if they do not offend against the rule as to perpetuity, and are not illegal in themselves. I see no reason why a settlement may not be made, providing, by way of shifting use, for all the contingen

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cies on which the testator has directed the estates to shift *68 backwards and forwards; and the necessary complexity * of such settlement, if it can be made, is no argument against the legality of the provisions.

As to the question arising on the second branch of the argument, it lies on those who seek to set aside the disposition on the ground of illegality, to make out that such illegality exists; and I have heard no arguments to satisfy my mind that there is any illegality in making the estates in question depend on the desired title being conferred. It was by no means either unnatural or improper that a nobleman upon whom the earldom of Bridgewater had descended should wish that the higher title should again be conferred on his family. It might be his first object, that if the title of Duke of Bridgewater should be conferred on his branch of the family, the estates should go to the support of that title, associated as it well might be in his mind with the great works of art which had rendered that title illustrious. He may well have said, "If that title, which is my first object, is obtained through the grace of the sovereign, my lands and wealth shall go along with a title which I should be proud to have again in the family; but if that object is not attained, I wish and direct that the property shall go to the Egertons." It may be that he did not really prefer the Egertons; and that if he had known that his object would not have been attained, he would not have disinherited his more immediate relations; but this is mere speculation, and by the plain words of the will he has chosen to prefer the Egertons if the dignity be not acquired within the specified time by the earlier takers. It seems to me extremely dangerous to limit the power of disposition on any general notion of impolicy, without some definite rule or principle being shown to

apply to the case. The principle that no disposition could *69 be allowed which might hold out a temptation * to commit

crime is clearly much too general to be supported. It would embrace almost every disposition and contract where a party is to expect a benefit from the death of another, nor can it be the true test whether impure or corrupt means may possibly be used.

Although it may be impossible to lay down any definite rule which should include every case, that which was suggested by Mr. Rolt in his argument seems to me a truer and less objectionable test, whether there is any thing illegal in the object to be attained, and whether, if not illegal, that object is either necessarily or according to the course suggested by the party to be attained by wicked or illegal means. If the object be illegal, as murder, theft, or other crime, of course the stipulation is illegal. So if the object can only be obtained by corruption or wickedness, the stipulation will be illegal and void; and even if the object be laudable, and may be attained by honourable means, still if it can be attained by improper means, and the party creating the condition makes such means the mode of performing it, the condition will be illegal and void. Thus in the case of The Earl of Kingston v. Pierepont,1 the means to be employed were obviously illegal and corrupt. It was impossible for the Court to decree the 10,000l. to be applied to the procuring of a dukedom, and it was obviously intended by the testator that the money should be applied in corruption; and no legal means of applying it to procure the dukedom could be pointed out. In the present case the object seems to me to be legal, and I cannot perceive that any corrupt means were likely to be used, or to have been available if they were. Suppose the father of any noble and learned lord who has attained the highest judicial dignity in this country, to have anticipated the future elevation of his son from his rising talents, and to *have said, "If my son becomes Lord Chancellor, I should *70 like him to have my family estate, from which I should wish him to take the title of his peerage, and in such case I direct that the estate shall go to him," could it be said that such a disposition was void as necessarily leading the son to the employment of mean arts in getting on in his profession, or of corrupt practices at elections to obtain a seat in Parliament, or of political subserviency when such seat should have been obtained? Could it seriously be said that such a devise would be void on the ground of the Crown being hampered, or of the advisers of the Crown not being likely to be able to withstand the corrupt influence which might be brought to bear upon them? Cannot a man who is making a will in anticipation of the different events which may happen to the members of his family say, that if his kinsman is made a

11 Vern. 5..

bishop or dean, a judge or general officer, his estate shall go to him, without the disposition being void on general notions of impolicy?

Most of the cases which have been relied upon on this subject are cases of idle wagers, the decision of which would have necessarily affected or led to the improper discussion of the rights or affairs of third parties, or would have involved indecent discussions; and such wagers were most properly held to be void. I agree entirely with the authorities on this subject which point out the danger of relying on general notions of public expediency or policy, which vary so much from time to time. It is impossible to see the extent to which such a rule of decision may lead, and it must tend to the greatest uncertainty as to individual rights in each particular case, if Courts of justice are to decide upon nice speculations on what they imagine may be the general effect as to public policy, without some definite mischief to the public being

*

clearly shown to apply to the case. In the present case *71 I am not satisfied that there is any illegality either in the object or in any proposed means of acquiring it, and I do not see that it was necessarily or in the ordinary course of things to be attained by corrupt practices. I cannot think that it ought to be assumed as a ground for a judicial decision that the Crown is likely, in a matter affecting the interests of the public, to be induced to act upon any grounds inconsistent with the public good. The condition, therefore, by which the estate is made to depend on the acquisition of the title does not seem to me to be illegal.

