Applicant, VS. DETROIT SHADE TREE COMPANY, Respondent. OF. EVIDENCE-REASONABLE INFERENCE STREET TRAFFIC-ARISING OUT Applicant's husband, Frederick Kunze, was in the employ of respondent as foreman, his duties requiring him to go from job to job about the city. Having completed his inspection on one job about nine o'clock in the morning of July 18, 1914, he left the work in charge of another employe and started to another part of the city, where it is claimed that he was to inspect another job for his employer. While so traveling he was struck and injured by an automobile and died on the following day. HELD: 1. That the performance of his duties in supervising different jobs of work required him to travel from one to the other, using such means of locomotion as he might deem desirable; and that it is to be reasonably inferred from the evidence that when the injury occurred he was about to take a car to go to another locality to inspect work for his employer. 2. That where an employe in the course of his employment is compelled to travel about the streets as in this case, the danger of being struck by street cars, automobiles, or general traffic is properly held to arise out of the employment. (Hopkins vs. Michigan Sugar Company distinguished.) Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board. Proceedings by Augusta Kunze against the Detroit Shade Tree Company under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation for the death of her husband. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Accident Board, and respondent brings certiorari. Affirmed. E. D. Alexander, of Detroit, Attorney for applicant. KUHN, J. This case is brought here by cretiorari to review an award made by the State Industrial Accident Board. Frederick Kunze, whose widow is the claimant herein, was employed by the Detroit Shade Tree Co., the defendant, as a tree trimmer and planter. Having been with the defendant company for about two years, on July 18, 1914 he was employed as a foreman; and in the course of this employment it was his duty to go from job to job about the city. On the day aforementioned he had inspected a job on Virginia Park, a street in the city of Detroit, and having completed this inspection at about 9 o'clock in the morning he left the work in charge of another employee and started east on Virginia Park to the intersection of Woodward Avenue, where it is to be reasonably inferred from the evidence that he was about to take a car to inspect another job north of Virginia Park at the corner of Josephine Avenue and Woodward Avenue; and it also appears that there was another job for inspection at the corner of Mount Vernon and John R. streets, which was also north of Virginia Park. While at the intersection of Virginia Park and Woodward Avenue he was knocked down by an automobile, seriously injured, and died the following day. It is the contention of the appellant that there is no evidence in the record that the deceased was at the time of his death engaged in any business for his employer. Mr. Alfred Gibson, the president of the defendant company, was sworn and testified as to the character of the employment. It appears from his testimony that the deceased was employed by the week, and he stated that in the summer time "He went around trimming trees, doing tree surgery work, taking down trees, and so on, with other men in my employ that he had charge of." He also testified that at the time of his injury the deceased had on his person a list of places to go, one after the other, and stated that he had finished his work on Virginia Park. We think it is clear from the record that the employment of the deceased was to go from place to place to trim trees, and that in the discharge of those duties it was not only necessary for him to supervise the work but it was necessary, in the course of his employment, to proceed from one job to the other, adopting such means of locomotion as he might desire. It is strongly urged by counsel for appellant that the death of the deceased was not due to any accident "arising out of and in course of his employment," and that there was no causal connection between the employment and the injury, and in support of this contention the recent decision of this court in Hopkins v. Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, is relied upon. In the opinion in that case Mr. Justice Steere, speaking for the Court, quoted from the rule announced by the Massachusetts court, in which it was stated: "If the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person |