VOL. III.] REFERENCE FROM BOARD OF REVENUE.

597

[REFERENCE FROM BOARD OF REVENUE.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE UNCOVENANTED SERVICE BANK,

LIMITED.

Stamp Act, XVIII of 1869, section 15 and Sch. II, Art. 7-Receipt or

discharge.

A memorandum purporting that a sum of money has been received by a Bank from a person, other than a constituent of such Bank, to be credited to a constituent's account, and furnished by the Bank for transmission to such constituent, is not a receipt or discharge given for or upon payment of money in satisfaction of a debt within the meaning of Art. 7 of Act XVIII of 1869, Sch. II., and is not chargeable with stamp duty.

THIS was a reference from the North-Western Provinces and

Oudh under section 41 of Act XVIII of 1869, as to whether a certain memorandum furnished by the Uncovenanted Service Bank, Naini Tal, to Mr. J. G. Robertson, for transmission to Captain H. Cotton, requires, under clause 7, schedule II of the General Stamp Act, to be stamped with a one-anna adhesive stamp. The memorandum was as follows:-" Uncovenanted Service Bank, Limited, Office. Memo. for Captain H. Cotton. By amount received from J. Robertson, Esq., to credit your account Rs. 300 (three hundred only), Naini Tal, 14th October 1878."

The Board of Revenue was of opinion that, as the document purports to be a memorandum, that the Bank has received from a person, other than its constituent, a sum of money to be credited to a constituent's account, as such, it falls under the proviso to clause 2, section 15 of the Act, inasmuch as "it expresses to have received money of or by the hands of a person other than the one to whom the money is to be accounted for," and that this being the case it is liable to a one-anna stamp.

1879

In re THE UNCOVENANTED SERVICE BANK, LD.

Judgment.

Upon the reference the High Court (1) delivered the following judgment:

We think that the Board of Revenue, North-Western Provinces, have not taken a correct view of the provisions of the Stamp Act.

Before we look at section 15 to see what instruments under the head of "receipts" are exempt from duty, we must first look to schedule II, to see whether the instrument in question is by section 4 chargeable with duty. It could only be chargeable under article 7, if it were "a receipt or discharge given for or upon the payment of money in satisfaction of a debt." If, therefore, the Rs. 300 was paid in this instance by Mr. Robertson to Captain Cotton's account, otherwise than in satisfaction of a debt, it would not be chargeable at all; and we find nothing in the facts stated, or upon the instrument itself, to show that it was paid in satisfaction of a debt. But even assuming that it was so paid, we consider that the document in question was not a "receipt or discharge" within the meaning of the Act, because it was not given to the party who paid the money.

In this instance, no receipt appears to have been given to Mr. Robertson, and the document in question is nothing more than the ordinary intimation which the Bank gives to its customer, that a certain sum has been paid in by Mr. Robertson to his credit.

If the instrument in question were a receipt within the meaning of article 7, then in a case where it would be proper for the Bank to give notice of a particular payment to several different people, each one of the notices so given would have to be stamped as a receipt.

It seems to us perfectly clear that this was never the intention of the Stamp Act, and for these reasons we are of opinion that the instrument in question is not chargeable with any stamp duty.

(1) GARTH, C.J., JACKSON and PONTIFEX, J.J.

Criminal Procedure Code, section 471-Cases exclusively triable by Sessions No. 2 of 1879.

Court-Indian Penal Code, section 193.

It is only in cases exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, that such Court has power to commit, or hold to bail and try an accused person charged with the offences mentioned in sections 467, 468 and 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The words "commit the case itself," occurring in section 471, do not empower a Court of Sessions to commit to itself a person charged with giving false evidence before it, under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code.

THE facts of this case are set out in the following judgment of

the High Court (1) :

In this case the Sessions Judge of Burdwan has committed the petitioner before us to take his trial before the Court of Sessions on a charge of having given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding, viz., a trial held in the Court of Sessions, under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge has himself held the preliminary enquiry and committed the case to the Court of Sessions.

We are asked to set aside this commitment as made in contravention of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sessions Judge, in the explanation which he has submitted, states that in his opinion section 471 empowers him to commit this case, and that that power is not limited or restricted by the provisions of the following section 472. We think that the learned Judge has taken an erroneous view of the law, and that the interpretation he would put upon these sections cannot be supported. The offence with which Fata Iyah Khan is charged is admittedly not one that is triable by the Court of Sessions

(1) BIRCH and MITTER, J.J.

1879

In re

KHAN.

Judgment.

exclusively. It is only in cases exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions that the Judge is empowered to commit or hold to FATA IYAH bail and try an accused person charged with the offences mentioned in sections 467, 468, and 469. In cases of a light nature, which are not triable by the Court of Sessions exclusively, all that the Judge is empowered to do is to send the case for enquiry to any Magistrate having power to try or commit for trial the accused person under section 471. The words "commit the case itself," occurring in section 471, do not mean that the Court of Sessions may commit the case to itself, as the Judge would interpret. If the section would bear this interpretation, it would be opposed to the distinct provisions of section 231 which restricts and limits the action of the Court of Sessions as a Court of Original Criminal Jurisdiction, save and except in the cases provided for by sections 435 and 472.

We are of opinion that the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge in this case is not warranted by law, and we therefore quash the commitment to the Court of Sessions, and direct the Sessions Judge to send the case for enquiry to the Magistrate who will deal with it as he thinks fit.

AZE

END OF VOL. III.

The mode of citation of the volumes of the CALCUTTA LAW REPORTS will be as follows:-

XIV of 1860, section 149. See COMMON
OBJECT
XXVII of 1860-Assignee by Devise-Pro-
bate.] A suit by a plaintiff representing his minor
1858, will not lie, to recover money due upon a
son, by virtue of a certificate under Act XL of
bond executed by defendant in favour of a testator
by whom it has been bequeathed to such minor
son, unless the plaintiff have first taken out pro-
bate of the will or obtained a certificate under
ing to the estate of such testator. SHODON Mo-
Act XXVII of 1860, to realize the debts belong-
131 HALDAR VS. ROMEZAN MOHALDAR