Upon these principles, I answer your Lordships' questions as follows:

1st. In my opinion the appellant did not, on the decease of the late Lord Alford his father, take any estate in the lands devised.

2d. It is difficult to answer this question, as I do not see how the estate is supposed to have arisen. If an estate is supposed to have arisen in the appellant at the moment of his father's death, subject to be devested at the same moment by the condition, if good, treated as a condition subsequent, I should think that the estate would be defeated by the condition, which does not seem to me illegal.

In the event of Lord Brownlow acquiring the desired title, the appellant would, under what was called in argument the second

equivalent clause, take an estate in the lands "thenceforth." The limitation is, that in such case the lands should "thenceforth and for the future" go and be enjoyed, &c.; and it appears to me that in such event a new use would arise at the time, by which the estate would" thenceforth" be vested in the appellant.

3d. I think that on the decease of Lord Alford, his brother became entitled to the term of ninety-nine years, under the limitation in his favour.

4th. The estate of the brother would be defeated if he *72 became Earl Brownlow and did not acquire the dukedom or marquisate in five years, in which case the estates would go over to the Egerton family, or if the present Earl Brownlow became Duke or Marquis of Bridgewater, in which case a use would arise in favour of the appellant.

5th. I have entertained some doubt as to the validity of the last two provisos, which would naturally lead to the refusal to take a particular title from the Crown; I have not been able to satisfy myself as to the power of the Crown to impose compulsorily any particular title on a peer. Subject to this doubt, I do not see that any of the provisos are illegal, and I think that if the last two are bad, they are clearly separable from the rest, and do not affect the validity of those which are good. Each proviso seems to me to operate as a limitation of a particular use or set of uses, and I see no difficulty in separating the last two, if bad, from the good.

6th. I think that all the provisos from which it appears, according to what I have said before on this part of the subject, that the acquiring the dignity is to precede the vesting of the estate, are to be treated as conditions precedent, whatever may be the language used, and notwithstanding the words are words of determination, and I see no difficulty in the same words being treated as creating conditions precedent or subsequent, according to the different subject matter to which they are to be applied. Thus the provisos as to the acquiring the title are in the nature of conditions precedent, with regard to the estates of the heirs male, whilst those for determining the terms for years in the lifetime of the termors are to be treated as conditions subsequent.

7th. Assuming that the estate in the jointure arose (notwithstanding any intention to be collected from the will, that *73 the jointress should never take if the title had not been acquired before the death, or until a condition made equivalent had

been performed), I think that, in the events which happened, the interest in the jointure ceased.

MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS. - Your Lordships have directed her Majesty's Judges to take the facts of this case from the printed Papers, but to read the will as if it were a devise to the uses therein mentioned, and not a devise to trustees to convey to those uses; and the first question proposed for our consideration is, whether," on decease of Lord Alford, his eldest son, the appellant, became entitled to any and what estate in the lands devised in remainder immediately expectant. on the ninety-nine years term." To this question I beg to answer, that I am of opinion that the appellant did not become entitled to any estate therein. He can only claim under the limitation in remainder to the use of the heirs male of the body of his father, which limitation the will proceeds to subject to the several provisos for the determination thereof thereinafter contained; and the first of those provisos is, that if Lord Alford "shall die without having acquired the title and dignity of Duke or Marquis of Bridgewater to him and the heirs male of his body, then and in such case the use and estate herein before limited to the heirs male of his body shall cease and be absolutely void." As, in fact, Lord Alford died without having obtained the required dignity, it is plain that' the appellant can claim no estate if this proviso is allowed to operate; but, on his behalf, it is contended that the proviso ought not to be allowed to operate, because it is against law, and is also in the nature of a condition subsequent. The case therefore falls, it is said, within

the well-known rule which is thus laid down in the Touch*74 stone,1 *after having expounded what conditions are

against law: "In all these cases, if the condition be subsequent to the estate, the condition only is void, and the estate good and absolute. If the condition be precedent, the condition and estate both are void, for an estate can neither commence nor increase upon an unlawful condition."

In my opinion, however, the proviso is neither against law, nor in the nature of a condition subsequent. I will defer giving my reasons for thinking that it is not against law till I come to answer the subsequent question of your Lordships on that subject, and for the present I will confine myself to my reasons for

1 Preston's Ed. 132.