every permit'shall designate and limit the ... time when' the authorized acts may be performed?

"4. May a permit to operate a denaturing plant, which permit provides that it shall be in force' until surrendered by the holder or canceled by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for violation of the national prohibition act or regulations made pursuant thereto,' be terminated by a general regulation providing that all such permits shall expire on a date named?"

We interpret the first question as inquiring whether a permit to manufacture denatured alcohol is a permit to manufacture liquor within the cited provision of § 6. As thus construed, we answer it in the negative. For, whether issued under § 4, Title II or under § 10, Title III, the permits held by plaintiffs authorize them to convert something which is undoubtedly liquor into a product which is required to be unfit for use as a beverage; that is, to convert liquor into something which is not liquor. Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., supra. For

If read literally, the first question is irrelevant to a decision and need not be answered. For, calling the solution "liquor" during its manufacture and preparation for the market—that is, before it is fully denatured and becomes the "article," denatured alcohol-does not aid in determining whether or not a permit to operate a denaturing plant and manufacture denatured alcohol is a permit "to manufacture . . . liquor." The character of the permit is determined, not by the nature of the solution in the process of manufacture, but by the character of the finished article authorized to be produced.

7 We are not told what denaturants plaintiffs use; but we are asked to take judicial notice that denatured alcohol may be fitted for beverage purposes by extracting the denaturant. We may also take judicial notice that some denaturants cannot be successfully extracted; and that any denaturant must be "such that it can not be removed from the mixture and the treated product made fit for beverage purposes without great difficulty." See "Industrial Alcohol," a monograph issued by the Treasury Dept., Bureau of Prohibition, p. 4 (Gov't Ptg. Office, 1930). Moreover, from the standpoint of caution, denatured alcohol, however treated, is not fit for beverage

purposes.

the reasons stated in that case, our answer to the third question is in the affirmative; and to the fourth question in the negative. In view of the answer to the third question, the second question need not be answered.

Second. In No. 511, the Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following questions:

"1. Does the provision of section 6, Title II, of the national prohibition act, which directs that every permit 'shall designate and limit the ... ... time when' the authorized acts may be performed, apply to a permit to use specially denatured alcohol?

"2. (Same as question 3 in No. 510).R

"3. May a permit to use specially denatured alcohol in the manufacture of toilet preparations, which permit provides that it shall be in effect until surrendered by the holder or cancelled by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for violation of the provisions of Title III of the national prohibition act or the regulations made pursuant thereto,' be terminated by a general regulation providing that all such permits shall expire on a date named?"

In this Court, the Government concedes that the permit here involved is not one to manufacture liquor within the meaning of either the special or the general time provisions of § 6. It contends, however, that since toilet preparations and denatured alcohol used in their manufacture are both excluded by § 4 from the operation of the Act, the plaintiff's business is not one for which a permit is required by the statute; that if the plaintiff used so-called completely denatured alcohol, no permit would be required at all, Regulations 61 (1920), Art. 108; Regulations 3 (1927), Art. 106; that permits for the use of specially denatured alcohol are required only by the regulations of the Bureau pursuant to its general authority, conferred, among other sections, by § 13, Title III, to

8 Except for the slight variation in the language of the permit mentioned in note 1, supra, and quoted in the third question.

Opinion of the Court.

281 U.S.

inake regulations to guard against the diversion of alcohol for unlawful purposes and to protect the public revenue; that the power to issue regulations includes the power to repeal and amend them; that § 9, Title II, applies only to the permits required by statute and does not abridge the regulatory power with respect to permits required only by administrative regulation. The conclusion is, in our opinion, unsound.

Since no question has been raised as to the propriety of plaintiff's permit, we do not inquire whether the permit is required by the Act or whether its requirement by regulations is authorized thereby. But, if the requirement of the permit is proper, it is so only because it is authorized by the Act, either explicitly or otherwise. There is no suggestion that the regulations were made under any other authority. If, then, the permit was issued under authority of the Prohibition Act, the plaintiff comes within the description in § 9 of "any person who has a permit "; and that section provides the exclusive procedure for the revocation of the permit. The attempt to revoke it by regulations without complying with that section exceeds the authority, and violates rights, conferred by the Act."

