to think that it has no direct reference to the question before us.
It includes suits to set aside an award under the Act, and I think
the term "award" there used does not include the decision of the
Court under section 39. But at all events it is so far useful in
considering this question that it indicates the intention of the
Legislature to make proceedings under this Act final, and to make
the mode of dealing with the questions to be raised under this
Act exhaustive and self-contained. The proviso in section 40
follows a declaration that "payment of the compensation shall
be made by the Collector according to the award to the persons
named therein, or in the case of an appeal under section 39, ac-
cording to the decision on such appeal." That no doubt is
intended to include the case of a decision under section 39. It
provides that any person who may receive the whole or any part
of the compensation awarded under this Act shall be liable to
pay the same, and no doubt compellable by suit to pay the same
to the person lawfully entitled thereto, just in the same manner
as a person who may have received a certificate under Act
XXVII of 1860 is compellable by suit to pay any money which
may have come into his hands under that certificate to the person
entitled thereto; and what the Legislature had in view, I think,
was that, if any person, by virtue of a particular title which was
not really vested in him at the time, should prevail against any
person claiming under a different title before the Court upon the
question of apportionment, he shall be liable and compellable to
pay over the money which he may have received under that de-
cision to some other person not a party to the proceedings in
whom that title really vested, not that it should be competent to
the parties, after a full investigation before the Court under sec-
tion 39, and after an appeal as allowed by that section, to bring
a regular suit and re-open the identical question before a different
Court. If that were so, as observed by the District Court, we
might have a decision arrived at by the District Judge after an
investigation conducted with all the formalities prescribed by the
law and under the procedure of the Code, whether it is called a
decree or not, and a formal decision by the High Court on appeal
from that decision, liable to be set aside upon a further suit in a
Moonsiff's Court, and in certain circumstances the decision of

1878

-~

RAJA NILMONY SINGH

v.

RAM BUNDHU
Roy.

the Moonsiff in such suit might become final. Some stress was laid by the appellant upon the fact, that section 37 in express terms gives fiuality to certain awards, and declares that, as between the persons interested who may agree in the apportionment of the compensation, the award should be conclusive evidence of the correctness of the apportionment; and it was said that, if the Judgment. Legislature had intended to give finality to the decision of the Civil Court under section 39, the intention would have been expressed in distinct terms. Somewhat similar use was made, at least I understand it to have been made, of the terms of section 58 itself, viz., it was contended that whereas that section forbids the bringing of a suit to set aside an award under the Act, it does not forbid the bringing of a suit to set aside the decision of a Court. I apprehend that what is intended by the terms of section 37 or of section 58, is nothing more than this, that it places awards made under the Act by express legislation upon the same footing of finality as a decision of the Court under section 39 is by the ordinary principles of law.

It is contended that the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit is not barred by section 1 of Act VIII of 1859, except it be by express provision of the law. In the first place Act X of 1870 is an Act subsequent to Act VIII of 1859, and contains, as it appears to me, abundant evidence of the intention of the Legislature that all proceedings in regard to land acquisition and compensation should be conducted under the Act and not otherwise. In addition to that, it seems to me that section 2 would bar the bringing of the present suits inasmuch as the causes of action, if there be any, on which the suits proceeded, have been already determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in the manner provided by the law. I think, therefore, that, upon the construction of this Act, a decision of the Court, if not appealable-and if there is an appeal, then the decision of the Appellate Court,-is final and not liable to be contested by a suit.

We have then been referred to two cases in which the learned Judges of this Court are said to have entertained a different opinion. The first of these cases is printed in 22 W. R., 38Dwarka Singh vs. Solano and another. That is the decision of

1878 RAJA NILMONY SINGH

v.

RAM BUNDHU
Roy.

Judgment.

of a single Judge of this Court in special appeal in a case not exceeding Rs. 50 in value; and, although such a decision of this Court is entitled to the greatest respect, it is not, it must be admitted, so binding upon a Division Bench as to compel a reference to the Full Bench. I have read and considered the opinion expressed by the learned Jadge, Mr. Justice AINSLIE, whose opinion, I need not say, is deserving of the greatest attention, but I am unable to concur in the view which he has expressed. That opinion is stated in these words. After discussing various sections of the Act he says:-" I hold that the order of distribution is not a final order or adjudication of the rights of the parties to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act to the property for which compensation has been assessed and awarded. Were it otherwise, it seems to me that questions involving title to properties, of which the land taken for public purposes might be a trifling fraction, would be finally adjudicated in proceedings under the Act-a result which cannot have been contemplated by the Legislature." That in all respect appears to me a reason which would be applicable to every decision in which the rights of an important or extensive character came to be adjudicated, although the particular subject before the Court happened to be of a small value. That is a state of things which constantly arises. As to the nature of the inquiry, I have already said that an inquiry in a land acquisition case is, or should be, just of as careful and formal a character as any in a regular suit.

