corporate limits, public utilities for supplying water, light, heat, power and transportation to the municipality and the inhabitants thereof; and may also sell and deliver water, heat, power and light without its corporate limits to an amount not to exceed twenty-five per cent of that furnished by it within the corporate limits; and may operate transportation lines without the municipality within such limits as may be prescribed by law: Provided, That the right to own or operate transportation facilities shall not extend to any city or village of less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants.

"Sec. 24. When a city or village is authorized to acquire or operate any public utility, it may issue mortgage bonds therefor beyond the general limit of bonded indebtedness prescribed by law: Provided, That such mortgage bonds issued beyond the general limit of bonded indebtedness prescribed by law shall not impose any liability upon such city or village, but shall be secured only upon the property and revenues of such public utility, including a franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate the same, which franchise shall in no case extend for a longer period than twenty years from the date of the sale of such utility and franchise on foreclosure."

The general law passed pursuant to the constitutional provision is Act No. 279, Public Acts of 1909, amended in some respects by Act No. 203, Public Acts of 1911, and by Act No. 5, Public Acts of 1913. Of this legislation it may be said, generally, that it recognizes and provides for the exercise of the right of cities to acquire and control property in accordance with their charters, which they may make, revise or amend, within certain limitations. Among other things, the charters may provide:

"(i) For the purchase of the franchises, if any exist, and of property used in the operation of companies or individuals engaged in the plank-road, cemetery, hospital, almshouse, electric light, gas, heat, water and power business; and in cities having not less than twentyfive thousand inhabitants the purchase of the franchise, if any, and the property of street railway and tram railway companies, State and county taxes shall be paid upon such transportation property so purchased and owned by any such city;"

"(s) For the exercise of all municipal powers in the management and control of municipal property and in the administration of the municipal government, whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the interest of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants, and

through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject to the constitution and general laws of this State."

The city of Detroit, the plaintiff in certiorari, exists under a special charter, being of the class referred to in section 2 of the act as follows:

"Each city now existing shall continue with all its present rights and powers until otherwise provided by law."

It has, however, as is matter of common knowledge, amended its charter in various respects, not here of importance. It possessed, before the constitution was adopted, various powers relating to the acquisition, ownership and control of property, and still possesses these powers and in their exercise has acquired and owns property, real and personal, which is operated by the city. In the management and control of this property and in the exercise of powers concerning streets and public places, it employs and pays many men.

Counsel for plaintiff in certiorari say:

"If the municipality in its private business capacity is a private corporation, it is then entitled to the same right of election as every other private corporation; and if this Act is compulsory in its features as applied to the municipality, it then compels the municipality to pay its injured employes, and results in the taking away of the municipality's property (its money) without due process of law, for the reason that by due process of law is meant the right to have laws operate on all alike, not subjecting the individuals to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice."

The constitution of 1909 has pointed out the extent of the local powers and capacities of cities and villages with more precision than was done in former constitutions, thus restricting the power of the Legislature to grant or to deny to particular communities the enumerated capacities and powers, at will, but it has not abolished all distinctions between municipal and other corporations and individuals with respect to the exercises of the powers conferred nor denied the power of

the Legislature to enact general laws applicable to cities. The distinction between powers governmental in character and those private in character as exercised by municipal corporations does not involve the abrogation of the distinction between private municipal activity and private individual activity. To employ a seeming paradox, private municipal activities are all of them public. What has been called private in municipal activity is, nevertheless public when contrasted with purely private enterprise and adventure.

There remains, and always must remain, the distinction. pointed out in the opinion last referred to. The actual basis for the carrying on by municipal corporations of private municipal business is taxation. There is not, and there can not be, any merely local power to tax persons or property, and municipal activity may still be, and it is the command of the constitution that it shall be, restricted, limited, by the limitation of the power to tax, to borrow money and to exploit the municipal credit. Moreover, municipal corporations are still State agencies and as such subject to legislative direction and control, none the less so because the exercise of such control may indirectly affect a private municipal activity. The act, in its application to municipalities, involves no right of local self-government, or local control and management of corporate property. It deprives the municipality of none of its property, because, in effect, it is made lawful to raise by tax the money required to pay all injured employes some compensation. A new public purpose for which taxes may be levied is declared.

The subject of the legislation which is in question here is a social subject, in its very nature referable for community action to the State itself. A social theory needed to be crystallized into law. Its nature was such that no community less than the State could be appealed to for this purpose. The theory of this and of similar legislation includes the essential idea that the industrial worker is himself a social asset and ought not, in any case, to bear the whole result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; that

society at large ought to share the loss. The subject is one of governmental control, of public policy, necessarily committed to the Legislature. Whether it is or is not denominated a police regulation, municipal corporationss are, for the purpose of carrying out such a measure, subject to legislative control. The first question is therefore answered adversely to the plaintiff in certiorari.

The second question, namely, whether the classification of employers as municipal and other can be defended, is, in principle, answered by what has been already said. The legislature was confronted with the duty to devise a plan, complete in itself, for dealing with the subject and accomplishing the desired purpose. The limitation upon its power in this direction is the constitution, which I think it has not contravened. The burden created, if it can be called a burden, is uniform as to each individual of each class. There is no vested right of any person to labor for a municipal corporation.

There is also a consideration of expediency which may have influenced the Legislature. Private corporations and individ uals exploit private capital. Out of this, in the first instance, the compensation of employes must be paid. The burden thus assumed by the employer must be distributed by his action in the course of his business. In the case of a municipal corporation the burden assumed by it as employer is distributed, immediately and finally, upon the community subject to be taxed to raise the necessary fund. However that may be, there is found in the imposition of the law upon municipal corporations no invasion of private rights, but only the enforcement of a State policy which, in view of municipal activities, ought to be uniformly accepted and observed by all municipal corporations.

The order of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed.

MARYANNA MATWICZUK,

Applicant,

VS.

AMERICAN CAR & FOUNDRY COMPANY,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF CLAIM-POWER OF ATTORNEY.

Applicant's decedent was killed while in respondent's employ. His brother-in-law immediately consulted an attorney who notified respondent of the widow's claim and suggested an early settlement. Decedent's widow lived in Poland and she gave his brother-in-law power of attorney to act for her, which was executed in Poland and received by him more than six months after the date of the injury. Respondent refused to pay compensation on the ground that the brother-in-law had no authority to make the application for compensation and that the power of attorney was given him more than six months after the injury, and therefore he was barred from making such claim.

HELD: 1. That the attorney's letter notifying respondent of the death of decedent was sufficient notice of a claim for compensation.

2. That the power of attorney took effect at the time of mailing rather than at the time of delivery.

Appeal of American Car & Foundry Company from the decision of an arbitration committee awarding compensation to Maryanna Matwiczuk for the death of her husband. Affirmed.

Opinion by the Board:

It is conceded in this case that Joseph Matwiczuk, the husband of the applicant, met his death on May 22, 1913, as a result of injuries received while in the employ of respondent. It is undisputed that the injuries resulting in his death arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that his widow would be entitled to the compensation fixed by law if claim therefor was made within the time fixed by the Compen