"The Government urges that under Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, Section IV, N, subsec. 2, 38 Stat. 114, 199 and Act of June 7, 1906, c. 3047, 34 Stat. 217 (U. S. C., Tit. 26, §§ 481-487), the requirement of permits for the manufacture and denaturation of alcohol tax free, in special cases, was governed entirely by regulations; that permits under the regulations made pursuant to those Acts were limited to specific amounts of alcohol (Regulations 30, Art. 60, 61, 77-90); that §§ 10 and 11, Title III of the Act treat of similar subjects; and that the Prohibition Act, as shown by the report of the House Judiciary Committee (H. R. Report No. 91, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2) purports to continue the policy of the prior Acts and regulations. There is a decisive difference between the Prohibition Act and those statutes. The latter are silent on the whole subject of permits; the former specifically provides how permits should be revoked. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Nos. 443 and 444,

We answer the third question in the negative. For reasons stated in connection with questions 2 and 3 in No. 510, we answer the second question in the affirmative; and do not answer the first.

No. 445-Affirmed.

No. 510-Question 1 answered No.

Question 2 not answered.

Question 3 answered Yes.

Question 4 answered No.

No. 511-Question 1 not answered.
Question 2 answered Yes.
Question 3 answered No.

UNITED STATES v. NORRIS.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 555. Argued April 28, 1930.-Decided May 26, 1930.

1. After entry of a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment charging conspiracy unlawfully to transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act, a stipulation of facts filed by a relying on the same and even more specific portions of the House Committee report referring to the Lever Act, August 10, 1918, c. 53, §§ 15 and 16, 40 Stat. 276, 282, the Revenue Act of 1918, February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1105-16, and Internal Revenue T. D. 2788, make quite as cogent an argument for a contrary conclusion. We need not consider the merits of either argument. For, we are of opinion that § 9 is applicable to the permits involved in all these cases. There is no need to seek light from debatable inferences from a general statement in the Committee report.

The Government also points out that, aside from the decisions in Nos. 443, 444, 445 and 510, its contentions in No. 511 are of great importance to the administrative officers in promulgating regulations governing the use of specially denatured alcohol. Our decision merely denies the power to revoke unexpired permits in a way other than that prescribed in the Act. As in Nos. 443 and 445, we refrain from deciding whether or not the Regulations are effective as to future applicants for permits.

defendant and received by the trial court merely as evidence for its information in determining what sentence should be imposed, is ineffective to import an issue as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue of fact upon the question of guilt or innocence. P. 622.

2. If the stipulation be regarded as adding particulars to the indictment, it is void under the rule that nothing can be added to an indictment without the concurrence of the grand jury by which the bill was found. Id.

3. Regarded as evidence upon the question of guilt or innocence, the stipulation came too late, for the plea of nolo contendere, upon that question and for that case, was as conclusive as a plea of guilty would have been. P. 623.

4. After a plea of nolo contendere, nothing remains for the court but to render judgment, as no issue of fact exists and none can be made while the plea remains of record. Id.

34 F. (2d) 839, reversed.

CERTIORARI, post, p. 707, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a judgment of the District Court, 29 F. (2d) 744, sentencing the respondent after a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment charging conspiracy to transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act.

Assistant Attorney General Youngquist, with whom Attorney General Mitchell, Messrs. Mahlon D. Kiefer, John J. Byrne and A. E. Gottshall were on the brief, for the United States.

Mr. Frederic L. Ballard, with whom Messrs. Charles I. Thompson and Allen Hunter White were on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Norris and one Kerper were indicted by the federal grand jury for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, charged in two counts with conspiring unlawfully to trans