The other decision referred to is, that of a Division Bench printed in 25 W. R., 103, in the case of Kaminee Dabia vs. Protap Chunder Sandyal. The judgment is delivered by Mr. Justice MACPHERSON, on appeal against a judgment of Mr. Justice MCDONELL; but I think it clear that in that case the question now before us was not in any shape brought before the Court. That was a suit to recover from the defendants the sum of Rs. 20 which had been paid to one of them as compensation awarded under the Acquisition Act, and also to have the plaintiff's title declared to two cottahs of land which she claimed. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff had been one of the parties before the Court on the question of apportionment of

compensation. The learned Judges observe :-"The award under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be in any way affected by this suit; and therefore section 58 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot apply." This case, therefore, may be dismissed from consideration. as not bearing on the question before us. I think, therefore, that this question is not concluded by authority in any shape, and, as our opinion is quite clear upon this point, we affirm the judgment of the Court below in these six appeals which are dismissed with costs.

[CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

1878

Share of Rent, Suit for-Arrears of Rent, Suit for share of Payment of

Rent Jointly-Joint lease.

A tenant who has taken a lease from joint owners, to whom he has paid the rent jointly, may be sued by one of his co-lessors for the latter's share of arrears of rent, the other co-lessors being made defendants.

Doorga Churn Surmah vs. Jampa Dossee, 21 W. R., 46; and Zara Chunder Banerjee vs. Ameer Mundul, 22 W. R., 394; cited and followed.

SPECIAL APPEAL from a decree passed by the Judge of Burdwan, reversing that of the Moonsiff of Raneegunge. The facts of the case are as follows:

Nilambur Dass was the original putnidar of certain mouzahs, and he executed a will in favour of the plaintiff and the proforma defendants, Redoy Manji and others, by which he bequeathed the talook to the plaintiff and his co-sharers in certain specified shares, the plaintiff being appointed as Mohunt of the akras maintained by Nilambur Dass. The defendants, Messrs. Simpson & Co., took two leases from the plaintiff and his cosharers, one consisting of 146 beegahs of land at a jumma of Rs. 511, and another of 59 beegalis at a jumma of Rs. 83, and obtained pottahs on the 11th and 16th of November 1869 (27th Kartick, 2nd Aughran, 1276). The plaintiff sues to recover his share

1878

of the rent respecting these two jummas from the year 1280 to JADU DASS the year 1282, and he states that the pro-forma defendants have been colluding with the principal defendants, and have refused SUTHERLAND. to join him in bringing this suit.

MOHUNT

V.

Judgment.

Messrs. Simpson & Co. stated that the plaintiff, being a man of bad character, was displaced from the Mohuntship by Redoy Manji and others (the pro-formâ defendants), who were authorized thereto by the will of Nilambur Dass, and one Huri Dass Mohonto was appointed in his stead; and that no coal being found in the jummai lands, the plaintiff, his successor, and his co-sharers remitted the rent of 1280 and 1281, and granted an abatement of Rs. 100 in the rent of 1282. The Court of First Instance gave a decree for the plaintiff for his share of the rents for 1281 and 1282, but this decision was reversed on appeal. Plaintiff then brought this special appeal.

Baboo Rash Behary Ghose, and Baboo Juggut Chunder Bannerjee, for Appellant.

Orr, for the Respondent. Baboo Omurrath Bose, with him.

The judgment of the High Court (1) was delivered by

JACKSON, J. JACKSON, J. :—

The plaintiff alleged that, under the will of Nilambur Dass, he and the pro-formâ defendants were in joint possession of certain mouzahs, the share which devolved on plaintiff from his father being 3 annas 4 gundas; that the principal defendants, Sutherland and others, took in Kartic, 1276, a lease of 146 beegahs of land out of these mouzahs at a rental of Rs. 511, and a further lease in Aughran of the same year of 59 beegahs of land at a rental of Rs. 83, altogether amounting to Rs. 594; that the defendants not having paid the plaintiff rent for the years 1280 to 1282, he requested the pro-formâ defendants to join him in a suit against the principal defendants for the recovery of Rs. 447, being his share of the rent for those years; but, they having refused to join him in the suit, and having colluded with the principal defendants, he brings the present suit for the above amount, being his share of the rent.

(1) JACKSON and TOTTENHAM, J.J.