Opinion of the Court. 281 U.S. the subject. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 581; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215. And now that Congress has acted, the laws of the States, in so far as they cover the same field, are superseded, for necessarily that which is not supreme must yield to that which is. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 104; Southern Railway Cc. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370." In New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, supra, 150, 153, the Court furthermore held that although the Federal Employers' Liability Act" does not require the carrier to respond for injuries occurring where it is not chargeable with negligence," this is "because Congress, in its discretion, acted upon the principle that compensation should be exacted from the carrier where, and only where, the injury results from negligence imputable to it "; that the Act "is as comprehensive of injuries occurring without negligence, as to which class it impliedly excludes liability, as it is of those as to which it imposes liability" and "is a regulation of the carriers' duty or obligation as to both"; and that "the reasons which operate to prevent the States from dispensing with compensation where the act requires it equally prevent them from requiring compensation where the act withholds or excludes it." This was followed and approved in Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, supra, 172, in which the Court said that the Act "establishes a rule or regulation which is intended to operate uniformly in all the States, as respects interstate commerce, and in that field it is both paramount and exclusive." In the light of the foregoing decisions and in accordance with the principles therein announced we conclude that the Merchant Marine Act-adopted by Congress in the exercise of its paramount authority in reference to the maritime law and incorporating in that law the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act-establishes as a modification of the prior maritime law a rule of general application in reference to the liability of the owners of vessels for injuries to seamen extending territorially as far as Congress can make it go; that this operates uniformly within all of the States and is as comprehensive of those instances in which by reference to the Federal Employers' Liability Act it excludes liability, as of those in which liability is imposed; and that, as it covers the entire field of liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and exclusive, and supersedes the operation of all state statutes dealing with that subject. It results that in the present case no resort can be had to the Virginia Death Statute, either to create a right of action not given by the Merchant Marine Act, or to establish a measure of damages not provided by that Act. 2. Nor can the libel be sustained as one to recover indemnity for Barford's death under the old maritime rules on the ground that the injuries were occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Aside from the fact that the libel does not allege the unseaworthiness of the vessel and is based upon negligence alone, an insuperable objection to this suggestion is that the prior maritime law, as herein above stated, gave no right to recover indemnity for the death of a seaman, although occasioned by unseaworthiness of the vessel. The statement in The Osceola, supra, 175, on which the administrator relies, relates only to the seaman's own right to recover for personal injuries occasioned by unseaworthiness of the vessel, and confers no right whatever upon his personal representatives to recover indemnity for his death. Apparently for this reason the words "at his election,”—which appear in the first clause of § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, relating to the personal right of action of an injured seaman, and, as held in Pacific Co. v. Peterson, supra, 139, gave him, as alternative measures of relief, "an election between the right under the new rule to recover compensatory damages for injuries caused by negligence, and Opinion of the Court. 281 U.S. the right under the old rules to recover indemnity for injuries occasioned by unseaworthiness "-were omitted from the second clause of § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, relating to the right of the personal representative to recover damages for the seaman's death, since there was no right to indemnity under the prior maritime law which he might have elected to pursue. And, for the reasons already stated, and in the absence of any right of election, the right of action given the personal representative by the second clause of § 33 to recover damages for the seaman's death when caused by negligence, for and on behalf of designated beneficiaries, is necessarily exclusive and precludes the right of recovery of indemnity for his death by reason of unseaworthiness of the vessel, irrespective of negligence, which cannot be eked out by resort to the death statute of the State in which the injury was received. 8 3. It is suggested in argument that if the statutes of the several States are superseded by the Merchant Marine Act it would follow that the Death on the High Seas Act, which had been previously adopted, would likewise be superseded. That Act, however, concededly has no application here, since Barford's death did not occur on the high seas but within the territorial limits of the State of Virginia. We have no occasion to consider its scope and effect here and do not determine what effect, if any, the Merchant Marine Act has upon it; and nothing stated in this opinion is to be considered as having any reference to those questions. Nor do we consider or determine the effect of the Federal Employees Compensation Act, upon which, although incidentally referred to in argument, neither the administrator nor the United States here relies. The decree is 8 41 Stat. 537, c. 111, U. S. C., Tit. 46, c. 21. Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. FRED. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 229. Argued January 24, 1930.-Decided February 24, 1930. The Traffic Act for the District of Columbia, in extending, § 8(a), the privilege of operating motor cars within the District without having District operators' permits to non-residents licensed to operate such vehicles in States granting like exemptions to residents of the District, does not relieve a non-resident, so licensed, who formerly resided in the District and whose District permit was then revoked under § 13(a), from punishment under § 13(d), if he operates his vehicle within the District during the unexpired period of the revoked permit. P. 51. 33 F. (2d) 375, reversed. CERTIORARI, 280 U. S. 541, to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia which, on writ of error, reversed a judgment of the Police Court sentencing the respondent for a violation of the Traffic Act. Mr. Richmond B. Keech, Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. William W. Bride, Corporation Counsel, and Edward W. Thomas, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. S. McComas Hawken for respondent. MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent was convicted in the police court of the District of Columbia of the offense of operating a motor vehicle in the District during the unexpired period of his operator's permit after it had been revoked. § 13 (d) of the Traffic Acts of the District of Columbia, Act of March 98234°-30— Opinion of the Court. 281 U.S. 3, 1925, as amended by Act of July 3, 1926. C. 443, 43 Stat. 1119; c. 739, 44 Stat., Pt. 2, 812. The Court of Appeals of the District, on writ of error, set aside the conviction. 33 F. (2d) 375. This Court granted certiorari May 27, 1929, to review its judgment. Section 13 (d) provides: "Any individual found guilty of operating a motor vehicle in the District during the period for which his operator's permit is revoked or suspended, or for which his right to operate is suspended under this Act, shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500, or imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or both." The facts, proved at the trial, showed an unquestioned violation of this section by respondent unless, as contended, his possession of a Virginia operator's permit or license, aided by the reciprocity provisions of the District Traffic Acts, exempts him from its operation. Following the revocation of his District of Columbia permit, respondent, who was then a resident of the District, took up his residence in Virginia and procured from that state a motor vehicle registration card and automobile license tags, authorizing him to operate his motor car in Virginia. The alleged violation of § 13 (d) occurred while his Virginia registration license was in force and while respondent was temporarily in the District, driving his automobile equipped with the Virginia license tags. By § 7, all persons operating motor cars within the District are required to have an operator's permit, which permit, under § 13 (a), may be suspended or revoked by the Director of Traffic for cause. By § 7 (e) operation of a motor vehicle without a permit is punishable by fine of "not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both." But by § 8 (a) the requirement of an operator's permit is dispensed with in favor of non-residents who have procured a permit or license |